correction: credential-forward + unified graph; activate SOPS (author-first)

Operator directive: don't diverge architecture to avoid asking for credentials;
provision them upfront via SOPS and keep the existing (unified) graph.

Roadmap reconciliation: Phase 2 = Network/Storage/TLS/DNS/Ingress, so
cert-manager/externaldns/gateway (the credential-gated pieces) ARE Phase 2;
monitoring is Phase 4. Earlier A2/rollout scope was inverted by credential-avoidance.

Reverts (credential-driven): remove clusters/dev/rollout/ + the $patch:delete's;
restore unified base graph (dev = ../base + cluster-vars + SOPS decryption,
R-ENV-02 intact); restore monitoring files (Phase 4). Kept non-credential
improvements: tofu for_each/rejoin, Kyverno parametrization + webhook excludes.

platform/kustomization.yaml now phased (single shared list): Phase-2 set =
kyverno, cilium, longhorn, cert-manager, externaldns, gateway; later components
commented with phase markers.

SOPS activated: .sops.yaml at repo root; bootstrap/sops/secret-templates/*.yaml.example
for all secrets (cloudflare x2, grafana, alertmanager-smtp, keycloak, oauth2-proxy, pia);
bootstrap/sops/CREDENTIALS.md checklist; pre-wired commented cloudflare-api-token lines
in cert-manager + externaldns; filled non-secret ACME email. Agents never touch real
secret values (operator encrypts).

Validated: kubectl kustomize dev(unified)/prod/platform(Phase-2 only), templates inert,
make -C ci gate PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 committed 2026-08-16 22:09:20 -05:00
1 parent e1c738fa63
commit a108d5ab98
23 files changed
+448 -198

No files matched your search

+25 -31
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ spec:
storageSpec:
volumeClaimTemplate:
spec:
storageClassName: ${MONITORING_STORAGE_CLASS} # replicated tier (ADR-0003); cluster-vars knob
storageClassName: longhorn # replicated tier (ADR-0003)
accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
resources:
requests:
@@ -80,24 +80,22 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 96Mi
# SMTP is an OPERATOR HAND-OFF DEFERRED to Phase 4 — no creds yet, and the by-name
# `alertmanager-smtp` Secret does NOT exist. Mounting a missing Secret wedges Alertmanager
# in ContainerCreating, so the mount is DISABLED until the hand-off. Re-enable verbatim
# (uncomment) when the SOPS `alertmanager-smtp` Secret is delivered. TODO(Phase-4 SMTP).
# secrets:
# - alertmanager-smtp
# Routing stays live; RECEIVERS ARE NULL until the SMTP hand-off (alerts still fire, route,
# and show in the Alertmanager UI + Grafana — they just aren't emailed). The smtp_* globals
# and email_configs are retained below, commented, so re-enabling is a pure uncomment.
# SMTP credentials are an OPERATOR HAND-OFF: a SOPS-encrypted Secret, referenced BY NAME
# only (docs/07). Mounted at /etc/alertmanager/secrets/<name>/ so the config below can read
# the password from a file (never inline plaintext).
secrets:
- alertmanager-smtp
# Routing/receivers. Non-secret SMTP endpoint fields (smarthost/from/to/username) are
# operator-supplied placeholders (REPLACE-ME, same convention as velero); the PASSWORD is
# read from the mounted SOPS secret via *_file. Both severities email; subject/route differ.
config:
global:
resolve_timeout: 5m
# TODO(Phase-4 SMTP hand-off): uncomment together with the alertmanager-smtp Secret mount.
# smtp_smarthost: "smtp.example.com:587"
# smtp_from: "[email protected]"
# smtp_auth_username: "<smtp-login>"
# smtp_auth_password_file: /etc/alertmanager/secrets/alertmanager-smtp/smtp-password
# smtp_require_tls: true
smtp_smarthost: "REPLACE-ME:587" # operator hand-off (e.g. smtp.gmail.com:587)
smtp_from: "REPLACE-ME" # operator hand-off (From: address)
smtp_auth_username: "REPLACE-ME" # operator hand-off (SMTP login)
smtp_auth_password_file: /etc/alertmanager/secrets/alertmanager-smtp/smtp-password
smtp_require_tls: true
route:
group_by: ["alertname", "namespace"]
group_wait: 30s
@@ -111,29 +109,25 @@ spec:
group_wait: 10s
repeat_interval: 1h
receivers:
# NULL receivers until Phase-4 SMTP. email_configs retained (commented) for verbatim re-enable.
- name: email-warning
# email_configs:
# - to: "<alert-inbox>"
# send_resolved: true
# headers:
# subject: '[WARNING] {{ .CommonLabels.alertname }} ({{ .CommonLabels.namespace }})'
email_configs:
- to: "REPLACE-ME" # operator hand-off (alert inbox)
send_resolved: true
headers:
subject: '[WARNING] {{ .CommonLabels.alertname }} ({{ .CommonLabels.namespace }})'
- name: email-critical
# email_configs:
# - to: "<alert-inbox>"
# send_resolved: true
# headers:
# subject: '[CRITICAL] {{ .CommonLabels.alertname }} ({{ .CommonLabels.namespace }})'
email_configs:
- to: "REPLACE-ME" # operator hand-off (alert inbox)
send_resolved: true
headers:
subject: '[CRITICAL] {{ .CommonLabels.alertname }} ({{ .CommonLabels.namespace }})'
# --- Grafana: dashboards (R-OBS-03), surfaced in the C2 UI (docs/12) behind Keycloak SSO ---
grafana:
enabled: true
# Admin bootstrap + (later) OIDC client are SOPS secrets referenced BY NAME (WS-SEC/ADR-0014).
# cluster-vars knob: prod = the SOPS `grafana-admin-credentials` Secret; dev = "" (empty),
# which makes the chart fall back to its default admin password (dev-only, NAT-isolated) so
# Grafana starts without an operator secret. TODO: supply a dev Secret if wider dev access.
admin:
existingSecret: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_SECRET}
existingSecret: grafana-admin-credentials
userKey: admin-user
passwordKey: admin-password
# DEV TRIM: emptyDir (default). Dashboards are provisioned from ConfigMaps (sidecar), so no
+1 -1
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ spec:
replicas: 1
persistence:
enabled: true
storageClass: ${MONITORING_STORAGE_CLASS} # replicated tier (ADR-0003); cluster-vars knob
storageClass: longhorn # replicated tier (ADR-0003)
size: ${MONITORING_LOKI_PVC_SIZE} # overlay knob (dev 5Gi / prod large)
resources:
requests: