diff --git a/decisions/2026-09-30-oauth2-proxy-auth-failure-visible.md b/decisions/2026-09-30-oauth2-proxy-auth-failure-visible.md
index 9a185c9..dab0441 100644
--- a/decisions/2026-09-30-oauth2-proxy-auth-failure-visible.md
+++ b/decisions/2026-09-30-oauth2-proxy-auth-failure-visible.md
@@ -257,3 +257,33 @@ succeeds, not the day a listener exists.
 - **The radarr `/signalr` finding is the coordinator's measurement, not mine** — I reproduced neither
   the 206/209 sample nor the jackett 0-in-13,612. They are recorded as reported.
 - **L2/L3 conformance still did not run** (`CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` unset). Nothing is certified.
+
+### Round 2 addendum — CI is RED, by design, and the local gate cannot see why
+
+After pushing round 2, `gate / gate (pull_request)` reported **failure after 1m42s** while the local
+toolbox run was rc 3 with nothing failed. Measured cause, singular:
+
+    sensitive paths touched:
+      conformance/tests/l0-static/servicemonitor-ports-resolve/check.sh   (matched conformance/**)
+    approving reviews: (no reviews at all)        author=gitea-admin
+
+`ci/approval-policy.sh` is fail-closed and exits 1 when a PR touches a `sensitive_paths` glob with no
+`APPROVED` review from a non-author — "a change to the gate cannot be gated by the gate". The single
+`KNOWN_EXTERNAL_MONITORS` entry is what trips it. **Nothing in L0/L1 failed.**
+
+**The local gate structurally cannot catch this, and said `approval-policy: green (N/A)`.** The stage
+short-circuits to N/A when `GITHUB_EVENT_NAME` is unset, which it always is off-CI. So for any branch
+touching a sensitive path, a clean local gate is a FALSE REASSURANCE — the PR run is the only honest
+signal. That is a general trap, not specific to this change, and it is worth knowing before someone
+concludes a red PR means broken code.
+
+To clear: a non-author approving review, then **re-run the gate** — approval does not re-trigger the
+status check, so the required context stays red until the job runs again. `required_approvals=1`
+already applied to every PR here, so the human was needed regardless; the conformance entry only
+turns the tick red while that is pending.
+
+The alternative is to drop the register entry, which means dropping `podmonitor.yaml` with it (the
+check fails without the declaration). I did not take it: the entry is the "declare the limit"
+mechanism the check explicitly asks for, it is shrink-only so it cannot rot quietly, and
+`flux-podmonitor.yaml` is the same case already in the register. But it is a real trade and the
+reviewer should make it knowingly.