c4eba5b (run 340) bakes a worker template without imagePullSecrets, so the new admission rule
refuses worker Jobs. df36d9b is agent-runner:main == :sha-ddd04d460ef6 (measured on the registry),
and its /etc/pm-agent/worker-job-template.yaml carries imagePullSecrets: pm-agent-registry (read
from the published layer).
Renovate found df36d9b but holds it under "Awaiting Schedule" on dashboard #91: the operator's
dispatch (run 385) was a real run at 12:14 New York, outside the 03:00-06:00 window. The
renovate-digest markers are unchanged, so later bumps remain Renovate's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Rebased #61 onto the CI image pipeline (#81). This commit makes the remaining in-git
blockers to going live go away:
- deployment.yaml and PM_WORKER_IMAGE pin images run 340's digest (sha256:c4eba5b3...,
tag sha-523cd9118f95 = main), read from the registry. Renovate markers unchanged.
- PM_DRY_RUN=true and PM_REQUIRE_LABEL=agent for the first run. Dry run is required, not
just cautious: the run-340 image's baked worker template predates imagePullSecrets, so
admission would deny its Jobs until CI re-publishes after this merge and Renovate bumps.
- Token scopes: Gitea 1.24.3 scopes GET /api/v1/user (the dispatcher's first call) under
read:user. The documented list was missing it. Now read:user, write:repository,
write:issue, read:package everywhere.
- Org-package read documented as a team (Packages=Read, no repos), not just a scope.
- sops is toolbox-only; the .examples say so and give the in-place edit.
- runbook: key-name check no longer emits Secret values before the pipe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
The registry had two blockers. #59 fixed the first (nodes resolved the hostname to the
non-hairpinned WAN and failed TLS against the router's CN=%D cert). This is the second:
the pull is unauthenticated, and this registry refuses unauthenticated clients outright —
measured 2026-10-05, its anonymous token carries access: null and every path 401s.
pm-agent-registry is a dockerconfigjson Secret (SOPS, placeholders) referenced by
imagePullSecrets on the dispatcher Deployment and on the committed worker Job template. It
holds the SAME Gitea token as pm-agent-credentials, because the two consumers need two
formats: the application reads a raw token from env, the kubelet reads a dockerconfigjson
before any container starts. Same one-value-in-two-files pattern as the Keycloak client
secret, documented in both .example files. The operator's part is the value plus one new
scope: read:package.
ADMISSION GAINED A SEVENTH RULE. imagePullSecrets is a pod-spec field no container
references, which is exactly why it is easy to leave unread — the same shape of omission
as initContainers, ephemeralContainers, env and envFrom before it. The kubelet reads the
named Secret, in this namespace, before anything runs. Rule 1's pattern now REQUIRES the
committed entry; rule 7 forbids any other and any second one. Both halves are needed: a
foreach over an absent list yields no result.
The leverage is small and the policy says so: the image is digest-pinned, so a different
pull credential cannot change WHAT runs. Pinned anyway — 'only the committed shape' is the
premise, and the rule costs four lines.
kyverno test: 33 passed, 0 failed (was 28). Three new fixtures, each a real path: the
committed entry plus a second one, a different Secret, and none at all.
The gate also caught me shipping the Secret in plaintext — I never ran sops -e -i on the
placeholder. Recorded in the handoff entry, because the file looked finished.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Operator rule 2026-10-29: image creation, hosting and lifecycle belong to CI/CD, never to a
workstation build/push. Nothing had ever been pushed to the Gitea registry.
- .gitea/workflows/images.yaml + scripts/images.sh: PRs build+verify (no credential); main
builds, verifies and pushes toolbox, agent-runner (FROM toolbox) and conformance-runner as
sha-<commit> + main, reading the digest back from the registry. Only changed images build.
- Each image's own build-image.sh does the build and in-image verification, now engine-neutral
(DinD: no podman-only calls, probe over stdin not a bind mount). New toolbox build-image.sh.
- Digest references carry `# renovate-digest:` markers; renovate.json5 gains a custom.regex
manager for them. The worker Job template is deliberately untracked (it would loop).
- renovate.yaml pins renovate-version 44.167.0: the action's default (39.264.0) rejects the
current config's managerFilePatterns, so every run would have died at CONFIG_VALIDATION.
- Push credential: REGISTRY_PUSH_TOKEN secret; the Actions token has no package scope in
Gitea 1.24.3 (container.go Authenticate). Retention: infra/gitea/registry-retention.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
A service that reads this repository's Gitea issues, decides what to do about each
thread as the Program Manager persona, and runs one worker agent per assignment that
authors a change, runs the merge gate and opens a pull request. It reacts to issue
creation and to comments; the assignment and all correspondence travel through the
issue thread and the PR. It authenticates with an Anthropic subscription token. It
never pushes to main and never merges.
Three choices carry the design, with alternatives recorded in docs/plans/:
- it POLLS rather than receiving webhooks (Gitea's webhook SSRF guard, lost
deliveries, and no inbound reach needed at all);
- it keeps NO state: the trigger is "the newest thing in this thread was not
written by me", so the issue thread is the state — no PVC, no backup obligation;
- the model holds NO tools: its reply is one JSON object this code validates, so
nothing in the path executes text.
The boundary is platform/kyverno/admission/pm-agent-job-shape.yaml (Enforce,
failurePolicy: Fail), not the RBAC: Kubernetes places no `use` check on
serviceAccountName, so "may create Jobs" is "may run arbitrary code as the
namespace's most privileged identity". Six rules admit only the committed shape, and
the worker identity is bound to nothing with no token mounted, so there is nothing to
escalate to. 28/28 offline Kyverno assertions.
Nothing has run: the image has never been built or pushed, and both the image digest
and the two credentials are deliberate placeholders. See the handoff entry's
"What I did NOT verify".
Refs CLAUDE.md §1/§3/§6, R-SEC-02, R-GITOPS-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5