fix(conformance): trusted-tls verifies LE-prod cert via system trust + split-horizon DNS (R-TLS-01/03)

Rewrote the probe for the LE-production switch: no embedded staging root, no --cacert
(system CA bundle validates ISRG Root X1), resolves the hostname via in-cluster
split-horizon DNS to the Gateway VIP (the real-client path). PASSES live (9s). Removed the
le-staging-root-ca fixture.
This commit is contained in:
jakman85 committed 2026-08-25 08:21:55 -05:00
1 parent 90714cb910
commit 5ba3f9d46d
2 files changed
+25 -75

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@@ -4,18 +4,20 @@
# Spec: docs/09 (Gateway API + DNS-01 wildcard), ADR-0006 (LE issuers)
#
# GIVEN the shared Gateway terminating TLS with the cert-manager wildcard cert,
# WHEN a probe dials it (SNI *.home.keithjackson.dev) and verifies the chain,
# THEN the served cert is non-self-signed, unexpired, covers the wildcard SAN,
# and CHAINS TO A REAL CA ROOT (R-TLS-01). The wildcard SAN also covers
# internal-only hostnames, so internal services get the same trusted cert
# (R-TLS-03).
# WHEN an in-cluster probe dials it by hostname (SNI *.home.keithjackson.dev) and
# verifies the chain against the SYSTEM trust store,
# THEN the served cert is non-self-signed, unexpired, covers the wildcard SAN, and
# chains to a PUBLICLY-TRUSTED CA root (R-TLS-01). The wildcard SAN also covers
# internal-only hostnames, so internal services get the same trusted cert (R-TLS-03).
#
# TRUST MODEL (operator decision "A", DECISIONS-LOG): dev issues from Let's
# Encrypt **STAGING** (ADR-0006, to avoid prod rate limits) — a real CA, but not
# in the system trust store. So the probe verifies the chain against the LE
# STAGING root (fixtures/le-staging-root-ca.yaml, "(STAGING) Pretend Pear X1"),
# which is the faithful "chains to a trusted root" check for this environment.
# A prod overlay (LE-prod) would verify against the system store instead.
# TRUST MODEL: the cluster issues from Let's Encrypt **PRODUCTION** (ACME_CLUSTER_ISSUER
# = letsencrypt-prod), whose root (ISRG Root X1) is in the system trust store — so the
# probe verifies against the container's DEFAULT CA bundle (no --cacert). A clean verify
# is exactly what real in-cluster OIDC clients (oauth2-proxy, Grafana) depend on. The
# probe resolves the hostname via in-cluster split-horizon DNS (coredns-custom → Gateway
# VIP, R-DNS-01) — the same path real clients use — so no --connect-to hack is needed.
# Replaced the earlier LE-staging + embedded-root check when dev switched to LE-prod so
# in-cluster SSO clients trust the cert (DECISIONS-LOG Session 7).
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
@@ -31,14 +33,10 @@ metadata:
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
The shared Gateway serves a valid, unexpired, non-self-signed wildcard cert
that chains to a real CA root (LE-staging in dev); the wildcard SAN covers
internal-only hostnames too.
that chains to a publicly-trusted CA root (LE production); the wildcard SAN
covers internal-only hostnames too.
spec:
steps:
- name: given-le-staging-root-trust-anchor
try:
- apply:
file: fixtures/le-staging-root-ca.yaml
- name: then-gateway-cert-chains-to-trusted-root
try:
- apply:
@@ -49,39 +47,29 @@ spec:
name: tls-probe
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
activeDeadlineSeconds: 120
activeDeadlineSeconds: 180
template:
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
volumes:
- name: ca
configMap:
name: le-staging-root
containers:
- name: probe
image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
volumeMounts:
- name: ca
mountPath: /ca
readOnly: true
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
gw="cilium-gateway-shared.gateway.svc.cluster.local"
# Probe TWO wildcard hostnames — one "public", one "internal-only". Both
# match *.home.keithjackson.dev, so a clean verify against the LE-staging
# root for BOTH proves R-TLS-01 (chains to a real CA root) AND R-TLS-03
# (the same trusted wildcard covers internal-only names).
# --connect-to sends SNI/Host=$host but DIALS the gateway Service by name
# (env-agnostic — no hardcoded VIP). curl (no -f) exits 0 on the gateway's
# 404 once TLS+hostname verify; it exits 60 if the chain/hostname fails
# (verified empirically), so `set -e` + rc=0 is the assertion. TLS
# terminates at the gateway before HTTP routing, so no backend is needed.
# match *.home.keithjackson.dev, so a clean verify against the SYSTEM CA
# bundle for BOTH proves R-TLS-01 (chains to a publicly-trusted root) AND
# R-TLS-03 (the same trusted wildcard covers internal-only names). Names
# resolve via in-cluster split-horizon DNS to the Gateway VIP. curl (no
# --cacert, no -k) validates against the default CA bundle and exits 0 on
# the gateway's 404 once TLS+hostname verify; it exits 60 if the chain or
# hostname fails. TLS terminates at the gateway before HTTP routing, so no
# backend is needed.
for host in conformance.home.keithjackson.dev internal-only.home.keithjackson.dev; do
curl -sS --cacert /ca/root.pem \
--connect-to "${host}:443:${gw}:443" \
curl -sS --retry 5 --retry-connrefused --retry-delay 3 --max-time 20 \
-o /dev/null "https://${host}/"
echo "TLS_TRUSTED ${host}"
done