Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 b2752aec48 feat(auth): gate jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr UIs with oauth2-proxy sidecar (rollout)
Roll the verified Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar out to the remaining
four forward-auth apps after the pihole canary was confirmed fail-closed
(unauthenticated -> 302 to Keycloak, pod 2/2, clean sidecar OIDC discovery).

Each app's Gateway route now terminates at its oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180,
--allowed-group=media-users, --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>); the
gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180, so
the bare UI is never served un-authenticated (fail-closed; R-IDP-02/06). The
apps' own app/API ports stay in-Service for EAST-WEST callers (arr ->
qbittorrent:8080 / jackett:9117) via the existing reciprocal-ingress allows.

- keycloak: confidential jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr clients (realm-import
  + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper).
- secrets: four SOPS/age <app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials, wired into apps/wave-0
  and apps/wave-1 by the renderer's sidecar-creds wave rule.
- ci: remove the temporary canary deferral (all five goldens now reproduce).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-08-31 08:45:46 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 68690e5019 fix(net): allow SSO apps egress to keycloak backend (Cilium 1.20 CVE-2025-30162)
App SSO broke cluster-wide after the Cilium 1.16.5->1.20.1 upgrade: the CVE-2025-30162 fix (in
>=1.16.8/1.17.2) makes the shared Gateway's L7 proxy re-evaluate a pod's egress policy against
Keycloak's REAL backend cluster identity (enforce_policy_on_l7lb) when it hairpins to keycloak.home.
'toEntities: world' matches the Gateway VIP at L3/L4 but not the resolved keycloak identity at L7, so
OIDC discovery/token 403'd ('Access denied') for every app with a NetworkPolicy (gitea/nextcloud/
semaphore/headlamp/crafty...); Grafana survived only because monitoring has no NetworkPolicy.

Fix: explicit toEndpoints egress allow to the keycloak backend for SSO apps.
- catalog/render.py: emit it for auth.mode in {oidc,forward-auth}; re-rendered 8 app goldens.
- platform/headlamp + platform/crafty: hand-written policies get the same allow.
Split-horizon design unchanged. Verified live: headlamp-ns -> keycloak discovery 403 -> 200.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-08-30 23:34:03 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 36a1a4e1f9 refactor(apps): split monolithic apps Kustomization into dependency waves
Replaces the single `apps` Flux Kustomization with dependency-ordered waves
(apps-wave-0..2) so a crashlooping workload isolates to its wave + downstream
instead of stalling the entire app tier. Parallel within a wave, ordered across.

- catalog/render.py: compute waves by longest dependency-path depth over the
  ServiceDefinition `dependencies:` edges (a `<svc>-db` is a leaf, so its
  consumer lands strictly higher — the "DB below consumer" rule falls out of
  longest-path, no special case). `--emit-waves` generates the per-wave
  kustomizations + Flux CRs; `--wave-layout` places renders into the right dir.
  wave 0: pihole gitea jackett plex qbittorrent nextcloud-db semaphore-db
  wave 1: sonarr radarr nextcloud semaphore gitea-actions
  wave 2: seerr
- apps/*.yaml -> apps/wave-{0,1,2}/ (byte-identical moves; SOPS files intact).
- clusters/base: apps.yaml removed; apps-wave-{0,1,2}.yaml added (dependsOn
  chain: platform-config -> wave-0 -> wave-1 -> wave-2, prune+wait each).
- clusters/dev: one SOPS decryption patch per wave (load-bearing).
- DESIGN-waves.md: wave table, topology, cutover runbook.

Cutover: preceded by disabling prune on `apps` (1bfb0db) so removing that
object here does not GC its resources; the wave Kustomizations SSA-adopt the
byte-identical manifests in place (no restart, no PVC churn).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-08-26 12:19:00 -05:00