docs/source-comment-audit
10
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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028853c87c |
feat(pihole): two replicas on different nodes, and fix a PVC mounted where pihole never writes
Phase 2 of making LAN DNS survive a node failure. Pihole was one pod on one node; measured 2026-10-04, losing that node meant roughly 6-10 minutes with no LAN resolution (tolerationSeconds 300 + NotReady detection + a Longhorn RWO force-detach), while losing the node holding the pihole-dns L2 lease -- a DIFFERENT node -- meant tens of seconds. Two of three nodes were single points of failure with wildly different blast radii. Adds `availability.replicas` to the ServiceDefinition schema (1.10.0). Intent only; the mechanism is render.py's, documented in the renderer contract. 1 or absent renders a Deployment exactly as before -- verified byte-identical across the whole apps/ tree. >1 renders a StatefulSet (a longhorn PVC is RWO, so a multi-replica Deployment never schedules the second pod), per-replica volumeClaimTemplates, REQUIRED hostname anti-affinity, podManagementPolicy Parallel, a minAvailable:1 PodDisruptionBudget, and an SLI that follows the rendered kind (a Deployment-shaped rule against a StatefulSet absent()s forever). Pinned by ~20 new --selftest assertions rather than a conformance change. ALSO FIXES A LIVE BUG. Pihole's config PVC was mounted at the renderer default /data/config, but pihole writes to /etc/pihole. Measured: /etc/pihole (7.1M -- gravity.db, pihole.toml, query DB) was on the OVERLAY, while the 2Gi Longhorn volume held lost+found and 24K of nothing. So every restart discarded all state and re-downloaded 72k gravity domains, and backup.policy has been backing up an empty volume while reporting success. Fixed here because otherwise the new per-replica volumes would hold nothing while state stayed ephemeral -- and because persisting gravity.db is what makes a restart cheap. The /etc/pihole mount is safe on the image's own evidence: start.sh is PID 1 as uid 0 and chowns the directory recursively (no fsGroup needed), and it calls migrate_gravity which creates the database when absent. The gate caught a real regression on the first run: the wave-0 alert unit test fed pihole a Deployment-shaped series. Updated; promtool SUCCESS. Touches no sensitive paths, so this one needs no override. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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bdfa72b1c7 |
Merge pull request 'feat(gpu): satisfy hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync with gpu.intel.com/i915 instead of a /dev/dri hostPath (the hostPath was measured not to work: device-cgroup EPERM)' (#37) from feat/quicksync-via-device-plugin into main
Reviewed-on: #37 Reviewed-by: Keith Jackson <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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78bf68493d |
feat(gpu): satisfy hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync with gpu.intel.com/i915, not a /dev/dri hostPath
The hostPath mechanism was MEASURED NOT TO WORK. In the live Plex pod on
k3s-prod-2, 2026-10-01: the device node was VISIBLE in the container
(`crw-rw---- root video2 226,128 renderD128`) and could not be opened --
`uid 0 O_RDWR -> EPERM` and `uid 1000 O_RDWR -> EPERM`. EPERM from the DEVICE
CGROUP, not EACCES from file permissions, proven three ways: root on the HOST
opens the same device rc=0; the node is unified cgroup2fs; and the container's
runc config.json read `linux.resources.devices: [{allow: False, access: 'rwm'}]`
with `linux.devices: None` -- one deny-all rule, no allow entry for major 226.
A hostPath is a filesystem operation: it binds the device node in but adds no
cgroup allow rule, because Kubernetes cannot infer one from a volume.
The Intel GPU device plugin produces that allow rule
(`createDeviceSpecsFromDrmFiles` emits `DeviceSpec{..., Permissions: "rw"}`).
It shipped as #36 and is live: all three prod nodes advertise
`gpu.intel.com/i915: 1`, DaemonSet 3/3/3 (measured 2026-10-01).
ZERO ServiceDefinition field changes, which was the entire point of making the
field an enum of capability classes rather than a device path. `catalog/plex.yaml`'s
`hardware:` block comes through byte-identical; only its comment changes, because
it restated the old mechanism. Contract invariant 8 holds, now demonstrated rather
than claimed.
- catalog/render.py: `DRI_VOLUME_NAME`/`DRI_DEVICE_DIR` retired for
`QUICKSYNC_RESOURCE`; the hardware branch now sets
`resources.limits["gpu.intel.com/i915"] = 1` on the APP container only (never a
sidecar) and emits no volume, no mount, no securityContext, no nodeSelector.
`limits` not `requests` is mandatory: Kubernetes mirrors requests from limits,
and a requests-only extended resource is invalid. This is the only app-container
`resources` render path and is deliberately narrow -- no general CPU/memory
feature was invented.
- selftests: resources dict asserted EXACTLY; hostPath/mount asserted ABSENT; the
no-`hardware` negative extended to `resources`; the podSecurityContext
pass-through and the no-synthesised-securityContext assertions kept; one new
assertion that the limit never reaches the oauth2-proxy sidecar. Mutation-tested:
8/8 mutants caught (requests-instead-of-limits, emission dropped, hostPath
re-added, emitted unconditionally, supplementalGroups synthesised, wrong resource
name, quantity as a string, limit leaked onto the sidecar).
- apps/wave-0/plex.yaml: six hostPath lines removed, a three-line resources block
added. Only golden touched; keycloak/vm-demo unchanged.
THE REGRESSION, STATED RATHER THAN SOLD. Before: device missing ->
`DirectoryOrCreate` mounted an empty dir -> Plex ran and SILENTLY
software-transcoded (invisible, harmless to everything else). After: resource
unavailable (plugin broken, removed, or not yet reconciled) -> Plex is
UNSCHEDULABLE, and `apps-wave-0` is `wait: true` with `apps-wave-1` dependsOn it,
so that STALLS THE APP TIER. Unavoidable: an extended resource is a hard
scheduling constraint, and it is also the only thing that produces the cgroup
allow rule. There is no graceful-degradation variant. Plex's schedulability is now
coupled to the intel-gpu-plugin DaemonSet. Escape hatch, one field and no code
change: delete the `hardware:` block from catalog/plex.yaml and re-render.
Documented in the contract, the runbook (its own top-of-page section and a
"Plex will not schedule" procedure) and the handoff.
HARDWARE TRANSCODING IS STILL NOT OBSERVED WORKING. The decisive open() test
cannot be re-run until this merges and Flux reconciles, and the Plex-side
`HardwareAcceleratedCodecs` toggle is still unset. A green gate proves the
manifest renders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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99560c2d22 |
feat(auth): declare API paths per service, so --api-route can ship at all
PR #28 fixed the cookie collision, the 5-minute session and the missing metrics
listener in one renderer function, and deliberately declined `--api-route`
because the config model could not express the difference between two apps.
This adds the hook it was missing and sets the flag only where a measurement
says to.
THE DEFECT. oauth2-proxy answers an unauthenticated request with a 302 to
Keycloak. Its AJAX guard would send 401 instead, but it fires only on an EXACT
`Accept: application/json`, which these apps' JavaScript does not consistently
send. So a browser XHR gets a 302, FOLLOWS IT INVISIBLY, has it satisfied
silently by the live SSO session, and resolves 200 carrying the app's HTML where
the JavaScript expected JSON. On a write it is worse: a browser following a 302
re-issues a POST as a GET and DROPS THE BODY, so the operator's change is
discarded and the UI reports success.
MEASURED, on two apps and two different paths -- which is the whole argument:
jackett 2026-09-30: 33 x 302 vs 2 x 401 on /api/ paths, and 4 of 6 POSTs
answered by the proxy and never reaching Jackett (upstream `-`).
radarr 2026-10-01, 23h after PR #28 deployed (pod radarr-7d55cbffb9-42hmh,
0 restarts): 232 unauthenticated requests in the pod's whole life and
ALL 232 are the same call -- POST /signalr/messages/negotiate from a
browser, 302, upstream `-`. A left-open tab whose session the cookie
rename orphaned, polling forever, silently redirected every time and
NEVER re-prompting. The reported symptom, still in production.
So radarr's broken path is /signalr/ and jackett's is /api/, and PIHOLE SERVES
NO /api/ AT ALL. One function renders all five sidecars, so the cheap fix is a
constant -- and a constant applies one app's measurement to four apps nobody
measured. `auth` was `additionalProperties: false`, so there was no per-app
hook. Adding one named, documented key is the change; the block stays closed.
schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json 1.8.0 -> 1.9.0: optional
`auth.apiRoutes`, a list (radarr needs two, and --api-route is natively
repeatable) of anchored path regexes. Plus the shape invariant that a
non-empty list requires mode: forward-auth, since no sidecar is rendered
for oidc/native/none and declaring it there would be a SILENT NO-OP.
catalog/render.py emits one --api-route per entry, in order, and RAISES on
an unanchored entry. The flag is SINGULAR -- verified against the pinned
v7.8.1 binary's own --help; --api-routes does not exist and the proxy
refuses to start with it.
catalog/{jackett,radarr}.yaml the two measured apps.
catalog/{pihole,sonarr,qbittorrent}.yaml comments recording that they get
NOTHING, and why. Sonarr and qBittorrent were measured (0 unauthenticated
requests in 23h) and left alone: that is evidence of no TRAFFIC, not of no
need, and sonarr being nearly radarr's codebase is what makes the guess
tempting and still a guess.
apps/wave-0/jackett.yaml, apps/wave-1/radarr.yaml regenerated. Only TWO
goldens change; pihole/qbittorrent/sonarr are byte-identical to main,
which is the per-app property proving itself on the real tree.
BREADTH IS THE DANGEROUS DIRECTION AND IT IS NOT SYMMETRIC. A missing
--api-route is a silent 302. A too-broad one answers a plain PAGE LOAD with
401, so a logged-out operator gets a bare error page and is never offered a
sign-in -- the service looks permanently broken. Each entry must therefore
match `^\^/[A-Za-z0-9._~/-]+(\.\*|\$)?$`: anchored at ^/ then literal path
characters. `^/`, `^/.*`, `.*`, `/api/` and `^/api/|^/` are all rejected, all
five provoked. Alternation is refused rather than supported because the flag is
repeatable, so one entry per route costs nothing.
NEW GATE CHECK: conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-api-routes-per-app
(whole-repo scope, so ci/l0.sh's --include-scope union runs it on every
invocation; no bespoke stage, which whole-repo-invariants-wired would fail).
It is a SIBLING of oauth2-proxy-cookie-names-distinct, not an extension of it:
that check's subject is cookie IDENTITY and shares neither inputs nor failure
mode with this, so bundling them would make its name a lie and let a future
api-route decision be expressed only by weakening a COOKIE check.
The check exists for one reason the other gates cannot cover: render-golden
compares the render to the goldens, so a RENDERER CONSTANT plus regenerated
goldens AGREE WITH EACH OTHER while both being wrong. Provoked: the regen exits
0 -- render-golden is happy -- and this check exits 1 with 15 failures naming
pihole, qbittorrent, radarr and sonarr individually. It also asserts the
anchoring pattern is the SAME in the schema and the renderer, because three
surfaces guard this and if they drift the loosest wins silently.
Tested in both directions on throwaway trees outside the repo: compliant tree
rc 0 / 43 assertions / 6 sidecars; pre-change tree rc 1 / 11 failures; and four
targeted mutations (hand-edited golden, widened regex, renderer constant,
deleted schema pattern) each firing their own assertion class and nothing else.
ALSO FOLDED IN (coordinator's request; defect is in the file I own). _selftest()
reached _cookie_name() through a bare `next(genexpr)` with NO default, so
deleting the --cookie-name emission -- the exact mutation that assertion exists
to catch -- raised StopIteration, which escaped _selftest() BEFORE its collected
`SELFTEST FAIL:` lines were printed. Right verdict, zero diagnostics, and it
masked every other assertion the same mutation broke (found by Desmond Oyelaran
while wiring the selftest into the render-golden stage; his PR #33 is not in this
base -- origin/main @
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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fa4765bb3e |
feat(schema): declare a host hardware capability, hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync
A ServiceDefinition could not say it needs the host's Intel QuickSync render
device. The schema is `additionalProperties: false`, so there was no authorable
form for it at all, and `apps/` is generated — a hand-edit would be reverted by
the next render.
Adds optional top-level `hardware`, with one optional member `gpu`, an enum
whose only current value is `intel-quicksync` (schema 1.7.0 -> 1.8.0).
The enum is the point. The SD declares WHAT CLASS of device it needs; the
hostPath and the mount live only in catalog/render.py. Migrating to the Intel
GPU device plugin (`gpu.intel.com/i915` resource requests, no hostPath) is then
a renderer change with zero catalog edits. Letting an SD name `/dev/dri`
directly would look simpler and make that migration a catalog-wide edit, so
both the schema description and the renderer contract say so explicitly.
When `hardware.gpu == intel-quicksync`, r_deployment emits exactly two things,
on the app container only:
- a hostPath volume `dri` -> /dev/dri, type DirectoryOrCreate;
- a read-write volumeMount of it at /dev/dri (VA-API opens the render node
read-write, so deliberately not readOnly).
Mounting the device is sufficient. In particular NO
podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups is emitted, and adding one would be a
regression rather than a hardening. Measured in the running container on
prod-2, 2026-09-30:
PID 1 s6-svscan Uid: 0 Gid: 0 Groups: 0
pid 246 Plex Media Server Uid: 1000 Gid: 1000 Groups: 100 1000
The service is started with `exec s6-setuidgid plex ...`, and the child's group
list is exactly the /etc/group account-database list — root's gid 0, which
PID 1 holds, is gone. That is a setgroups() that REPLACES rather than appends,
so anything Kubernetes supplies is discarded before the app starts. What works
is the image's own /etc/cont-init.d/45-plex-hw-transcode-and-connected-tuner,
which stats each /dev/dri char device, groupadds a matching group inside the
container and usermods the app user into it, every start, nothing hardcoded.
An inert supplementalGroups would have read as the mechanism to whoever
debugged this next, so the absence is documented at the emission site and
asserted by --selftest. Corollary: the hook re-stats on every start, so host
GID drift is self-healing and no GID is pinned anywhere in this repo.
`DirectoryOrCreate` is load-bearing. A node that comes back without the render
device (rebuild, BIOS change, driver regression, hardware swap) must degrade
the workload to software transcoding, not fail the mount: apps-wave-0 is
`wait: true` and apps-wave-1 dependsOn it, so a failed hostPath mount stalls
the whole app tier for a feature that is not load-bearing. /dev is tmpfs, so
the empty directory the kubelet creates leaves nothing durable behind. Its cost
— a missing device is silent, and no metric exists to alert on — is recorded in
the contract rather than papered over with an alert that could not fire.
Also deliberately NOT emitted: no `privileged: true` (Kyverno restrict-host-
namespaces is Enforce and it is not needed), no nodeSelector (placement is a
separate concern with its own justification), no resource requests (there is no
app-container resource render path).
No catalog entry uses the field. Re-rendering `--all catalog -o apps` is a zero
diff, which is the proof the change is inert until opted into.
Self-tests in the existing check(...) style: the positive (volume + mount, and
no securityContext / privileged / nodeSelector), the negative (an SD without
`hardware` gains no volume, no mount, no securityContext — mirroring the
podSecurityContext negative) and a pass-through case (an SD's own
podSecurityContext survives byte-for-byte). Note that NO gate stage runs
`render.py --selftest`; they were run by hand and the gap is recorded in the
handoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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4080065aa7 |
feat(dns): exposure: internal can no longer publish a public record
docs/09 R-DNS-03 and schemas/renderer-contract.md both said an `internal` service renders no public DNS record. Nothing enforced either sentence. ExternalDNS's `gateway-httproute` source admitted EVERY HTTPRoute on the shared Gateway, so six `exposure: internal` services — jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore, sonarr — published `<name>.home.keithjackson.dev` into the public authoritative Cloudflare zone answering with the Gateway VIP 192.168.2.20. That published the internal subnet, the Gateway VIP and a full service inventory to anyone who could guess a label, and made each of those names a DNS-rebind primitive — which is why the SOHO router strips RFC1918 answers and LAN clients need per-client dnsmasq overrides to reach their own services. THE MECHANISM, established against the DEPLOYED version rather than from memory. The live prod Deployment runs registry.k8s.io/external-dns/external-dns:v0.21.0. In v0.21.0, source/annotations/processors.go IsControllerMismatch() skips a source object whose `external-dns.alpha.kubernetes.io/controller` annotation is present and != its own `dns-controller`, and source/gateway.go applies that check inside Endpoints() BEFORE any hostname is resolved; source/service.go applies the identical check, covering the second configured source. catalog/render.py now emits that annotation on every HTTPRoute it renders for an `internal` service, derived from `exposure` alone — no per-service list — so a service that omits `exposure` inherits the internal default and is unpublishable too. Verified LIVE on prod on a throwaway hostname with no existing record at risk: the annotated route published nothing, and adding the annotation to a route that already had a record produced action=DELETE for both its A record and its `a-` TXT registry entry one ~60s reconcile later, moving nothing else in the zone. WHY PER-RESOURCE AND NOT A CLUSTER-WIDE OPT-IN FILTER. `labelFilter` is the stronger default posture and v0.21.0 supports it for both configured sources, but nine publishing objects here are hand-authored platform/apps manifests with no `exposure` field, seven of which hold live records (auth, crafty, crafty-mc, grafana, headlamp, the apex, unifi). An opt-in filter deletes all seven at once, and whether each should be publicly resolvable is an operator decision per name. Per-resource exclusion has exactly the blast radius of the defect; the seven are enumerated in a shrink-only register so the unadjudicated set cannot grow silently, and the filter stays available as hardening afterwards. `policy: sync`, `txtOwnerId` and `domainFilters` are UNTOUCHED. Per-resource exclusion only ever removes an object from this instance's view, so nothing here makes prod capable of deleting a record it does not own. WHAT THIS DELETES, and it is not reversible by a revert alone: 12 records — the A record and the `a-`-prefixed TXT registry entry for each of jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore and sonarr. The zone has no `*.home.keithjackson.dev` wildcard and `*.keithjackson.dev` does not match two labels, so each becomes a public NXDOMAIN with no fallback. The complete pre-state is captured at the authority and committed as a recovery baseline (.standup-dns/dns-20260914-pre-externaldns-scope.txt), with the restore procedure for both halves of a record. MERGE ORDER IS NOT OPTIONAL: feat/pihole-lan-dns-authority must land and be verified first. Removing these records while the LAN still depends on them, with the router stripping RFC1918 and no internal authority yet, breaks name resolution outright. The five `exposure: public` services are LEFT UNCHANGED and still answer with the Gateway VIP, so they remain publicly unreachable. That is two open operator decisions, both written up in platform/externaldns/helmrelease.yaml: what address they should answer with (136.51.115.252 is the legacy non-k3s stack serving a placeholder cert, not established as correct for this cluster), and how to separate them from the non-public names that share the Gateway — because in v0.21.0 the target annotation is read only from the GATEWAY and a ListenerSet, never from an HTTPRoute, so a per-service override is not expressible while they all attach to `shared`. No knob is added for it yet: one that cannot take effect invites someone to set it and expect one. Guard: conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns, a whole-repo-scoped L0 static check (no ci/l0.sh stage — the whole-repo-invariants-wired meta-test forbids one). It asserts both directions (present on internal, absent on public), the `service`-source half, that the renderer DERIVES the annotation from `exposure` and cannot emit external-dns's own claiming value, proves the shipped renderer end-to-end on internal/public/omitted-field fixtures, and ratchets the non-catalog register. Proven to fail on the pre-fix tree (9 of 53 assertions, naming all six services) and pass after (56/56). Schema 1.6.0 -> 1.7.0: no field changes, a mapping change to `exposure`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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cf7d97e546 |
fix(obs): twelve app SLI rules read a signal that exists; kill the dead ServiceMonitors
Twelve `<app>-down` SLI rules were STRUCTURALLY INERT. Each read `up{job="<app>"} == 0`,
and the ServiceMonitor rendered beside it named `endpoints[].port: metrics` — a port NO
rendered app Service defined. Every monitor discovered ZERO targets, so no `up{job="<app>"}`
series existed and the rule could not fire. Verified on prod before this change:
`count by (job) (up)` listed 24 jobs and not one of the twelve appeared; `up{job="plex"}`
and `up{job="gitea"}` both returned nothing. `PrometheusTargetsMissing` could not see it
either — a target that was never discovered has no `up` series to be 0.
THE PORT NAME WAS NEVER THE MISSING PIECE. Ground truth per app: Plex, Pi-hole, Jackett,
qBittorrent, Sonarr, Radarr, Seerr, Semaphore and Nextcloud export NO Prometheus metrics
without a separate exporter sidecar; Gitea can but only with app.ini metrics enabled;
Keycloak does, on the operator's management port, already scraped by
platform/keycloak/servicemonitor.yaml; vm-demo is a KubeVirt VM with no Service at all, so
its monitor selected nothing whatsoever. `metrics: true` was asserting a fact none of them
had. There was also a THIRD layer of inertness nobody had hit yet: every app namespace ships
default-deny with `ingress: []` and the renderer emitted no monitoring allow, so even a
correct port would have been dropped by policy — while renderer-contract.md claimed the
baseline carried such an allow.
FIXED IN THE GENERATOR, not in twelve rendered files:
* `slis: [up]` now renders a `<app>-down` alert against kube-state-metrics readiness of the
service's own workload object —
`kube_deployment_status_replicas_available{namespace,deployment} == 0 or absent(...)`,
`kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready` for a StatefulSet, and
`absent(kubevirt_vmi_info{namespace,name,phase="running"})` for a VM. The same idiom
KeycloakDown has used since it was fixed. kube-state-metrics IS scraped, so this needs no
exporter and no new target. The `or absent(...)` half is load-bearing: the signal
DISAPPEARING now fires the alert instead of silencing it.
* schema 1.6.0 adds `observability.metricsEndpoint` — WHERE metrics are served. A
ServiceMonitor is rendered ONLY from it, and it renders all three halves of a working
scrape together: the named Service port, the monitor endpoint, and the
monitoring-namespace CiliumNetworkPolicy allow. No catalog entry declares one, so twelve
dead ServiceMonitors are gone. `metrics: true` keeps meaning logs-to-Loki plus
kube-state-metrics liveness.
* schema 1.6.0 also adds `observability.livenessWorkload`, and catalog/keycloak.yaml uses
it. Keycloak's server is a StatefulSet run by the operator; the default Deployment shape
would have made its `absent()` half fire FOREVER — the other failure mode this repo has
shipped.
* renderer selftest gains cases 9/9a/9b/9c: no metricsEndpoint => no monitor; the up SLI
must not read `up{job=...}`; endpoint port must exist on the Service; the metrics port
must NOT reach the Gateway allow; an unknown livenessWorkload.kind is REFUSED.
PROOF, both directions, for all twelve (apps/wave-{0,1,2}/tests/app-slis.test.yaml, run by
platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh over the RENDERED manifests):
* quiet on the healthy state; firing on no-ready-replica; firing when the series is ABSENT;
the VM asserted both gone and in a non-running phase; per-app isolation asserted, and
keycloak asserted un-maskable by its neighbours (keycloak-operator Deployment,
keycloak-db StatefulSet ready in the same namespace).
* mutation-checked: six mutations, each turning its suite red — reverting plex to
`up{job=...} == 0`; dropping seerr's `absent()` half; pointing keycloak at a Deployment;
capitalising the VMI phase to `Running`; widening keycloak's matcher to the namespace;
inverting plex's `== 0` to `!= 0`. Control run green.
* live on prod with `promtool query instant`: all ten deployed app Deployments export
`kube_deployment_status_replicas_available`,
`kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="keycloak",statefulset="keycloak"}` = 2,
`kubevirt_vmi_info` present with a lowercase `phase="running"`; and evaluating the twelve
SHIPPED expressions returns no series for eleven (quiet, not permanently firing). The
twelfth is vm-demo, which is not in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml and so is not deployed
— its rule is not applied either.
DELETION WAS NOT THE ANSWER, and the evidence is recorded rather than assumed:
kube-prometheus-stack's `kubernetes-apps` group IS live on prod (17 rules, KubePodNotReady /
KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch among them), so app pods are not unmonitored — but that is a
generic warning keyed to a namespace, not the per-service CRITICAL SLI R-OBS-01 declares.
platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml carries no generic app-readiness rule at all.
GUARD SO IT CANNOT RECUR SILENTLY: new whole-repo L0 invariant
conformance/tests/l0-static/servicemonitor-ports-resolve. It walks the MONITORS, not the
alerts, so it needs no `up{job=...}` rule to reach one, and resolves each endpoint by SELECTOR
across the whole tree rather than by same-file adjacency. Fixing the alerts DELETED the only
thing that made the broken monitors visible to the sibling check, which is exactly why this
axis needed its own home. It declares `conformance.home.k3s/scope: whole-repo` and adds no
ci/l0.sh stage. Proven to FAIL on the pre-fix tree: 15 failures — eleven port disagreements,
vm-demo's monitor matching no Service at all, and the three generator/contract assertions —
and to pass after. Its resolver is additionally proven on in-check fixtures (agreeing pair
accepted, disagreeing pair rejected, target-less endpoint rejected), because after the fix
there are zero in-repo monitors left for it to judge and a guard whose only evidence is
"nothing failed" cannot be told apart from one that stopped working. It also asserts
r_servicemonitor does not HARDCODE a port name — the mechanism by which one edit gave twelve
services the same wrong one.
Also fixed, found on the way:
* platform/monitoring/tests/run.sh discovered the SUITE convention only inside
platform/monitoring/tests/ while documenting it as general — a suite added anywhere else
was never run and still looked like coverage. Now discovered tree-wide; a misplaced
*.test.yaml fails loudly instead of vanishing.
* KNOWN_UNWIRED_JOBS in alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets is now EMPTY, and the twelve
apps/* entries in alert-rules-unit-tested's UNTESTED_FILES are gone — both because the
gaps were CLOSED, not waived. Both registers are shrink-only and a stale entry fails.
* renderer-contract.md claimed the default-deny baseline carried a standing monitoring
scrape allow. It never did; the claim is corrected and the allow is now real, per declared
metrics endpoint and scoped to that one port.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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1f20506829 |
feat(renderer): inClusterClients — authorable direct east-west ingress (schema 1.5.0)
A platform controller that dials a service's ClusterIP directly had NO authorable
form in the ServiceDefinition contract:
* ingressRoutes renders the north-south allow only — gateway-ingress admits
`fromEntities: [ingress]`, the Gateway's Envoy identity, and nothing else;
* dependencies compiles edges only BETWEEN CATALOG SERVICES, from the source
entry's own declaration.
Under the default-deny baseline (R-NET-01) such a client is therefore DROPPED, and
the only way to unblock it was a live `kubectl apply` of a hand-written CNP — a
cluster object outside git, one `kubectl delete` or one rebuild from coming back.
`inClusterClients: [{namespace, port, protocol?, name?}]` closes that. Each entry
renders ONE least-privilege ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy: this service's
endpointSelector, `fromEndpoints` matching ONLY `k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace`,
`toPorts` carrying ONLY the declared port/protocol — never `fromEntities: all`.
Additive: the namespace default-deny keeps denying everything undeclared (R-NET-02),
and the entry is NOT a dependency edge, so it creates no wave ordering.
Shape notes:
* selected by NAMESPACE, not pod labels: an upstream controller's labels belong to
its chart, not to this platform's contract. The cost is explicit — every pod in
that namespace is admitted on that port, so the field is for platform-controller
namespaces (flux-system, monitoring), never a shared one. The schema description
says so.
* optional `name` (default: the namespace) only names the rendered policy,
`<service>-allow-<name>-ingress`. That name is operator-facing (kubectl get cnp,
a Hubble drop), and pinning it lets an allowance that already had to be applied
live be authored under its EXISTING name, so Flux adopts the live object in place
instead of creating a near-duplicate and leaving the original unmanaged.
* one field, not a policy DSL: no arbitrary selectors, entities or CIDRs.
Covered by render.py --selftest (4c): name/namespace/selector/port shape, no
fromEntities widening, default-deny still `ingress: []`, the gateway allow not
displaced, `name` defaulting to the namespace, and nothing rendered when the field is
absent. No golden changes here — no catalog entry uses the field yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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cec550045b |
feat(storage): the bulk tier becomes real — static NFS PVs, authored once per environment
The `bulk` class has existed since Phase 0 as a deliberate stub: the StorageClass named an NFS
CSI driver that is not installed and a server/share of REPLACE-ME, so plex, sonarr, radarr and
qbittorrent all carry a comment saying "attach the library once OQ-2 is resolved". This is that
resolution — for the case that actually exists here, which is NOT the case the stub anticipated.
The stub assumed DYNAMIC provisioning: ask a CSI driver for a bulk volume and get a fresh empty
subdirectory. That is the wrong shape for this platform's bulk data. The media library is 8.33 TiB
that already exists, on ZFS datasets on the Proxmox host, with live non-k3s consumers. Nothing
needs provisioning; existing datasets need ATTACHING. So a bulk storage entry now renders a
STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume plus its PVC, and needs no CSI driver at all (the in-tree
NFS volume source is not deprecated and has no CSI migration).
Schema 1.4.0 adds, on a storage entry:
export absolute NFS export path; REQUIRED when class is bulk, FORBIDDEN otherwise (an `if`
in the schema, so a bulk entry cannot be authored without saying what it attaches).
subPath mount a subtree instead of the volume root — any class.
readOnly any class; on bulk it also sets the PV's nfs.readOnly, so the mount really is `ro`.
The SERVER is deliberately NOT a schema field. It is the `${BULK_NFS_SERVER}` cluster-vars knob,
because dev and prod reach the SAME storage host by different addresses and R-ENV-02 says the
service definition is authored once. A ServiceDefinition says WHICH dataset; the overlay says
where the host is.
Three decisions worth the reader's time, argued in full in the r_bulk_pvs docstring:
* PV/PVC, not an inline `nfs:` pod volume. Inline is fewer objects and would work. It cannot
express `persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain`, which is the one property most worth having
in git for 8.33 TiB of data with consumers outside this cluster; it puts read-only enforcement
one Deployment edit away from silent removal; and it is invisible to `kubectl get pv,pvc`,
which is where an operator looks for attached external storage.
* storageClassName: "" on both ends, NOT the `bulk` StorageClass. Explicitly empty is the
canonical marker for a statically provisioned volume. It also sidesteps a trap: a
StorageClass's `provisioner` is IMMUTABLE, so re-pointing the deployed `bulk` stub would make
Flux fail on that object forever.
* Access mode is always `…Many` and follows the read/write posture — ReadOnlyMany for a reader,
ReadWriteMany for a writer. One export is consumed by several namespaces AND several nodes at
once, which is exactly what ReadWriteOnce cannot express; which `Many` it is then makes the
intent legible in `kubectl get pv`.
mountOptions are a platform decision held in the renderer rather than a per-service field:
nfsvers=4.1,hard,noatime,timeo=600,retrans=2. NFSv4 carries mount and lock in-protocol, so the
only port that must be reachable is tcp/2049 — no rpcbind/111, mountd or statd. That is a
firewall decision as much as a storage one. `hard` over `soft` because a soft mount converts a
server hiccup into a short read handed to the application.
The contract doc records the trap that will otherwise be discovered in production: fsGroup is a
NO-OP on an NFS volume (the in-tree plugin does no ownership management), so a writable bulk mount
requires the container's own uid/gid to suit the export's ownership. A mount that succeeds and
then cannot write is this tier's characteristic failure.
Every pre-existing golden renders byte-identical: the new keys are emitted only when declared, and
`readOnly` defaults to False. render-golden: 10/10. selftest: PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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eccc13bb3c |
T-0.3 ServiceDefinition schema + renderer contract + examples (R-GITOPS-02)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |