d8b25a67feeea46f3e1311d4e8fb15aedaaad8e8
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
8ccfdab180 |
fix(ci): let an administrator merge their own green PR
`required_approvals: 1` on `main` was a lock-out, not a protection. Gitea
refuses to let a PR's author approve their own PR, and `jakman85` is the only
collaborator — so no account in existence could approve a PR the operator
opened, including the PR that would fix that. Measured 2026-10-01 on PR #35:
gate green in 1m41s, reviews `[]`, `required_approvals: 1`, unmergeable.
It was never the documented design either: `ci/approval-policy.sh`'s header and
`ci/gate.sh:194` both already describe the model as "required_approvals drops
to 0 and the GATE decides", and `require-gate.sh`'s own closing note named this
failure and prescribed this remedy. 2026-09-30's entry flagged the 1-vs-0
disagreement as unresolved; this settles it at 0.
Layer 1 — branch protection. required_approvals 1 -> 0 in the declaration, plus
infra/gitea/allow-admin-self-merge.sh to apply it live (target read FROM the
declaration, so the script cannot drift from what the gate checks).
require-gate.sh moves to 0 too; left at 1 it would re-impose the lock-out on its
next run. The narrow choice is deliberate: the other way to unblock an owner is
block_admin_merge_override: false, which would re-open what
block-admin-override.sh was written to close (PRs #5-#9, zero approvals). This
drops the approval COUNT only — block_admin_merge_override and
enable_status_check stay true and are asserted after the PATCH, so a red gate
stays unmergeable by everyone, administrators included.
Layer 2 — ci/approval-policy.sh. Sensitive paths still need a non-author
approval the sole admin cannot get, so an administrator may waive it with an
`/approve-override <reason>` comment: directive must start a line, reason
mandatory, permission re-checked LIVE, invalidated by a new commit, and the
overrider + reason printed in the gate log and job summary. Candidate selection
is the pure, offline ci/approval-override.py (23 unit assertions, all passing);
authorisation stays in the fail-closed stage. Every new failure mode blocks.
The cost, stated not buried: for an administrator, "a change to the gate cannot
be gated by the gate" is now advisory rather than structural. Unavoidable with
one human; what is bought back is an attributed, commit-scoped record instead of
a silent bypass. And the uncomfortable part, accepted as an operator decision:
authorisation is by live permission alone, and the AGENT account `gitea-admin`
also holds `owner` — so an agent can clear its own PR this way. Documented in
approval-policy.json, the stage header, and CLAUDE.md (which tells agents not
to). Narrowing needs no code change: add `override_admins` and the stage already
requires membership.
Adjacent fix, in scope because `make -C ci test` is the only runner for the
suite added here: ci/tests/gate-decision.test.sh hand-maintained a stub list
that "must name EVERY stage gate.sh runs" and omitted `approval-policy` (added
to gate.sh by PR #17), so run_stage hit exit 127 and 15 of 50 assertions failed.
Verified pre-existing on pristine origin/main @
|
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
fcc66c7858 |
fix(gitea): admins could override the gate -- the enforcement was not enforcing
enable_status_check and required_approvals were set earlier today and recorded as done. They did not bite. block_admin_merge_override was false, and Gitea lets repo admins override merge requirements without it. jakman85 holds owner, so both requirements were bypassable by exactly the account that performs every merge. The evidence was already on the record: PRs #5-#9 all merged while required_approvals: 1 was in force, with ZERO approvals recorded on any of them. Two process failures, both the same shape as the defect this whole session started with: 1. Verified with the wrong view. /branches/main reports protected, enable_status_check and required_approvals but NOT block_admin_merge_override -- it showed everything green while the rule was overridable. /branch_protections/main is authoritative. 2. Probed for a field name assumed to exist. This Gitea (1.24.3) has no `apply_to_admins`; asking jq for it returns null, which reads like "set to false" but means "key absent", so a PATCH that silently did nothing produced a convincing before/after. jq returning null is not a value -- it may be an absence. Enumerate with to_entries. require-gate.sh now sets block_admin_merge_override: true; block-admin-override.sh fixes it in isolation. Both carry the field-name warning. This PR is the test. If it merges WITHOUT an approval, the fix did not work. Also records the governance question: with only jakman85 (human) and gitea-admin (agent), a human-authored PR now needs the automation account to approve it. That is ceremony, not review, and the choice between keeping it, dropping approvals in favour of the status check, or adding a second human is the operator's to make. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
||
|
jakman85andClaude Opus 5
|
b2d9883958 |
docs(ci): close out the hardening -- land the scripts, correct a claim that shipped wrong
The branch-protection + PR-gate + sidecar sequence is complete and verified. This records the finished state and fixes what the sequence itself proved wrong. CORRECTS A FALSE CLAIM I SHIPPED. PR #7 said the sidecar conversion would remove the one-per-start dockerd line "http: TLS handshake error from 127.0.0.1: EOF". It does NOT. Exactly one still appears, immediately after "API listen on [::]:2376" -- it is now the startupProbe's FIRST attempt, landing microseconds after dockerd begins listening and cut off by timeoutSeconds: 1; the next poll succeeds. Cosmetic, and deliberately not chased: raising the timeout to hide one benign startup line would slow every subsequent poll. The manifest comment now states this instead of the wrong prediction. Lands infra/gitea/require-gate.sh and verify-then-enforce.sh, which drove the rollout from a session temp dir. verify-then-enforce.sh merges nothing -- merging is a human's reviewed act -- but forces the reconcile and ABORTS unless the pod is healthy, a runner is online, and a real workflow goes green on it, before enabling enforcement and probing the push. Re-run it after any future act-runner change. Trims the now-obsolete feat/ rationale from claim-ship.sh: per-branch push triggers were deleted, so no prefix produces a duplicate run any more. CLAUDE.md's enforcement table flips from "weaker than this rule" to machine-enforced, with all four rows marked verified and the push rejection noted as PROVOKED rather than assumed. It also now states what a green PR does NOT prove: CLUSTER_AVAILABLE is unset, so L2/L3 never runs in CI and only the L0/L1 offline subset is covered. infra/gitea/README.md marks the sequence done and names the root cause that remains unfixed: Gitea repo settings live in its own database, invisible to Flux and unreadable by the conformance gate, so NOTHING detects drift from what this directory declares. These scripts assert desired state; they are not a detector. The check that reads the live API and fails on divergence is the highest-value work left, and it is the difference between this being fixed and this being unable to recur. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |