feat(conformance): cover R-PLAT-01, R-NET-04, R-SEC-03 — 88.2% -> 94.1%, and fix an unrecordable-proof defect
Coverage 45/51 -> 48/51, gaps 6 -> 3 (R-C2-01, R-C2-02, R-STATE-04), 0 safety-critical. --strict-coverage exit 0; run.sh --layer l0 11/11 PASS. R-PLAT-01 — split L0 + L2, because "3 nodes with production-grade HA control plane" is half authored and half observable. l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code (92 assertions): environments DERIVED from the R-ENV-02 seam (never a hardcoded group name); k3s installed as `server` with no --datastore-endpoint/--disable-etcd anywhere; exactly ONE --cluster-init founder per environment; odd, quorum-capable server count with tolerance >= 1; tls-sans carry the VIP and every server IP; kube-vip leader-elected with cp_enable/svc_enable parsed from the template's OWN env pairs; each VIP outside its environment's LB pool and not a node IP. l2-behavioral/ha-control-plane: control-plane AND etcd role on every node, every node a REGISTERED etcd member, exactly 3 when the cluster says CLUSTER_ENV=prod, and an in-cluster Job curling /readyz through the VIP AND every server's own address — which proves the VIP fronts the API and that every server runs an apiserver, not one founder plus two joiners. An earlier draft probed those endpoints FROM THE RUNNER: that passes from prod's LAN and fails against dev (nodes behind the pfSense NAT), making the test a property of where it was launched. Hence the in-cluster Job. R-NET-04 — what it adds over R-NET-05/07 is the PATH SET and the totality/disjointness of the selecting rules, not another per-service check. l0-static/egress-paths-selected-by-rules (68 assertions): exactly two paths, the same closed set in schema + Kyverno policy + renderer; EXACTLY ONE CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy with a single selector matching only egress-class=vpn; nothing selects `internet` (absence of a rule IS the path); RFC1918 containment computed with `ipaddress` plus every address each overlay assigns itself; the tunnel default route and blackhole confined to table 51820 behind an ip rule that must carry a from/fwmark/iif selector; and the nft chain `policy accept` with every drop qualified — the internet-fails-OPEN direction that R-NET-06's L3 test does not assert. R-SEC-03 — refuses the tautology "a test exists, therefore it is auditable". l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible (78 assertions) drives the real machinery: each of docs/07's five proofs must have an EXECUTABLE test at the layer the spec's wording demands (fault injection and DR drill => L3), taken from status.py's own verdict; run.sh --requirements must resolve and pass the gate's --require assertion; each proof declares a sentinel record_run.py can attribute, computed with record_run.parse_sentinels itself; and TWO FORGERIES are mounted against the real tools — a green JUnit whose log holds only a SKIP token, and a ledger row claiming `proven` at the root commit — which must come back not-proven and stale-proof. The five proofs are parsed from docs/07 when the spec is mounted, not hand-listed. *** A REAL DEFECT FOUND AND FIXED, not asserted around. *** l2-behavioral's default-deny, trusted-tls and gateway-ingress-reachable declared NO pass sentinel, so record_run.py could never attribute a pass to them — the isolation and TLS audit proofs were STRUCTURALLY UNRECORDABLE (landing as unknown-no-sentinel-declared, and status.py requires all of a requirement's tests to be proven). Each now ends with an additive terminal sentinel step reached only when every prior step passed. Verified: all three carry it. TWO HOLLOW DRAFT ASSERTIONS CAUGHT BY THE AGENT ITSELF, both the failure mode this repo keeps hitting: (a) `svc_enable=false` matched a COMMENT in the kube-vip role defaults, so flipping the template to true still passed — now parses the DaemonSet template's env pairs; (b) the nft scoping check searched for the VALUE of a Jinja variable while the template carries its NAME, matching nothing and passing vacuously — templates are now rendered against role defaults first. 30 perturbations across the three checks, all caught, plus 16 synthetic L2 perturbations via a fake-kubectl shim. R-C2-01/02 judged IMPLEMENTATION gaps, so no test was written: Homepage's widgets.yaml carries only datetime and search, kubernetes.yaml is empty, automountServiceAccountToken is false, and its NetworkPolicy allows DNS egress only — no health source is even reachable. It has already drifted (crafty authors a route with no tile). A test today would go red on both; it must ship WITH the config fix. VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. Neither cluster mutated. Refs R-PLAT-01, R-NET-04, R-SEC-03, R-TEST-01..05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -153,3 +153,20 @@ spec:
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finally:
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- script:
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content: 'echo "cleanup handled by chainsaw namespace teardown"'
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
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# chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
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# green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
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# GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
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# `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
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# forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-NET-01 — the isolation half of docs/07's audit proof list
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# — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
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# acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
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# is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
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# tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
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- name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
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try:
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- script:
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content: echo DEFAULT_DENY_PROVEN_OK
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check:
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(contains($stdout, 'DEFAULT_DENY_PROVEN_OK')): true
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@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
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# =============================================================================
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# L2 BEHAVIORAL — the default egress path is the WAN; the VPN is opt-in (R-NET-04) [RUNNABLE]
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# Catalog: docs/14 L2 row ("real runtime behavior, probes against a cluster")
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# Spec: docs/00 R-NET-04 ("The platform MUST support **multiple egress paths** selected by
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# routing rules ... realized as two paths — the local `internet` path and the
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# in-cluster `vpn` path").
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# docs/03 §"Egress routing: two paths, one physical WAN": "the `internet` path is
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# simply the default route out".
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# docs/03 §"VPN egress model": "**Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in.**
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# Every pod — and the nodes themselves — egress the local/private WAN by default and
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# **never** the VPN. Only services labeled `egress-class=vpn` are steered to the
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# tunnel"; and the tunnel "is **split-tunnel**: ... only what Cilium points at `tun0`
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# uses the VPN."
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#
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# WHAT THIS PROVES THAT tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class DOES NOT
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# --------------------------------------------------------------
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# That test (R-NET-05/07) compares two LABELLED pods — `internet` vs `vpn` — and shows their
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# public IPs differ, then flips a label. Both of its pods declared a class, so it says nothing
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# about the case R-NET-04 actually turns on: a pod that NO routing rule selects. This test adds
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# that pod, and asserts the two claims that make a rule-selected path set complete:
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#
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# TOTALITY — an UNLABELLED pod egresses the WAN, i.e. the same public IP as the
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# explicitly-`internet` pod. Absence of a matching rule IS a path, and it is
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# the local one. If the steering rule ever widened (an empty selector, a
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# matchExpression, a second rule), this pod's IP would move to the tunnel and
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# this assertion is what would notice.
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# COEXISTENCE — the WAN path and the VPN path are live AT THE SAME TIME, observed in one
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# pass: three pods, two distinct public IPs. "Multiple egress paths" is a
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# simultaneity claim, not a claim that one switch has two positions.
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# PER-DESTINATION SELECTION — the vpn-class pod still reaches an in-cluster/RFC1918
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# destination over the LOCAL path while its public traffic is tunnelled. The
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# tunnel is destination-scoped (excludedCIDRs), not a default route, so ONE pod
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# uses BOTH paths at once.
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#
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# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): no address, hostname or range appears. Every assertion is a
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# RELATION between observed values (equal / not-equal), so it holds against dev and prod alike
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# and survives the WAN or the VPN provider rotating addresses.
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#
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# GIVEN one unlabelled, one `internet`-class and one `vpn`-class pod — the same workload three
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# times, differing only in the class they declare (or do not),
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# WHEN each asks an external echo for the public IP it egressed from, and the vpn-class pod
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# also resolves a name through the in-cluster resolver,
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# THEN the unlabelled pod's public IP EQUALS the internet-class pod's (the default route out
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# is the WAN, and the VPN is strictly opt-in);
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# AND the vpn-class pod's public IP DIFFERS from both (a second, simultaneously-live path);
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# AND the vpn-class pod still resolves in-cluster (its private-destination traffic was not
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# swallowed by the tunnel), so the same pod is using both paths at once.
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#
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# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
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# - THAT NO OTHER RULE EXISTS. Three pods cannot enumerate a rule set. That exactly one
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# steering rule is authored, that it selects only the vpn class, that no `ip rule` is
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# unscoped and no nftables DROP unqualified is the L0 half, in
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# tests/l0-static/egress-paths-selected-by-rules (same requirement label).
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# - WHICH INTERFACE the packets left by. The observation is the public IP an external echo
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# reports; it distinguishes the paths without naming them. Asserting "out tun0" would need
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# host-level datapath inspection (Hubble/tcpdump on the gateway node), which no test in
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# this suite does.
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# - THE KILL-SWITCH. Tunnel-down behaviour is R-NET-06's, at L3 (vpn-killswitch): `vpn`
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# fails closed. Its mirror — that `internet` is never blackholed — is asserted statically
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# by the L0 half, not here.
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# - NODE traffic. docs/03 also says "the nodes themselves" egress the WAN by default. That
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# is a host-level fact this test cannot see from a pod.
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# - EXTERNAL DEPENDENCY, stated plainly: the public-IP echo (api.ipify.org) is off-cluster,
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# so a WAN outage or the echo being down fails this test. That is the same dependency
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# tests/l2-behavioral/egress-class already carries; the alternative — trusting the
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# cluster's own account of which path it used — would not be a behavioural test at all.
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#
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# CLEANUP: chainsaw deletes the per-test namespace (all three pods with it). Nothing outside
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# that namespace is created or changed — no label on a platform object, no policy edit.
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# =============================================================================
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apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
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kind: Test
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metadata:
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name: egress-default-path
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labels:
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conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-04: "true"
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annotations:
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conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-04"
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conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
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conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
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conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
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conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
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Given an unlabelled, an internet-class and a vpn-class pod, when each observes the public
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IP it egressed from, then the unlabelled pod's IP equals the internet-class pod's (the
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default route out is the WAN, the VPN is opt-in) while the vpn-class pod's differs — two
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paths live at once — and the vpn-class pod still reaches in-cluster destinations over the
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local path, so one pod uses both paths simultaneously.
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spec:
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timeouts:
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apply: 60s
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assert: 2m
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exec: 3m
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steps:
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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- name: given-three-pods-differing-only-in-their-declared-egress-class
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try:
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- apply:
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file: fixtures/three-egress-pods.yaml
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# Bare pods (restartPolicy: Never) — Ready == Running here.
