feat(plex): one advertised hostname for local+remote, its own LE cert, and a LAN definition
Two symptoms after the publishing fix landed:
1. LAN clients were reported as Remote. Measured root cause:
LanNetworksBandwidth was ABSENT, so Plex had no notion of a local
network and classified everything WAN -- 468 requests logged
"Allowed Network (WAN)", ZERO "(LAN)", including Seerr from inside the
cluster. allowedNetworks only waives AUTH; it does not make a client
local. Two settings, and only one has an env hook.
2. The advertised URL hard-coded both the VIP and the server's cert hash
into a cluster-var -- two values nothing kept in sync.
Operator design: ONE hostname, plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}, split-horizon --
PiHole answers it with ${PLEX_L4_VIP} on the LAN, Cloudflare answers it
publicly with the WAN address NATed to the same VIP.
- catalog/plex.yaml: ADVERTISE_IP -> https://plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}:32400,
plus a level-triggered postStart hook (pihole/qbittorrent idiom) that
re-asserts LanNetworksBandwidth and the three customCertificate* prefs
every start, converting PEM -> PKCS#12 so cert renewals need no extra part.
- apps/wave-0/plex-cert.yaml: cert-manager Certificate for exactly that
name from letsencrypt-prod, so the advertised https URL is servable.
- schema 1.11.0: `optional` on secretKeyRef/configMapKeyRef. Load-bearing --
the cert is issued INTO the plex namespace, which the rendered plex.yaml
itself creates, so it lands in the same reconcile; hard refs would have
held Plex in CreateContainerConfigError and, since apps-wave-0 is
wait:true, stalled the whole app tier on a slow DNS01 challenge.
- catalog/pihole.yaml: the plex-vip split-horizon answer. Required --
measured, the name resolved to the Gateway VIP where nothing listens
on 32400 (http=000).
- PLEX_ADVERTISE_URL deleted; the hostname removes the cert-hash fragility.
Corrects my own earlier claim that a SAN match is REQUIRED: it is not
(httpsRequired=0, secureConnections defaults to Preferred, so clients can
fall back to cleartext). A matching cert keeps the remote leg ENCRYPTED.
Hence: obtain a real cert for the advertised name rather than pick the name
to suit Plex's built-in one.
UNVERIFIED, and stated plainly in the handoff: nothing here has run. Cert
issuance for this name is inferred from the wildcard's success, and whether
Plex accepts an OpenSSL-3 PKCS#12 bundle is untested -- the largest risk.
Touches clusters/** -> sensitive paths -> needs a non-author approval or the
operator's /approve-override; deliberately not self-posted (CLAUDE.md 1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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@@ -496,16 +496,6 @@ patches:
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- op: replace
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path: /data/PLEX_L4_VIP
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value: "192.168.2.24"
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# PLEX_ADVERTISE_URL — the prod VIP above in Plex's `plex.direct` form, which is the ONLY form
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# that validates: the server's cert is `*.130072f20c334d6c8f63d0dfef87309b.plex.direct` with no
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# IP SAN (read off the live listener 2026-10-04), so a bare `https://192.168.2.24:32400` fails
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# TLS for every client — the 2026-10-04 outage. Measured with full verification, no `curl -k`:
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# this URL answers /identity with 200 and TLS verify OK; the bare-IP form fails to connect.
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# THE DASHED IP MUST MATCH /data/PLEX_L4_VIP ABOVE (192.168.2.24 -> 192-168-2-24); nothing
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# enforces that. The hash is server identity, not a secret, and changes only if Plex reissues.
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- op: replace
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path: /data/PLEX_ADVERTISE_URL
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value: "https://192-168-2-24.130072f20c334d6c8f63d0dfef87309b.plex.direct:32400"
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# The prod flat LAN. This is the 192.168.2.0/24 segment the SOHO ROUTER at 192.168.2.1 owns —
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# NOT pfSense's 192.168.1.0/24, which is a different network and not in the LAN-DNS path.
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# It scopes the ingress allow for PiHole's DNS listener to LAN clients only.
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