feat(pm-agent): pin the first published agent-runner digest, start dry, and fix the token scopes
Rebased #61 onto the CI image pipeline (#81). This commit makes the remaining in-git blockers to going live go away: - deployment.yaml and PM_WORKER_IMAGE pin images run 340's digest (sha256:c4eba5b3..., tag sha-523cd9118f95 = main), read from the registry. Renovate markers unchanged. - PM_DRY_RUN=true and PM_REQUIRE_LABEL=agent for the first run. Dry run is required, not just cautious: the run-340 image's baked worker template predates imagePullSecrets, so admission would deny its Jobs until CI re-publishes after this merge and Renovate bumps. - Token scopes: Gitea 1.24.3 scopes GET /api/v1/user (the dispatcher's first call) under read:user. The documented list was missing it. Now read:user, write:repository, write:issue, read:package everywhere. - Org-package read documented as a team (Packages=Read, no repos), not just a scope. - sops is toolbox-only; the .examples say so and give the in-place edit. - runbook: key-name check no longer emits Secret values before the pipe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -46,15 +46,17 @@ waive the sensitive-path human review on its own pull request.
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Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
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1. **The image is published by CI, not by a person.** `platform/pm-agent/deployment.yaml` and
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`PM_WORKER_IMAGE` in `configmap.yaml` carry an all-zero digest placeholder until the first
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publish. `.gitea/workflows/images.yaml` builds `agent-runner` on rootless BuildKit
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`PM_WORKER_IMAGE` in `configmap.yaml` carry the digest of the **first** publish (images
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run 340, `sha-523cd9118f95`), pinned once on 2026-10-30 so going live did not wait on
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Renovate's first run; every later bump is Renovate's. That digest predates the worker
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template's `imagePullSecrets` entry, so worker Jobs built from it are refused by
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admission — which is why `PM_DRY_RUN` starts `true` (see `configmap.yaml`). `.gitea/workflows/images.yaml` builds `agent-runner` on rootless BuildKit
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(`platform/buildkit/`) — the same Containerfile, and the same `verify` stage, that
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`infra/agent/build-image.sh` builds locally — and on a push to `main` publishes it to
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`gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/home-network/agent-runner` under `sha-<commit>` and `main`.
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Renovate then follows the `main` tag through the `# renovate-digest:` marker above **both**
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lines and moves them together in one pull request. Nobody builds-and-pushes this image from
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a workstation, and nobody pastes a digest. Until the first publish, and until that PR
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merges: `ImagePullBackOff`. The one operator prerequisite on the publishing side is the
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a workstation. The one operator prerequisite on the publishing side is the
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`REGISTRY_PUSH_TOKEN` Actions secret (see the header of `.gitea/workflows/images.yaml`);
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without it the publish job fails loudly rather than skipping.
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@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
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`pm-agent-registry` is a `dockerconfigjson` Secret referenced by both the Deployment and
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the committed worker Job template, and the admission policy pins it to exactly that
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name. What is left to you is the value: the Gitea token must carry **`read:package`** in
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addition to `write:repository` and `write:issue`, and the dockerconfigjson is built from
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addition to `read:user`, `write:repository` and `write:issue`, and the dockerconfigjson is built from
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it. Steps:
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[`pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml.example`](./pm-agent-registry.sops.yaml.example).
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@@ -99,8 +101,11 @@ Both are deliberate, and both fail **visibly** rather than silently:
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They hold the **same** Gitea token in two formats, because a Secret cannot be both — the
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same one-value-in-two-files pattern the Keycloak client secret already uses here. So mint
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it once, with all three scopes: `read:package` (the pull), `write:repository` (clone,
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branch push, pull request) and `write:issue` (issue comments). The first `.example`
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it once, with all four scopes: `read:package` (the pull), `read:user` (the dispatcher's
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startup `GET /user` — Gitea 1.24.3 scopes the whole `/user` group), `write:repository`
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(clone, branch push, pull request) and `write:issue` (issue comments). The account also
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needs package *permission*, not just the scope: a `pm-agent-pull` org team with Packages
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= Read and no repositories (steps in the registry `.example`). The first `.example`
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explains which account to create and why it must *not* be an administrator.
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Until they are filled in: the pull fails `401`, and if you fix only the pull, the
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@@ -174,7 +179,7 @@ Job from a committed template. **The model's output is data, never a command.**
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- **The worker's own credentials are inside the model's reach.** The session runs as the same
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uid in the same container as the wrapper, so it can read the environment, including its
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`GITEA_TOKEN` and `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`. There is no isolation between them and none is
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claimed. What bounds it: the Gitea token is scoped `write:repository, write:issue` on **one
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claimed. What bounds it: the Gitea token is scoped `read:user, write:repository, write:issue, read:package` on **one
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repository** with no admin permission, and egress reaches only this Gitea and tcp/443.
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- **`world:443` is wider than `api.anthropic.com`.** Cilium can express the tighter rule
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(`toFQDNs`) but nothing in this repository uses FQDN policy and its prerequisite (Cilium's
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