Merge pull request 'feat(plex): one advertised hostname for local+remote, its own LE cert, and a LAN definition so LAN clients stop reading as remote' (#48) from feat/plex-vip-hostname-and-lan-networks into main
Reviewed-on: #48 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]>
This commit was merged in pull request #48.
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---
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date: 2026-10-04
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branch: feat/plex-vip-hostname-and-lan-networks
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title: Plex — one advertised hostname for local and remote, its own LE certificate, and a LAN definition so LAN clients stop being reported as remote
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---
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## What changed
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Two operator-reported symptoms, after the 2026-10-04 "server missing from the account" fix
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(decisions/2026-10-04-plex-advertise-plexdirect.md) had restored publishing:
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1. **LAN clients were shown as Remote.** Root cause, measured: `LanNetworksBandwidth` was **ABSENT**,
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so Plex had no definition of a local network and classified *everything* as WAN — **468 requests
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logged `Allowed Network (WAN)` and ZERO `(LAN)`**, including Seerr dialling from inside the
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cluster. `allowedNetworks` (the `ALLOWED_NETWORKS` env) only waives **auth**; it does not make a
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client local. Two different settings, and only one of them has an env hook.
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2. **The advertised URL was a single-purpose, fragile value.** The previous fix advertised
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`https://<dashed-ip>.<serverhash>.plex.direct:32400`, which works, but hard-codes the VIP *and*
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the server's certificate hash into a cluster-var — two values nothing could keep in sync.
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**Operator design adopted (2026-10-04): ONE hostname, `plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}`, serving both
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audiences by split-horizon DNS** — PiHole answers it with `${PLEX_L4_VIP}` on the LAN, Cloudflare
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answers it publicly with the WAN address, NATed to the same VIP.
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- **`catalog/plex.yaml`:** `ADVERTISE_IP` → `https://plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}:32400`. New
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`lifecycle.postStart` hook (level-triggered, same idiom as pihole's and qbittorrent's) that
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re-asserts on **every** start: `LanNetworksBandwidth`, and the three `customCertificate*` prefs
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after converting the PEM to the PKCS#12 bundle Plex requires. New `PLEX_TLS_CRT`/`PLEX_TLS_KEY`
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env from the `plex-vip-tls` Secret, both `optional: true`.
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- **`apps/wave-0/plex-cert.yaml` (new, hand-written):** a cert-manager `Certificate` for exactly
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`plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}` from ClusterIssuer `letsencrypt-prod`. Non-catalog because the schema has
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no field for a Certificate. A single name, not the wildcard: the wildcard's Secret lives in
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`gateway` and Secrets are not readable across namespaces, and re-requesting `*.${BASE_DOMAIN}`
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would burn a duplicate-certificate slot for no benefit.
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- **`schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json` → 1.11.0:** adds `optional` to
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`env.valueFrom.secretKeyRef` / `configMapKeyRef`. **This is load-bearing, not tidiness.** The
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Certificate must be issued into the `plex` namespace, and that namespace is created by the
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rendered `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml` itself — so it cannot be issued in an earlier tier and lands in
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the *same* reconcile as the workload. With hard refs, Plex would sit in
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`CreateContainerConfigError` until a certificate issued, and `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` with
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`apps-wave-1` dependsOn it, so a slow or failed DNS01 challenge would have **stalled the whole app
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tier** — the hazard `catalog/plex.yaml` already documents for its GPU resource.
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- **`catalog/pihole.yaml`:** `address=/plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}/${PLEX_L4_VIP}` added to
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`FTLCONF_misc_dnsmasq_lines`. Required, not cosmetic: measured 2026-10-04,
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`plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}` resolved to **`192.168.2.20`** (the Gateway VIP) via the zone wildcard,
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and a connect to `:32400` there returned **`http=000`**.
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- **`clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml` + `clusters/prod/kustomization.yaml`:** `PLEX_ADVERTISE_URL`
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**deleted** — the hostname makes it unnecessary, which removes the cert-hash fragility outright.
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`PLEX_L4_VIP`'s note now records its second consumer (pihole).
