Merge pull request 'feat(upgrades): automate node reboots (kured) and wire Renovate, which had never run' (#73) from feat/automated-upgrades into main
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Reviewed-on: #73
Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]>
This commit was merged in pull request #73.
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jakman85 committed 2026-10-18 06:28:30 +00:00
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@@ -420,3 +420,34 @@ flux_bootstrap_env_path: "clusters/prod"
# rather than leaving an inert drop-in behind, so this group-wide `true` is still correct
# for it.
etcd_io_priority_enabled: true
# --- automatic security patching (roles/unattended_upgrades) -------------------------
# TURNS ON roles/unattended_upgrades FOR PROD ONLY. Role default is false. Same seam as
# node_baseline_backports_kernel and etcd_io_priority_enabled above.
#
# WHAT WAS THERE BEFORE: nothing at all. Measured on all three prod nodes 2026-10-17 —
# `unattended-upgrades`, `update-notifier-common` and `needrestart` were ALL absent,
# `apt-mark showhold` was empty on every node, /etc/apt/preferences.d/ was empty, and
# nothing on the node could create /var/run/reboot-required. These boxes have had ZERO
# automatic patching since provisioning, and no way to signal that a reboot was needed.
#
# WHAT ENABLING THIS DOES *NOT* DO: nothing, until the operator runs
# playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml. It is not applied by site.yml (deliberately — see
# that playbook's header). And once run, it still never upgrades the KERNEL, never
# restarts k3s, and never reboots:
# * kernel — blacklisted `^linux-`, AND the trixie-backports archive the running
# kernel comes from (o=Debian Backports, measured) is not an allowed origin. Two
# independent exclusions, because this is the EFI-memattr constraint: these HP minis
# need >= 6.13 or they can boot with a fraction of their RAM
# (PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b), and 6.12 kernels are still installed and bootable here.
# The kernel continues to move ONLY under a deliberate
# `node-baseline.yml --tags kernel` run, exactly as before.
# * k3s — needrestart blacklist. k3s is not even an apt package on these nodes
# (measured: no `k3s`, no `containerd` in dpkg), so the control plane and runtime are
# outside apt's reach regardless.
# * reboots — Automatic-Reboot "false", asserted by the role against apt's own
# effective config. Reboots belong to kured (platform/kured): one node at a time,
# under a cluster-wide lock, inside 03:00-06:00, after cordon + drain. Three
# control-plane nodes with etcd quorum 2/3 must never reboot themselves
# independently, which is what Automatic-Reboot "true" would mean.
unattended_upgrades_enabled: true
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
---
# Automatic Debian SECURITY patching for the k3s nodes — the package half of the automated upgrade
# process. The reboot half is kured (platform/kured), reconciled by Flux; the two are designed
# together and neither is useful alone. Full rationale for every decision:
# roles/unattended_upgrades/defaults/main.yml and that role's README.md.
#
# TARGET (R-ENV-02): `k3s_hosts` defaults to dev's `k3s_servers`; prod is
# ansible-playbook playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
# Same pattern node-baseline.yml and node-health.yml established — `hosts:` is templated before
# group_vars exist, so the target is an extra var, never a group_vars value.
#
# The role is a NO-OP unless `unattended_upgrades_enabled` is true, which is set for prod only in
# inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml. Running this against dev changes nothing.
#
# DELIBERATELY NOT IN site.yml. site.yml is the bring-up chain (node-baseline -> k3s ->
# etcd-io-priority -> kube-vip -> cilium -> verify -> flux-bootstrap) and is "not run against prod
# casually". Automatic patching is not a prerequisite for anything in that chain and nothing in the
# chain depends on it, so adding it there would only widen what a cluster rebuild touches. It is
# applied on its own, once, and re-applied when its configuration changes.
#
# SAFE TO RUN ON A LIVE CLUSTER, AT ANY TIME. This playbook installs and configures the upgrader. It
# never runs `apt upgrade`, never restarts k3s, and never reboots — the role asserts the last of
# those against apt's own effective config rather than trusting the file it just wrote. The first
# unattended upgrade happens at the next timer firing (04:00 +/-60m), and any reboot that upgrade
# implies is kured's to schedule, one node at a time, inside 03:00-06:00.
#
# TAGS. `--tags verify` re-runs only the read-only assertions and the per-node summary, which is the
# way to answer "is automatic patching actually working on these boxes, and is anything waiting on a
# reboot" without rewriting any configuration:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags verify
- name: Automatic security upgrades on the k3s nodes (kernel excluded; reboots delegated to kured)
hosts: "{{ k3s_hosts | default('k3s_servers') }}"
become: true
gather_facts: true
roles:
- unattended_upgrades
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
# roles/unattended_upgrades
Automatic Debian **security** patching on the k3s nodes. The kernel is excluded, k3s is never
restarted, and reboots are delegated to **kured** (`platform/kured`).
- **Playbook:** `playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml`
- **Enabled by:** `unattended_upgrades_enabled` — role default `false`, set `true` for prod in
`inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml`
- **Companion component:** `platform/kured` (the reboot half). **Neither is useful alone** — see
"The two halves" below.
- **Every decision and its reasoning:** `defaults/main.yml`. That file is the argument; this one is
the orientation.
## The two halves, and why they ship together
| | what it does | what it must NOT do |
|---|---|---|
| **this role** (Ansible, host) | installs security updates continuously; leaves `/var/run/reboot-required` behind when one needs a reboot | upgrade the kernel; restart k3s; reboot |
| **kured** (Flux, cluster) | cordons, drains, reboots and uncordons **one node at a time** when that file exists | decide *whether* a reboot is needed |
Deploying either alone produces a mechanism that looks healthy and does nothing:
- **kured alone** watches a file that nothing creates. Measured 2026-10-17:
`update-notifier-common` — the package that owns the hook which writes
`/var/run/reboot-required` — was **not installed on any node**. kured would sit at 1/1 Running
reporting `kured_reboot_required=0` forever.
- **this role alone** installs patches that a long-running process never picks up, and when a
reboot *is* needed there is nothing safe to take it. `Automatic-Reboot "true"` is not the
answer: three control-plane nodes with etcd quorum 2/3, each rebooting at its own time, is how
the cluster is lost.
## What it was replacing: nothing
Measured on all three prod nodes, 2026-10-17:
| | |
|---|---|
| `unattended-upgrades` | **not installed** |
| `update-notifier-common` | **not installed** |
| `needrestart` | **not installed** |
| `apt-mark showhold` | **empty** — no package held on any node |
| `/etc/apt/preferences.d/` | **empty** — no apt pin declares the backports-kernel intent |
| `/var/run/reboot-required` | absent, and uncreatable |
These nodes had received **no automatic patching since provisioning**.
## The three decisions
### 1. Security only
Allowed origins are `label=Debian-Security` and nothing else. `trixie-updates` is excluded
deliberately (not overlooked) — it carries non-security fixes that are useful but are the archive
through which an unreviewed change would most plausibly arrive on a control-plane node. The knob to
add it is `unattended_upgrades_include_updates`.
### 2. The kernel is excluded twice over
**This is the highest-risk part of the change.** These HP EliteDesk 800 G5 minis publish a corrupt
EFI Memory Attributes Table on R21 firmware; Linux `< 6.13` does not validate it before reserving
memory from its contents, and `k3s-prod-2` twice booted with **2.6 GiB of 16 GB**. Upstream
`8fbe4c49c0cc` (first in v6.13) is the only fix — there is no kernel cmdline workaround. Full
write-up: `infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md` §0b and `roles/node_baseline/defaults/main.yml:21-51`.
Measured 2026-10-17: all three nodes run `7.1.8+deb13-amd64` (`7.1.8-1~bpo13+1`, i.e. the backports
metapackage), comfortably above the floor — **but `linux-image-6.12.107+deb13-amd64` and
`linux-image-6.12.94+deb13-amd64` are also still installed, below the floor, bootable, and held by
nothing.**
So an unattended process must not be able to touch the kernel at all:
1. **Origin exclusion (structural).** The running kernel comes from `o=Debian Backports` (measured
via `apt-cache policy`, pin priority 100 — the `NotAutomatic` + `ButAutomaticUpgrades`
signature). That origin is not in `Origins-Pattern`, so unattended-upgrades cannot see a kernel
upgrade at all.
2. **Package blacklist (belt and braces).** `^linux-` is blacklisted, so even if the origin list is
later widened — the most likely future edit to this role, and the one that would silently re-arm
the hazard — the kernel is still untouchable.
The role **asserts both** against `apt-config dump` (apt's own parse of the whole
`/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/` directory) rather than trusting the file it just wrote.
**This does not stop the kernel moving.** The operator still advances it deliberately with
```
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags kernel --limit <host>
```
which is the only thing that maintains the backports source, the metapackage and the on-node
provenance stamp. `node_baseline`'s own note that `apt upgrade` keeps the backports kernel current
still holds for an operator-run apt. What changed is that a **new unattended actor** is forbidden
from it.
Also blacklisted, for the same "operator-only" reason: `intel-microcode`, `amd64-microcode`,
`grub-*`. Microcode and bootloader changes take effect on reboot and alter boot behaviour on the
very firmware that is already misbehaving here.
`Remove-Unused-Kernel-Packages` is **false**, against the Debian default: those older kernels are
the documented rollback path, and an unattended process pruning them could remove the fallback an
operator needs in front of a box that will not boot.
### 3. needrestart restarts services — but never k3s
A security-only policy that restarts nothing patches bytes on disk that no running process reads.
`needrestart` in mode `a` restarts services still mapped to a deleted library, which is what makes
the policy actually effective.
`k3s.service` is blacklisted. Restarting the Kubernetes control plane unattended at 04:00 is a
worse outcome than a delayed library fix; that fix lands at the next kured reboot instead. Measured
2026-10-17, `k3s.service` is the **only** matching unit — k3s bundles its own containerd and
kubelet, and neither `containerd` nor `containerd.io` is an apt package on these nodes — so this
one entry is complete today.
