Operator decision on PR #81: no CI job may reach a privileged daemon. The act runner is untouched.
- platform/buildkit (+ clusters/base/buildkit.yaml): moby/buildkit v0.34.1-rootless pinned by
digest, uid 1000, not privileged; caps drop ALL + SETUID/SETGID, seccomp/AppArmor Unconfined,
read-only rootfs (each measured under podman). cert-manager CA + server/client certs, ClusterIP
:1234, default-deny with ingress only from the act-runner pod (DinD masquerades jobs to it).
No Kyverno exception: every applied policy matches app-namespace=true only.
- Each Containerfile names its shipped stage and ends in a `verify` stage holding every former
`docker run` assertion (uid 65532, RUN --network=none, writable-path inventory standing in for
the read-only rootfs). The old `&& echo` checks that could never fail are real assertions now.
- images.sh drives buildkitd with a pinned buildx (sha256-checked) via bake; PRs build verify
targets with agent-runner FROM the in-run toolbox (target: context); main verifies, then pushes.
Fails loudly when the builder secrets are absent or buildkitd is unreachable.
- infra/gitea/buildkit-client-secret.sh copies the client cert into Actions secrets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Operator rule 2026-10-29: image creation, hosting and lifecycle belong to CI/CD, never to a
workstation build/push. Nothing had ever been pushed to the Gitea registry.
- .gitea/workflows/images.yaml + scripts/images.sh: PRs build+verify (no credential); main
builds, verifies and pushes toolbox, agent-runner (FROM toolbox) and conformance-runner as
sha-<commit> + main, reading the digest back from the registry. Only changed images build.
- Each image's own build-image.sh does the build and in-image verification, now engine-neutral
(DinD: no podman-only calls, probe over stdin not a bind mount). New toolbox build-image.sh.
- Digest references carry `# renovate-digest:` markers; renovate.json5 gains a custom.regex
manager for them. The worker Job template is deliberately untracked (it would loop).
- renovate.yaml pins renovate-version 44.167.0: the action's default (39.264.0) rejects the
current config's managerFilePatterns, so every run would have died at CONFIG_VALIDATION.
- Push credential: REGISTRY_PUSH_TOKEN secret; the Actions token has no package scope in
Gitea 1.24.3 (container.go Authenticate). Retention: infra/gitea/registry-retention.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
pm-worker's command is pinned by admission with no args, so everything a caller could
influence arrives in the environment — and the guards at the top of that script are what
stand between an injected variable and a clone from the wrong host or a push to the
wrong ref. Nothing exercised them, which makes them a claim rather than a control.
probe-validation.sh asserts 17 refusals, each on BOTH a non-zero exit and the specific
message, so a guard that stopped firing cannot pass by failing somewhere else. It covers
a redirected git host, a real and reachable WRONG one (the egress policy permits tcp/443,
so that case is not hypothetical), the right host with a smuggled path, 'main' and five
other bad branch shapes, a malformed owner/repo, a bad mode, a bad issue number, and each
missing credential. build-image.sh runs it inside the built image too.
Writing it found three things:
- the PM_BRANCH != main guard is unreachable while the pattern check above it holds, so
the comment claiming it as the defence was wrong about which line does the work. Kept
as an assertion independent of the regex; the comment now says so.
- the EXIT trap ended in a failing test, which under set -e can replace the script's
real exit code with that failure.
- a provenance LOG LINE read a file through a redirect that set -o pipefail would have
turned into a dead worker if the file were absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
A service that reads this repository's Gitea issues, decides what to do about each
thread as the Program Manager persona, and runs one worker agent per assignment that
authors a change, runs the merge gate and opens a pull request. It reacts to issue
creation and to comments; the assignment and all correspondence travel through the
issue thread and the PR. It authenticates with an Anthropic subscription token. It
never pushes to main and never merges.
Three choices carry the design, with alternatives recorded in docs/plans/:
- it POLLS rather than receiving webhooks (Gitea's webhook SSRF guard, lost
deliveries, and no inbound reach needed at all);
- it keeps NO state: the trigger is "the newest thing in this thread was not
written by me", so the issue thread is the state — no PVC, no backup obligation;
- the model holds NO tools: its reply is one JSON object this code validates, so
nothing in the path executes text.
The boundary is platform/kyverno/admission/pm-agent-job-shape.yaml (Enforce,
failurePolicy: Fail), not the RBAC: Kubernetes places no `use` check on
serviceAccountName, so "may create Jobs" is "may run arbitrary code as the
namespace's most privileged identity". Six rules admit only the committed shape, and
the worker identity is bound to nothing with no token mounted, so there is nothing to
escalate to. 28/28 offline Kyverno assertions.
Nothing has run: the image has never been built or pushed, and both the image digest
and the two credentials are deliberate placeholders. See the handoff entry's
"What I did NOT verify".
Refs CLAUDE.md §1/§3/§6, R-SEC-02, R-GITOPS-02.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5