feat(keycloak): declare passkey (WebAuthn passwordless) login for the homelab realm
Adds the realm's WebAuthn Passwordless policy and restructures the browser-mfa
flow so a passkey is an ALTERNATIVE beside the password form. Additive and
optional by design: this IdP gates every SSO app plus kubectl, so a mandatory
passkey flow that misfires is a total lock-out. Enrolment is not forced.
Policy: RP ID is ${BASE_DOMAIN} (not the keycloak host) because a passkey's RP ID
is fixed at enrolment and must not be bound to a name that can move; resident key
required (a non-discoverable credential is a second factor, not a passkey); user
verification required (without it, possession alone is a complete login).
Flow: auth-username-password-form is split into auth-username-form +
auth-password-form, because the server must know who is logging in before it can
decide whether a passkey exists. Conditional OTP for platform-admins is relocated
intact onto the password branch only — a UV-required passkey is already two
phishing-resistant factors.
No requiredActions block is declared, deliberately: Keycloak 26.0.6 treats
requiredActions as REPLACE not merge, so declaring one would delete the default
set including CONFIGURE_TOTP and lock every platform-admin out of the OTP step
this flow still enforces. webauthn-register-passwordless is already registered
enabled-but-not-default by Keycloak's own defaults.
UNAPPLIED: the realm import is a one-shot resting at Done=True/Started=False, so
this reaches the live realm never. See the handoff entry and the README section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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@@ -74,6 +74,142 @@ spec:
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bruteForceProtected: true
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permanentLockout: false
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sslRequired: external
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# ===========================================================================================
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# PASSKEYS — the WebAuthn PASSWORDLESS policy (R-IDP-04). 2026-10-17.
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# ===========================================================================================
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# Read this together with the browser-mfa flow at the bottom of the file: THIS block decides
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# what a passkey must BE, the FLOW decides when one is OFFERED. Keycloak keeps TWO independent
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# WebAuthn policies per realm and they are not interchangeable:
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#
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# webAuthnPolicy* -> the TWO-FACTOR policy, consumed by the `webauthn-authenticator`
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# authenticator (a security key presented AFTER a password).
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# webAuthnPolicyPasswordless* -> the PASSWORDLESS policy, consumed by
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# `webauthn-authenticator-passwordless` (a passkey presented
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# INSTEAD of a password). This is the one passkeys use.
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#
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# Setting the wrong family is a silent no-op: the passwordless authenticator reads
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# getWebAuthnPolicyPasswordless() only (WebAuthnPasswordlessAuthenticator.getWebAuthnPolicy),
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# so a policy written into the two-factor fields is simply never consulted by a passkey login.
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# Only the passwordless family is declared here; the two-factor family is deliberately left at
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# Keycloak's defaults because nothing in this realm uses `webauthn-authenticator` — TOTP
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# (auth-otp-form) is the second factor for platform-admins, see the flow section.
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#
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# ADDITIVE AND OPTIONAL — THE DECISION THIS BLOCK EXISTS TO MAKE
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# -------------------------------------------------------------
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# Passkeys are offered ALONGSIDE the password, never instead of it, and enrolment is NOT forced.
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# This is a single-operator homelab whose IdP gates Grafana, Gitea, Nextcloud, Headlamp,
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# Semaphore, PiHole, Crafty, the *arr stack AND kubectl itself (the `kubernetes` client below).
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# A mandatory passkey flow that misfires is therefore not an inconvenience, it is a total
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# lock-out from the whole platform AND from the cluster API in one step — and the only repair
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# paths left would be the Keycloak bootstrap admin and the break-glass cert kubeconfig. The
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# expected gain from forcing enrolment (one human stops typing a password) is small; the
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# expected loss is the platform. So: additive, optional, and password login keeps working for
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# every user who never enrols.
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#
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# Concretely that means: no `requiredActions` block is declared anywhere in this file (see the
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# long note in the flow section for why declaring one would be actively DANGEROUS), and the
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# passkey step sits as an ALTERNATIVE beside the password form rather than ahead of it.
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#
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# RELYING-PARTY ID — THE FIELD THAT SILENTLY BREAKS EVERY PASSKEY IF IT IS WRONG
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The RP ID is baked into every credential at enrolment and can never be changed afterwards:
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# a passkey created under one RP ID is unusable under another, with no error the user can act
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# on — the browser simply reports that no credential is available. It is also browser-enforced,
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# so it cannot be "fixed" server-side: per WebAuthn, the RP ID must be equal to, or a
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# registrable-domain suffix of, the origin's effective domain. Keycloak is served at
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# keycloak.<BASE_DOMAIN> (httproute.yaml, and the Keycloak CR's hostname), so the legal choices
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# are keycloak.<BASE_DOMAIN>, <BASE_DOMAIN>, or the registrable domain one level up. It is NOT
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# the full URL and NOT a scheme — "https://..." here would fail every ceremony.
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#
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# We choose BASE_DOMAIN, the shared platform suffix, NOT the keycloak host, for one concrete
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# reason drawn from this repo's own history: a credential that cannot be re-keyed must not be
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# bound to a name that can move. The oauth2-proxy client below ALREADY declares a redirect URI
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# on auth.<BASE_DOMAIN>, i.e. this platform already contemplates serving auth on a second
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# hostname; and the client-URL reconciler exists precisely because moving a hostname in git
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# silently fails to reach the realm (see README, "Client URLs: the same one-shot failure").
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# Binding passkeys to the keycloak subdomain would mean that relocating Keycloak invalidates
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# every enrolled passkey; binding them to BASE_DOMAIN survives it. The cost is scope: any
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# future WebAuthn relying party under this base domain could assert the same RP ID. In a
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# homelab where every such party is already behind THIS IdP that is not a trust boundary worth
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# buying. Note the residual, unavoidable risk: changing BASE_DOMAIN itself invalidates every
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# passkey, which is a re-enrolment, not a repair.
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#
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# Written as the cluster-var so it is substituted by the same Flux postBuild pass, with the same
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# value, as every hostname in this file — there is no second place the domain is decided.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessRpId: ${BASE_DOMAIN}
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# The human-readable name the browser/OS shows in the passkey prompt and stores beside the
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# credential ("Save a passkey for Homelab SSO?"). Matches the realm displayName above so the
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# OS keychain entry is recognisable. It is also load-bearing on the UPDATE path: Keycloak's
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# updateRealm applies the passwordless policy ONLY when this field is non-empty
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# (DefaultExportImportManager line ~842), so an admin-API realm update that omits it drops the
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# whole policy silently.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessRpEntityName: "Homelab SSO"
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# ES256 then RS256 — exactly Keycloak's own DEFAULT_POLICY, declared explicitly rather than
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# inherited so the realm's crypto is auditable from git. ES256 is what every platform
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# authenticator (Touch ID/Face ID, Windows Hello, Android) and every FIDO2 key produces;
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# RS256 is the fallback for older Windows Hello TPM-backed credentials. EdDSA/Ed25519 is
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# deliberately NOT offered: authenticator and browser support is uneven, and an authenticator
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# that picks an algorithm the verifier handles badly fails at enrolment, which is the worst
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# moment to discover it. Order is a preference list, not an allow-list ordering requirement.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessSignatureAlgorithms:
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- ES256
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- RS256
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# DISCOVERABLE CREDENTIAL REQUIRED. "Yes" is a Keycloak sentinel, not a boolean, and the login
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# theme compares it as the literal string: webauthnRegister.js maps 'Yes' to
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# authenticatorSelection.requireResidentKey=true and ANY other non-sentinel value to false.
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# This is not optional for passkeys — a non-discoverable credential cannot be found by the
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# browser without the server first naming it, so it is a second factor, not a passkey.
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# (Keycloak 26.0.6 emits only the LEGACY requireResidentKey member, not the newer
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# residentKey:"required"; per WebAuthn L2 the client maps requireResidentKey=true onto
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# residentKey="required", so discoverable credentials are genuinely requested — but it also
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# means this policy cannot express residentKey:"preferred" at all.)
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessRequireResidentKey: "Yes"
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# USER VERIFICATION REQUIRED. The authenticator must verify the human (biometric or PIN) and
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# say so in the assertion. This is the field that makes a passkey login at least as strong as
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# the password it replaces: with verification merely "preferred", possession of an unlocked
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# phone or an unattended security key would be a COMPLETE login to every SSO-gated app — a
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# single-factor possession check, strictly weaker than the password+TOTP path beside it.
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# Required makes the passkey branch inherently two-factor (something you have + something you
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# are/know), which is the premise the flow section relies on when it does NOT ask a
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# passkey-authenticated platform-admin for TOTP as well.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessUserVerificationRequirement: required
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# "not specified" is Keycloak's sentinel for "either kind of authenticator"
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# (Constants.DEFAULT_WEBAUTHN_POLICY_NOT_SPECIFIED; the theme JS omits the WebAuthn member
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# entirely when it sees this exact string). Deliberately NOT narrowed: "platform" would reject
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# every YubiKey and every phone used as a cross-device passkey, and "cross-platform" would
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# reject Touch ID and Windows Hello — i.e. either choice silently halves the usable hardware.