## Schedule
`apt-daily` at 03:30 and `apt-daily-upgrade` at 04:00, both `±60m` randomised, via systemd drop-ins.
Chosen to land **inside** kured's 03:00–06:00 reboot window so that a sentinel written by an upgrade
can be acted on the same night rather than ~24h later.
Two traps the role handles explicitly:
- `/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades` must set the four `APT::Periodic::*` counters. Without
them the apt-daily timers fire and **do nothing** — installed, configured, green, and inert.
- The timer drop-ins clear `OnCalendar=` before setting it. systemd **accumulates** `OnCalendar`
entries across drop-ins, so omitting the reset keeps the shipped schedule *in addition* to ours.
## Why a new role rather than extending `node_baseline`
`node_baseline` is the repo's only other apt surface and would have been a defensible home. Two
reasons against:
1. **Single responsibility.** `node_baseline` is the *first-boot floor* — it runs before k3s exists
and is the thing that makes a node installable. Continuous patching policy is a different
lifecycle with a different blast radius, and it wants to be runnable (and re-runnable) without
going anywhere near that role's data-disk tasks.
2. **Concurrent work.** Other open branches touch `roles/node_baseline/`. A new role has nothing to
merge.
Nothing here duplicates `node_baseline`: it does not add apt sources, does not touch the kernel, and
does not manage disks.
## Post-merge verification
Running the role is safe on a live cluster at any time — it installs and configures the upgrader, and
never runs `apt upgrade`, restarts k3s, or reboots.
```bash
# Apply (prod). Idempotent; re-runnable.
cd infra/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod
# Re-run ONLY the read-only assertions + the per-node pending-reboot summary.
cd infra/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags verify
```
Then, on a node, confirm the three properties that matter (all read-only, no sudo needed for the
first two):
```bash
ssh [email protected] 'apt-config dump | grep -iE "unattended-upgrade::(automatic-reboot|package-blacklist|origins)"'
ssh [email protected] 'systemctl list-timers apt-daily-upgrade.timer --no-pager'
ssh [email protected] 'ls -la /var/run/reboot-required 2>&1; dpkg -l update-notifier-common needrestart unattended-upgrades | tail -4'
```
Expect: `Automatic-Reboot "false"`, a blacklist containing `^linux-`, an `Origins-Pattern`
containing `Debian-Security` and **not** `Backports`, a next-elapse around 04:00, and all three
packages `ii`.
A dry run of what the upgrader would actually do (needs root, so this one is an operator step):
```bash
sudo unattended-upgrade --dry-run --debug
```
The kernel must appear in its blacklist output, not its upgrade list.
## What this role cannot tell you
- **That a security upgrade has ever succeeded.** That is in
`/var/log/unattended-upgrades/unattended-upgrades.log` on each node, and nothing in this repo or
in Prometheus reads it. There is no alert for "automatic patching has silently stopped working".
That is a real, known gap — see the handoff entry
`decisions/2026-10-17-automated-upgrades.md`.
- **That a reboot actually happened.** That is kured's half, and it *is* alerted on
(`KuredRebootPending`, `KuredNodeCoverageGap`, `KuredNotReporting` in
`platform/kured/alerts.yaml`).
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
---
# roles/unattended_upgrades — automatic Debian SECURITY patching on the k3s nodes, with the kernel
# deliberately excluded and with reboots delegated to kured (platform/kured).
#
# OFF BY DEFAULT, ON FOR PROD. Same seam as node_baseline_backports_kernel / etcd_io_priority_enabled:
# a plain boolean, default false, turned on in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml. Not a hostname
# test — that would encode the environment into the role (see node_baseline's defaults for the full
# argument, which this role follows rather than restates).
#
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# STATE BEFORE THIS ROLE (measured on all three prod nodes, 2026-10-17, via `dpkg-query -W`)
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# unattended-upgrades NOT INSTALLED
# update-notifier-common NOT INSTALLED
# needrestart NOT INSTALLED
# apt-mark showhold EMPTY (no package is held on any node)
# /var/run/reboot-required ABSENT, and nothing on the node can create it
# /etc/apt/preferences.d/ EMPTY (no apt pin declares the backports-kernel intent)
# So: zero automatic patching, and no mechanism by which a reboot could ever be signalled. That last
# point is why this role and platform/kured must land together — kured watches
# /var/run/reboot-required, and on these nodes today NOTHING WRITES IT. Deploying kured alone would
# produce a daemon that is permanently, silently idle while looking perfectly healthy.
#
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# DECISION 1 — SECURITY ONLY, NOT FULL UPGRADES
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Measured `apt-cache policy` on k3s-prod-1, 2026-10-17, gives the four archives and their pins:
# trixie o=Debian, a=stable, l=Debian pin 500
# trixie-updates o=Debian, a=stable-updates, l=Debian pin 500
# trixie-security o=Debian, a=stable-security, l=Debian-Security pin 500
# trixie-backports o=Debian Backports, a=stable-backports, l=Debian Backports pin 100
#
# Only `Debian-Security` is allowed below. The reasoning, in order of weight:
#
# * Security updates are the class where the cost of NOT applying them is unbounded and the
# change itself is minimal by Debian policy (targeted fixes against the frozen stable version,
# no feature churn). It is the one class worth applying with nobody watching.
# * A full `apt upgrade` on these nodes would also pull trixie point-release changes, which is a
# larger surface than anyone has reviewed for a 3-node etcd cluster, for no urgency.
# * `trixie-updates` is DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED, not overlooked. It carries non-security fixes that
# are too urgent to wait for a point release — useful, but it is the archive through which an
# unreviewed change would most plausibly arrive, and it is not what "unattended" should mean on
# a control-plane node. Add it consciously later if the operator wants it; the knob is below.
# * `trixie-backports` is EXCLUDED, AND THAT IS THE KERNEL ARGUMENT — see DECISION 2.
#
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# DECISION 2 — THE KERNEL IS EXCLUDED TWICE OVER. THIS IS THE HIGHEST-RISK PART OF THE CHANGE.
# ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# The constraint: HP's R21 firmware on these EliteDesk 800 G5 minis publishes a corrupt EFI Memory
# Attributes Table, and Linux < 6.13 does not validate it before reserving memory from its contents
# — k3s-prod-2 twice booted with 2.6 GiB of 16 GB. Upstream 8fbe4c49c0cc (first in v6.13) is the
# ONLY fix; there is no kernel cmdline workaround. So these nodes run the backports metapackage
# `linux-image-amd64` (measured 2026-10-17: version 7.1.8-1~bpo13+1 installed and running on all
# three, well above the floor). Full write-up: infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b, and the rationale
# block in roles/node_baseline/defaults/main.yml:21-51.
#
# A NODE THAT COMES BACK FROM AN UNATTENDED UPGRADE ON A 6.12 KERNEL IS A NODE THAT MAY COME BACK
# WITH A FRACTION OF ITS RAM. Note that 6.12 kernels are not hypothetical here — measured
# 2026-10-17, `linux-image-6.12.107+deb13-amd64` and `linux-image-6.12.94+deb13-amd64` are BOTH
# still installed on all three nodes, below the floor, bootable, and nothing holds them.
#
# Two independent mechanisms keep unattended-upgrades away from the kernel, and the role asserts
# both rather than trusting either:
#
# 1. ORIGIN EXCLUSION (structural). The running kernel comes from `o=Debian Backports`, which is
# not in Allowed-Origins. u-u only ever considers packages from allowed origins, so it cannot
# see a backports kernel upgrade at all. This also means the backports kernel receives no
# automatic patching — accepted, and in any case backports carries no security guarantees
# (node_baseline's defaults state that cost plainly: "no security-tracker commitment, no DSAs").
# 2. PACKAGE BLACKLIST (belt and braces). `linux-*` is blacklisted below, so even if the origin
# list is later widened — the most likely future edit to this file, and the one that would
# silently re-arm the hazard — the kernel is still untouchable. Without this, widening origins
# to include backports would hand an unattended process the EFI-memattr-critical package.
#
# WHAT THIS DOES *NOT* DO, AND MUST NOT BE READ AS DOING: it does not stop the kernel moving. The
# operator still advances it deliberately with
# ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags kernel --limit <host>
# which is the only thing that maintains the backports source, the metapackage and the on-node
# provenance stamp. node_baseline's own comment ("`ButAutomaticUpgrades: yes` ... means `apt upgrade`
# keeps it current once installed") still holds for an operator-run apt; the measured pin priority of
# 100 is exactly the NotAutomatic + ButAutomaticUpgrades signature that produces that behaviour.
# Nothing here changes it. What changes is that a NEW unattended actor is forbidden from the kernel.
#
# NOT BLACKLISTED, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT APT PACKAGES AT ALL — measured 2026-10-17: `dpkg-query` finds
# no `k3s`, no `containerd` and no `containerd.io`. k3s is a single static binary at
# /usr/local/bin/k3s installed by roles/k3s_server, and it bundles its own containerd and kubelet.
# So the entire Kubernetes control plane and container runtime are OUTSIDE apt's reach and cannot be
# upgraded by this role even in principle. That is worth knowing before worrying about it.
unattended_upgrades_enabled: false
# The packages this role installs. Each one is load-bearing; see the notes.
unattended_upgrades_packages:
# The upgrader itself.
- unattended-upgrades
# THE SENTINEL WRITER, AND THE WHOLE REASON kured CAN WORK. On Debian, /var/run/reboot-required is
# not created by the kernel, by apt, or by unattended-upgrades — it is created by a hook shipped in
# update-notifier-common. Measured ABSENT on all three nodes. Without this package the file is
# never written, kured correctly never reboots, every dashboard stays green, and the reboot half of
# this PR is an elaborate no-op. The role asserts the hook exists after install rather than
# assuming the package shipped one (see tasks/main.yml).
- update-notifier-common
# Restarts services still mapped to a deleted library after a security upgrade. Without it a
# security-only policy patches bytes on disk that no running process reads — see DECISION 3.
- needrestart
# --- Allowed origins -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Verbatim apt origin expressions, substituted into 50unattended-upgrades. The ${distro_*} tokens
# here are UNATTENDED-UPGRADES' OWN placeholders, expanded by it at runtime — they are not Ansible
# or Flux substitutions, which is why they are single-quoted and why this role's files never travel
# through Flux envsubst.
#
# `l=Debian-Security` plus the `-security` codename is the form Debian's own shipped config uses, and
# both halves were confirmed against the measured archive metadata above (l=Debian-Security,
# n=trixie-security). Matching on the LABEL rather than the suite name is what makes this survive the
# next Debian release.
unattended_upgrades_allowed_origins:
- 'origin=Debian,codename=${distro_codename},label=Debian-Security'
- 'origin=Debian,codename=${distro_codename}-security,label=Debian-Security'
# Set this to add 'origin=Debian,codename=${distro_codename}-updates,label=Debian' — a deliberate
# widening, kept as a knob so that turning it on is a reviewable one-line change rather than an edit
# to a heredoc. See DECISION 1 for why it is off.
unattended_upgrades_include_updates: false
# --- Package blacklist ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Regular expressions matched against package names. See DECISION 2: `linux-` is the EFI-memattr
# guard and must not be removed without re-reading PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b.
unattended_upgrades_blacklist:
# Every kernel package: linux-image-*, linux-headers-*, linux-image-amd64 (the metapackage that
# actually tracks backports), plus linux-kbuild / linux-libc-dev. Anchored at the start so it
# cannot accidentally match an unrelated package containing the substring.
- '^linux-'
# Microcode changes take effect only on reboot and can alter boot behaviour on the very firmware
# that is already misbehaving here. Operator-only, same argument as the kernel.
- '^intel-microcode$'
- '^amd64-microcode$'
# The bootloader. A grub upgrade rewrites boot configuration on a machine with a documented
# warm-reboot hang (k3s-prod-2, 2026-09-03). Never unattended.
- '^grub-'
- '^grub2-common$'
# --- Reboot policy -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# FALSE, AND THIS IS THE DIVISION OF LABOUR WITH kured, NOT AN OVERSIGHT.
# unattended-upgrades can reboot a node itself (Automatic-Reboot "true"). It must not here: it has
# no notion of a cluster, so it would not cordon, would not drain, would not evict the 25 attached
# Longhorn volumes cleanly, would not check whether another node is already down, and — on three
# control-plane nodes where etcd quorum is 2 of 3 — three nodes each deciding independently to
# reboot at their own `Automatic-Reboot-Time` is precisely how you lose the cluster.
# u-u therefore only ever leaves the sentinel behind; kured owns every reboot, one node at a time,
# under a cluster-wide lock. See platform/kured/helmrelease.yaml.
unattended_upgrades_automatic_reboot: false
# --- needrestart (DECISION 3) --------------------------------------------------------------------
# See the role README for the full argument. Summary: 'a' (restart services automatically) is what
# makes a security-only policy actually effective — a patched libssl on disk does nothing for a
# process still mapping the old one — but k3s.service is EXCLUDED, because restarting the
# Kubernetes control plane unattended at 06:00 is a worse outcome than a delayed library fix.
# Measured 2026-10-17: the only matching unit on these nodes is `k3s.service` (no separate
# containerd or kubelet unit exists; k3s bundles both), so this blacklist is complete today.
unattended_upgrades_needrestart_mode: a
unattended_upgrades_needrestart_blacklist:
- '^k3s'
# --- Schedule ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# apt's own systemd timers (apt-daily, apt-daily-upgrade) drive u-u; these set their windows.
# 04:00 with a 1h randomised delay, so the upgrade lands INSIDE kured's 03:00-06:00 reboot window
# (platform/kured/helmrelease.yaml) rather than hours away from it: if an upgrade ever does set the
# sentinel, the reboot can be taken the same night instead of waiting ~24h. The randomised delay
# keeps the three nodes from hitting the mirror simultaneously; it does NOT serialise anything, and
# it does not need to — u-u never reboots, so three concurrent upgrades are harmless.
unattended_upgrades_download_time: "03:30"
unattended_upgrades_upgrade_time: "04:00"
unattended_upgrades_randomised_delay: 60m
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
---
# Re-arm apt's periodic timers after a config or drop-in change.
#
# WHY A daemon_reload IS REQUIRED AND NOT OPTIONAL. The timer windows are set by drop-ins under
# /etc/systemd/system/apt-daily{,-upgrade}.timer.d/. systemd does not re-read unit files on its own,
# so until it is told to, the RUNNING manager keeps the shipped schedule and the new window is
# ignored — the files look right in git and on disk, `systemctl cat` shows them, and the upgrade
# still fires at the old time. That is a silent config no-op, which is the failure mode this whole
# role is written against.
#
# `daemon_reload` re-parses unit files and re-runs generators. It starts and stops nothing, so it
# cannot disturb k3s, containerd or Longhorn — the same reasoning node_baseline's "Reload systemd
# unit files" handler records.
#
# RESTARTING THE TIMERS IS ALSO SAFE, and is not the same as running the upgrade. `*.timer` units
# only hold the schedule; restarting one recomputes its next elapse and does NOT trigger its
# `*.service`. With `Persistent=true` set in the drop-in, a window missed while the node was down is
# caught up on the next boot rather than skipped.
#
# Both fire only when a task actually changed, so a re-run of the role is silent.
- name: Restart unattended-upgrades timers
ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
name: "{{ item }}"
state: restarted
enabled: true
daemon_reload: true
loop:
- apt-daily.timer
- apt-daily-upgrade.timer
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
---
# roles/unattended_upgrades — automatic Debian security patching, kernel excluded, reboots delegated
# to kured. Every decision and its reasoning lives in defaults/main.yml; this file is the mechanism.
#
# TAGS — following roles/node_baseline, every task carries one of `packages`, `config` or `verify`.
# An untagged run does all three in that order. The split exists because `verify` is the half an
# operator will want to re-run on its own to answer "is automatic patching actually working on this
# box", without re-writing any configuration:
# ansible-playbook playbooks/unattended-upgrades.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags verify
#
# IT DOES NOT UPGRADE ANYTHING, AND IT DOES NOT REBOOT. This role installs and CONFIGURES the
# upgrader; it never runs `apt upgrade` itself and never takes a reboot. Both of those are deliberate
# and both follow roles/node_baseline/tasks/main.yml:61-67 ("IT DOES NOT REBOOT", after k3s-prod-2
# hung on a warm reboot on 2026-09-03 and needed a physical power button). Applying this role is
# therefore a SAFE operation on a live cluster at any time of day: the first unattended upgrade
# happens at the next timer firing, and any reboot it implies is kured's to schedule inside the
# 03:00-06:00 window.
- name: Automatic security upgrades (unattended-upgrades; kernel excluded, reboots via kured)
when: unattended_upgrades_enabled | bool
tags: [packages, config, verify]
block:
# ── PREFLIGHT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Assert this is a Debian-family host
# The config file layout, the origin expressions and the package names below are all
# Debian-specific. On anything else this role would write files that are silently ignored,
# which is the failure mode this whole PR exists to avoid.
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- ansible_facts['os_family'] == 'Debian'
fail_msg: >-
REFUSING TO CONFIGURE unattended-upgrades on {{ inventory_hostname }}: os_family is
'{{ ansible_facts["os_family"] }}', not 'Debian'. The allowed-origin expressions and
config paths in this role are Debian-specific.
tags: [packages, config, verify]
# ── PACKAGES ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Install unattended-upgrades, the reboot-sentinel writer and needrestart
# update-notifier-common is NOT optional padding: it owns the hook that creates
# /var/run/reboot-required, which is the only thing kured watches. See defaults/main.yml.
ansible.builtin.apt:
name: "{{ unattended_upgrades_packages }}"
state: present
update_cache: true
cache_valid_time: 3600
tags: [packages]
# ── CONFIG ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Written as a whole file rather than patched in place, for the reason node_baseline gives for
# its own apt source: an idempotent full-file write with a managed-by header is reviewable and
# re-runnable, whereas line-editing a conffile fights dpkg on every package upgrade.
#
# 52- RATHER THAN 50-: Debian ships /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/50unattended-upgrades as a CONFFILE of
# the unattended-upgrades package. Overwriting it would make every future apt upgrade of that
# package prompt about a locally-modified conffile (or, under the non-interactive defaults a
# scripted run uses, silently keep one side and discard the other). apt reads the directory in
# lexical order and later files win, so a separate 52- file overrides the shipped defaults
# without ever touching them, and `apt-config dump` in the verify block below proves which value
# actually won rather than assuming this ordering holds.
- name: Configure unattended-upgrades (52-k3s-unattended-upgrades)
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/52-k3s-unattended-upgrades
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: |
// MANAGED BY ANSIBLE — infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades. Local edits are reverted
// on the next run. Rationale for every value: that role's defaults/main.yml.
//
// Overrides the shipped 50unattended-upgrades by lexical ordering (52 > 50). The shipped
// file is a dpkg conffile and is deliberately left untouched.
// SECURITY ONLY. Deliberately excludes trixie-updates (non-security fixes) and
// trixie-backports (o=Debian Backports) -- and excluding backports is what makes it
// structurally impossible for this upgrader to move the EFI-memattr-critical kernel,
// which is installed from there. See defaults/main.yml DECISION 2.
Unattended-Upgrade::Origins-Pattern {
{% for origin in unattended_upgrades_allowed_origins %}
"{{ origin }}";
{% endfor %}
{% if unattended_upgrades_include_updates | bool %}
"origin=Debian,codename=${distro_codename}-updates,label=Debian";
{% endif %}
};
// NEVER AUTOMATICALLY UPGRADED, whatever the origin list later says. `^linux-` is the
// EFI-memattr guard: these HP minis need kernel >= 6.13 or they can boot with a fraction
// of their RAM, and 6.12 kernels are still installed and bootable on all three nodes.
// Do not remove without re-reading infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b.
Unattended-Upgrade::Package-Blacklist {
{% for pkg in unattended_upgrades_blacklist %}
"{{ pkg }}";
{% endfor %}
};
// REBOOTS BELONG TO kured (platform/kured), NOT TO apt. All three nodes are
// control-plane + etcd with quorum 2 of 3, so three hosts independently deciding to
// reboot at their own Automatic-Reboot-Time is how the cluster is lost. u-u leaves
// /var/run/reboot-required behind; kured takes a cluster-wide lock and reboots exactly
// one node at a time, after cordon + drain, inside 03:00-06:00, gated on Longhorn volume
// health.
Unattended-Upgrade::Automatic-Reboot "{{ unattended_upgrades_automatic_reboot | bool | lower }}";
Unattended-Upgrade::Automatic-Reboot-WithUsers "false";
// Keep the node's disk from filling with superseded .debs, and keep a log an operator can
// read after the fact (/var/log/unattended-upgrades/). MinAge guards against removing a
// package still needed by a rollback.
Unattended-Upgrade::Remove-Unused-Kernel-Packages "false";
Unattended-Upgrade::Remove-New-Unused-Dependencies "true";
Unattended-Upgrade::Remove-Unused-Dependencies "false";
Unattended-Upgrade::AutoFixInterruptedDpkg "true";
Unattended-Upgrade::MinimalSteps "true";
Unattended-Upgrade::SyslogEnable "true";
// Remove-Unused-Kernel-Packages is FALSE on purpose, against the Debian default. These
// nodes deliberately carry more than one kernel: the backports kernel they boot and the
// distro kernels that are the documented rollback path (node_baseline writes the rollback
// procedure onto the node itself). An unattended process pruning kernels could remove the
// fallback an operator needs at 3am in front of a box that will not boot.
notify: Restart unattended-upgrades timers
tags: [config]
- name: Enable the apt periodic timers that actually run unattended-upgrades
# Installing the package is NOT sufficient to make it run on a schedule: without these
# counters apt's daily units do nothing, and the whole mechanism is inert while looking
# installed. `1` means "every day".
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: |
// MANAGED BY ANSIBLE — infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades.
// Without these four counters the apt-daily timers fire and do nothing, so
// unattended-upgrades would be installed, configured, and never once invoked.
APT::Periodic::Update-Package-Lists "1";
APT::Periodic::Download-Upgradeable-Packages "1";
APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1";
APT::Periodic::AutocleanInterval "7";
tags: [config]
- name: Ensure the systemd timer drop-in directories exist
# `copy` does not create parent directories, and these two .timer.d/ dirs do not exist on a
# stock Debian node — without this task the next task fails with "Destination directory does
# not exist" on a first run.
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item }}.timer.d"
state: directory
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0755"
loop:
- apt-daily
- apt-daily-upgrade
tags: [config]
- name: Pin the apt timer windows into kured's reboot window
# Overriding the shipped timers rather than editing them: a drop-in survives package upgrades.
# OnCalendar is cleared first (`OnCalendar=` with no value) because systemd ACCUMULATES
# OnCalendar entries across drop-ins — omit the reset and the unit keeps its shipped schedule
# IN ADDITION to ours, which would run the upgrade at both times and look like it worked.
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: "/etc/systemd/system/{{ item.unit }}.timer.d/override.conf"
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: |
# MANAGED BY ANSIBLE — infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades.
# Lands the upgrade inside kured's 03:00-06:00 reboot window so a sentinel written by an
# upgrade can be acted on the same night rather than ~24h later.
[Timer]
OnCalendar=
OnCalendar={{ item.time }}
RandomizedDelaySec={{ unattended_upgrades_randomised_delay }}
Persistent=true
force: true
loop:
- { unit: apt-daily, time: "{{ unattended_upgrades_download_time }}" }
- { unit: apt-daily-upgrade, time: "{{ unattended_upgrades_upgrade_time }}" }
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.unit }} at {{ item.time }}"
notify: Restart unattended-upgrades timers
tags: [config]
- name: Configure needrestart (restart services, but never k3s)
# See defaults/main.yml DECISION 3. Auto-restart is what makes a security-only policy real --
# a patched library on disk does nothing for a process still mapping the deleted one -- but
# k3s.service is excluded because restarting the control plane unattended is worse than a
# delayed library fix. `$nrconf{restart}` is Perl config read by needrestart itself.
ansible.builtin.copy:
dest: /etc/needrestart/conf.d/50-k3s.conf
owner: root
group: root
mode: "0644"
content: |
# MANAGED BY ANSIBLE — infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades.
# Restart mode: '{{ unattended_upgrades_needrestart_mode }}' (a = automatically, l = list only, i = interactive)
$nrconf{restart} = '{{ unattended_upgrades_needrestart_mode }}';
# Units matching these patterns are NEVER restarted automatically. k3s bundles containerd
# and the kubelet, so this one entry covers the entire control plane and runtime on these
# nodes (measured 2026-10-17: k3s.service is the only matching unit). A library fix that
# needs k3s restarted therefore waits for the reboot kured will take.
$nrconf{blacklist_rc} = [
{% for pat in unattended_upgrades_needrestart_blacklist %}
qr({{ pat }}),
{% endfor %}
];
tags: [config]
# ── VERIFY ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# These tasks exist because every component of this mechanism fails SILENTLY. An installed
# package, a written config file and a green play are all compatible with nothing ever being
# upgraded and no reboot ever being signalled.
- name: Ask apt-config what the effective settings actually are
# `apt-config dump` is apt's OWN parse of the whole /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/ directory, so it
# proves what WON after lexical ordering rather than what this role wrote. If the shipped
# 50unattended-upgrades were ever renamed above 52-, this is the task that would catch it.
ansible.builtin.command: apt-config dump
register: unattended_upgrades_aptconfig
changed_when: false
check_mode: false
tags: [verify]
- name: Assert the kernel is blacklisted and automatic reboots are off
# The two properties that must never silently regress. Asserted against apt's own view.
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
# apt-config renders each list entry as `Unattended-Upgrade::Package-Blacklist:: "^linux-";`
# so the anchored pattern itself is the thing to look for. Checking for the bare string
# `linux-` would pass on almost any dump and prove nothing.
- "'\"^linux-\"' in unattended_upgrades_aptconfig.stdout"
- "'Unattended-Upgrade::Automatic-Reboot \"false\"' in unattended_upgrades_aptconfig.stdout"
# The origin list must be non-empty, or u-u runs nightly and upgrades nothing — installed,
# scheduled, green, and inert.
- "'Debian-Security' in unattended_upgrades_aptconfig.stdout"
fail_msg: >-
EFFECTIVE apt CONFIG ON {{ inventory_hostname }} IS NOT WHAT THIS ROLE INTENDED.
Either the `^linux-` kernel blacklist or `Automatic-Reboot "false"` is not winning.
Both are safety properties, not preferences: without the blacklist an unattended process
can move a kernel these HP minis must keep >= 6.13 (PROD-PROVISIONING.md §0b), and
without Automatic-Reboot=false three control-plane nodes can each reboot themselves
independently and take etcd below quorum. Inspect with `apt-config dump | grep -i
unattended` and check for a file sorting after 52- in /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/.
success_msg: >-
Effective apt config confirmed: kernel blacklisted, automatic reboot disabled.
tags: [verify]
- name: Find the hooks that can create /var/run/reboot-required
# THE SENTINEL IS THE SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE FOR THE ENTIRE REBOOT HALF OF THIS DESIGN, and
# it is the one part that cannot be asserted from the repo — it depends on what
# update-notifier-common actually ships on this Debian release. Rather than hard-code a path
# that may not exist, discover the candidates and assert that at least one is present.
ansible.builtin.find:
paths:
- /etc/kernel/postinst.d
- /etc/apt/apt.conf.d
patterns:
- "*update-notifier*"
- "*unattended-upgrades*"
- "99update-notifier"
file_type: any
register: unattended_upgrades_sentinel_hooks
changed_when: false
tags: [verify]
- name: Assert something on this node can write the reboot sentinel
# If this fails, kured is a no-op: it watches /var/run/reboot-required forever, the file is
# never created, no reboot is ever taken, and NOTHING GOES RED -- the DaemonSet stays 1/1
# Running and `kured_reboot_required` reports a steady 0 on every node. That is the exact
# shape of failure (a check whose failure mode is a green tick) this repo has been burned by
# before, so it is an assert and not a debug message.
ansible.builtin.assert:
that:
- unattended_upgrades_sentinel_hooks.matched | int > 0
fail_msg: >-
NOTHING ON {{ inventory_hostname }} CAN CREATE /var/run/reboot-required. No
update-notifier / unattended-upgrades hook was found under /etc/kernel/postinst.d or
/etc/apt/apt.conf.d. kured watches that path and reboots only when it exists, so with no
writer the reboot automation is permanently and INVISIBLY idle -- kured stays 1/1 Running
and reports kured_reboot_required=0 on every node forever. Confirm
update-notifier-common is installed (`dpkg -l update-notifier-common`) and inspect
`dpkg -L update-notifier-common | grep -E 'postinst.d|apt.conf.d'`.
success_msg: >-
Reboot sentinel writer present ({{ unattended_upgrades_sentinel_hooks.matched }} hook(s)
found) -- a kernel or flagged package upgrade will signal kured.
tags: [verify]
- name: Report the pending-reboot state of this node
# Read-only. Tells the operator whether this node is currently waiting on kured for a reboot,
# which is the question `--tags verify` is usually being run to answer.
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: /var/run/reboot-required
register: unattended_upgrades_reboot_required
changed_when: false
tags: [verify]
- name: Summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: >-
{{ inventory_hostname }}: security-only unattended upgrades ACTIVE
(upgrade timer {{ unattended_upgrades_upgrade_time }} +/-{{ unattended_upgrades_randomised_delay }}),
kernel and microcode blacklisted, automatic reboot DISABLED.
Reboot currently pending: {{ unattended_upgrades_reboot_required.stat.exists }}.
{% if unattended_upgrades_reboot_required.stat.exists %}
This node is waiting for kured to reboot it in the next 03:00-06:00 window; it will be
cordoned and drained first, and no other node will be rebooted at the same time.
{% endif %}
tags: [verify]