feat(ci): the pipeline is the approver; humans approve changes to the pipeline
Implements the operator intent: "CI/CD pipeline is the end-all-be-all for approval. If the CI pipeline is not good enough to be trusted for this, then it is not good enough to do its intended job and needs to be improved. Manual approvers should only be for architecturally or security relevant changes." Adds ci/approval-policy.sh as a gate stage. A green gate becomes sufficient for an ordinary change; the one exception is structural rather than a matter of taste: A CHANGE TO THE GATE CANNOT BE GATED BY THE GATE. A PR that weakens a check would be approved by the weakened check. The same holds for the admission policies, the Flux wiring that decides what reconciles, the SOPS recipients and the RBAC. Those paths -- and only those -- still require an APPROVED review from someone other than the author. The list is data with a reason per entry (infra/gitea/approval-policy.json) and is itself a sensitive path, so the policy cannot be widened or narrowed without a human. FAIL-CLOSED, and deliberately the opposite of gitea-settings. There, a missing credential must not block every PR -- that is a lock-out. Here, a missing credential would let an unreviewed change to the gate merge, so "cannot evaluate" is a BLOCK. Verified against real PRs rather than fixtures: PR #16 (sensitive paths, approved by jakman85, author gitea-admin) -> PASS PR #6 (.gitea/workflows/gate.yml, ZERO reviews) -> BLOCK, naming the file push event (not a PR) -> N/A, exit 0 bogus token -> BLOCK, not skip Also caught before shipping: the first draft passed the PR file list with a second stdin redirect after a heredoc, which silently wins and leaves the script body unread. Running it found that; reading it would not have. required_approvals is NOT changed here. Flipping it live must happen together with the declaration in expected-branch-protection.json, or gitea-settings correctly fails on the drift -- that is a separate, deliberate change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
20ea70d221
commit
0c6949ed98
6 files changed
+189
-1
No files matched your search
+15
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ run_stage lint "${CI_DIR}/lint.sh"
|
||||
run_stage l0 "${CI_DIR}/l0.sh"
|
||||
run_stage render-golden "${CI_DIR}/render-golden.sh"
|
||||
run_stage l1 "${CI_DIR}/l1.sh"
|
||||
run_stage approval-policy "${CI_DIR}/approval-policy.sh"
|
||||
run_stage gitea-settings "${CI_DIR}/gitea-settings.sh"
|
||||
run_stage conformance "${CI_DIR}/conformance.sh"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -189,6 +190,20 @@ case "${OUTCOME[spec-immutability]}" in
|
||||
pass) ok "spec-immutability: green" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# approval-policy: the branch requires NO human approvals (required_approvals: 0) -- the GATE
|
||||
# is the approver, per operator intent. This stage is the single exception: a change to the
|
||||
# pipeline itself, the admission policies, the Flux wiring, the SOPS recipients or the RBAC
|
||||
# cannot honestly be approved BY the thing it changes, so those paths still need a human.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It never SKIPS -- it exits 0 or 1 only, and blocks when it cannot evaluate. That is the
|
||||
# opposite of gitea-settings' tolerance and it is deliberate: there, a missing credential is a
|
||||
# lock-out; here, a missing credential would let an unreviewed change to the gate merge.
|
||||
case "${OUTCOME[approval-policy]}" in
|
||||
fail) err "approval-policy: a sensitive change lacks a non-author approval -> blocks merge"; BLOCK=1 ;;
|
||||
skip) err "approval-policy: did not run -- it is fail-closed by design, so treat as a block"; BLOCK=1 ;;
|
||||
pass) ok "approval-policy: green" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# gitea-settings: the ONLY check that can see Gitea's own database (branch protection +
|
||||
# runner registration). A FAIL is real drift and always blocks -- that is the whole point.
|
||||
# A SKIP means no token or unreachable Gitea, which is an UNWIRED CREDENTIAL, not a defect
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user