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# The operator should be able to enrol a laptop AND a phone AND a hardware key.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessAuthenticatorAttachment: "not specified"
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# ATTESTATION: none. Requesting "direct" would hand Keycloak an attestation statement it has
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# no trust anchors to validate here (no metadata service is configured) and nothing to compare
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# it against, since the AAGUID allow-list below is deliberately empty — so the statement would
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# be collected, unverifiable, and would add an extra "share model information?" consent prompt
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# on Safari/iOS for no security gain. Attestation is how you ENFORCE an approved-hardware list;
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# we do not have one, so asking for it is cost without benefit.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessAttestationConveyancePreference: none
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# Empty = accept any authenticator model. An AAGUID allow-list is a hardware whitelist: it
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# would have to be maintained by hand, and every new phone, laptop or key the operator buys
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# would be rejected at enrolment with a message that does not explain itself. It is also moot
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# while attestation is "none" (above) — with no attestation statement there is no trustworthy
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# AAGUID to match against in the first place.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessAcceptableAaguids: []
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# Ceremony timeout in SECONDS (the login theme multiplies by 1000; 0 means "send no timeout and
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# let the browser decide"). 300s is chosen over a tighter value because the slowest LEGITIMATE
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# path is the cross-device hybrid flow — Keycloak renders a QR code, the operator unlocks a
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# phone, scans it, and completes a biometric check — which routinely takes over a minute. A
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# 60-120s timeout looks tidy and converts that flow into an unexplained failure. Browsers clamp
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# this value (Chrome to at most 10 minutes), so 300 is honoured rather than reinterpreted.
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessCreateTimeout: 300
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# Send the user's existing passkeys as excludeCredentials at enrolment, so re-enrolling an
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# authenticator the user already registered is refused by the authenticator itself instead of
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# producing a second, indistinguishable credential in the account console. Cheap, and it keeps
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# "which passkey is which" answerable — which matters when the recovery story is "delete the
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# lost one".
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webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessAvoidSameAuthenticatorRegister: true
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# webAuthnPolicyPasswordlessExtraOrigins is intentionally NOT set. It exists to admit non-web
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# origins (native app facet IDs, e.g. android:apk-key-hash:...). Every ceremony here happens in
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# a browser on Keycloak's own origin, which is already covered by the RP ID above; adding
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# origins is only ever a widening of who may ask for these credentials.
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# --- Authorization model (R-IDP-06): groups drive access; platform-admins carry a realm role. ---
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roles:
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realm:
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@@ -528,14 +664,105 @@ spec:
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# --- MFA for platform-admins (R-IDP-04): a browser flow whose OTP step is CONDITIONAL on the
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# platform-admin role. Non-admins log in without OTP; platform-admins must enroll/present TOTP.
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# Set as the realm browserFlow below. VERIFY at bring-up (see runbook): a malformed flow fails
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# the whole import — if so, the fallback is to comment this block + browserFlow and configure
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# the conditional-OTP-by-role flow via the admin console. ---
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# ===========================================================================================
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# MFA for platform-admins (R-IDP-04) + PASSKEY login (2026-10-17). The realm browserFlow is
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# bound to browser-mfa at the bottom of this file.
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# ===========================================================================================
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# Non-admins log in without OTP; platform-admins must enroll/present TOTP. VERIFY at bring-up
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# (see runbook): a malformed flow fails the whole import — if so, the fallback is to comment
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# this block + browserFlow and configure the flow via the admin console.
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#
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# THE SHAPE, AND WHY IT IS THIS SHAPE
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# -----------------------------------
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# browser-mfa (top level, bound as browserFlow)
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# auth-cookie ALTERNATIVE already-authenticated SSO cookie
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# identity-provider-redirector ALTERNATIVE (no IdPs configured; kept for parity)
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# browser-mfa-forms ALTERNATIVE the interactive path:
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# auth-username-form REQUIRED WHO are you (no password yet)
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# browser-mfa-passkey-or-password REQUIRED ...and PROVE it, one of two ways:
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# webauthn-authenticator-passwordless ALTERNATIVE a passkey, or
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# browser-mfa-password-and-otp ALTERNATIVE the password path:
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# auth-password-form REQUIRED password, then
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# browser-mfa-conditional-otp CONDITIONAL TOTP iff platform-admin
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#
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# WHY THE USERNAME/PASSWORD SCREEN HAD TO BE SPLIT IN TWO. The previous flow used the combined
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# `auth-username-password-form`, which collects both on one page. A passkey branch cannot live
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# behind that: the server must know WHICH user is logging in before it can decide whether a
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# passkey is even available, and the combined form has already taken the password by the time
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# it knows. So it is replaced by the `auth-username-form` / `auth-password-form` pair — the
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# same decomposition Keycloak's own passwordless recipe uses. THIS IS A VISIBLE UX CHANGE FOR
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# EVERY USER, passkey or not: login becomes two screens (username, then password) instead of
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# one. That cost is accepted deliberately — it is the enabling change, it is what Google and
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# Microsoft logins already do, and the alternative (below) is worse.
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#
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# WHY NOT USERNAMELESS ("just tap your passkey", no username screen at all). Keycloak 26.0.6
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# does support it: WebAuthnPasswordlessAuthenticator.requiresUser() returns FALSE, so the
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# authenticator can legally run as a first step with no user in context. We deliberately do not
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# do that, because of how the flow engine then behaves. In DefaultAuthenticationFlow the
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# "does this user actually have this credential?" guard sits INSIDE the requiresUser() branch;
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# with requiresUser() false and no user yet set, the engine skips that guard and simply invokes
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# the authenticator. A passkey execution placed before the username form is therefore offered
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# to EVERYONE, so every login — including every password-only user and every family member who
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# will never own a passkey — would open on a passkey prompt they must dismiss. That is the
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# opposite of additive. Keeping the passkey step AFTER auth-username-form means a user is in
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# context, which is what makes the graceful degradation below actually work.
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#
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# WHY THE PASSKEY BRANCH DEGRADES CLEANLY TO A PASSWORD (the property the whole "additive"
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# claim rests on). With a user in context, the engine takes the non-requiresUser branch and
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# raises CREDENTIAL_SETUP_REQUIRED when the user has no credential of this type and the
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# authenticator's factory does not allow self-setup — and WebAuthnPasswordlessAuthenticatorFactory
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# .isUserSetupAllowed() is false, and the authenticator is a CredentialValidator, so both
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# conditions hold. That exception is raised INSIDE the ALTERNATIVE loop, which catches it,
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# marks the execution ATTEMPTED and proceeds to the next alternative. Net effect: a user with
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# no passkey never sees a passkey screen and lands on the password form; a user WITH one gets
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# the passkey screen and keeps the password as a "Try another way" option. Note that for a
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# user holding BOTH, which screen appears FIRST is decided by Keycloak's authentication
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# selection list (the user's own credential ordering), not by the priorities below.
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#
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# WHY A PASSKEY LOGIN IS NOT ALSO ASKED FOR TOTP. browser-mfa-conditional-otp hangs off the
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# PASSWORD branch only, so a platform-admin who authenticates with a passkey is not challenged
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# for TOTP. That is intentional, and it rests on the policy above: userVerification is
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# `required`, so the authenticator has already proved possession of hardware AND verified the
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# human (biometric or PIN) in one phishing-resistant, origin-bound ceremony. Stacking TOTP on
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# top would add a replayable, phishable shared secret to a credential that is neither, for
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# friction on every login. If a future operator disagrees, the change is small and local: move
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# the browser-mfa-conditional-otp reference out of browser-mfa-password-and-otp and into
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# browser-mfa-passkey-or-password's parent as a REQUIRED step, so it applies to both branches.
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#
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# WHY THERE IS NO `requiredActions` BLOCK IN THIS FILE — DO NOT ADD ONE
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Enrolment uses Keycloak's `webauthn-register-passwordless` required action, and the obvious
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# move is to declare it here. DO NOT. In Keycloak 26.0.6 the realm import treats
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# requiredActions as REPLACE, NOT MERGE: DefaultExportImportManager.importRealm branches on
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# `if (rep.getRequiredActions() != null)` and, when the representation declares ANY, imports
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# exactly those plus delete_account — the `else` branch that installs the full default set
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# (DefaultRequiredActions.addActions) never runs. RealmManager.setupRequiredActions is no
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# backstop either: it fires only when the realm has ZERO required-action providers.
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#
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# So declaring one action would create this realm with that action and delete_account and
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# NOTHING ELSE — no CONFIGURE_TOTP, no UPDATE_PASSWORD, no VERIFY_EMAIL, no delete_credential,
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# no UPDATE_PROFILE. The first casualty would be the MFA requirement this very flow enforces:
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# with CONFIGURE_TOTP unregistered, a platform-admin who does not yet have TOTP could never
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# enrol one, while auth-otp-form below still demands it — a hard lock-out of every
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# platform-admin from every SSO-gated app, including Headlamp and kubectl, delivered by a
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# change whose stated purpose was to ADD a login method.
