fix(ci): accept the override from a PR review, and stop misdiagnosing an unreadable comments API
gate / gate (pull_request) Failing after 1m47s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped

The override did not work on its first real test, and the reason was invisible
from the outside. Run 203 on PR #38: a well-formed `/approve-override` posted by
jakman85 in the PR comment box, 29 minutes newer than the head commit, and the
stage still blocked with:

    approval-override: COMMENTS_JSON is not a list

SETTINGS_API_TOKEN is minted [read:repository, read:admin], and Gitea puts
/issues/{n}/comments behind the *issue* scope — so Gitea answered with an error
OBJECT, `jq -e .` accepted it as valid JSON, and the stage fell through to 'no
approving review'. A permission failure wearing the costume of a missing
override. /pulls/{n}/files and /pulls/{n}/reviews are under read:repository,
which is why every other part of the same stage worked.

1. The diagnosis no longer lies. COMMENTS_JSON leaves the must-parse-or-block
   loop and is checked for being an ARRAY; when it is not, the stage prints
   Gitea's own .message, names the missing scope and says where to post instead.
   An unreadable source can only cause a false BLOCK, never a false pass, so a
   loud warning is the honest behaviour and blocking was not.
2. An override is accepted from a PR REVIEW body as well as a comment, so the
   hatch is not hostage to one API scope — a review of type 'Comment' works on
   the token CI has today. The gate names which source it used; PENDING
   (unsubmitted, author-only) reviews are dropped.
3. set-ci-token.sh requests read:issue, making the ordinary comment box work —
   on a RE-RUN only, since an existing token's scopes cannot be widened.

ci/tests/approval-override.test.sh: 23 -> 38 assertions, covering the reviews
source, PENDING reviews, an error object from the comments API, 'an unreadable
comments source must not suppress a valid review override', latest-wins across
both sources, and that the diagnostic quotes Gitea's message.

Also measured and recorded: run 203 shows gitea-settings PASS after the operator
ran the live PATCH, with block_admin_merge_override still true — the narrow
change held, the approval count moved and the gate's teeth did not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-10-02 00:44:31 -05:00
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@@ -161,7 +161,18 @@ a *green* one no longer needs a signature that cannot exist.
**Security-relevant changes are still reviewed** — by `ci/approval-policy.sh` against
`approval-policy.json` `sensitive_paths`, not by this field. An administrator waives that review
only by posting `/approve-override <reason>` on the PR: reason mandatory, permission re-checked
live, invalidated by a new commit, and recorded by account in the gate summary. Note that the
live, invalidated by a new commit, and recorded by account in the gate summary.
> **Post the override as a PR *review* (type "Comment"), not in the plain comment box** — until
> the CI token is re-minted. `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN` is `[read:repository, read:admin]`, and
> `/issues/{n}/comments` needs Gitea's *issue* scope, so Gitea answers with an error **object**
> instead of an array and the override is invisible. Measured on PR #38 (2026-10-02): a correct,
> fresh, well-formed override in the comment box produced `approval-policy: FAIL` reading as "no
> approving review" — a permission failure disguised as a missing one. `/pulls/{n}/reviews` is
> under `read:repository` and worked in the same run. The stage now reads **both** sources, names
> which one it used, and says plainly when the comments API is unreadable. `set-ci-token.sh`
> requests `read:issue` as of 2026-10-02, so **re-run it** and the comment box works too — token
> scopes cannot be widened in place. Note that the
**agent account `gitea-admin` also reports permission `owner`**, so it can clear its own PRs that
way; that is an accepted consequence of authorising by permission alone, and the route to
narrowing it (an `override_admins` allowlist, already honoured by the code) is written down in