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- **`catalog/render.py`:** `plex-cert` EXTRA_UNITS entry; **`apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml`:**
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`plex-cert.yaml` hand-added (NOT via `--emit-waves`, which would also onboard `keycloak` and
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`vm-demo` — the pre-existing drift recorded on 2026-10-03).
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**A correction to my own earlier reasoning, recorded because it was wrong in the handoff log.** The
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previous entry asserted a bare-IP URL "can NEVER validate" and treated a SAN match as a
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*requirement*. The operator pointed out it is not: `httpsRequired=0` and `secureConnections` default
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to Preferred, so clients can fall back to cleartext. The measurements still stand (a validating
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client did fail, and real clients did send `certificate unknown`) — but the correct framing is that a
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matching certificate keeps the remote leg **encrypted**, not that it is required for Plex to
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function. That is why this branch obtains a real certificate for the advertised name rather than
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choosing the name to suit Plex's built-in one.
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**SENSITIVE PATHS — touches `clusters/**` (two files), so `ci/approval-policy.sh` will BLOCK until an
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approving review (or the operator's `/approve-override <reason>` posted as a PR *review* of type
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"Comment"). Deliberately not self-posted: CLAUDE.md §1.**
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## What I verified
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Live prod, 2026-10-04, read-only. Secrets per CLAUDE.md §6: prefs were read by name-scoped grep,
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the server token was used inside the pod and never printed, and no `Preferences.xml` was dumped.
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- **The LAN-classification root cause, directly:** `LanNetworksBandwidth=<ABSENT>`, and request
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tagging of **468 × `Allowed Network (WAN)` vs 0 × `(LAN)`** — including `10.0.2.33` (Seerr), an
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in-cluster pod. This is the measurement the whole hook rests on.
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- **All four prefs the hook sets EXIST on this build**, read from the server's own `/:/prefs`
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(token-authenticated, output filtered to ids): `LanNetworksBandwidth`, `customCertificatePath`,
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`customCertificateKey`, `customCertificateDomain`, all `type="text"`. I had earlier been unable to
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confirm this (an unauthenticated `GET /:/prefs` returns **401**) and said so rather than assuming.
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- **There is NO env path for these settings** — the reason the hook exists. Grep of the image's
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entire init surface: `setPref` is called for exactly six prefs (`MachineIdentifier`,
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`ProcessedMachineIdentifier`, `PlexOnlineToken`, `customConnections`, `allowedNetworks`,
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`TranscoderTempDirectory`) and the only `PLEX_*` env it reads are CLAIM/CLAIM_FILE/UID/GID/
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UPDATE_CHANNEL and five INFO/HOME vars. No `PLEX_PREFERENCE*` of any kind; zero files mention
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`LanNetworks`.
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- **The DNS gap was real:** `plex-vip.${BASE_DOMAIN}` resolved to `192.168.2.20` (Gateway VIP), and
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`https://192.168.2.20:32400` returned `http=000` (nothing listening). PiHole's wildcard is why.
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- **`openssl` is present in the image** (`/usr/bin/openssl`, 3.0.13) — the hook's PEM→PKCS#12
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conversion has a tool to run.
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- **The issuer exists and works:** ClusterIssuer `letsencrypt-prod` `READY=True` (28d), and the
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existing `gateway/wildcard-home` Certificate is `Ready`/not-expired, which is what makes a DNS01
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issuance for a new name in this zone a reasonable expectation.
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- **The renderer's substitution guard caught a real defect in my own work**, which is recorded
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because it is the second time this class of bug has appeared here: my hook's explanatory comment
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contained brace-wrapped names, and `assert_substitution_safe` refused to emit
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(`'PX' is not a declared cluster-vars key — envsubst will replace it with the EMPTY STRING`).
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Reworded; the rendered hook now contains exactly one brace-wrapped name, `BASE_DOMAIN`, verified
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by parsing the emitted manifest.
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- **A `set -u` bug I introduced and then removed.** With `optional: true` the TLS env vars are
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genuinely UNSET when no certificate has issued; under `set -u` the first `[ -n ... ]` would abort
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the hook, and a postStart hook exiting non-zero makes kubelet KILL the container — the exact
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failure `optional` exists to prevent. Verified by parsing the rendered manifest that no `set -u`
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**command** remains (only two mentions in comments).
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- **Toolbox gate** (`./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c './ci/gate.sh'`): **rc 3**, with
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`spec-immutability`, `decisions-log`, `lint`, `l0`, `render-golden`, `l1` and `approval-policy` all
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**pass**; the rc 3 is the two known environmental skips (`gitea-settings` — no local
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`SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`; `conformance` L2/L3 — `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` unset). **Not green. Reported as
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rc 3.** `l0` passing is the specific proof the schema edit admits `optional` and still validates
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every catalog file; `render-golden` passing is the proof catalog and committed goldens agree.
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- **Only plex and pihole goldens moved.** No other service's manifest changed, and no service was
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silently onboarded.
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## What I did NOT verify
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- **THE OUTCOME, ENTIRELY. Nothing in this branch has been observed working.** It is unreconciled:
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no Certificate exists in prod, `plex-vip` still resolves to the Gateway VIP, `LanNetworksBandwidth`
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is still absent, and the hook has NEVER RUN. Every claim above is about the inputs, not the result.
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- **Whether the certificate will actually ISSUE.** DNS01 for a new name in this zone is inferred from
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the wildcard's success, not demonstrated. If the Cloudflare credential or solver is scoped in a way
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that fails for this name, Plex will start (by design) with no TLS and the advertised `https://` URL
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will be unservable — i.e. **this branch could leave the advertised URL broken in a new way**. First
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reconcile must be watched.
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- **Whether `openssl pkcs12 -export` produces a bundle PLEX ACCEPTS.** OpenSSL 3 defaults to AES-256
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+ SHA-256, which some consumers reject. Untested against Plex. If it is rejected, Plex may fail to
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load its TLS listener — the hook guards against a *missing* file, NOT against a present-but-
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unreadable one. **This is the single largest unverified risk in the change.**
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- **Whether the certificate prefs take effect without a restart.** Plex may need to re-initialise its
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listener after `customCertificatePath` changes. If so, the first reconcile applies the prefs and
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the SECOND start serves the cert. Converges either way, but the first start may look wrong.
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- **Whether `LanNetworksBandwidth` actually flips the Remote badge.** It is the correct setting by
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Plex's own documentation and the measured absence explains the symptom exactly, but I did not set it
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live and observe a client reclassify.
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- **SNAT makes the LAN definition coarser than it looks.** With `externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster`, Plex
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sees the ingress NODE's address for everything arriving via the VIP, so once `10.0.0.0/8` and
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`192.168.0.0/16` are LAN, GENUINE REMOTE clients arriving that way will ALSO be classified local
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and remote bandwidth limits will not bind on them. This is the metering consequence already
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accepted on 2026-10-03, now made stronger rather than weaker. Not measured.
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- **The public Cloudflare record for `plex-vip` is off-repo and absent from this branch**, as is the
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WAN tcp/32400 port-forward. Remote access cannot work until the operator creates both; nothing here
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can verify either, and this repo has no off-LAN vantage point.
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- **The private key is exposed in the container's environment** (`/proc/1/environ`) because the schema
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and renderer support no secret VOLUME — measured: `storage` accepts only
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[class, export, mountPath, name, readOnly, size, subPath] with `additionalProperties: false`, and
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no rendered app mounts a Secret. A volume would be the better shape; adding secret-volume support
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is the clean follow-up and I did not do it.
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- **The PKCS#12 passphrase is a hardcoded literal** (`plexvip`) in the rendered manifest. It protects
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nothing — Plex needs it in cleartext in `customCertificateKey` and it sits beside the bundle on the
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same PVC — but it is worth knowing it is not a secret and was never treated as one.
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- **Four places must agree and nothing enforces it:** `ADVERTISE_IP`, the hook's
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`customCertificateDomain`, `plex-cert.yaml`'s `dnsNames`, and PiHole's answer. No gate stage or
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conformance test checks that they match, or that PiHole's `plex-vip` answer still equals
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`${PLEX_L4_VIP}`.
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