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#
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# And the declaration buys nothing, because the default set ALREADY CONTAINS IT.
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# DefaultRequiredActions registers `webauthn-register-passwordless` with enabled=true,
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# defaultAction=false, priority 80, gated on Profile.Feature.WEB_AUTHN — which is Type.DEFAULT
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# in 26.0.6, i.e. on unless explicitly disabled. enabled=true / defaultAction=false IS the
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# additive-and-optional posture this change wants: the action exists and can be triggered for
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# a user on demand, but it is not forced on anyone at next login. Declaring it would restate
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# the default while deleting ten siblings.
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#
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# (The symmetric question for authenticationFlows has the opposite answer, which is why THIS
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# block is safe: importAuthenticationFlows adds the declared flows and then backfills each
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# unbound binding — browser, registration, direct grant, reset credentials, client auth, first
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# broker login, docker auth — from the built-in defaults individually. Declaring flows does not
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# suppress the built-ins; declaring required actions does suppress them.)
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authenticationFlows:
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- alias: browser-mfa
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description: "Browser flow with conditional OTP required for platform-admins."
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description: "Browser flow: passkey or password, with conditional OTP for platform-admins."
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providerId: basic-flow
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topLevel: true
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builtIn: false
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@@ -555,13 +782,63 @@ spec:
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priority: 30
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flowAlias: browser-mfa-forms
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userSetupAllowed: false
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# Identify the user FIRST (username only), then prove it. Both steps are REQUIRED: the
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# username is never optional, and neither is proving possession of the account.
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- alias: browser-mfa-forms
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description: "Username/password then conditional OTP."
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description: "Username, then passkey or password (+ conditional OTP)."
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providerId: basic-flow
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topLevel: false
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builtIn: false
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authenticationExecutions:
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- authenticator: auth-username-password-form
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# auth-username-form = Keycloak's "Username Form" (UsernameFormFactory) — resolves the
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# user WITHOUT taking a password, which is the prerequisite for offering a passkey.
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# Replaces the previous auth-username-password-form; see the header for the UX cost.
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- authenticator: auth-username-form
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authenticatorFlow: false
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requirement: REQUIRED
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priority: 10
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userSetupAllowed: false
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- authenticatorFlow: true
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requirement: REQUIRED
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priority: 20
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flowAlias: browser-mfa-passkey-or-password
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userSetupAllowed: false
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# THE FORK. Two ALTERNATIVEs, so satisfying either one completes the flow. Priority puts the
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# passkey first for users who have one; users who do not fall through to the password branch
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# automatically (CREDENTIAL_SETUP_REQUIRED is caught by the ALTERNATIVE loop — see header).
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- alias: browser-mfa-passkey-or-password
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description: "A passkey (WebAuthn passwordless), or password with conditional OTP."
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providerId: basic-flow
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topLevel: false
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builtIn: false
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authenticationExecutions:
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# webauthn-authenticator-passwordless = "WebAuthn Passwordless Authenticator"
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# (WebAuthnPasswordlessAuthenticatorFactory). It reads the realm's PASSWORDLESS policy
|
||||
# declared above — NOT the two-factor webAuthnPolicy* family. Keep it ALTERNATIVE: as
|
||||
# REQUIRED it would force a passkey on every user, which is the lock-out this change is
|
||||
# explicitly designed not to create.
|
||||
- authenticator: webauthn-authenticator-passwordless
|
||||
authenticatorFlow: false
|
||||
requirement: ALTERNATIVE
|
||||
priority: 10
|
||||
userSetupAllowed: false
|
||||
- authenticatorFlow: true
|
||||
requirement: ALTERNATIVE
|
||||
priority: 20
|
||||
flowAlias: browser-mfa-password-and-otp
|
||||
userSetupAllowed: false
|
||||
# The unchanged pre-passkey behaviour, relocated intact into the password branch: password,
|
||||
# then TOTP iff the user holds the platform-admin role. Nothing about the OTP condition
|
||||
# changed; it simply no longer sits on the path a passkey login takes.
|
||||
- alias: browser-mfa-password-and-otp
|
||||
description: "Password, then conditional OTP for platform-admins."
|
||||
providerId: basic-flow
|
||||
topLevel: false
|
||||
builtIn: false
|
||||
authenticationExecutions:
|
||||
# auth-password-form = Keycloak's "Password Form" (PasswordFormFactory) — the password
|
||||
# half of the old combined form, now that the username has already been collected.
|
||||
- authenticator: auth-password-form
|
||||
authenticatorFlow: false
|
||||
requirement: REQUIRED
|
||||
priority: 10
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user