feat(prod): operator decisions — node DNS, service VIPs, become vault, collections path
gate / gate (push) Has been cancelled
gate / conformance (push) Has been cancelled

1. PROD NODE DNS = 8.8.8.8 + 1.1.1.1 (operator, 2026-09-01). Two INDEPENDENT public
   upstreams, so the single-upstream SPOF that broke containerd pulls and CoreDNS
   forwarding on dev cannot recur. Prod deliberately differs from dev, which is
   PiHole-first because dev needs the local jackson.lan zone.

   SCOPE CORRECTED IN THE COMMENTS. Three resolvers answer *.home.keithjackson.dev and
   only one is configured here:
     pods  -> CoreDNS -> platform/coredns/coredns-custom.yaml, whose `template` plugin
              answers the WHOLE zone with ${GATEWAY_VIP}. Self-contained in-cluster;
              PiHole is NOT in this path. Prod is already correct (.20).
     LAN   -> PiHole. Not a cluster concern.
     nodes -> THIS FILE.
   The one thing public node DNS breaks: the k3s API SERVER is a node process carrying
   oidc-issuer-url=https://keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev/realms/homelab and reaches the
   issuer through the NODE resolver, so prod would get the PUBLIC record instead of the
   prod Gateway VIP — breaking kubectl OIDC SSO. Dev avoids this only because its node
   resolver IS PiHole. Not blocking (prod has no cluster or Keycloak yet); options are
   recorded in PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4 for the operator to pick.

2. SERVICE VIPs DECIDED: UNIFI_L4_VIP 192.168.2.21, CRAFTY_L4_VIP 192.168.2.22 — the
   first two addresses after GATEWAY_VIP (.20), mirroring dev's .53/.54/.55 ordering
   within the .20-.30 pool. S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT stays TBD-PROD-* : no prod backup target
   exists, and dev's versitygw is across the pfSense boundary on the dev host, so it is
   not DR for prod.

3. PROD BECOME VAULT committed, ansible-vault encrypted, matching the hypervisor and
   proxmox_hosts pattern. Verified working: `ansible k3s_prod -m command -a 'id -un'
   --become` returns root. The L0 no-plaintext-secrets check asserts every ansible
   vault.yml starts with $ANSIBLE_VAULT, so this stays honest by gate.

4. TOOLCHAIN GAP FIXED: the devcontainer image does NOT ship the Galaxy collections, so
   EVERY ansible play died at parse time on community.general.modprobe. ansible.cfg now
   sets collections_path = collections, and the collections are installed there from the
   existing collections/requirements.yml (gitignored — pinned by requirements, fetched at
   setup, vendored bytes are not source).

5. DRIVE HEALTH MEASURED and recorded in §2 with the raw attribute table so the numbers
   are auditable. Verdict: usable, but not for production etcd/Longhorn state — 31% of
   rated life consumed, 15 grown bad blocks, 187 erase failures, and 32 unexpected power
   losses on a consumer drive with NO power-loss protection, in a single failure domain.
   etcd is the worst possible tenant: it fsyncs constantly and unclean power loss without
   PLP is exactly how a member corrupts.

6. NON-ECC RAM: RISK ACCEPTED by the operator, recorded as a CLOSED decision, not an open
   item — do not re-litigate. Rationale: 3-node k3s homelab, not enterprise; corruption on
   one node is outweighed by the other two and causes node ejection. That holds for the
   dominant mode (etcd raft CRC + quorum; Longhorn 3 replicas + hard anti-affinity +
   rebuild). Recorded residual: corruption introduced UPSTREAM of replication replicates
   faithfully to all three replicas, so quorum sees no disagreement — low probability, and
   the only mitigation is different hardware. Follow-up noted: Longhorn's
   snapshotDataIntegrity is left at the chart default rather than set explicitly, and it
   is the mechanism that operationalises the operator's own argument.

Serves: R-DNS-01, R-DNS-03, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03, R-SEC-01. Task: T-7.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-09-01 00:40:29 -05:00
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@@ -69,9 +69,38 @@ sda 477G C400-MTFDDAC512M (SSD, ~2011-era Micron/Crucial)
Consequences to settle before imaging nodes 2 and 3:
- [ ] **Drive health checked first** (operator decision, 2026-08-31). See §5 for the command —
needs root. A ~15-year-old consumer SSD is not an obvious place for prod state.
- [ ] **Decide the layout.** `roles/node_baseline` expects *block devices*
- [x] **Drive health MEASURED 2026-09-01** (`smartctl -a /dev/sda`, via the baseline package
floor — see §5). Raw attributes, so the numbers are auditable:
| | |
|---|---|
| Model | Crucial/Micron RealSSD m4/C400/P400 (`C400-MTFDDAC512MAM`, fw `070H`) |
| SMART self-assessment | **PASSED** — no attribute in `WHEN_FAILED` |
| Power-on hours | 6,814 (~284 days) · 147 power cycles |
| **Rated life used** | **31%** (`202`), i.e. 69% remaining (`173` VALUE 069) |
| **Grown failing blocks** | **15** (`170`), reallocation events **15** (`196`) |
| **Erase failures** | **187** (`172`) |
| **Unexpected power losses** | **32** (`174`) |
| Pending / offline-uncorrectable / reported-uncorrectable | **0 / 0 / 0** (`197`/`198`/`187`) |
| UDMA CRC errors | 0 (`199`) — cabling is clean |
**Read attribute `5` carefully.** Its raw value is `61440`, which is NOT a bad-sector
count: `61440 = 15 x 4096`, and both `170` and `196` independently read **15**. Its
normalised VALUE is 100 against a THRESH of 10. So the drive has **15 grown bad blocks**,
not sixty-one thousand bad sectors. The first `node_health` run FAILED on that raw value;
the check now judges on normalised VALUE/THRESH, `WHEN_FAILED`, and the vendor-independent
uncorrectable counters instead.
**Verdict: usable, but not for production state.** Nothing says imminent failure — no
pending or uncorrectable sectors, SMART self-assessment passes. But this is a ~2011
consumer MLC drive that has already consumed **31% of its rated life**, grown **15** bad
blocks, logged **187** erase failures, and taken **32** unclean power losses **with no
power-loss protection**, in a single failure domain. etcd is the worst possible tenant for
it: etcd fsyncs constantly, and an unclean power loss on a drive without PLP is exactly how
a member corrupts — this drive has already logged 32 of them.
(Non-ECC RAM is a separate, **accepted** risk — operator decision 2026-09-01, see
`DECISIONS-LOG.md`. It is not part of this verdict.)
- [ ] **Decide the layout.**- [ ] **Decide the layout.** `roles/node_baseline` expects *block devices*
(`node_baseline_longhorn_device`, `node_baseline_etcd_device`) and makes a filesystem on them.
Its defaults `/dev/vdb` and `/dev/vdc` are **virtio names that do not exist on bare metal** —
prod must override them in `group_vars`. On a single-disk node there is no second device at