979cc4b21d68578f9fdd7f9debf47a80d74be498
19
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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f65c12b395 |
feat(images): build on rootless BuildKit over mTLS; verification moves into Containerfile verify stages
Operator decision on PR #81: no CI job may reach a privileged daemon. The act runner is untouched. - platform/buildkit (+ clusters/base/buildkit.yaml): moby/buildkit v0.34.1-rootless pinned by digest, uid 1000, not privileged; caps drop ALL + SETUID/SETGID, seccomp/AppArmor Unconfined, read-only rootfs (each measured under podman). cert-manager CA + server/client certs, ClusterIP :1234, default-deny with ingress only from the act-runner pod (DinD masquerades jobs to it). No Kyverno exception: every applied policy matches app-namespace=true only. - Each Containerfile names its shipped stage and ends in a `verify` stage holding every former `docker run` assertion (uid 65532, RUN --network=none, writable-path inventory standing in for the read-only rootfs). The old `&& echo` checks that could never fail are real assertions now. - images.sh drives buildkitd with a pinned buildx (sha256-checked) via bake; PRs build verify targets with agent-runner FROM the in-run toolbox (target: context); main verifies, then pushes. Fails loudly when the builder secrets are absent or buildkitd is unreachable. - infra/gitea/buildkit-client-secret.sh copies the client cert into Actions secrets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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a2440a3125 |
feat(upgrades): automated OS reboots (kured) + security-only unattended-upgrades, and give Renovate a runner
Two halves of one repeatable upgrade process. Neither works alone. (a) OS upgrades and reboots platform/kured/ — Kubernetes Reboot Daemon, chart 6.1.0/app 1.23.0, in its own Flux Kustomization (dependsOn platform, wait:true). NOT in platform/kustomization.yaml: that tier gates platform-config and every apps wave, so a wedged reboot daemon there could stall every application. A component added to make maintenance safer must not be able to cause an outage. infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades/ — new role (node_baseline is touched by other open branches, and this is a different lifecycle), enabled for prod in group_vars. The human gate is the SENTINEL, which is how this honours node_baseline's "IT DOES NOT REBOOT" (k3s-prod-2 hung on a warm reboot 2026-09-03) and cluster-upgrade-plan.md's rejection of automating away the gate between nodes: u-u is security-only with the kernel blacklisted, so it essentially never writes /var/run/reboot-required. That file appears when an operator deliberately runs node-baseline.yml --tags kernel. kured then does only the mechanical half, including the ordering rule node_baseline has to shout. Quorum: concurrent reboots are structurally impossible, not merely unlikely. concurrency:1 plus kured's single lock annotation (API-server optimistic concurrency), and lockTtl:0 — an expiring lock is exactly the 3-node etcd catastrophe, so a hung node holds it forever and nothing cascades. Longhorn: measured 25 volumes x 3 replicas, hard anti-affinity, 600s replenishment wait, serialized rebuild — so every drain degrades ALL volumes to 2/3 and the inter-node gate must be volume robustness, not pod readiness. Doubled: lockReleaseDelay 30m (unconditional) plus kured's Prometheus alert gate (semantic). alertFilterMatchOnly:true is load-bearing — the flag inverts the regexp's meaning, and under the chart default kured would have been blocked on day one by the five alerts measured firing with no end in sight, and never rebooted anything. Kernel floor (kernel >= 6.13, EFI memattr): excluded TWICE. The running kernel comes from o=Debian Backports, which is not an allowed origin, so u-u cannot see a kernel upgrade; and ^linux- is blacklisted anyway so widening origins later cannot re-arm it. Asserted against apt-config dump, not against the file just written. 6.12 kernels are still installed and bootable on all three nodes, and nothing was held. Closes a silent no-op: update-notifier-common was absent on all three nodes, so NOTHING could create the sentinel. kured alone would have idled forever at 1/1 Running. platform/kured/alerts.yaml — three rules over kured's only metric, with a companion promtool suite pinning each both ways, plus runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md. Window is DAILY 03:00-06:00 because a weekly one forces for:8d, longer than this cluster's 7d Prometheus retention. (b) Image/dependency automation Renovate was aspirational: renovate.json present and complete, with no workflow, no in-cluster workload, and its docker+kubernetes managers disabled — so every plain image: tag was maintained by nothing while seven files claimed otherwise. .gitea/workflows/renovate.yaml — scheduled daily, dry_run default true for a safe first run, and a preflight that FAILS (not skips) without RENOVATE_TOKEN, because a skipped Gitea job reports success and that is how this stayed inert. Renovate now owns both halves; Flux image-automation is formally closed: it pushes commits rather than opening PRs (bypassing CLAUDE.md §1), and it cannot work here anyway — main is protected user_can_push:false and the flux-system GitRepository has no secretRef. Its controllers are installed and have idled 43 days with zero CRs. conformance/: +34/-0, one new SCRAPE_OWNERS entry claiming kured_. Weakens nothing; tightens the check for this component (requires service.create+metrics.create, both chart-default false, plus a companion NetworkPolicy requirement). Required because assertion (3) fails an alert over an unclaimed metric and KNOWN_UNWIRED_METRICS is shrink-only. Sensitive paths touched: clusters/**, conformance/**, .gitea/** — needs a non-author approving review; /approve-override deliberately NOT posted. NOT verified: no OS upgrade run, no node rebooted, no lock observed, the Ansible role never executed, and whether CNPG switches its primary on a drain-induced eviction (the most likely way the first real reboot fails). Full list in the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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0569d47d49 |
Merge branch 'main' into feat/pm-agent-issue-to-pr
One conflict, in clusters/base/kustomization.yaml: PR #55 (vpn-ingress) and this branch both appended a resource line to the same tail. Resolved by keeping BOTH, with main's vpn-ingress first — it is a platform-config-tier leaf, while pm-agent dependsOn apps-wave-0, which is later. Nothing else conflicted. runbooks/kustomization.yaml auto-merged and carries both the vpn-remote-access and pm-agent entries; the handoff entries are separate files and had nothing to merge, which is the whole point of decisions/ being a directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f92707f38c |
feat(vpn-ingress): WireGuard remote access on udp/51820 (hostNetwork, declarative peers)
Lets the operator's Android / Linux / Windows / macOS devices dial in from anywhere and behave like LAN machines: full reach to 192.168.2.0/24 plus internet egress out the house WAN. Opposite direction to platform/vpn-egress, which sends pods OUT through PIA; the two share nothing but the word "VPN". WireGuard because it is the only option with a first-party client on all four named platforms, and because its handshake MAC is keyed with the responder's own public key: an unauthenticated packet gets NO reply, so udp/51820 is indistinguishable from a closed port. That, not "it is encrypted", is what makes an unfiltered WAN port defensible, and why there is no source allowlist. hostNetwork: true is REQUIRED, not convenient. A pod-networked server must SNAT clients to its own pod IP, so every remote client would carry that pod's Cilium identity -- and a pod-sourced request to the shared Gateway VIP returns 403 from Envoy for ALL 16 hostnames (measured 2026-10-04), because Cilium's Gateway preserves the original source identity and enforces the destination's ingress policy. The obvious build would have shipped a healthy-looking tunnel on which every cluster web UI was 403 and *.home.keithjackson.dev did not even resolve. In the host netns traffic is SNATed to the node and arrives as host/remote-node, exactly like a LAN client. It also sidesteps the unsafe ip_forward sysctl, the L2-announcement lease lottery, and double encapsulation (hence MTU 1420). Permitted by restrict-host-namespaces' own carve-out for platform namespaces. The cost is stated in networkpolicy.yaml rather than papered over: no NetworkPolicy constrains a hostNetwork pod. A DaemonSet so the hand-made WAN forward cannot be invalidated by a reschedule; all three nodes answer the same keys, so failover is a one-line router change. Peer PUBLIC keys are plaintext in peers.yaml, which makes "who can get into my house" a reviewable PR diff. The only secret -- the server's private key -- is an out-of-band Secret: an agent must not mint a long-lived private key, and the two halves are joined only at pod start into a tmpfs that dies with the pod. Ships INERT-BUT-HEALTHY with zero peers. THREE off-repo manual steps remain (kernel module, server key, WAN forward) -- runbooks/vpn-remote-access.md. Touches clusters/** , so ci/approval-policy.sh will block pending the operator's /approve-override. Deliberately not posted by me (CLAUDE.md §1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c5b5b8672a |
feat(pm-agent): an in-cluster AI Program Manager that turns Gitea issues into pull requests
A service that reads this repository's Gitea issues, decides what to do about each thread as the Program Manager persona, and runs one worker agent per assignment that authors a change, runs the merge gate and opens a pull request. It reacts to issue creation and to comments; the assignment and all correspondence travel through the issue thread and the PR. It authenticates with an Anthropic subscription token. It never pushes to main and never merges. Three choices carry the design, with alternatives recorded in docs/plans/: - it POLLS rather than receiving webhooks (Gitea's webhook SSRF guard, lost deliveries, and no inbound reach needed at all); - it keeps NO state: the trigger is "the newest thing in this thread was not written by me", so the issue thread is the state — no PVC, no backup obligation; - the model holds NO tools: its reply is one JSON object this code validates, so nothing in the path executes text. The boundary is platform/kyverno/admission/pm-agent-job-shape.yaml (Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail), not the RBAC: Kubernetes places no `use` check on serviceAccountName, so "may create Jobs" is "may run arbitrary code as the namespace's most privileged identity". Six rules admit only the committed shape, and the worker identity is bound to nothing with no token mounted, so there is nothing to escalate to. 28/28 offline Kyverno assertions. Nothing has run: the image has never been built or pushed, and both the image digest and the two credentials are deliberate placeholders. See the handoff entry's "What I did NOT verify". Refs CLAUDE.md §1/§3/§6, R-SEC-02, R-GITOPS-02. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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4e1b169256 |
feat(gpu): Intel GPU device plugin v0.37.0, in its own Flux Kustomization
Makes the three prod nodes advertise `gpu.intel.com/i915`. This is the measured
fix for the Plex hardware-transcoding blocker, and it only makes the resource
EXIST — no consumer is switched over here.
WHY. The `/dev/dri` hostPath merged on main @
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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8eb5baffa4 |
feat(sec): constrain the conformance CI trigger at admission (R-SEC-02)
Implements the credential model the operator chose for wiring L2/L3 into CI: a narrow
trigger SA bounded by a fail-closed Kyverno admission policy, rather than the
zero-credential GitOps-native alternative (plan section 4, primary model).
THE ESCALATION THIS CLOSES. Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Job's
serviceAccountName. Any principal that can `create jobs` in ns conformance can create a Job
running as conformance-runner -- nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch -- with an
arbitrary command. A CI token with plain `create jobs` IS that privileged identity no matter
how narrow its own Role looks. RBAC cannot fix this; only constraining the SHAPE of what the
trigger may create can.
Adds:
* SA/Role/RoleBinding conformance-trigger -- create+get+list+watch jobs, get pods and
pods/log, nothing else. Namespaced. No delete (a trigger that can delete can hide a
failed run), no exec, no secrets. Results come back as a tarball on stdout read via
pods/log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
* ClusterPolicy conformance-trigger-job-shape -- Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail. It does NOT
use ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}: a security boundary an overlay can downgrade to Audit
is not a boundary. It constrains ONLY conformance-trigger, so a mistake here cannot wedge
the rest of the cluster.
* Flux Kustomization `conformance` -> ./conformance/incluster, wait:false and non-gating
like apps-vms, so a test identity can never stall the platform or app tiers.
* A kyverno test with seven cases, six of them real escalation paths.
VERIFIED by `kyverno apply` (pass: 10, fail: 6, error: 0), not assumed:
evil-command DENIED at /spec/template/spec/containers/0/command/ <- THE attack
evil-image DENIED at .../image/
tag-not-digest DENIED at .../image/ (mutable tag is republishable)
host-namespaces DENIED at /spec/template/spec/hostPID/
extra-volume DENIED by the volumes foreach
injected-args DENIED by the args foreach
good-run ADMITTED
ALSO FIXES A FAIL-OPEN IN THE GATE ITSELF. `kyverno test` does NOT fail when a policy cannot
LOAD: every row becomes "Skip / Invalid Policy" and it still prints "N tests passed" and
exits 0. Measured while writing this policy -- a schema error (subjects in a separate
match.all entry from resources) produced exactly that, and ci/l0.sh would have certified a
security policy that does not load as green. This is not specific to this policy: a typo in
restrict-host-namespaces or secret-provenance would silently disable it with the gate still
green. ci/l0.sh now scans for "Invalid Policy" and fails. Proven: broken policy -> l0 rc=1,
restored -> rc=0.
IMAGE PINNING, HONEST LIMIT: the plan specifies pinning the exact runner image digest. That
image does not exist yet, so this enforces the enforceable half -- the image must be under
the conformance repository path AND digest-pinned, never a mutable tag. Residual surface:
anyone who can PUSH to that path could publish a different digest. Tighten to the literal
digest when the image is built; it is a one-line change to the pattern, reviewed in a PR,
which is where a change to a security boundary belongs.
NOT YET WIRED, deliberately: no runner image, no trigger kubeconfig, no CLUSTER_AVAILABLE.
The identities here are inert until those exist, and PR #12 makes CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true
block rather than fake a green in the meantime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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44983095e1 |
feat(runbooks): make the 42 alert runbook_url annotations resolve
Every platform-health alert rule carries `runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"` — 42 annotations over 34 distinct names, across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml, platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml. There was no runbooks/ directory and no HTTPRoute serving that path: an in-cluster probe of https://home.keithjackson.dev/runbooks/node-down returned HTTP 404. Every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment the documentation is read, and the annotation made it look solved — the same green-surface-over-absent-mechanism class as the import Job that reported success while storing placeholder secrets. No alerts.yaml is touched and no runbook_url value changes. The existing URL scheme is made to resolve instead. WHAT LANDS - runbooks/<34>.md — one per name, each grounded in this cluster's real topology and, where one exists, its real incident history: the 2026-09-07 k3s-prod-1 etcd I/O starvation (measured PSI 11.36 vs 0.75/1.29, the exact journal lines, the four mechanisms proven inert), the Longhorn reboot tax and the freeze/thaw of concurrent-replica-rebuild-per-node-limit, Cilium's once-resolved egress interface cache (Ifindex 3 against a live 1780) and the absence of OSS failover, the CNPG 38-hour ContinuousArchiving=False with its measured 6.8 MiB/h disk-full clock and the 2026-09-12 aggregation-scope fix, the 2026-09-06 Keycloak lockout in which all 12 clients held literal placeholder secrets behind an entirely green cluster, the Velero R2 x-amz-tagging NotImplemented incompatibility and its v1.14.3-rc.2 pin, and swap re-enabling itself across reboots via systemd-gpt-auto-generator. Each page states what the alert means HERE, the first diagnostic commands, likely causes ordered by probability with a remediation each, and when to escalate or stop. - Every page uses FULLY-QUALIFIED resource names and says why: three CRDs register the kind `Backup` here, the bare short name resolves to Longhorn's (zero objects), so `kubectl get backup -A` prints "No resources found" on a cluster holding 6 Velero and 27 CNPG backups. Acting on that false negative is how a CLI quirk becomes data loss. - Every page states that kubectl only works via `infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c '...'` with an explicit `--context k3s-prod`, because dev.sh defaults its current-context to k3s-dev. - Pages also record which alert groups are INERT today (measured 2026-09-13: no Longhorn, cert-manager, Flux-controller or Hubble scrape job exists, so 13 rules evaluate against nothing) so nobody reads their silence as health. SERVING — runbooks/serving/ plus clusters/base/runbooks.yaml A two-replica nginx-unprivileged serving a ConfigMap generated from runbooks/*.md, at the apex `/runbooks` prefix, in its own non-gating post-platform Flux tier (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — the platform/homepage pattern, file for file. - The service catalog cannot express this route: ingressRoutes[].host is pattern-bound to a single DNS label plus the apex, so the bare apex is unrepresentable, and there is no path field. - Rejected: redirecting to the Gitea web UI. A runbook is read when the platform is broken, and Gitea is an app-tier workload whose own dependencies several of these runbooks document; Gateway API's RequestRedirect also has no "append .md" modifier, so it would need 34 hand-maintained ReplaceFullPath rules. - configMapGenerator maps each file to an EXTENSIONLESS key (node-down=node-down.md), so /runbooks/node-down is a plain static lookup with no rewrite rule. Served as text/plain: the namespace has DNS-only egress, so a CDN markdown renderer could not load anyway. - The tier declares NO postBuild.substituteFrom, deliberately: envsubst would run over the prose and silently empty every ${...} shell example (it fails open — the 2026-09-01 emptied Cilium k8sServiceHost). The HTTPRoute omits `hostnames:` and inherits the https-apex listener's, so nothing needs substituting. AUTH — PUBLIC, deliberately auth-mode=none. Gating these pages behind oauth2-proxy/Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable when Keycloak is down and runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets unreadable during the exact 2026-09-06 failure mode. An operator who cannot log in is this route's primary reader. Content is operational procedure only, no secrets. The rationale is recorded in an annotation on the HTTPRoute so the route is left OUT of the Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands. PROVEN — in-cluster probe through the Gateway on prod /runbooks/node-down HTTP 200 8613 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/keycloak-down HTTP 200 9378 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/cnpg-archiving HTTP 200 11729 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/longhorn-faulted HTTP 200 9135 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/vpn-down HTTP 200 11092 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 /runbooks/backup-failure HTTP 200 9604 bytes text/plain; charset=utf-8 HTTPRoute Accepted by io.cilium/gateway-controller on sectionName https-apex; the `/runbooks` prefix wins over homepage's apex `/` by Gateway API longest-path precedence. GUARD — conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-runbooks-resolvable (R-OBS-04) 363 offline assertions. It checks BOTH halves, because the regression is silent in both directions: an alert with a new runbook_url and no runbook links to a 404, AND a runbook committed without its configMapGenerator entry is in git, reviewed, merged, and still 404s in the cluster. Also asserts a quality floor so a stub cannot make the link look fixed, and that route/listener/nginx prefix agree with the annotations. Proven to fail, then reverted: a bogus runbook_url (2 FAIL), a runbook removed from the generator (1 FAIL), and a 31-byte stub (7 FAIL). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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f21e89d9d2 |
fix(gitops): CDI cold-start deadlock repaired IN THE GRAPH, not by a pre-apply
`platform-config` applied the CDI CR *and* cdi-storageprofiles.yaml in ONE pass.
StorageProfile's CRD does not exist until cdi-operator reconciles that CR, and
Flux server-side dry-runs every object before applying any — so the unknown kind
aborted the tier, the CR was never applied, the CRD was never created, and the
tier could NEVER converge. Observed on prod: cdi-operator Available 12h, no CDI
CR, no storageprofiles CRD, every downstream tier blocked.
The profiles now live in their own tier ./platform-config-cdi with
dependsOn: platform-config and wait: true. Because dependsOn is REVISION-gated
and platform-config runs wait: true, the CDI CR must be applied AND healthy —
exactly the event that creates the CRD — before the profiles are applied. Cold
clusters order themselves. `standup.sh crds` is retained as a fallback for
clusters already stuck, and because it is idempotent.
THE GENERALISABLE RULE (recorded in clusters/README.md): a CR whose CRD is
created by a CONTROLLER AT RUNTIME is second-order and needs its own pass.
cdi-operator.yaml registers exactly ONE CRD (cdis.cdi.kubevirt.io); storageprofiles,
datavolumes, datasources and dataimportcrons appear only after it reconciles the
CDI CR. An audit found StorageProfile is the only second-order kind in
platform-config — KubeVirt, CDI, KeycloakRealmImport, CNPG Cluster,
VolumeSnapshotClass, ClusterIssuer, PrometheusRule, ServiceMonitor and the Cilium
L2 CRs all have their CRD in git or in a chart.
Moving the CDI CR up into `platform` was rejected: that would put CDI's health on
the tier the CNI gates and everything waits on — the mistake the oauth2-proxy and
headlamp splits exist to undo.
apps-vms gains dependsOn: platform-config-cdi. LOAD-BEARING, not cosmetic:
apps/vms/unifi/20-datavolume.yaml provisions on storageClassName: longhorn-vm and
its comment claimed platform-config guaranteed the profiles — which this move
would have silently falsified.
THE PRUNE TRANSIENT, MEASURED RATHER THAN ASSUMED. platform-config has
prune: true, so it deletes both profiles once, CDI recreates them with empty spec,
and the new tier re-applies the overrides ~30-60s later. Compared our override
against CDI's unaided inference for the same Longhorn provisioner on dev:
longhorn-vm (we override) spec RWX/Block -> status ReadWriteMany/Block
longhorn-static (no override) spec unset -> status ReadWriteOnce/Block
Both infer cloneStrategy: snapshot. So cloneStrategy is NOT at risk; accessModes
IS — unaided CDI gives RWO. A DataVolume provisioned on longhorn-vm inside the
window would be stamped RWO/Block and be PERMANENTLY non-live-migratable. Flux can
no longer cause it (apps-vms gates on the new tier); a human must not do it by hand.
Corroborating evidence that the recreate happens at all: dev has 5 StorageClasses
and 5 StorageProfiles, three with fluxOwner=NONE, spec unset and status populated
— CDI creating and inferring them with no Flux involvement.
MERGE PRECONDITION: `flux get kustomization platform-config` must be Ready on the
target first. If it is not, the profiles are pruned and sit at CDI defaults until
it recovers — and prod was in that state hours earlier. Fallback is the two-step
the Cilium move used (merge with prune: false, verify the ownership label moved,
restore prune: true).
substituteFrom: cluster-vars is declared even though the manifest has no ${TOKEN},
deliberately: conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution only audits
paths whose Kustomization declares it, so omitting it would move the file OUT of
the audited set — a blind spot for a future literal-token ship. Gate confirms it
stayed in (path=./platform-config-cdi files=2 defined=0 hazards=0). No SOPS
decryption stanza: the moved file is two plain CRs, so no overlay change was needed.
VERIFIED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE AGENT: platform-config renders 0 StorageProfile
while keeping the CDI and KubeVirt CRs; platform-config-cdi renders exactly the
two profiles; the graph is byte-identical across dev and prod with apps-vms
carrying both edges and no cycle. Full CI gate PASS.
KNOWN FOLLOW-UP: bootstrap/standup.sh TIER_ORDER does not yet include
platform-config-cdi, so `resume` will not wait on it. Another agent holds that
file; the PM will add it.
Refs R-GITOPS-01, R-ENV-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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63f98aab26 |
feat(flux): give Cilium its own Kustomization — MERGE 1 of 2 (transition)
Cilium was one of ~12 components inside a single `platform` Kustomization with wait:true,
so the CNI's health was indistinguishable from eleven unrelated components in the tier's
Ready condition, and the only emergency valve was freezing the whole platform tier. This
repo already set the precedent in reverse (oauth2-proxy and headlamp were split OUT so
unhealthy leaves would not gate a tier); Cilium is the mirror image — the one component
that legitimately SHOULD gate everything.
New clusters/base/cilium.yaml: path ./platform/cilium, wait:true, prune:true, interval 1h
(a CNI does not need a 10m re-render cadence; kustomize-controller is source-triggered so
a push still reconciles immediately — the interval is only the drift-correction floor),
timeout 10m (a 3-node DaemonSet rollout with wait exceeds the 5m default),
dependsOn:[flux-system], and postBuild.substituteFrom: cluster-vars — the last is
LOAD-BEARING, not decorative: helmrelease.yaml references ${K3S_API_HOST} and
kustomize-controller now runs --feature-gates=StrictPostBuildSubstitutions=true, so
without it this Kustomization would fail immediately.
*** THE HAZARD WAS FAR WORSE THAN "the CNI gets pruned" ***
platform/cilium/namespace.yaml is the ONLY declaration of Namespace/kube-system anywhere
under ./platform, and the live object carries kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/name=platform.
With prune:true, the moment ./platform/cilium leaves platform's path the stale set is not
"the Cilium HelmRelease" — it is `kubectl delete namespace kube-system`, taking coredns,
metrics-server, local-path AND Cilium. A full cluster kill, not a CNI kill.
TWO INDEPENDENT PROTECTIONS, deliberately not trusting either alone:
1. prune:false on `platform` for this transition merge — Flux's documented Procedure 1 for
moving resources between Kustomizations. Chosen over the per-resource
`kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled` annotation because that needs THREE merges
and leaves the new Kustomization owning resources it can never prune.
2. The pruner's own owner-label filter. In v1.4.0, prune() passes Inclusions:
GetOwnerLabels(obj.Name...), so platform only deletes objects whose LIVE labels still
say name=platform. The new cilium Kustomization relabels all three to name=cilium on
apply, and platform.dependsOn:[cilium] is REVISION-GATED, so platform provably cannot
reconcile revision N until cilium has APPLIED revision N. The relabel deterministically
precedes the prune.
Protection 2 alone would probably have sufficed. Not betting kube-system on "probably".
NOTED FOR THE FUTURE, in-file: anyone moving a platform/* component must first check
whether it is the sole declarer of a shared Namespace — that turns a component-scoped
prune into a cluster-scoped one.
Verified: `kubectl kustomize platform` goes 88 -> 85 documents, 3 removed / 0 added /
0 CHANGED, and `kubectl kustomize platform/cilium` reproduces those 3 byte-identical
(sha256-matched). A pure ownership move; no Cilium value touched. L0 substitution gate
103 assertions (was 102), new cilium row, 0 hazards. Server-side dry-run against the live
cluster accepted both CRs. clusters/prod renders clean off the same base.
MERGE 2 (restore prune:true) follows only after verifying: 13/13 Ready; kube-system, the
HelmRelease and the HelmRepository all relabelled to name=cilium; platform's inventory no
longer lists them; and Cilium pod ages/restarts UNCHANGED from
cilium-2f8h8 r=0 2026-09-01T05:55:27Z / cilium-425m8 r=1 2026-08-30T13:25:10Z /
cilium-54cww r=0 2026-09-01T05:55:26Z, HelmRelease v11.
Serves: R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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d1248e6778 |
feat(backup): wire Velero + CNPG Barman to the live MinIO S3 target
Author the GitOps side of off-cluster backups against the on-Proxmox MinIO (http://192.168.1.9:9000, path-style; buckets velero + cnpg). Velero (R-STATE-03): - HelmRelease (chart 8.x / Velero 1.15) + velero-plugin-for-aws init container + node-agent kopia File System Backup (deployNodeAgent, uploaderType=kopia, snapshotsEnabled=false). BSL default -> bucket velero, s3ForcePathStyle. - Two daily Schedules: `daily` backs up the whole cluster's resources+PVC data (defaultVolumesToFsBackup opt-out) EXCEPT monitoring+unifi; `daily-resources-only` captures monitoring+unifi RESOURCES only (Prometheus TSDB, Loki 72h logs, and the ~7.4GiB UniFi VM disk are reconstructable — excluded from volume backup). - velero-cloud-credentials SOPS Secret (cloud INI key, ns velero). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/backup.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + clusters/dev SOPS decryption patch — mirrors headlamp. CNPG native Barman PITR (R-IDP-05 / R-STATE-03): - keycloak-db, nextcloud-db, semaphore-db gain spec.backup.barmanObjectStore (s3://cnpg/<cluster>, endpointURL MinIO, gzip WAL+data, 30d retention) + a daily ScheduledBackup (6-field cron, immediate) each. - Per-namespace scoped-key SOPS Secrets (<db>-backup-credentials), same-ns only. - render.py: emit-waves now recognizes <svc>-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml as a DB-wave sidecar (+ self-test); wave-0 kustomization regenerated. Creds mirror platform/backup/minio-credentials.sops.yaml (scoped key k3s-backup), SOPS round-trip verified with the cluster age key. gate: green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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0437871807 |
Onboard Crafty Controller (Minecraft panel) with Keycloak-gated web UI
Add Crafty Controller 4 (registry.gitlab.com/crafty-controller/crafty-4:4.10.8) as a platform component: a web panel that runs Java + Bedrock Minecraft servers as subprocesses in one pod + a 20Gi Longhorn PVC (mounted 5x by subPath). Auth = Option B (per-app oauth2-proxy reverse-proxy sidecar), since Cilium 1.16.5 cannot do ext_authz on the shared Gateway: - oauth2-proxy v7.8.1 sidecar (:4180) reverse-proxies to Crafty's self-signed HTTPS UI (127.0.0.1:8443), gated to Keycloak homelab realm group platform-admins. - Confidential `crafty` client provisioned live via kcadm + captured in the realm import; client secret + cookie secret via SOPS/age (mirrored in realm-clients). - Web UI: HTTPRoute crafty.home.keithjackson.dev -> Service :80 -> sidecar :4180. - Game ports: Cilium L2 LoadBalancer on VIP 192.168.1.55 (next free after .53/.54), starter set TCP 25565-25567 (Java) + UDP 19132-19134 (Bedrock), NOT auth-gated. - fsGroup:0 / runAsGroup:0 / runAsUser:1000 for the image's crafty:root identity on the root:root Longhorn PVC (the seerr fsGroup lesson). - Own non-gating Flux tier clusters/base/crafty.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) + sops-decryption patch in clusters/dev — a leaf UI must never gate the platform. - Explicit default-deny NetworkPolicy + CiliumNetworkPolicies (platform namespace, not app-namespace, so Kyverno does not auto-generate the baseline). make -C ci gate green; kustomize build of platform/crafty, clusters/base, clusters/dev clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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1749603f87 |
feat(homepage): apex landing dashboard at home.keithjackson.dev
Deploy Homepage (gethomepage) as the apex landing dashboard aggregating links to cluster services, in its OWN non-gating post-platform Flux Kustomization (clusters/base/homepage.yaml, dependsOn platform-config, wait:false) — mirrors headlamp/oauth2-proxy so a leaf UI can never gate the platform chain. - platform/homepage/: plain manifests (ns, config ConfigMap, Deployment, Service, default-deny+Cilium ingress NP, apex HTTPRoute). Non-root pod, HOMEPAGE_ALLOWED_HOSTS, bundled mdi-* icons (DNS-only egress). - gateway.yaml: add https-apex + http-apex-redirect listeners for the bare apex (the *.home wildcard listener does NOT match it). Apex is already a SAN on the wildcard cert — no new Certificate. - Forward-auth annotated (auth-mode=forward-auth) but NOT enforced: the Gateway ext-authz mechanism is an unbuilt Phase-6 WS-NET TODO (same status as all other forward-auth apps). Flagged as PM follow-up. Gate: lint/l0/render-golden(10/10)/l1 green; conformance skipped (no cluster). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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ebe0371b1b |
platform: move Headlamp out of the gating platform tier + fix -session-ttl crashloop
Headlamp's HelmRelease sat in the wait:true `platform` Flux tier. Its pod crashlooped (`flag provided but not defined: -session-ttl` — chart 0.40.1 renders a container arg the appVersion v0.40.1 backend lacks; upstream kubernetes-sigs/headlamp#4883), and because it gated `platform`, the whole chain stalled: platform Ready=Unknown -> platform-config, oauth2-proxy, apps-wave-0/1/2 and apps-vms all Ready=False "dependency not ready". Part A (unblock + durable lesson): a leaf UI must never gate the chain. Move all Headlamp resources into a new non-gating Flux Kustomization clusters/base/headlamp.yaml (dependsOn platform-config, wait:false, SOPS decryption patched per-env in clusters/dev) — mirroring oauth2-proxy exactly. The new Kustomization owns the whole platform/headlamp component; its HTTPRoute moves from platform-config into platform/headlamp/kustomization.yaml. Removed headlamp from platform/kustomization.yaml and its httproute from platform-config/kustomization.yaml. Now a crashlooping Headlamp can never stall platform/platform-config/apps. Part B (make it start): pin the chart to 0.41.0 (`>=0.41.0 <0.42.0`). The backend added `f.Int("session-ttl", …)` in v0.41.0 and chart 0.41.0 pins that same image (appVersion == chart version), so chart+image realign; every arg the chart renders for our values is supported. OIDC config + per-user RBAC (clusterRoleBinding.create:false) unchanged. Gate: `make -C ci gate` PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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960cab937b |
fix(flux): move oauth2-proxy to a post-platform tier (dependsOn platform-config)
oauth2-proxy is a leaf forward-auth service that depends on Keycloak + trusted wildcard TLS + split-horizon DNS. It lived in the gating `platform` Flux Kustomization (wait:true), so on a cold start it Failed until those dependencies existed, keeping the whole `platform` tier not-Ready. That in turn blocked `platform-config` — which brings up the very Keycloak instance, wildcard Certificate and L2 VIP oauth2-proxy needs (and previously carried oauth2-proxy's own httproute/servicemonitor) — from ever reconciling. A self-gating cold-start deadlock, twice-proven (DECISIONS-LOG sessions 7 & 9). Break the cycle by moving the whole oauth2-proxy component out of the `platform` tier into its own non-gating post-platform Flux Kustomization: - clusters/base/oauth2-proxy.yaml: new Kustomization -> ./platform/oauth2-proxy, dependsOn platform-config, wait:false, substituteFrom cluster-vars. - clusters/base/kustomization.yaml: reference the new Kustomization. - platform/kustomization.yaml: drop the oauth2-proxy component (no longer in the gating tier). - platform/oauth2-proxy/kustomization.yaml: pull in httproute + servicemonitor so the full component travels together. - platform-config/kustomization.yaml: drop the in-place oauth2-proxy httproute/servicemonitor refs (moved with the controller). - clusters/dev/kustomization.yaml: add the SOPS decryption patch for the new oauth2-proxy Kustomization (it now owns the encrypted credentials Secret that the `platform` Kustomization used to decrypt). Now `platform` reaches Ready without oauth2-proxy; platform-config brings up Keycloak/TLS/DNS; then oauth2-proxy reconciles against dependencies that already exist. wait:false guarantees its health can never gate anything above it. No config of oauth2-proxy itself changed — only its reconciliation tier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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317b3f02f1 |
feat(vms): onboard UniFi OS Server as a KubeVirt VM on a non-gating track
First KubeVirt VM app + first real CDI http import. UniFi OS Server (UOS) is Ubiquiti's current self-host product (the .deb is deprecated); it bundles UniFi OS + Network app + its own datastore, so no MongoDB companion. - apps/vms/unifi: CDI DataVolume (Ubuntu 24.04 cloud image -> longhorn-vm RWX/Block, live-migratable) + VirtualMachine (evictionStrategy: LiveMigrate) with cloud-init that installs podman/slirp4netns/jq and runs the UOS installer NON-INTERACTIVELY. The installer URL is resolved at boot from Ubiquiti's public firmware API (fw-update.ui.com/api/firmware-latest) — always-latest, no pinned URL to maintain (currently UOS v5.1.37). - L4 exposure: two LoadBalancer Services (TCP+UDP) sharing a pinned, L2-announced Cilium VIP 192.168.1.54 (device inform/adoption + STUN can't ride the L7 Gateway); external-dns publishes unifi.home.keithjackson.dev. UI on :11443. - default-deny + additive CNPs (controller ingress, egress, and CDI-importer egress for the image pull). - clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml: NON-GATING Flux Kustomization (wait:false, dependsOn platform-config) — VMs are a separate lifecycle from the app waves, so a slow VM import/install can't stall the app tier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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36a1a4e1f9 |
refactor(apps): split monolithic apps Kustomization into dependency waves
Replaces the single `apps` Flux Kustomization with dependency-ordered waves
(apps-wave-0..2) so a crashlooping workload isolates to its wave + downstream
instead of stalling the entire app tier. Parallel within a wave, ordered across.
- catalog/render.py: compute waves by longest dependency-path depth over the
ServiceDefinition `dependencies:` edges (a `<svc>-db` is a leaf, so its
consumer lands strictly higher — the "DB below consumer" rule falls out of
longest-path, no special case). `--emit-waves` generates the per-wave
kustomizations + Flux CRs; `--wave-layout` places renders into the right dir.
wave 0: pihole gitea jackett plex qbittorrent nextcloud-db semaphore-db
wave 1: sonarr radarr nextcloud semaphore gitea-actions
wave 2: seerr
- apps/*.yaml -> apps/wave-{0,1,2}/ (byte-identical moves; SOPS files intact).
- clusters/base: apps.yaml removed; apps-wave-{0,1,2}.yaml added (dependsOn
chain: platform-config -> wave-0 -> wave-1 -> wave-2, prune+wait each).
- clusters/dev: one SOPS decryption patch per wave (load-bearing).
- DESIGN-waves.md: wave table, topology, cutover runbook.
Cutover: preceded by disabling prune on `apps` (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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ca982864fc |
fix(platform): controllers/configs split so CRDs precede their CRs
Un-suspend deadlocked: the single platform Kustomization applies HelmReleases
(which register CRDs) AND custom resources of those CRDs (ClusterIssuer,
Certificate, Kyverno ClusterPolicies) in ONE pass. Flux's server-side apply
fails atomically ('no matches for kind ClusterIssuer') → nothing installs, so
the CRD-registering HelmReleases never run either. Classic ordering deadlock.
Fix (flux2 controllers/configs pattern, applies to dev+prod equally — no
R-ENV-02 divergence): add a platform-config Flux Kustomization (dependsOn
platform, wait) carrying the CRs; platform keeps only the controllers.
- New clusters/base/platform-config.yaml (path ./platform-config, substituteFrom
cluster-vars, no decryption — no SOPS content); wired into base + apps now
dependsOn platform-config (transitively waits for platform).
- platform-config/ references the CR files IN PLACE via ../platform/... (Flux
builds LoadRestrictionsNone; Kyverno policies must stay under platform/kyverno/
for the CI L0 gate). CR resources dropped from the platform
component kustomizations (cert-manager, gateway, kyverno).
- Authored the missing Cilium L2 resources (were only a TODO): CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool
(dev NAT 10.73.0.240-.250) + CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy (ens*), so Gateway
LoadBalancer listeners get a VIP. Prod range must be parameterized later.
Verified: platform build has zero CRs; platform-config build has 2 ClusterIssuers,
6 ClusterPolicies, Certificate, Gateway, both Cilium L2 CRs; dev/prod build; gate PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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af4f6c07ae |
T-0.1 Flux GitOps layout + dev/prod overlays + platform component skeletons (R-GITOPS-01/03, R-ENV-02, R-PLAT-01)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |