fix(pm-agent): the agent is IN the cluster — one git host, the cluster-local service name
An in-cluster consumer reaches a service by its *.svc.cluster.local name, which is by design a different path from how a client outside the cluster reaches the same service. pm-worker's host allowlist accepted TWO values: the cluster-local name and the external hostname gitea.home.keithjackson.dev. The second is removed. It was never needed — nothing sets it — it would route in-cluster traffic out through the Gateway and back for no reason, and as an ACCEPTED value it widened the allowlist to a host reachable over the namespace's world:443 egress rule, which is precisely the injection shape the allowlist exists to refuse. probe-validation.sh now pins that: 20 refusals, including the external hostname, the cluster-local name over https, and the cluster-local name on the wrong port. Also corrects a remark in the handoff entry: I cited cluster-vars' GATEWAY_VIP (192.168.1.53) as suspicious next to the nodes' 192.168.2.x. That was noise — those base cluster-vars values are dev-era leftovers for a decommissioned cluster and say nothing about prod. None of the measured facts depended on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
6253d546f8
commit
a209a618fd
4 files changed
+34
-10
No files matched your search
@@ -86,12 +86,22 @@ refuses "branch equal to the base branch" "must not be the base branch" \
|
||||
# --- where code comes FROM and goes TO -------------------------------------
|
||||
# The namespace's egress policy permits tcp/443 to the world (the model needs it), so an
|
||||
# injected host would be REACHABLE. These are the cases that matter most.
|
||||
refuses "a redirected git host" "is not an allowed git host" \
|
||||
refuses "a redirected git host" "is not the allowed in-cluster git host" \
|
||||
PM_GITEA_URL=https://evil.invalid
|
||||
refuses "a real, reachable, WRONG git host" "is not an allowed git host" \
|
||||
refuses "a real, reachable, WRONG git host" "is not the allowed in-cluster git host" \
|
||||
PM_GITEA_URL=https://github.com
|
||||
refuses "the right host on a smuggled path" "is not an allowed git host" \
|
||||
refuses "the right host on a smuggled path" "is not the allowed in-cluster git host" \
|
||||
PM_GITEA_URL=http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000/../..
|
||||
# This agent is IN the cluster, so it reaches Gitea by its cluster-local service name. The
|
||||
# EXTERNAL hostname is refused too — it used to be a second accepted value, and as an
|
||||
# accepted value it widened this allowlist to a host reachable over the `world:443` egress
|
||||
# rule, which is the injection shape the allowlist exists to refuse.
|
||||
refuses "this Gitea's EXTERNAL hostname" "is not the allowed in-cluster git host" \
|
||||
PM_GITEA_URL=https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
|
||||
refuses "the cluster-local name over https" "is not the allowed in-cluster git host" \
|
||||
PM_GITEA_URL=https://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:3000
|
||||
refuses "the cluster-local name, wrong port" "is not the allowed in-cluster git host" \
|
||||
PM_GITEA_URL=http://gitea.gitea.svc.cluster.local:8080
|
||||
refuses "a malformed owner" "PM_GITEA_OWNER is malformed" \
|
||||
'PM_GITEA_OWNER=../other-org'
|
||||
refuses "a malformed repository" "PM_GITEA_REPO is malformed" \
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user