fix(net): allow SSO apps egress to keycloak backend (Cilium 1.20 CVE-2025-30162)

App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.

Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 committed 2026-08-30 23:34:03 -05:00
1 parent 45deac9d50
commit 68690e5019
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@@ -527,6 +527,28 @@ def r_internet_egress(s: dict) -> dict:
switch (a cluster-wide singleton keyed on the egress-class pod label) decide the PATH; this
policy decides that north-south egress is ALLOWED at all.
"""
egress = [{"toEntities": ["world"]}]
# SSO apps (oidc/forward-auth) reach Keycloak at keycloak.home, which coredns split-horizon
# resolves to the shared Gateway VIP (an L2-announced LoadBalancer IP Cilium classifies as
# `world`), so the pod hairpins THROUGH the Gateway. Under Cilium >=1.16.8/1.17.2 (the
# CVE-2025-30162 fix, present in 1.20), the Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluates THIS pod's egress
# policy against Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) — `world`
# matches the VIP at L3/L4 but NOT the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so OIDC discovery/
# token 403s ("Access denied") without an explicit allow to the keycloak backend. Scope it to
# the apps that actually talk to Keycloak (auth mode oidc or forward-auth).
if s.get("auth", {}).get("mode") in ("oidc", "forward-auth"):
egress.append(
{
"toEndpoints": [
{
"matchLabels": {
"io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": "keycloak",
"app": "keycloak",
}
}
]
}
)
return {
"apiVersion": "cilium.io/v2",
"kind": "CiliumNetworkPolicy",
@@ -537,7 +559,7 @@ def r_internet_egress(s: dict) -> dict:
},
"spec": {
"endpointSelector": {"matchLabels": {"app.kubernetes.io/name": s["name"]}},
"egress": [{"toEntities": ["world"]}],
"egress": egress,
},
}