docs(runbooks): forward-auth IS enforced — correct the posture note

The serving route's comment claimed that because no Gateway ext-authz
attachment exists, every forward-auth route is 'in practice reachable
unauthenticated today'. That is wrong, and wrong in a dangerous direction
for a document an operator reads during an incident.

Enforcement here is PER-POD, not gateway-level: each of the five services
declaring auth: forward-auth (pihole, jackett, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr)
publishes both its app port and 4180 on its Service, and its HTTPRoute
targets :4180 — the oauth2-proxy sidecar. Verified on prod. The app port
remains reachable in-cluster on purpose, which is how sonarr/radarr drive
qBittorrent's API, and Cilium default-deny governs that path.

The public-by-design decision for this route is unchanged and still correct;
what changes is that it is genuinely the exception rather than one open route
among many. Headlamp's exclusion is likewise deliberate (native OIDC with
per-user id_token forwarding and no ServiceAccount cluster rights).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-09-13 00:10:24 -05:00
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@@ -127,13 +127,16 @@ the 404 it replaced — it looks fixed.
## Why this route has no login
Deliberately public. Every other exposed UI here declares forward-auth via oauth2-proxy → Keycloak; if
Deliberately public. The UIs that declare forward-auth (pihole, jackett, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr)
really are closed: enforcement is per-pod, each one's HTTPRoute targeting its oauth2-proxy sidecar on
:4180 rather than the app port. If
these pages did too, `keycloak-down` would be unreadable exactly when Keycloak is down,
`keycloak-db` unreadable when its database is down, and `keycloak-client-secrets` unreadable during the
precise failure that broke all 12 OIDC clients on 2026-09-06 behind an entirely green cluster. An
operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. The content is operational procedure — metric
names, thresholds, kubectl invocations, topology — and no secrets. See
`runbooks/serving/httproute.yaml` for the full reasoning, including the instruction to leave this route
**out** of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands.
`runbooks/serving/httproute.yaml` for the full reasoning, including how forward-auth is actually
enforced here and the instruction to leave this route **out** of any Gateway-level ext-authz attachment
if one is ever introduced.
The running narrative of real incidents on this cluster is `DECISIONS-LOG.md`.