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata: { name: egress-unlabelled }
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status: { phase: Running }
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata: { name: egress-internet }
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status: { phase: Running }
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- assert:
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resource:
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Pod
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metadata: { name: egress-vpn }
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status: { phase: Running }
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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- name: then-the-unlabelled-pod-takes-the-wan-and-the-vpn-path-is-live-too
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try:
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- script:
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content: |
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set -eu
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ns="$NAMESPACE"
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get_ip() {
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# Echo the pod's observed public IP, or empty on failure.
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kubectl -n "$ns" exec "$1" -c curl -- \
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curl -fsS --max-time 10 https://api.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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# Poll until all three answer AND the vpn class has diverged from the WAN:
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# Cilium may still be programming the egress datapath just after the pods go
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# Ready. Bounded by the loop, never a bare sleep-and-hope.
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none="" inet="" vpn=""
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for i in $(seq 1 12); do
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[ -n "$none" ] || none="$(get_ip egress-unlabelled)"
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[ -n "$inet" ] || inet="$(get_ip egress-internet)"
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[ -n "$vpn" ] || vpn="$(get_ip egress-vpn)"
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if [ -n "$none" ] && [ -n "$inet" ] && [ -n "$vpn" ]; then
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[ "$vpn" != "$inet" ] && break
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# Steering may not have converged; re-read the vpn pod only.
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vpn=""
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fi
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sleep 5
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done
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echo "unlabelled_ip=$none internet_ip=$inet vpn_ip=$vpn"
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[ -n "$none" ] || { echo "FAIL: the UNLABELLED pod never returned a public IP — a pod that declares no egress class must still reach the internet over the default WAN path (docs/03: 'the internet path is simply the default route out'); no path at all means the default was blackholed or steered into a dead tunnel" >&2; exit 1; }
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[ -n "$inet" ] || { echo "FAIL: the internet-class pod never returned a public IP — the declared default path is down, so no comparison is possible" >&2; exit 1; }
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[ -n "$vpn" ] || { echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod never returned a public IP — the second egress path is not carrying traffic, so the platform is not offering MULTIPLE paths (R-NET-04)" >&2; exit 1; }
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# TOTALITY: no rule selects the unlabelled pod, so it must land on the WAN —
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# the same WAN the explicitly-internet pod uses.
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if [ "$none" != "$inet" ]; then
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echo "FAIL: the UNLABELLED pod egressed $none but the internet-class pod egressed $inet. They must be the same path: docs/03 — 'Default is the WAN; the VPN is strictly opt-in. Every pod ... egress the local/private WAN by default and never the VPN.' A different IP means some rule is selecting a pod that never opted in." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# COEXISTENCE: and the vpn path is a genuinely different path, live right now.
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if [ "$vpn" = "$inet" ]; then
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echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod egressed the same public IP as the WAN ($vpn) — there is only ONE live egress path, so 'multiple egress paths selected by routing rules' (R-NET-04) does not hold" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "EGRESS_DEFAULT_PATH_IS_WAN_OK"
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check:
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(contains($stdout, 'EGRESS_DEFAULT_PATH_IS_WAN_OK')): true
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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- name: then-the-vpn-class-pod-still-reaches-private-destinations-locally
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try:
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- script:
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# PER-DESTINATION SELECTION. The steering rule tunnels 0.0.0.0/0 MINUS all
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# RFC1918 space, so a vpn-class pod's private-destination traffic must stay on the
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# local datapath. The cluster resolver is an in-cluster (RFC1918) address reached
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# from the pod's own /etc/resolv.conf — no literal is written here — so a
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# successful lookup from the vpn-class pod proves the tunnel did not swallow its
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# local traffic, i.e. ONE pod is using BOTH paths at the same time.
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content: |
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set -eu
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ns="$NAMESPACE"
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resolver="$(kubectl -n "$ns" exec egress-vpn -c curl -- \
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sh -c 'awk "/^nameserver/{print \$2; exit}" /etc/resolv.conf' 2>/dev/null || true)"
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[ -n "$resolver" ] || { echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod has no nameserver in /etc/resolv.conf, so its local-path reachability cannot be observed" >&2; exit 1; }
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echo "vpn_pod_resolver=$resolver (in-cluster, RFC1918 — excluded from the tunnel)"
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# A cluster-internal name, resolvable only by the in-cluster resolver: reaching
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# it proves the private-destination path works from a vpn-class pod.
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out=""
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for i in $(seq 1 6); do
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out="$(kubectl -n "$ns" exec egress-vpn -c curl -- \
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nslookup kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local 2>/dev/null || true)"
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case "$out" in *"Address"*) break ;; esac
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sleep 5
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done
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case "$out" in
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*Address*) : ;;
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*) echo "FAIL: the vpn-class pod could not resolve kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local via its in-cluster resolver ($resolver). Its RFC1918 traffic is being steered into the tunnel (or blackholed) instead of taking the local path — the two paths are not coexisting per destination, and the tunnel is behaving as a default route (docs/03: split-tunnel, 'only what Cilium points at tun0 uses the VPN')" >&2; exit 1 ;;
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esac
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echo "EGRESS_PATHS_COEXIST_PER_DESTINATION_OK"
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check:
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(contains($stdout, 'EGRESS_PATHS_COEXIST_PER_DESTINATION_OK')): true
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
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||||
# Three pods for the R-NET-04 default-path test — the SAME workload three times, differing
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# ONLY in how (or whether) they declare an egress class:
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#
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# egress-unlabelled NO egress-class label at all -> selected by NO routing rule
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# egress-internet egress-class: internet -> the declared default path
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# egress-vpn egress-class: vpn -> the only class any rule steers
|
||||
#
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||||
# WHY AN UNLABELLED POD IS THE POINT. docs/03: "Every pod — and the nodes themselves — egress
|
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# the local/private WAN by default and **never** the VPN." The unlabelled pod is the case no
|
||||
# other test covers: nothing selects it, so the DATAPATH's default must carry it, and it must
|
||||
# come out the same WAN as the explicitly-`internet` pod. That is the totality half of
|
||||
# R-NET-04's "selected by routing rules" — absence of a rule is itself a path.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The unlabelled pod is admissible here only because chainsaw's per-test namespace is not an
|
||||
# app namespace: Kyverno's require-egress-class-label (R-NET-05) rejects an unlabelled pod in
|
||||
# a namespace labelled homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace=true. That admission guarantee
|
||||
# is R-NET-05's, and it is exactly why this test must run outside an app namespace to observe
|
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# the datapath's own default at all.
