infra(gitea): script the branch protection that was never applied
Gitea repo settings live in its own database, not in a manifest Flux reconciles, so they are drift-prone and invisible to the conformance gate -- which is how main came to accept direct pushes while the log recorded it as protected. Adds infra/gitea/branch-protection.sh (blocks direct pushes to main) and a README carrying the measured before-state and the ORDER the remaining steps must happen in. The script deliberately leaves enable_status_check:false and required_approvals:0. Both would deadlock today: there is no runner to satisfy a required context, and the only human account is not yet a repo collaborator, so no one could supply an approval. The README sequences both. It prints a push probe to run afterwards. The API response is not proof -- Gitea may let site admins bypass protection, and that has to be observed, not assumed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Enable branch protection on main for home-network-k3s-impl.
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#
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# Sets enable_push:false -> no direct pushes to main; changes land only by merging a PR.
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#
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# enable_status_check is deliberately FALSE. There is currently NO Gitea Actions runner
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# registered (verified 2026-09-29: zero at repo, org and site level), so requiring the
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# gate context would deadlock EVERY PR permanently -- including the PR that fixes it.
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# Turn it on only after a runner is live and you have seen the gate actually report on
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# a real PR, using the context name CI itself produced.
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#
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# required_approvals is 0 for the same class of reason: jakman85 is a site admin but NOT
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# a repo collaborator, so requiring an approval now could leave nobody able to approve.
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# Add the collaborator first, then raise this to 1.
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set -euo pipefail
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HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
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OWNER=Home-Network
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REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
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creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
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U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"
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P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
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[ -n "$U" ] && [ -n "$P" ] || { echo "no stored credential for $HOST" >&2; exit 1; }
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echo "authenticating as '${U}' (secret not shown)"
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echo "==> creating branch protection on 'main'"
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jq -n '{
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branch_name: "main",
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enable_push: false,
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enable_status_check: false,
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status_check_contexts: [],
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required_approvals: 0,
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block_on_rejected_reviews: true,
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block_on_outdated_branch: false,
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dismiss_stale_approvals: true
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}' | curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") \
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-X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data @- \
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"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/branch_protections" \
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| jq -r 'if .branch_name then "created" else "API said: \(.message // tostring)" end'
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echo "==> verifying (this is the part that matters)"
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curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") \
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"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/branches/main" \
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| jq -r '{protected, user_can_push, required_approvals, enable_status_check, status_check_contexts}'
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cat <<'NOTE'
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Now prove it actually blocks you -- do not take the API's word for it. From a clean
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checkout on main, with nothing to lose:
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git commit --allow-empty -m 'protection probe'
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git push origin main # EXPECT: rejected by the remote
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git reset --hard HEAD~1 # tidy up either way
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If that push SUCCEEDS, Gitea is letting site admins bypass protection and this is not
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yet doing what you want.
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NOTE
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