Re-authors the fix stranded on origin/fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream (7a34590). That
commit was NOT landed: it wrote a netplan drop-in and ran `netplan apply`, but netplan
does not exist on these nodes any more (Debian 13 trixie generic cloud image; not in
node_baseline_packages). Landing it would have failed the handler with command-not-found
and BROKEN node-baseline.yml on every node — worse than not landing it. Its dev-LAN
literals also sat in role defaults, which prod inherits, pointing prod nodes at a PiHole
on a network they cannot reach.
The underlying problem is real and verified: a SINGLE upstream resolver is a hard SPOF.
PiHole answers jackson.lan instantly but its external recursion flaps — 0/25 for public
names (registry-1.docker.io, quay.io, ghcr.io) while gitea.jackson.lan resolved 5/5 —
breaking containerd image pulls and CoreDNS `forward . /etc/resolv.conf`.
MECHANISM DETECTION (new `dns` tag in node_baseline). Five read-only probes feed one
set_fact yielding three outcomes, because the two environments no longer share a resolver
stack (dev-1 is behind resolved's 127.0.0.53 stub; prod-1 has a direct resolv.conf and no
cloud-init at all):
* systemd-resolved — resolved running AND owning /etc/resolv.conf (proven by the
symlink pointing into /run/systemd/resolve/, or by every nameserver being a resolved
loopback). Writes resolved.conf.d/99-k3s-dns.conf with an ordered DNS=, Domains=, and
FallbackDNS= EXPLICITLY EMPTIED so systemd's compiled-in public resolvers can never
silently bypass the local zone and ad-blocking.
* resolv-conf-file — plain directly-managed file (prod's shape). Ordered nameserver
lines + options timeout:2 attempts:2, backup: true. Deliberately NO `rotate`, which
would destroy PiHole-first ordering.
* contended — resolvconf/openresolv present or NetworkManager active. Writes NOTHING
and fails loudly: a change that silently gets reverted is worse than no change.
Resolved-running-but-not-owning-resolv.conf correctly falls through to the file branch.
Ordering is the policy that keeps the local zone working — the second server is only
consulted after the first fails, so a gateway NXDOMAIN can never beat PiHole to a
jackson.lan answer.
SEAMS. Dev values in role defaults ([192.168.1.18, 192.168.1.1], search jackson.lan);
prod values in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vars.yml. NOT cluster-vars — that ConfigMap
is consumed by Flux postBuild for platform/ and apps/, and no Ansible code reads it.
PROD'S SECOND UPSTREAM IS AN OPEN OPERATOR DECISION and is left as a loud
BLOCKED-pending-second-upstream placeholder, the same precedent as the node_baseline disk
devices, with a dns-tagged assert that stops the play before any file is written. A
public resolver was NOT invented as a default: it would bypass the local zone, which is a
decision, not a default. PROD-PROVISIONING.md §4 was rewritten (the old bullet pointed at
the now-dropped branch) to state the choice, including that prod routing to the dev
PiHole is unverified across the pfSense boundary.
tofu: servers = [var.dns_server, var.network_gateway] — the one hunk of the old branch
worth taking as-is. Dev-only by nature.
ALSO FIXES A FALSE WARN THIS WOULD OTHERWISE CREATE: node_health_collect.py parsed
/etc/resolv.conf only, so on dev it read the 127.0.0.53 stub and would report a permanent
single-upstream WARN even after a correct fix. It now asks resolvectl for the real
upstreams when it sees the stub — and if that fails, nameservers is NULL with the reason
recorded, never the stub and never a guess. assess.yml turns null into SKIP, not WARN and
not PASS. The honesty discipline is preserved exactly.
Verified with NO play run against any node: syntax-check + yamllint + tofu fmt clean;
--tags packages still selects ONLY the apt task (the prod package-floor escape hatch
bypasses DNS entirely); --list-hosts unchanged; -c local simulation driving the REAL
detection expression and REAL file bodies extracted from the role by script (so the test
cannot drift) passes all 5 scenarios — dev stub -> systemd-resolved, prod shape ->
resolv-conf-file, NetworkManager and resolvconf -> contended; dev defaults pass the
assert byte-identically while prod overrides fail it by name; collector unit-tested
against 8 resolver shapes.
Serves: R-DNS-01, R-DNS-03, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Interim bridge to stop Longhorn replica-rebuild I/O storms on the shared HDD
Storage pool from starving etcd WAL fsync (crash-looping k3s / flapping the
kube-vip VIP). Adds a small dedicated SSD disk per node for etcd only; Longhorn
stays on HDD. See docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md.
tofu (infra/tofu):
- New vars etcd_ssd_datastore (default "local-zfs" = rpool/data, Micron 5100
SATA SSD mirror w/ PLP) and etcd_disk_gib (default 16).
- New virtio2 disk block on the SSD datastore per VM: discard=on, cache=none
(honor guest fsync straight to the ZFS ZIL — safe on PLP SSD), iothread=false.
Kept last (ascending interface) so bpg does not reorder virtio0/virtio1.
- Revert the debian_cloud_image resource to the long type name
proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file to match the R2 state: bpg >= 0.111
dropped the cross-type moved{} linkage to the short proxmox_download_file, so
the stale moved block failed EVERY plan with "Resource type mismatch" (broken
on main too). Aligning code to state yields a clean plan with no image
re-download. Short-name migration is deferred to a deliberate `tofu state mv`.
ansible (node_baseline):
- Format /dev/vdc (label k3s-etcd) and mount it at
/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db (defaults,noatime; no nofail so a missing etcd
disk fails loudly rather than silently landing etcd on the root HDD) before
k3s starts, so a rebuilt node comes up with etcd isolated on SSD. Data-safe:
filesystem module never reformats an existing fs.
Phase 1 only: non-disruptive. No tofu apply, no node/VM/etcd/Longhorn changes.
tofu plan verified: 0 to add, 3 to change, 0 to destroy — every VM an in-place
disk ADD (virtio2), dev-3 also an in-place memory 16384->24576; no VM replace.
Merge gate green (render==golden included).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
bpg/proxmox deprecates proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file ("Use
proxmox_download_file instead. This resource will be removed in v1.0."),
the short-name rename from ADR-007. Both are the same dual-registered
Framework resource, so rename the resource type + import_from reference
and add a `moved` block. OpenTofu 1.9 drives the provider's MoveState
(migration.PrefixMoveState) to transfer state in place: same id, no
re-download of the Debian image, no change to the VMs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Replace the dmacvicar/libvirt provider + resources with the modern
bpg/proxmox provider. The dev cluster moves off the memory-constrained
local libvirt host onto the Proxmox VE box.
- versions.tf: pin bpg/proxmox ~> 0.66; provider reads auth from env
(PROXMOX_VE_*, token never a tofu var) and normalizes a schemeless
PROXMOX_VE_ENDPOINT (prepend https://) to avoid the :8006 HTTP 301.
- variables.tf: Proxmox placement vars (node=proxmox, datastore=Storage,
image_datastore=local, bridge=vmbr0); LAN 192.168.1.0/24 gw .1 DNS .18;
node_ips .50/.51/.52; sizing 6 vCPU / 16384 MiB / 40+100 GiB; cpu_type
host; Cilium VIP range .53-.60.
- main.tf: proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file (cloud image -> local),
per-node user-data snippet (proxmox_virtual_environment_file), and
proxmox_virtual_environment_vm per node via name-keyed for_each (imported
OS disk virtio0, blank data disk virtio1, native initialization ip_config
+ dns + user_data_file_id).
- remove moved.tf (libvirt-specific count->for_each state migration).
Authoring only; no apply. Traces R-ENV-01, R-PLAT-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Implements T-1.5 findings F1/F2 (author-first, no cluster change).
F1 (tofu): refactor libvirt node resources count -> for_each keyed by
node name so single-node -replace/destroy cannot cascade to siblings.
Add ordered-list/primary helper locals; update outputs.tf off the map;
add moved.tf (12 moved blocks). tofu plan proves a pure state-address
migration: 0 to add, 0 to change, 0 to destroy (all 12 'has moved to').
State-persist via a 0-change apply is operator-permission-gated.
F2 (ansible): k3s_server secondary fetches the join token via
delegate_to the primary (published fact as fast path), so a single-node
rejoin with --limit k3s-dev-N is self-contained and no longer depends on
a fact an earlier play had to set. Syntax-check + CI gate green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
jakman85andClaude Opus 5