|
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apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Pod
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: egress-unlabelled
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
app: egress-default-path-test
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: curl
|
||||
image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
|
||||
command: ["sleep", "3600"]
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
requests: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
|
||||
limits: { memory: 32Mi }
|
||||
restartPolicy: Never
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Pod
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: egress-internet
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
app: egress-default-path-test
|
||||
homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: internet
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: curl
|
||||
image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
|
||||
command: ["sleep", "3600"]
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
requests: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
|
||||
limits: { memory: 32Mi }
|
||||
restartPolicy: Never
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Pod
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: egress-vpn
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
app: egress-default-path-test
|
||||
homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class: vpn
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: curl
|
||||
image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
|
||||
command: ["sleep", "3600"]
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
requests: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
|
||||
limits: { memory: 32Mi }
|
||||
restartPolicy: Never
|
||||
@@ -313,3 +313,20 @@ spec:
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: Namespace
|
||||
name: conformance-gw-probe
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
|
||||
# chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
|
||||
# green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
|
||||
# GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
|
||||
# `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
|
||||
# forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-NET-01/02/03 — north-south reachability under default-deny, part of the isolation proof
|
||||
# — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
|
||||
# acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
|
||||
# is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
|
||||
# tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
|
||||
- name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
|
||||
try:
|
||||
- script:
|
||||
content: echo GATEWAY_INGRESS_ISOLATION_PROVEN_OK
|
||||
check:
|
||||
(contains($stdout, 'GATEWAY_INGRESS_ISOLATION_PROVEN_OK')): true
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
# L2 BEHAVIORAL — the cluster under test IS an HA k3s control plane (R-PLAT-01) [RUNNABLE]
|
||||
# Catalog: docs/14 L2 row ("real runtime behavior, probes against a cluster")
|
||||
# Spec: docs/00 R-PLAT-01 ("The platform MUST run on k3s across 3 nodes with
|
||||
# production-grade HA control plane in prod; dev/test MAY run fewer nodes but MUST
|
||||
# exercise the same multi-node topology.")
|
||||
# docs/01 "Kubernetes distro | **k3s** (HA, embedded etcd) | R-PLAT-01/02"
|
||||
# docs/02 table: "Control plane | HA embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3) | HA
|
||||
# embedded etcd (k3s server on all 3)"
|
||||
# "Node count | 3 VMs (mirror prod topology) | 3 physical nodes"
|
||||
# docs/02 §"k3s topology decisions": "HA control plane with **embedded etcd** across
|
||||
# all 3 nodes (no external datastore)"; "Nodes are both control-plane and workload
|
||||
# (3-node converged cluster)".
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHY L2 — AND WHAT L0 ALREADY DID
|
||||
# --------------------------------
|
||||
# tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code (same requirement label) proves the AUTHORED
|
||||
# half offline: the repo builds a 3-server embedded-etcd control plane in both environments,
|
||||
# one founder, no external datastore, a leader-elected control-plane-only VIP in the serving
|
||||
# cert's SANs. It cannot prove that any of it is TRUE OF A RUNNING CLUSTER — an inventory
|
||||
# entry is not a node, and a templated DaemonSet is not a floating VIP. That is this test:
|
||||
# every assertion below is read from the cluster the suite is pointed at.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ENVIRONMENT-AGNOSTIC (R-ENV-02): no address, hostname, node count or range is written
|
||||
# here. The expected node count comes from the cluster's OWN declared identity
|
||||
# (flux-system/cluster-vars CLUSTER_ENV, via a test-level chainsaw binding — the same
|
||||
# ConfigMap Flux substitutes from); the control-plane VIP is read out of the kube-vip
|
||||
# DaemonSet the cluster is actually running; the server addresses come from the Node
|
||||
# objects; and the LoadBalancer pool the VIP must stay outside of is read from cluster-vars
|
||||
# too. R-PLAT-01 itself distinguishes prod from dev/test ("3 nodes ... in prod; dev/test MAY
|
||||
# run fewer"), so the assertion is necessarily environment-AWARE — but it takes the
|
||||
# environment from the cluster, never from a flag or a literal, which is precisely the
|
||||
# mechanism the tests/README.md convention prescribes.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# GIVEN the cluster this suite is pointed at,
|
||||
# WHEN its Nodes, its kube-vip DaemonSet and its kube-apiserver endpoints are inspected,
|
||||
# THEN DISTRO: every node's kubelet is a k3s build (`+k3s`) — the distro really is k3s;
|
||||
# SERVERS: every Ready node is BOTH control-plane AND etcd (the converged 3-node
|
||||
# topology docs/02 fixes — no agent-only node, no control-plane-only node),
|
||||
# the count is ODD and quorum-capable (tolerates >= 1 loss), and it is
|
||||
# EXACTLY three when the cluster declares itself prod;
|
||||
# ETCD: every one of those nodes is a REGISTERED embedded-etcd member (k3s stamps
|
||||
# `etcd.k3s.cattle.io/node-name` on a node that joined the etcd cluster), so
|
||||
# the datastore is embedded and replicated across all of them;
|
||||
# VIP: kube-vip is Ready on EVERY control-plane node, is control-plane-only
|
||||
# (svc_enable=false — it must not contend with Cilium LB-IPAM for ARP), and
|
||||
# the address it floats is neither a node address, nor the ingress Gateway
|
||||
# VIP, nor inside the Cilium LoadBalancer pool;
|
||||
# ENDPOINT: the kube-apiserver answers `/readyz` THROUGH THAT VIP over TLS that
|
||||
# validates against the cluster CA for the VIP itself — i.e. the VIP really
|
||||
# fronts the API and the serving cert really carries it;
|
||||
# EVERY SERVER SERVES: the apiserver also answers `/readyz` on EVERY server's own
|
||||
# address, again with a CA-valid cert for that address. This is the assertion
|
||||
# that separates a real HA control plane from one server plus two joiners:
|
||||
# if only the founder ran an apiserver, the other addresses would refuse.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# THE PROBE RUNS IN-CLUSTER, DELIBERATELY. An earlier draft dialled the VIP and the node
|
||||
# addresses from the RUNNER. That works from a host on the node LAN (verified against prod)
|
||||
# and FAILS against dev, whose nodes sit behind a NAT the runner reaches only via a
|
||||
# forwarded port — i.e. it would have made the test a property of where it was launched
|
||||
# from. A Job on the cluster is on the node network in both environments, so the probe is
|
||||
# the same probe everywhere. The Job is created imperatively (kubectl heredoc) rather than
|
||||
# as a fixture file because its address list is DISCOVERED from the cluster at run time —
|
||||
# writing it into a fixture is exactly the per-environment literal R-ENV-02 forbids.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* PROVE (honest gaps — do not read this test as claiming them):
|
||||
# - FAILOVER / SURVIVAL. Nothing here removes a node. That etcd keeps quorum, that the VIP
|
||||
# migrates, and that the API stays reachable when a server dies is an L3 fault-injection
|
||||
# claim and is proven NOWHERE in this suite yet (tests/l3-fault-injection/node-loss
|
||||
# drains a node for R-STATE-02's data-availability claim and asserts nothing about the
|
||||
# control plane). This is the largest remaining R-PLAT-01 gap.
|
||||
# - THE NEXT environment. That the repo would build an HA control plane again is the L0
|
||||
# half (tests/l0-static/ha-control-plane-as-code).
|
||||
# - "PRODUCTION-GRADE" as a capacity/performance judgement (operator's, docs/02 + §2 of
|
||||
# infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md).
|
||||
# - Cilium's own `k8sServiceHost` (cluster-vars `K3S_API_HOST`) is the PRIMARY NODE's
|
||||
# address, not this VIP, in both environments. That single-node dependency in the CNI's
|
||||
# control-plane path is escalated to the PM, not asserted here (R-TEST-06).
|
||||
# - etcd health beyond membership registration (raft leader, DB size, alarms) — k3s exposes
|
||||
# it only on the node-local etcd metrics port, which is not reachable through the
|
||||
# Kubernetes API this test is allowed to use.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# CLEANUP: the probe Job lives in chainsaw's per-test namespace and is deleted with it
|
||||
# (config/chainsaw-config.yaml skipDelete: false). Everything else is read-only: this test
|
||||
# creates nothing outside its own namespace and mutates no platform object.
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
|
||||
kind: Test
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: ha-control-plane
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
conformance.home.k3s/R-PLAT-01: "true"
|
||||
annotations:
|
||||
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-PLAT-01"
|
||||
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
|
||||
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
|
||||
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
|
||||
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
|
||||
Given the cluster under test, when its Nodes, kube-vip DaemonSet and apiserver
|
||||
endpoints are probed, then every node is a k3s server that is both control-plane and a
|
||||
registered embedded-etcd member, the count is odd and quorum-capable (exactly three
|
||||
when the cluster declares itself prod), kube-vip floats a control-plane-only VIP that
|
||||
collides with no allocator, and the apiserver answers /readyz through that VIP AND on
|
||||
every server's own address with a CA-valid cert.
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
timeouts:
|
||||
apply: 60s
|
||||
assert: 2m
|
||||
exec: 3m
|
||||
# -- R-ENV-02: the environment's identity and its address allocations are READ FROM THE
|
||||
# CLUSTER UNDER TEST. flux-system/cluster-vars is the ConfigMap Flux itself substitutes
|
||||
# from, so these are the same values the platform was rendered with. Test-level, so
|
||||
# they are in scope for every step (step outputs/bindings are step-scoped).
|
||||
bindings:
|
||||
- name: clusterEnv
|
||||
value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.CLUSTER_ENV)
|
||||
- name: gatewayVip
|
||||
value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.GATEWAY_VIP)
|
||||
- name: lbPoolStart
|
||||
value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.CILIUM_LB_POOL_START)
|
||||
- name: lbPoolStop
|
||||
value: (x_k8s_get($client, 'v1', 'ConfigMap', 'flux-system', 'cluster-vars').data.CILIUM_LB_POOL_STOP)
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: then-the-node-set-is-a-quorum-capable-converged-k3s-control-plane
|
||||
description: >-
|
||||
Read the Node objects: k3s on every node, every node both control-plane and a
|
||||
registered embedded-etcd member, an odd quorum-capable count, exactly three in prod.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
- script:
|
||||
env:
|
||||
- name: CLUSTER_ENV
|
||||
value: ($clusterEnv)
|
||||
content: |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
total="$(kubectl get nodes -o name | grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
[ "$total" -ge 1 ] || fail "the cluster reports NO nodes at all"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- k3s, on every node (R-PLAT-01 names the distro; docs/01 ADR-0001) -----
|
||||
# A non-k3s kubelet here would mean the platform is not running on k3s.
|
||||
notk3s="$(kubectl get nodes \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"="}{.status.nodeInfo.kubeletVersion}{"\n"}{end}' \
|
||||
| grep -v '+k3s' | grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
[ "$notk3s" = "0" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$notk3s node(s) do not run a k3s kubelet — R-PLAT-01 requires the platform to run on k3s"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- every node is BOTH control-plane AND etcd (docs/02 converged topology) -
|
||||
# Counted by label EXISTENCE, so it does not matter whether k3s writes "true"
|
||||
# or "". A control-plane node without the etcd role would be a server with an
|
||||
# external/absent datastore; an etcd node without control-plane would be an
|
||||
# isolated datastore member. Both are excluded by requiring all three counts
|
||||
# to be equal.
|
||||
cp="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane -o name | grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
etcd="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/etcd -o name | grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
echo "nodes_total=$total control_plane=$cp etcd=$etcd cluster_env=${CLUSTER_ENV:-<unset>}"
|
||||
[ "$cp" = "$total" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$cp of $total nodes carry node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane — docs/02 fixes a converged cluster where every node is a control-plane member ('k3s server on all 3')"
|
||||
[ "$etcd" = "$total" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$etcd of $total nodes carry node-role.kubernetes.io/etcd — docs/02 requires embedded etcd 'across all 3 nodes (no external datastore)'"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- every node is a REGISTERED embedded-etcd member -----------------------
|
||||
# k3s stamps etcd.k3s.cattle.io/node-name on a node that actually joined the
|
||||
# embedded-etcd cluster. The role label alone is a label; this annotation is
|
||||
# the datastore's own record of membership.
|
||||
members="$(kubectl get nodes \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.annotations.etcd\.k3s\.cattle\.io/node-name}{"\n"}{end}' \
|
||||
| grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
[ "$members" = "$total" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$members of $total nodes are registered embedded-etcd members (etcd.k3s.cattle.io/node-name) — the datastore is not replicated across every server"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Ready ---------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
notready="$(kubectl get nodes \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"="}{range .status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")]}{.status}{end}{"\n"}{end}' \
|
||||
| grep -v '=True$' | grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
[ "$notready" = "0" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$notready node(s) are not Ready — a control plane missing a member is not the HA topology under test"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- quorum arithmetic ---------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Embedded etcd needs floor(N/2)+1 members to commit. Fault tolerance is
|
||||
# N - quorum; 'production-grade HA' must survive at least one loss, which
|
||||
# rules out 1 and 2 members. An EVEN count buys no extra tolerance and adds
|
||||
# a tie, so it is also rejected.
|
||||
quorum=$(( total / 2 + 1 ))
|
||||
tolerance=$(( total - quorum ))
|
||||
echo "quorum=$quorum tolerance=$tolerance"
|
||||
[ "$tolerance" -ge 1 ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$total etcd member(s) give quorum $quorum and tolerate $tolerance loss(es) — an HA control plane must survive losing a server"
|
||||
[ $(( total % 2 )) -eq 1 ] \
|
||||
|| fail "$total etcd members is EVEN: quorum is the same as for $(( total - 1 )) members, so the extra member adds a tie instead of tolerance"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- the count R-PLAT-01 itself fixes, per environment --------------------
|
||||
# The environment is the cluster's OWN CLUSTER_ENV (cluster-vars), never a
|
||||
# flag: 'k3s across 3 nodes ... in prod; dev/test MAY run fewer nodes but MUST
|
||||
# exercise the same multi-node topology'.
|
||||
case "${CLUSTER_ENV:-}" in
|
||||
prod)
|
||||
[ "$total" = "3" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "this cluster declares CLUSTER_ENV=prod and has $total nodes — R-PLAT-01 requires 'k3s across 3 nodes ... in prod' (docs/02: '3 physical nodes')" ;;
|
||||
"")
|
||||
fail "flux-system/cluster-vars has no CLUSTER_ENV — the cluster does not declare which environment it is, so R-PLAT-01's prod clause has no referent (and no literal may be substituted for it)" ;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
[ "$total" -ge 2 ] \
|
||||
|| fail "this cluster declares CLUSTER_ENV=${CLUSTER_ENV} and has $total node(s) — dev/test may run fewer nodes than prod but MUST 'exercise the same multi-node topology'" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
echo "HA_TOPOLOGY_OK"
|
||||
check:
|
||||
(contains($stdout, 'HA_TOPOLOGY_OK')): true
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: then-a-control-plane-only-vip-is-floated-on-every-server
|
||||
description: >-
|
||||
Read the running kube-vip DaemonSet: Ready on every control-plane node,
|
||||
control-plane-only, and floating an address that collides with no other allocator.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
- script:
|
||||
env:
|
||||
- name: GATEWAY_VIP
|
||||
value: ($gatewayVip)
|
||||
- name: LB_POOL_START
|
||||
value: ($lbPoolStart)
|
||||
- name: LB_POOL_STOP
|
||||
value: ($lbPoolStop)
|
||||
content: |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
# dotted quad -> integer, for range comparison without ipcalc/python.
|
||||
n() { echo "$1" | awk -F. '{printf "%d", ($1*16777216)+($2*65536)+($3*256)+$4}'; }
|
||||
|
||||
# The DaemonSet is found by the label roles/kube_vip stamps on it, not by a
|
||||
# hardcoded name in a namespace this test guessed.
|
||||
ds="$(kubectl -n kube-system get ds -l app.kubernetes.io/name=kube-vip-ds -o name | head -1)"
|
||||
[ -n "$ds" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "no kube-vip DaemonSet is running in kube-system — the kube-apiserver has no floating endpoint, so losing the founder takes the API endpoint with it"
|
||||
|
||||
desired="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" -o jsonpath='{.status.desiredNumberScheduled}')"
|
||||
ready="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" -o jsonpath='{.status.numberReady}')"
|
||||
cp="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane -o name | grep -c . || true)"
|
||||
vip="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="address")].value}')"
|
||||
cp_enable="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="cp_enable")].value}')"
|
||||
svc_enable="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="svc_enable")].value}')"
|
||||
echo "kube_vip=$ds ready=$ready/$desired control_plane_nodes=$cp vip=$vip cp_enable=$cp_enable svc_enable=$svc_enable"
|
||||
|
||||
[ -n "$vip" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "the kube-vip DaemonSet announces no address — nothing is floated"
|
||||
[ "$cp_enable" = "true" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "kube-vip runs with cp_enable=$cp_enable — control-plane mode is off, so it floats no API VIP"
|
||||
[ "$svc_enable" = "false" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "kube-vip runs with svc_enable=$svc_enable — it would also serve Service LoadBalancers and contend with Cilium LB-IPAM for ARP on the same addresses (ADR-0002 gives Service LB to Cilium)"
|
||||
[ "$desired" = "$cp" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "kube-vip is scheduled on $desired node(s) but there are $cp control-plane nodes — the VIP must be able to move to ANY server, or its failover set is smaller than the control plane"
|
||||
[ "$ready" = "$desired" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "kube-vip is Ready on $ready of $desired nodes — a VIP holder that is not running cannot take the address over"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- the VIP collides with nothing --------------------------------------
|
||||
node_ips="$(kubectl get nodes \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.addresses[?(@.type=="InternalIP")].address}{"\n"}{end}' \
|
||||
| grep -c "^${vip}$" || true)"
|
||||
[ "$node_ips" = "0" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "the floated VIP $vip is ALSO a node's own InternalIP — a VIP that is a node's address cannot float off that node"
|
||||
[ "$vip" != "${GATEWAY_VIP:-}" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "the control-plane VIP and the ingress Gateway VIP are the same address ($vip) — kube-vip and Cilium would both ARP for it"
|
||||
if [ -n "${LB_POOL_START:-}" ] && [ -n "${LB_POOL_STOP:-}" ]; then
|
||||
v="$(n "$vip")"; lo="$(n "$LB_POOL_START")"; hi="$(n "$LB_POOL_STOP")"
|
||||
[ "$lo" -le "$hi" ] \
|
||||
|| fail "the cluster's Cilium LB pool ${LB_POOL_START}-${LB_POOL_STOP} is inverted, so the VIP cannot be proven to be outside it"
|
||||
if [ "$v" -ge "$lo" ] && [ "$v" -le "$hi" ]; then
|
||||
fail "the control-plane VIP $vip lies INSIDE this cluster's Cilium LoadBalancer pool ${LB_POOL_START}-${LB_POOL_STOP} — LB-IPAM could hand the kube-API's VIP to a Service"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
fail "flux-system/cluster-vars declares no CILIUM_LB_POOL_START/STOP — the separation between the control-plane VIP and the Service-LB allocator cannot be checked, and no literal range may be substituted for it (R-ENV-02)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "HA_VIP_CONTROL_PLANE_ONLY_OK"
|
||||
check:
|
||||
(contains($stdout, 'HA_VIP_CONTROL_PLANE_ONLY_OK')): true
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: then-the-apiserver-answers-through-the-vip-and-on-every-server
|
||||
description: >-
|
||||
From inside the cluster, probe /readyz on the floated VIP and on every server's own
|
||||
address, validating TLS against the cluster CA for the address dialled.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
- script:
|
||||
# The address list is DISCOVERED here (Nodes + the kube-vip DaemonSet), so the
|
||||
# Job cannot be a static fixture — writing the addresses down is the
|
||||
# per-environment literal R-ENV-02 forbids. Hence the imperative heredoc, the
|
||||
# same pattern tests/l3-fault-injection/dr-restore uses for run-time-shaped
|
||||
# fixtures. The Job lives in chainsaw's per-test namespace and is torn down with
|
||||
# it; nothing outside that namespace is created or changed.
|
||||
content: |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
ns="$NAMESPACE"
|
||||
fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
ds="$(kubectl -n kube-system get ds -l app.kubernetes.io/name=kube-vip-ds -o name | head -1)"
|
||||
vip="$(kubectl -n kube-system get "$ds" \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].env[?(@.name=="address")].value}')"
|
||||
servers="$(kubectl get nodes -l node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane \
|
||||
-o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.status.addresses[?(@.type=="InternalIP")].address}{" "}{end}')"
|
||||
[ -n "$vip" ] || fail "no floated VIP to probe"
|
||||
[ -n "$servers" ] || fail "no control-plane node addresses to probe"
|
||||
echo "probing vip=$vip servers=$servers"
|
||||
|
||||
# The probe pod authenticates with its own ServiceAccount token and validates
|
||||
# TLS against the cluster CA, both from the projected SA volume. /readyz is
|
||||
# authorized for any authenticated identity via the built-in
|
||||
# system:public-info-viewer role — anonymous access is NOT relied on (verified:
|
||||
# an unauthenticated /readyz on this platform answers 401).
|
||||
kubectl -n "$ns" apply -f - <<EOF
|
||||
apiVersion: batch/v1
|
||||
kind: Job
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: ha-api-endpoint-probe
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
backoffLimit: 1
|
||||
activeDeadlineSeconds: 150
|
||||
template:
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
restartPolicy: Never
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: probe
|
||||
image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
|
||||
env:
|
||||
- name: VIP
|
||||
value: "${vip}"
|
||||
- name: SERVERS
|
||||
value: "${servers}"
|
||||
command:
|
||||
- sh
|
||||
- -c
|
||||
- |
|
||||
set -u
|
||||
SA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
|
||||
probe() { # \$1 = address to dial
|
||||
curl -sS --max-time 15 \\
|
||||
--cacert "\$SA/ca.crt" \\
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer \$(cat \$SA/token)" \\
|
||||
"https://\$1:6443/readyz"
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc=0
|
||||
out="\$(probe "\$VIP" 2>&1)" || rc=1
|
||||
echo "vip \$VIP -> [\$out]"
|
||||
if [ "\$rc" != "0" ] || [ "\$out" != "ok" ]; then
|
||||
echo "FAIL: the kube-apiserver did not answer /readyz through the floated VIP \$VIP with a CA-valid cert for that address — the VIP does not front the API (or it is missing from the serving cert's SANs)"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
for s in \$SERVERS; do
|
||||
rc=0
|
||||
out="\$(probe "\$s" 2>&1)" || rc=1
|
||||
echo "server \$s -> [\$out]"
|
||||
if [ "\$rc" != "0" ] || [ "\$out" != "ok" ]; then
|
||||
echo "FAIL: server \$s does not answer /readyz with a CA-valid cert for its own address — it is not running a kube-apiserver, so the control plane is not HA across every node"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
echo "HA_API_ENDPOINT_OK"
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
# Bounded wait; on failure surface the probe's own output before failing.
|
||||
if ! kubectl -n "$ns" wait --for=condition=complete --timeout=140s job/ha-api-endpoint-probe; then
|
||||
kubectl -n "$ns" logs job/ha-api-endpoint-probe --tail=40 || true
|
||||
fail "the in-cluster API-endpoint probe did not complete — see its log above"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
logs="$(kubectl -n "$ns" logs job/ha-api-endpoint-probe --tail=40)"
|
||||
echo "$logs"
|
||||
case "$logs" in
|
||||
*HA_API_ENDPOINT_OK*) echo "HA_API_ENDPOINT_REACHABLE_OK" ;;
|
||||
*) fail "the probe completed without reporting success" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
check:
|
||||
(contains($stdout, 'HA_API_ENDPOINT_REACHABLE_OK')): true
|
||||
@@ -93,3 +93,20 @@ spec:
|
||||
kind: Job
|
||||
metadata: { name: tls-probe }
|
||||
status: { succeeded: 1 }
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# PROOF-OF-PASS SENTINEL (R-SEC-03). Every step above is an assert/Job-status gate, so
|
||||
# chainsaw already fails the test before reaching this step if any of them fails — but a
|
||||
# green Chainsaw JUnit carries NO stdout, and the L2/L3 tests in this suite can self-skip
|
||||
# GREEN, so lib/record_run.py refuses to treat a bare `passed` as evidence and records
|
||||
# `unknown-no-sentinel-declared` instead. Without a declared token this test could pass
|
||||
# forever and NEVER become a recorded proof of R-TLS-01/03 — the TLS half of docs/07's audit proof list
|
||||
# — which is precisely what docs/07 asks for ("These proofs are part of the platform
|
||||
# acceptance suite, not one-time checks"). This step exists only to emit that token, and it
|
||||
# is reached only when everything above has passed. Asserted by
|
||||
# tests/l0-static/auditability-proofs-producible.
|
||||
- name: then-emit-the-proof-of-pass-sentinel
|
||||
try:
|
||||
- script:
|
||||
content: echo TLS_TRUSTED_PROVEN_OK
|
||||
check:
|
||||
(contains($stdout, 'TLS_TRUSTED_PROVEN_OK')): true
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user