Autonomous session: Phase-2 platform authoring + Flux bootstrap progress

Author-only Phase-2 components (platform suspended; cluster untouched):
- platform/longhorn: 3-replica SC + bulk external-mount indirection (R-STATE)
- platform/monitoring: kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Alloy (dev-trimmed) + 8 alert rules (R-OBS)
- platform/cilium: parity fix (k8sServiceHost=10.73.0.11 + masquerade) safe to adopt Phase 2
- conformance: partial L2 tests (worker hit session limit; incomplete — see DECISIONS-LOG K2)
- bootstrap/gitea: fix rootless-podman perms (host bind-mount -> named volume)

Flux installed on the cluster; host Gitea up + repo pushed; GitRepository BLOCKED by
host firewalld (VM->10.73.0.1:3000) — needs one operator sudo command (DECISIONS-LOG).
Known issue K1: cluster-vars substitution-var case mismatch (fix before un-suspend).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 committed 2026-08-16 14:32:47 -05:00
1 parent 397f29e99a
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@@ -1,12 +1,20 @@
# =============================================================================
# L2 BEHAVIORAL SCAFFOLD — Explicit allow / deny-undeclared (R-NET-02)
# L2 BEHAVIORAL — Explicit allow / deny-undeclared (R-NET-02) [RUNNABLE]
# Catalog: docs/14 "Explicit allow / deny-undeclared (R-NET-02)"
# Spec: docs/03-networking-isolation-and-egress.md "Explicit allow rules"
#
# GIVEN a service with declared `dependencies`,
# WHEN the source reaches a DECLARED dest port -> THEN it succeeds;
# WHEN the source reaches an UNDECLARED dest -> THEN it fails (negative test).
# GIVEN a namespace with default-deny + ONE explicit allow (source -> declared-dest:8080),
# WHEN the source reaches the DECLARED dest port -> THEN it succeeds;
# WHEN the source reaches an UNDECLARED port (9090) -> THEN it fails;
# WHEN the source reaches an UNDECLARED dest (other) -> THEN it fails.
#
# STATUS: scaffold — needs T-2.3 (render dependencies -> CiliumNetworkPolicy).
# The destinations LISTEN on every probed port, so a block is caused by POLICY,
# not by a missing listener — this asserts BEHAVIOR, not object existence (R-TEST-01).
#
# RUNNABLE ON THE BASE CLUSTER: the fixture supplies the default-deny baseline and
# the single allow (fixtures/source-and-dests.yaml); Cilium enforces the standard
# NetworkPolicies. Probes are ephemeral Jobs labeled app=source so the allow/deny
# rules apply to them; chainsaw namespace teardown cleans everything.
# =============================================================================
apiVersion: chainsaw.kyverno.io/v1alpha1
kind: Test
@@ -18,31 +26,145 @@ metadata:
conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-02"
conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
conformance.home.k3s/executable: "true"
conformance.home.k3s/intent: >-
A declared dependency connects; an undeclared destination is blocked.
A declared dependency (source->declared-dest:8080) connects; an undeclared
port and an undeclared destination are both blocked by policy.
spec:
steps:
# -- GIVEN: baseline + one explicit allow + two live destinations. Wait until
# both destinations are Ready so a later block is unambiguously policy-caused.
- name: given-source-with-declared-dependency
try:
- apply:
# TODO(T-2.3): apply a ServiceDefinition/rendered policy where `source`
# declares dependency on `dest:declared-port`; deploy source + two dests.
file: fixtures/source-and-dests.yaml # TODO: author fixtures
file: fixtures/source-and-dests.yaml
- assert:
resource:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: { name: declared-dest }
status:
conditions:
- type: Ready
status: "True"
- assert:
resource:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: { name: other-dest }
status:
conditions:
- type: Ready
status: "True"
# -- THEN(declared succeeds): source -> declared-dest:8080 connects. Green Job = allowed.
- name: then-declared-succeeds
try:
- script:
content: |
set -euo pipefail
kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" exec source -- nc -z -w 3 declared-dest 80 \
&& echo ALLOW_OK
check: { ($stdout =~ 'ALLOW_OK'): true }
- name: then-undeclared-denied
- apply:
resource:
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: probe-allowed
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
activeDeadlineSeconds: 120
template:
metadata:
labels: { app: source }
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: probe
image: busybox:1.36.1
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -eu
nc -w 5 declared-dest 8080 </dev/null
echo ALLOW_OK
- assert:
resource:
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata: { name: probe-allowed }
status: { succeeded: 1 }
# -- THEN(undeclared PORT denied): source -> declared-dest:9090 is blocked.
# The Job EXITS 0 only when the connection is BLOCKED (green Job = deny).
- name: then-undeclared-port-denied
try:
- apply:
resource:
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: probe-undeclared-port
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
activeDeadlineSeconds: 120
template:
metadata:
labels: { app: source }
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: probe
image: busybox:1.36.1
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -u
if nc -w 5 declared-dest 9090 </dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
echo "LEAK: undeclared port 9090 reachable" 1>&2
exit 1
fi
echo DENY_PORT_OK
- assert:
resource:
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata: { name: probe-undeclared-port }
status: { succeeded: 1 }
# -- THEN(undeclared DEST denied): source -> other-dest:8080 is blocked.
- name: then-undeclared-dest-denied
try:
- apply:
resource:
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: probe-undeclared-dest
spec:
backoffLimit: 4
activeDeadlineSeconds: 120
template:
metadata:
labels: { app: source }
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
containers:
- name: probe
image: busybox:1.36.1
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -u
if nc -w 5 other-dest 8080 </dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
echo "LEAK: undeclared destination reachable" 1>&2
exit 1
fi
echo DENY_DEST_OK
- assert:
resource:
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata: { name: probe-undeclared-dest }
status: { succeeded: 1 }
finally:
- script:
content: |
set -euo pipefail
if kubectl -n "$NAMESPACE" exec source -- nc -z -w 3 undeclared-dest 80; then
echo "LEAK: undeclared destination reachable" >&2; exit 1
fi
echo DENY_OK
check: { ($stdout =~ 'DENY_OK'): true }
content: 'echo "cleanup handled by chainsaw namespace teardown"'
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
# =============================================================================
# Fixtures for the deny-undeclared behavior test (R-NET-02).
# Applied into the per-test namespace chainsaw creates (hermetic, self-cleaned).
#
# Models: a namespace default-deny baseline + ONE explicit declared dependency
# source(app=source) --> declared-dest : tcp/8080
# Everything else (declared-dest:9090, other-dest:8080) is UNDECLARED and must
# be blocked purely by policy. The destinations LISTEN on those ports, so a
# blocked probe proves policy enforcement, not a missing listener.
#
# Standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy is used (Cilium enforces it) for portability;
# the platform will render CiliumNetworkPolicies from catalog `dependencies`
# (T-2.3), but the asserted BEHAVIOR is identical (R-TEST-01).
# =============================================================================
---
# --- Default-deny baseline: deny all ingress+egress, allow only DNS egress. -----------
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-baseline
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
ingress: []
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
podSelector:
matchLabels:
k8s-app: kube-dns
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
---
# --- The ONE explicit allow (a declared dependency): source --> declared-dest tcp/8080.
# Expressed as the two matching halves a real rendered dependency produces:
# egress permit on the source, ingress permit on the destination.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-source-to-declared-8080-egress
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels: { app: source }
policyTypes: [Egress]
egress:
- to:
- podSelector:
matchLabels: { app: declared-dest }
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-source-to-declared-8080-ingress
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels: { app: declared-dest }
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels: { app: source }
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
---
# --- declared-dest: LISTENS on BOTH 8080 (declared) and 9090 (undeclared port). --------
# Two agnhost netexec containers, each an HTTP listener; a TCP connect on
# either port reaches a live socket, so a block is caused only by policy.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: declared-dest
labels: { app: declared-dest }
spec:
containers:
- name: dest-8080
image: registry.k8s.io/e2e-test-images/agnhost:2.47
args: ["netexec", "--http-port=8080"]
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
readinessProbe:
tcpSocket: { port: 8080 }
periodSeconds: 2
- name: dest-9090
image: registry.k8s.io/e2e-test-images/agnhost:2.47
args: ["netexec", "--http-port=9090"]
ports:
- containerPort: 9090
readinessProbe:
tcpSocket: { port: 9090 }
periodSeconds: 2
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: declared-dest
spec:
selector: { app: declared-dest }
ports:
- name: p8080
port: 8080
targetPort: 8080
- name: p9090
port: 9090
targetPort: 9090
---
# --- other-dest: an UNDECLARED destination. Listens on 8080 but no allow reaches it. ---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: other-dest
labels: { app: other-dest }
spec:
containers:
- name: dest-8080
image: registry.k8s.io/e2e-test-images/agnhost:2.47
args: ["netexec", "--http-port=8080"]
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
readinessProbe:
tcpSocket: { port: 8080 }
periodSeconds: 2
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: other-dest
spec:
selector: { app: other-dest }
ports:
- name: p8080
port: 8080
targetPort: 8080