home-network-k3s-impl

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Include renames

Author SHA1 Message Date

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jakman85andClaude Opus 5	6202d92c27	test(conformance): gate the URL desired state, and prove the selftest can fail L0 (212 assertions, was 175): * runs ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py --check, so client-urls.yaml must be exactly what the realm import renders. A hand edit that makes the two disagree is unmergeable -- this is what keeps the realm import the single source of truth for hostnames rather than just the place they were first typed. * asserts client-urls.yaml and the realm import are rendered by the SAME Flux Kustomization. postBuild.substituteFrom is per-Kustomization, so a split would let one ${BASE_DOMAIN} resolve to two different values and the realm would converge on a hostname the HTTPRoutes do not serve. * asserts the desired state uses no substitution token the realm definition lacks, names only clients the import declares, and declares no field outside the five-field write surface; that the CronJob mounts it readOnly at the path the script defaults to; and that the script, renderer and check agree on which fields are writable. * NEW mutations.py: injects 12 plausible regressions into the EXTRACTED script and requires --selftest to catch every one. A passing suite proves nothing if it cannot fail, and "reported success while the realm was broken" is precisely what this component exists to end -- so the same standard applies to its own test. ~20s. L2: the audit Job now mounts keycloak-client-urls and asserts KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_URLS_AUDIT_OK. Without that it would pass on a realm still holding pre-migration redirect URIs -- the exact state prod was measured in. Alerts: the existing Failing/Stale pair is EXTENDED to name redirect-URI drift, not duplicated. One CronJob gets one pair; a second pair on the same job_name regex would fire twice for one cause. No new critical, no new permanently-firing rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-09-12 21:26:12 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5	23ea72d01e	feat(keycloak): reconcile client redirect URIs, not just client secrets The realm import is a one-shot that never re-runs, so a redirect URI changed in git reaches the realm never. Prod's stored URIs were measured still on the pre-migration hostname while git declared the new one -- after a BASE_DOMAIN flip every OIDC login fails with a redirect_uri mismatch, with the CR still reading Done=True and nothing alerting. Same failure class as the literal-placeholder secrets, same cure. EXTENDS the existing reconciler rather than adding a sibling. Decisive reason: a URL write needs NO new endpoint. It is the same minimal client PUT, and the current URLs already come back in the allow-listed client lookup -- so the allow-list is widened by nothing and the users/groups/roles/authentication guarantee is preserved unchanged rather than re-declared in a second copy. The ConfigMap also carries exactly one script key by L0 contract, so a sibling would have had to fork ~300 lines of safety-critical code that the header explicitly forbids forking. Reconciles redirectUris, webOrigins, rootUrl, baseUrl, adminUrl -- only the fields a client actually declares, and on a write only the fields that actually drifted. A field the desired state omits is UNMANAGED and left untouched; absence never means force-to-empty. THE TWO PASSES ARE INDEPENDENT. Each reads its own desired state and fails closed for its own fields only. A malformed URL ConfigMap cannot stop client-SECRET repair, which would otherwise make credential healing depend on a hostname file. List fields compare order-insensitively (sorted, not set -- duplicates are still drift), because Keycloak does not preserve the authored order of redirectUris and an order-sensitive compare would rewrite every client forever while reporting success. --selftest grows to 84 assertions covering the domain flip, a client gaining a URI, a client losing a stale one, a public client's URLs being managed while its secret is not, per-pass fail-closed, order-insensitivity, and a server that accepts a PUT without applying it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-09-12 21:25:34 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5	6a8953e288	feat(prod): observability for the two failure modes that went unseen, plus OIDC self-healing Minimal prod delivery, authored directly on main (= prod's live revision `d1a6628`) rather than by merging work/prod-standup-campaign. That branch carries the DNS apex inversion, which would have set prod's BASE_DOMAIN to home.keithjackson.dev; prod runs external-dns with policy: sync and txtOwnerId: prod, so it would have begun rewriting apex records dev owns while the non-k3s prod still serves 443 there. Operator sequencing is "dev migrates first". Nothing under clusters/ is touched here at all, which is what makes this safe to land now. Also deliberately EXCLUDED, because prod's live cluster-vars has no CNPG_BACKUP_PATH key and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions would fail the whole tier: the R2 rework of platform/velero/ and the CNPG destinationPath changes. Those land as feat/r2-backup-prod together with the endpoint and bucket knobs. WHAT THIS FIXES 1. Nothing was watching CNPG. All three prod databases have run since bootstrap with ContinuousArchiving=False and firstRecoverabilityPoint=null, and no alert existed anywhere. Because archive_mode=on and the archive command fails, Postgres refuses to recycle WAL: keycloak-db holds every segment ever written (257 MiB on a 5 GiB volume, ~6.8 MiB/h) — roughly 29 days to a disk-full PANIC on the cluster's SSO database. Found by hand, 38h late. CNPGWALArchiveBacklog would have fired within the hour, and evaluates to 3 firing series on prod today. Rules key on cnpg_collector_* rather than cnpg_pg_stat_archiver_*, because nextcloud-db's exporter cannot log in to its own database (permission denied for database "nextcloud", both clusters) so the pg_stat_archiver family does not exist for it — the obvious metric would have been blind to one database in three. 2. No PVC outside namespace=monitoring had any fill alert. New rules are partitioned by namespace so they cannot double-fire with MonitoringVolumeFillingUp, pinned to job="kubelet" (the apiserver copy of the same series reports namespace=default), and guarded by inodes > 0 — block-mode PVCs such as unifi-rootdisk report available=0 forever and would otherwise have fired critical permanently. 3. VPNTunnelDown could never clear on a cluster with no gateway node; it has been firing critical on prod since 2026-09-05. Now guarded so prod self-arms the moment a node carries the egress-gateway label, with dev's behaviour unchanged today. 4. The Keycloak realm import fails OPEN: an unresolved placeholder is stored LITERALLY and the import still reports success, then sits at Done=True and never re-runs. On 2026-09-06 all 12 prod OIDC clients held the literal $(env:..._CLIENT_SECRET) string and every SSO login failed, while every signal was green. The CronJob is the level-triggered correction; two alerts make its silence observable. Repaired live already — this stops it recurring. Also: the R-NET-04 conformance scan descended into nested agent worktrees under .claude/, counting 4 egress policies where 1 is authored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-09-07 00:59:22 -05:00

jakman85andClaude Opus 5

6202d92c27

test(conformance): gate the URL desired state, and prove the selftest can fail

L0 (212 assertions, was 175):
  * runs ci/render-keycloak-client-urls.py --check, so client-urls.yaml must be exactly
    what the realm import renders. A hand edit that makes the two disagree is
    unmergeable -- this is what keeps the realm import the single source of truth for
    hostnames rather than just the place they were first typed.
  * asserts client-urls.yaml and the realm import are rendered by the SAME Flux
    Kustomization. postBuild.substituteFrom is per-Kustomization, so a split would let
    one ${BASE_DOMAIN} resolve to two different values and the realm would converge on
    a hostname the HTTPRoutes do not serve.
  * asserts the desired state uses no substitution token the realm definition lacks,
    names only clients the import declares, and declares no field outside the
    five-field write surface; that the CronJob mounts it readOnly at the path the
    script defaults to; and that the script, renderer and check agree on which fields
    are writable.
  * NEW mutations.py: injects 12 plausible regressions into the EXTRACTED script and
    requires --selftest to catch every one. A passing suite proves nothing if it cannot
    fail, and "reported success while the realm was broken" is precisely what this
    component exists to end -- so the same standard applies to its own test. ~20s.

L2: the audit Job now mounts keycloak-client-urls and asserts
KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_URLS_AUDIT_OK. Without that it would pass on a realm still holding
pre-migration redirect URIs -- the exact state prod was measured in.

Alerts: the existing Failing/Stale pair is EXTENDED to name redirect-URI drift, not
duplicated. One CronJob gets one pair; a second pair on the same job_name regex would
fire twice for one cause. No new critical, no new permanently-firing rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

2026-09-12 21:26:12 -05:00

jakman85andClaude Opus 5

23ea72d01e

feat(keycloak): reconcile client redirect URIs, not just client secrets

The realm import is a one-shot that never re-runs, so a redirect URI changed in git
reaches the realm never. Prod's stored URIs were measured still on the pre-migration
hostname while git declared the new one -- after a BASE_DOMAIN flip every OIDC login
fails with a redirect_uri mismatch, with the CR still reading Done=True and nothing
alerting. Same failure class as the literal-placeholder secrets, same cure.

EXTENDS the existing reconciler rather than adding a sibling. Decisive reason: a URL
write needs NO new endpoint. It is the same minimal client PUT, and the current URLs
already come back in the allow-listed client lookup -- so the allow-list is widened by
nothing and the users/groups/roles/authentication guarantee is preserved unchanged
rather than re-declared in a second copy. The ConfigMap also carries exactly one
script key by L0 contract, so a sibling would have had to fork ~300 lines of
safety-critical code that the header explicitly forbids forking.

Reconciles redirectUris, webOrigins, rootUrl, baseUrl, adminUrl -- only the fields a
client actually declares, and on a write only the fields that actually drifted. A
field the desired state omits is UNMANAGED and left untouched; absence never means
force-to-empty.

THE TWO PASSES ARE INDEPENDENT. Each reads its own desired state and fails closed for
its own fields only. A malformed URL ConfigMap cannot stop client-SECRET repair, which
would otherwise make credential healing depend on a hostname file.

List fields compare order-insensitively (sorted, not set -- duplicates are still
drift), because Keycloak does not preserve the authored order of redirectUris and an
order-sensitive compare would rewrite every client forever while reporting success.

--selftest grows to 84 assertions covering the domain flip, a client gaining a URI, a
client losing a stale one, a public client's URLs being managed while its secret is
not, per-pass fail-closed, order-insensitivity, and a server that accepts a PUT
without applying it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

2026-09-12 21:25:34 -05:00

jakman85andClaude Opus 5

6a8953e288

feat(prod): observability for the two failure modes that went unseen, plus OIDC self-healing

Minimal prod delivery, authored directly on main (= prod's live revision d1a6628)
rather than by merging work/prod-standup-campaign. That branch carries the DNS apex
inversion, which would have set prod's BASE_DOMAIN to home.keithjackson.dev; prod
runs external-dns with policy: sync and txtOwnerId: prod, so it would have begun
rewriting apex records dev owns while the non-k3s prod still serves 443 there.
Operator sequencing is "dev migrates first". Nothing under clusters/ is touched
here at all, which is what makes this safe to land now.

Also deliberately EXCLUDED, because prod's live cluster-vars has no CNPG_BACKUP_PATH
key and StrictPostBuildSubstitutions would fail the whole tier: the R2 rework of
platform/velero/ and the CNPG destinationPath changes. Those land as
feat/r2-backup-prod together with the endpoint and bucket knobs.

WHAT THIS FIXES

1. Nothing was watching CNPG. All three prod databases have run since bootstrap with
   ContinuousArchiving=False and firstRecoverabilityPoint=null, and no alert existed
   anywhere. Because archive_mode=on and the archive command fails, Postgres refuses
   to recycle WAL: keycloak-db holds every segment ever written (257 MiB on a 5 GiB
   volume, ~6.8 MiB/h) — roughly 29 days to a disk-full PANIC on the cluster's SSO
   database. Found by hand, 38h late. CNPGWALArchiveBacklog would have fired within
   the hour, and evaluates to 3 firing series on prod today.
   Rules key on cnpg_collector_* rather than cnpg_pg_stat_archiver_*, because
   nextcloud-db's exporter cannot log in to its own database (permission denied for
   database "nextcloud", both clusters) so the pg_stat_archiver family does not exist
   for it — the obvious metric would have been blind to one database in three.

2. No PVC outside namespace=monitoring had any fill alert. New rules are partitioned
   by namespace so they cannot double-fire with MonitoringVolumeFillingUp, pinned to
   job="kubelet" (the apiserver copy of the same series reports namespace=default),
   and guarded by inodes > 0 — block-mode PVCs such as unifi-rootdisk report
   available=0 forever and would otherwise have fired critical permanently.

3. VPNTunnelDown could never clear on a cluster with no gateway node; it has been
   firing critical on prod since 2026-09-05. Now guarded so prod self-arms the moment
   a node carries the egress-gateway label, with dev's behaviour unchanged today.

4. The Keycloak realm import fails OPEN: an unresolved placeholder is stored
   LITERALLY and the import still reports success, then sits at Done=True and never
   re-runs. On 2026-09-06 all 12 prod OIDC clients held the literal
   $(env:..._CLIENT_SECRET) string and every SSO login failed, while every signal was
   green. The CronJob is the level-triggered correction; two alerts make its silence
   observable. Repaired live already — this stops it recurring.

Also: the R-NET-04 conformance scan descended into nested agent worktrees under
.claude/, counting 4 egress policies where 1 is authored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

2026-09-07 00:59:22 -05:00