529556d7c71174b42dd56c056b5675eda6d459d8
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6586919132 |
fix(ci): CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true would have FAKED A GREEN over 54 skipped tests
Wiring L2/L3 into CI was a tracked next step, described in the plan as needing only
vars.CLUSTER_AVAILABLE. Attempting it surfaced that the variable does not enable L2/L3 at
all -- it only changes which way the stage fails, and before this commit one of those ways
was a false pass.
MEASURED, before the guard:
CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true ./ci/conformance.sh -> rc=0
"[junit] wrote skipped JUnit for 54 scaffolded test(s)"
"[ ok ] L2/L3 conformance passed for touched subset"
run.sh exits 0 in scaffold mode when it cannot reach a cluster, marking every test
<skipped>. That is correct and honest FOR run.sh. It is catastrophic in ci/conformance.sh,
which reaches that code only because the environment DECLARED a cluster available -- so it
reported a pass over 54 tests that never executed. One Gitea variable away from a fake green
on a gate that is now an ENFORCING required status check, and nothing caught it because
nobody had ever set the variable.
The CI runner holds no cluster credential by design (automountServiceAccountToken: false),
so the local run this stage attempts can never succeed. The in-cluster trigger path that
would make L2/L3 actually run is still unimplemented, and is blocked on a privilege-
escalation design decision that is the operator's to make (plan section 4: any principal
that can `create jobs` in ns conformance can run arbitrary code as the privileged
conformance-runner SA, because Kubernetes places no `use` check on serviceAccountName).
The stage now BLOCKS (exit 1) when a cluster is declared but every test skipped, which is
what the merge-gate decision matrix already said should happen ("conformance skipped while
CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true -> BLOCK"). Verified: rc=1, naming the count and the reason.
The plan document claimed CLUSTER_AVAILABLE was "the only remaining gate". Corrected in
place with the measurement and an explicit do-not-set-this-yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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87c3d83dff |
fix(conformance): placeholder-guard-coupling actually RUNS — it was skipping forever
`conformance/tests/l0-static/placeholder-guard-coupling` (R-ENV-02, R-STATE-03) exited 3 SKIPPED on every gate run since it landed, because its check keyed its whole existence on `bootstrap/standup.sh`. Measured, not assumed: that file has NEVER been on `main` — there is no deletion commit for it anywhere; it landed only on unmerged prod-standup branches (`work/prod-standup-campaign`, `prod/*`, `feat/prod-hardening`). It was planned and never merged, not removed. SKIPPED is not green, and a permanently-skipped incident-derived test is the quiet version of the failure it was written to prevent. The skip was also hiding a RED. Run against the real `standup.sh` from `work/prod-standup-campaign`, the old check FAILED 2 of 34 assertions — false positives from treating the empty string as placeholder-shaped for knobs cluster-vars authors empty on purpose (`BACKUP_CREDENTIALS_SUFFIX`, `VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX`, both `""` on dev and both documented there as load-bearing). It would have false-blocked the merge landing its own input. NOT deleted — the hazard is not gone. Split into two halves, one of which needs no guard: HALF A (always runs): no environment overlay ships a placeholder-shaped EFFECTIVE cluster-vars value; an empty effective value is STATED by the overlay rather than inherited in silence; a LOUD base sentinel is explicitly overridden by every overlay. This is the 2026-09-05 outcome asserted at the source instead of at the guard — if prod's S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT is never a placeholder, velero cannot be pointed at a hostname that does not exist. Input surface is `clusters/`, all of it on `main`. HALF B (self-activating): the real predicate extracted and executed against those same values, the consumer trace, and the mid-string anchoring property. The check NEVER exits 3 again, and the guard is DISCOVERED by content rather than hardcoded: any tracked `*.sh` defining `<name>_is_placeholder()` is found, so a guard landing at `bootstrap/standup.sh` — or moved into a sourceable library, the remedy the check already recommends — activates HALF B with no edit to the test. Two files defining it is a FAIL. When no guard exists the gap is printed loudly every run instead of swallowed as a skip. LOUD vs EMPTY is the correction that makes it honest in both modes: a loud placeholder is always a defect in an overlay, while `""` is held to the explicitness rule instead — and still counts as a placeholder for a knob a guard covers, because a `""` case-arm is the guard author's declaration that empty is not a usable target. Proof, all reverted: 84 assertions and exit 0 on `main`; prod S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT set to the literal `https://TBD-R2-ACCOUNT-ID.r2.cloudflarestorage.com` FAILS (A1); deleting dev's explicit VELERO_BACKUP_PREFIX op so it inherits `""` FAILS (A2); a LOUD base BULK_NFS_SERVER with prod's override deleted FAILS 2/86 (A1+A3); and with the real `standup.sh` present, reverting `s3_is_placeholder` to the `TBD-*` PREFIX glob FAILS 12/110 (B3 anchoring). With the pristine `standup.sh` the check PASSES at 110 assertions where the old one failed 2 of 34. L0 layer: 14 checks, 14 PASS, 0 SKIP, 0 FAIL (was 13 PASS / 1 SKIP). Coverage unchanged — R-ENV-02 and R-STATE-03 both still list this test, 49/51 with the same 2 gaps. Also: * `ci/touched-requirements.sh` — `bootstrap/*` -> R-STATE-03 R-GITOPS-01 is KEPT, its stale comment corrected. It claimed standup.sh "carries the placeholder guards", describing a file that is not here; R-STATE-03 there is ANTICIPATORY. Deleting the entry would leave the change that lands a placeholder guard selected by nothing. * `ci/tests/touched-requirements.test.sh` — new path-map section (12 assertions, was 8) locking `bootstrap/*` and `clusters/*`, so removing either entry is a test failure rather than a silent loss of selection. All three ci/tests pass (12 + 31 + 15). * `docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md` §7 — its "nothing in the gate currently refuses a placeholder-shaped overlay value" is no longer true; corrected. * Scope re-audited: still deliberately requirement-scoped, not whole-repo. Every path that can break it attributes a requirement it declares. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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82aff4d053 |
feat(apps): attach the media library and the legacy Nextcloud dataset over NFS
plex, sonarr, radarr and nextcloud each gain one bulk volume. Authored in the catalog and re-rendered, never hand-edited into apps/ (render-golden: 10/10). Layout, the export change the operator must apply, the uid analysis and the validation probes are in docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md; everything there was measured on the host over read-only SSH, not assumed. WHAT THE LAYOUT TURNED OUT TO BE, AND WHY IT DECIDED THE DESIGN /mnt/Storage/plex holds movies/ tv/ photos/ AND downloads/ as SIBLINGS in one dataset — so the arrs' import source and their libraries are one filesystem on the server, and the download client's completed folders are already named radarr/ and tv-sonarr/. The k3s arrs are joining a tree an arr stack has been driving for a long time. That sibling fact is the whole argument for the arrs mounting the export ROOT rather than a subPath per directory. Sonarr and Radarr import by hardlinking or atomically renaming, both same-filesystem operations, and to the kernel "same filesystem" means SAME MOUNT. Two subPath mounts of one export are two mounts: link() across them returns EXDEV regardless of what the server knows, and the arrs do not fail loudly — they degrade to copy-then-delete, rewriting every file over NFS and destroying the seeding copy. The smallest subtree containing both tv/ and downloads/ IS the export root, so the root mount is the MINIMAL mount that preserves hardlinks. Least privilege bounded below by a hard requirement. The cost is stated, not hidden: sonarr can also write /media/movies. plex /mnt/Storage/plex -> /media ro ReadOnlyMany sonarr /mnt/Storage/plex -> /media rw ReadWriteMany radarr /mnt/Storage/plex -> /media rw ReadWriteMany nextcloud /mnt/Storage/nextcloud -> /mnt/legacy-nextcloud ro ReadOnlyMany (subPath: nextcloud) Plex is read-only because it indexes and streams; every write on that tree belongs to the arrs, and saying so removes Plex from the set of things that can damage 8.33 T. All three media consumers use the SAME mountPath deliberately: when qbittorrent is eventually given this export, the arrs and the download client will already agree on absolute paths, which is the other precondition for hardlinked imports. *** /media AND NOT /data — A COLLISION CAUGHT WHILE RENDERING. *** The arrs' Longhorn config PVC renders at the renderer default /data/config. A media mount at /data is mounted OVER it and MASKS the config volume: the pod comes up with its app database shadowed by an 8 T media tree. That discovery also exposed a SEPARATE PRE-EXISTING BUG, reported and deliberately NOT fixed here: LinuxServer arr images run with -data=/config, so /data/config is very likely the wrong home for that PVC and the app has been writing its EPHEMERAL layer — the exact failure catalog/plex.yaml's mountPath comment records already having been bitten by. Plex was fixed; sonarr, radarr, qbittorrent and jackett were not. Fixing it starts those apps from an empty config volume, so it needs its own change with the operator present. This change does not make it worse. UID/GID — THE FAILURE THIS TIER ALWAYS HAS The export is sec=sys + no_root_squash, so the client's numeric uid passes through verbatim and the server's ownership is the entire access story. The tree is 0755 owned 1000:3000, so ONLY uid 1000 can write it. LinuxServer images default to 911. Without intervention sonarr and radarr would have mounted cleanly, gone Ready, and failed EVERY import with EACCES. And fsGroup cannot fix that — the in-tree NFS plugin does NO ownership management, so podSecurityContext.fsGroup is a no-op on an NFS volume. Reaching for it is how this gets misdiagnosed. So PUID=1000/PGID=3000 are added to both arrs (PGID 3000 keeps what they write group-readable to the live non-k3s consumers of the same export), and fsGroup: 3000 is added for the LONGHORN config PVC only, so changing PUID does not depend on the image re-chowning /config. plex already runs as 1000 and reads a 0755 tree; nextcloud reads as www-data. Neither needs work. NEXTCLOUD IS MOUNTED READ-ONLY, WHICH IS A DEVIATION FROM THE BRIEF — ON EVIDENCE The task said nextcloud writes. The dataset says otherwise: of 270 G, 267 G is config_backup/, the rest is config/ (103 M) and config_old/ (3.4 G). There is NO data/ directory. This is the OLD non-k3s instance's configuration plus a backup blob — an archive — and that instance is STILL LIVE on it (exported rw to 192.168.1.6 and .5, which the operator has said must stay active). Two Nextclouds writing one instance's config directory, each with its own database and therefore its own oc_filecache, is unrecoverable corruption. "Do not grant more than needed" lands on ro, and ro is the trivially reversible choice. If the intent is in fact a MIGRATION, that is a larger and more deliberate change than a mount; the one-line flip is documented. Read-only for nextcloud can additionally be enforced SERVER-side (only nextcloud consumes that dataset from k3s), and the sharenfs value in the doc uses ro= for the k3s clients. The media tree cannot: plex and the arrs may land on any node, so the server sees the same addresses for reader and writers. Plex's ro is therefore a client-side guarantee — stated as a limitation, not left implied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85
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863af01062 |
docs: the §2 shared-device measurement came back, and it does not hold
infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §2 recorded the etcd/Longhorn shared-partition risk as "accepted to be MEASURED, not assumed", with an exit condition. The measurement arrived on 2026-09-07 in production, 2 d 7 h after bring-up, as an outage. §2 now carries "THE MEASUREMENT CAME BACK": the journal evidence, the three-node IO PSI table (11.36 / 0.75 / 1.29), and the honest verdict that the section's own premise — "every prod node is SSD or NVMe, where rebuild I/O costs latency rather than collapsing it" — was right about node 2 and wrong about node 1. A 2011 C400 with 61,440 reallocated sectors and no power-loss protection is not the "SSD" that reasoning assumed, and §0 had already named the three-way drive asymmetry as the fault line. The exit condition is OPEN and the second bullet (dedicated device) applies; that remains the operator's. Also records what the three software mitigations in this branch do and do not buy, including the point that no cgroup or scheduler control arbitrates the ext4 journal both tenants share — and the gap that etcd's own fsync histograms, which the exit condition literally asks for, are not collected because kubeEtcd is disabled for k3s. PSI is the signal that exists. DECISIONS-LOG gains the full entry: the four I/O mechanisms found INERT on these nodes (IOSchedulingClass, IOSchedulingPriority, io.latency, bare IOWeight), the finding that concurrentReplicaRebuildPerNodeLimit was already set and already held during the outage, the third instance of config that looked applied and was not (orphanAutoDeletion), and the three things still requiring the operator. infra/ansible/README.md: CORRECTED a stale claim that k3s-prod-2/-3 "stay commented out" of the inventory. They have been live in [k3s_prod_secondary] since 2026-09-03. That sentence is exactly the kind used to reason about blast radius — `-e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod` targets THREE hosts, not one — so it is replaced with the --list-hosts command that settles it. The new etcd-io-priority play is added to the run order, the layer table and the prod command list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit a00a27a2567ea6a805c8c196b75df2c92a7c63a4) |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d1a547fd15 |
docs(plan): L2/L3 conformance CI wiring plan; gate.yml placeholder -> plan pointer
HAND-OFF 2 (L2/L3 conformance wiring) — DEFERRED with a concrete plan, per the hand-off's escape hatch (too risky to wire live cluster access from CI autonomously; do NOT hand CI a broad kubeconfig). The intended seam (in-cluster Chainsaw Job under its own scoped SA; CI holds only a narrow trigger credential) is mostly scaffolded but not safe to finish autonomously: - ci/conformance.sh still runs run.sh locally rather than triggering the in-cluster Job. - conformance/incluster/chainsaw-job.yaml has no repo-clone init-container and the stock chainsaw image lacks bash/python3/kubectl/git that run.sh needs. - No trigger SA/RBAC/credential exists, and the core blocker is a privilege-escalation design question: any `create jobs` credential in the conformance namespace can create a Job running as the privileged conformance-runner SA. This needs an admission constraint (recommended: narrow trigger SA + a Kyverno policy pinning the admissible Job shape), or a GitOps-native zero-credential trigger — an operator decision. - conformance/incluster/ isn't wired into Flux; Gitea vars/secrets aren't provisioned. docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md captures current state, the security analysis, the functional gaps, a file-by-file step sequence, validation/rollback, and the open decisions. gate.yml's conformance placeholder now points to it (still if:false, honest). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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a04251bbc8 |
docs: plan for Longhorn SSD tiering (hot-tier move off HDD)
Investigation + phased implementation plan to move the churn-heavy, latency-sensitive Longhorn volumes (Prometheus, the CNPG Postgres DBs, Loki, gitea) off the slow/failing HDD 'Storage' pool onto a tagged SSD-backed Longhorn disk on local-zfs, ending the reboot rebuild storm. Key finding: the recorded 'SSD does not fit Longhorn' blocker was based on the 384 GiB provisioned figure; actual working set is ~79 GB cluster-wide (~26 GB/node) since all bulk media is on NFS, not Longhorn. Hot tier is ~51 GB actual / 114 GiB provisioned and fits the ~323 GiB SSD AVAIL with headroom. Read-only investigation; no live storage touched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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b745bab26b |
docs(plan): evaluate Cilium 1.20.1 native Gateway ExternalAuth vs oauth2-proxy
Research + implementation plan (no live change) on whether Cilium 1.20.1's
native Gateway API ExternalAuth filter (GEP-1494) can replace the un-wired
forward-auth CEC template and Crafty's oauth2-proxy sidecar.
Verdict: DEFER. The filter exists in 1.20.1 code (shipped 1.20.0, PR #45739) but
is EXPERIMENTAL-channel Gateway API; the cluster runs the standard-channel CRDs
(verified: HTTPRoute filters[].type enum lacks ExternalAuth), so it is not even
installable today. Also: fail-open bug (#47178, fixed #47265) in a brand-new
security filter, no 1.20 docs, and the ext_authz hop would hit the same
enforce_policy_on_l7lb hairpin re-evaluation just fixed for Keycloak (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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cbc2301b30 |
docs: reconcile docs/comments with post-upgrade cluster state
Text-only cleanup after the upgrade campaign. Updates stale version strings, prose, and comments to the verified current facts; no Kubernetes behavior or version pins changed except the kubectl toolchain bump (below). Verified facts applied: k3s v1.36.4+k3s1, Debian 13 trixie, Cilium 1.20.1 / Gateway API v1.6.1, Longhorn 1.12.1, node RAM 24 GiB, dedicated virtio2 SSD etcd disk per node, Velero chart 12.x / v1.18, Grafana 13.2.0. - Version strings across infra/ and platform/ READMEs + comments - kubectl toolchain 1.31.4 -> 1.36.4 (devcontainer/ci/conformance versions.env; 1.31 vs a 1.36 cluster exceeded the +-1 skew) - Retired-single-apps-Kustomization refs -> apps-wave-0/1/2 + apps-vms with per-wave SOPS decryption (flux/clusters docs + bootstrap.sh) - COMPLETED/historical banners on the three executed plan docs - Resolved TODO(WS-SEC) markers -> Renovate-maintained ranges - Appended dated DECISIONS-LOG entry (2026-08-30) superseding the 2026-08-26 LIVE STATE line Left as revalidation items (not blind-edited): external-snapshotter v8.2.0 vs 1.36, Cilium ext_authz/forward-auth relevance under 1.20.1, conformance ImageVolume feature-gate assertions under 1.36. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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5efd983239 |
W1: Cilium 1.16.5->1.17.18, Longhorn 1.7->1.8 (pre-k8s-1.32 component landing)
Land the two pacing components on current k8s 1.31 before the 1.32 k3s hop. Cilium 1.17 supports k8s 1.29-1.32; Longhorn 1.8 supports 1.25+; Gateway API CRDs stay v1.2.1 (Cilium 1.17 targets v1.2.x). Also commits the full upgrade plan doc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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8dfb42f6c0 |
docs: add Phase 2 SSD-etcd execution runbook
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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af5fc5b25f |
feat(tofu,ansible): SSD-backed etcd disk per k3s node (Phase 1: code + plan)
Interim bridge to stop Longhorn replica-rebuild I/O storms on the shared HDD
Storage pool from starving etcd WAL fsync (crash-looping k3s / flapping the
kube-vip VIP). Adds a small dedicated SSD disk per node for etcd only; Longhorn
stays on HDD. See docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md.
tofu (infra/tofu):
- New vars etcd_ssd_datastore (default "local-zfs" = rpool/data, Micron 5100
SATA SSD mirror w/ PLP) and etcd_disk_gib (default 16).
- New virtio2 disk block on the SSD datastore per VM: discard=on, cache=none
(honor guest fsync straight to the ZFS ZIL — safe on PLP SSD), iothread=false.
Kept last (ascending interface) so bpg does not reorder virtio0/virtio1.
- Revert the debian_cloud_image resource to the long type name
proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file to match the R2 state: bpg >= 0.111
dropped the cross-type moved{} linkage to the short proxmox_download_file, so
the stale moved block failed EVERY plan with "Resource type mismatch" (broken
on main too). Aligning code to state yields a clean plan with no image
re-download. Short-name migration is deferred to a deliberate `tofu state mv`.
ansible (node_baseline):
- Format /dev/vdc (label k3s-etcd) and mount it at
/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db (defaults,noatime; no nofail so a missing etcd
disk fails loudly rather than silently landing etcd on the root HDD) before
k3s starts, so a rebuilt node comes up with etcd isolated on SSD. Data-safe:
filesystem module never reformats an existing fs.
Phase 1 only: non-disruptive. No tofu apply, no node/VM/etcd/Longhorn changes.
tofu plan verified: 0 to add, 3 to change, 0 to destroy — every VM an in-place
disk ADD (virtio2), dev-3 also an in-place memory 16384->24576; no VM replace.
Merge gate green (render==golden included).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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