dce20b7be6de436aec4bcd2b482bfa689a656a31
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5.5
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788eaeae62 |
fix(node-baseline): pin the OIDC issuer to the Gateway VIP on prod nodes
After public DNS moved to the WAN IP (#40), prod nodes resolve keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev to a WAN address the router does not hairpin, so the apiserver could not reach its OIDC issuer. Adds an opt-in node_baseline_hosts_pins /etc/hosts block; prod pins keycloak to GATEWAY_VIP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c1e36d9353 |
docs(node_baseline): say why the Longhorn claim guard's swap list is now always empty
The claim guard builds node_baseline_lh_protected_devices from ansible_mounts plus `swapon --show`. With swap.target masked, a baselined node has no active swap, so that half of the list contributes nothing — which reads like a guard that quietly stopped guarding. It is not: the claim candidate comes from whatever is mounted at node_baseline_longhorn_claim_mountpoint, and a swap partition is neither mounted nor ext4, so it could never be the candidate. Say so where the next reader will ask. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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0e92d258dd |
fix(node_baseline): swap-off now survives a reboot — mask swap.target
The role's `swapoff -a` + commented fstab line held only until the next boot,
on every prod node. Measured 2026-09-07: all three came back from a reboot with
977 MiB of swap ACTIVE (k3s-prod-1 /dev/sda4, k3s-prod-3 /dev/sda4, k3s-prod-2
/dev/nvme0n1p4) while their fstab swap entry was commented out by this role. The
role reported success and the setting silently expired.
CAUSE. systemd-gpt-auto-generator claims any GPT partition typed
0657fd6d-a4ab-43c4-84e5-0933c84b4f4f ("Linux swap") from the PARTITION TABLE,
synthesises a .swap unit into /run/systemd/generator.late/ and links it into
swap.target.wants/. It never reads /etc/fstab, so neutralising fstab cannot stop
it. Re-running the generator by hand on k3s-prod-1 says so verbatim:
Probed fstype 'swap' on partition /dev/disk/by-diskseq/1-part4.
Adding swap: /dev/disk/by-diskseq/1-part4
MECHANISM. Mask swap.target. `systemctl show` on the generated unit says its only
inbound dependency is `WantedBy=swap.target` — Requires/RequiredBy/BoundBy empty,
and the matching .device unit has an empty Wants=, so a device appearing does not
pull its swap unit in by itself. swap.target is the single choke point for every
activation path: gpt-auto, systemd-fstab-generator, systemd-cryptsetup-generator.
It is device-shape independent (no device name appears in the change, so one task
covers sda4, nvme0n1p4 and dev's vda VMs), boot-safe (swap.target is Wants=/After=
from sysinit.target and After= from tmp.mount; RequiredBy= is EMPTY on all three
prod and all three dev nodes, and a masked unit reached only via Wants= is skipped,
not failed), and inert if the device is absent or renamed. The generated units are
masked too, as a second independent barrier.
Rejected: `systemd.gpt_auto=0` (disables GPT auto-discovery wholesale, needs a GRUB
edit + reboot to become true, and on DEV would switch off root auto-discovery — dev's
vda1 carries the discoverable GUID 4f68bce3-e8cd-4db1-96e7-fbcaf984b709); clearing
the partition's GPT type GUID (a partition-table write to the live boot disk of a node
serving etcd and Longhorn replicas, and an irreversible decision about that 977 MiB
that belongs to the operator); `systemd.swap=0` (systemd-fstab-generator only — this
swap does not come from fstab).
`swapoff -a` is now conditional on `swapon --show` returning something, so the task
reports honestly instead of hiding a command that ran anyway behind changed_when: false.
PROVEN on k3s-prod-1 (all 18 Longhorn volumes healthy before the reboot):
run 1 changed=2, run 2 changed=0
after `reboot`: /proc/swaps empty, `free` Swap 0B, swap.target masked, the
generated unit still emitted by the generator and still masked, `systemctl
--failed` empty, `systemctl is-system-running` = running.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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9b8979a427 |
feat(prod): temp Gitea source + wireless disabled + flux bootstrap path
Autonomous prod bring-up, operator away. Three changes that together clear the last blockers before `flux bootstrap`. === 1. TEMPORARY BOOTSTRAP GITEA — the last hard blocker, cleared === clusters/prod's source URL could not work: Gitea runs ON the dev cluster (the one slated for decommission) and split-horizon DNS resolves gitea.home.keithjackson.dev to PROD's OWN gateway. Stood up the existing bootstrap/gitea/bootstrap-gitea.sh on the operator's workstation with HOST_NAT_IP=192.168.2.132; all three prod nodes verified reachable (Gitea 1.22.6 via the API), no firewall change needed — prod is on the same /24, no NAT. clusters/prod now points at http://192.168.2.132:3000/... under a boxed TEMPORARY banner with a 5-step cutover checklist ending 'delete this whole block — dev's stanza is what done looks like'. Repo verified PUBLIC with anonymous read two independent ways (API "private":false; git ls-remote unauthenticated with GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0), so NO secretRef is needed — documented so a future auth failure is not misread as a network fault. bootstrap-gitea.sh's header corrected: it documented HOST_NAT_IP=10.73.0.1, the RETIRED libvirt NAT, and forbade agent use; the operator has now directed this for prod. === 2. WIRELESS DISABLED ON PROD (operator-reported) === k3s-prod-3 was on ethernet AND wireless, and the wifi DHCP client was overwriting /etc/resolv.conf. Root cause of the silence: node_baseline's DNS `contended` detection checked resolvconf and NetworkManager but NOT dhcpcd, so the role wrote resolvers, reported success, and dhcpcd reverted them on lease renewal — the exact 'green run that fixed nothing' the contended branch exists to prevent. Now IaC, not a one-off: survey wireless hardware, **REFUSE to disable it if the path to the node runs over the wireless interface** (the guard that meant an agent dying mid-apply cost nothing), blacklist the driver so it never reloads, stop dhcpcd only where it holds a wireless interface and nothing else, take links down and unload modules with NO reboot, then report the resulting state. dhcpcd is now in the contended set without weakening fail-closed. Applied and verified: node 3's wlp1s0 is GONE from /sys/class/net, dhcpcd inactive and its unit not-found, ONE default route per node, all three on 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 resolving public names. Safe and idempotent on nodes 1 and 2, whose wifi hardware was already down. === 3. flux_bootstrap PATH PARAMETERISED === bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh already read FLUX_ENV_PATH but the role never exported it, so it ALWAYS bootstrapped clusters/dev — prod was impossible. Two behaviour-bearing lines: role default clusters/dev + `environment: FLUX_ENV_PATH`, overridden to clusters/prod in group_vars/k3s_prod. Proven per host with a read-only Ansible probe: prod hosts resolve clusters/prod, localhost/hypervisor resolves clusters/dev. Only two definitions repo-wide. DEV PROVEN BYTE-IDENTICAL for the source change: all 12 substituting Flux paths rendered for both trees, 27/27 SHA-256 artefacts identical, with TWO POSITIVE CONTROLS (an overlay-level canary and a deep-path content canary) confirming the harness detects change — and both canaries proven restored. Honest scope note recorded: kustomize strips comments, so the harness proves the built stream, not source comments. L0 substitution check: 106 assertions, 0 hazards. ci/l0.sh and ci/lint.sh exit 0. === STILL BLOCKING A FULL PROD RECONCILE (operator decisions) === - S3_BACKUP_ENDPOINT remains TBD-PROD-*: prod CANNOT reach dev's versitygw at 192.168.1.9:9000 (verified UNREACHABLE from all three — the pfSense boundary), and a prod backup target is a deferred operator decision. Deliberately NOT invented: a DR target on a workstation container would create false confidence. Velero/CNPG backups will fail loudly. - Prod's public resolvers mean the API server's oidc-issuer-url resolves PUBLICLY, so kubectl SSO will not work on prod until split-horizon is solved for it (§4). - The temp Gitea is a single container on the operator's workstation — a single point of failure for prod reconciliation, acceptable for bring-up only. Serves: R-GITOPS-01, R-DNS-01, R-DNS-03, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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05baae90ec |
feat(prod): kernel fix + disk layout — prod nodes ready for k3s
Prod is being stood up now, without waiting for node 2's RAM upgrade. Three coupled
changes, all applied and verified on all three nodes.
=== 1. KERNEL >= 6.13 — now a PREREQUISITE, not a nice-to-have ===
A k3s SERVER that intermittently boots with 2.6 GiB is not a degraded node; it fails under
etcd plus its workload share, unpredictably, on any reboot. Fixed before k3s goes on.
roles/node_baseline gains a `kernel`-tagged block: asserts the suite matches the node's
Debian release, writes a deb822 trixie-backports source, installs, reads back the exact
version, writes a provenance/rollback note to the node. Scoped by
node_baseline_backports_kernel (default FALSE, true only in group_vars/k3s_prod) — chosen
over a hostname test so a fourth prod node inherits it from group membership. Verified:
--check against dev skips all 8 tasks on all 3 hosts. Two deliberate calls: `state: latest`
not `present` (linux-image-amd64 was already installed from main, so `present` would have
silently fixed nothing), and NO preferences.d pin (backports' NotAutomatic +
ButAutomaticUpgrades already gives 100/500; an explicit Pin-Priority: 100 would switch OFF
automatic security upgrades for the very kernel being installed).
Installed 7.1.8+deb13-amd64 on all three; 6.12.107 kept bootable.
THE DECISIVE PROOF: node 2 booted at MEMATTR=0xbeeb0018 — the EXACT address that gave it
2.6 GiB twice — and now reserves 634,904K instead of 13,958,980K. MemTotal 15.4 GiB. Same
address, handled correctly; not a lucky draw.
§0b's claim that a fixed kernel prints 'FW_BUG Corrupted...' is CONDITIONAL and was
corrected: >=6.13 has three rejection gates and only the third prints that line; all three
nodes hit gate 1 (version > 2). Proof instead is boot-independent — decompressing
/boot/vmlinuz on all three yields the FW_BUG and descriptor-size strings verbatim; neither
exists in 6.12.
TWO MORE BUGS IN MY OWN HEALTH CHECK, found because the fix couldn't otherwise be shown:
- MEMATTR_VERSION_RE matched (\d+) but the kernel prints that field with %d — SIGNED. Node
2's real value was -1569980416, which did not match, so state fell through to `clean` and
the node reported PASS "the kernel accepted it without complaint". A FALSE PASS on the
exact bug the check exists to find. Now (-?\d+).
- bad_version was WARN unconditionally, so a FIXED node would have stayed WARN forever.
Now keys on memattr_kernel_fixed: same line, WARN below 6.13, PASS at/above.
=== 2. DISK LAYOUT — Longhorn claimed, per-node paths DISCOVERED not hardcoded ===
Operator decision: reuse the ~424 GB partition; accept the shared-device I/O risk (dev's
etcd/Longhorn contention was on a spinning HDD, prod is SSD/NVMe).
Device paths differ per node (sda5 / nvme0n1p5 / sda5), so the role DISCOVERS the partition
via `findmnt --mountpoint` on a declared claim mountpoint rather than trusting inventory.
Per-host host_vars would have frozen today's hardware into inventory, where it goes stale on
the first re-image and the stale value's failure mode is mkfs on the WRONG partition.
Eleven fail-closed asserts before any write: real block device, not backing / /boot /usr
/var /home /tmp or active swap (built from the node's OWN gathered facts, never a hardcoded
list), already ext4, no foreign label, >= 100 GiB, and empty. Relabel, never reformat.
/srv verified empty first on every node (ls -A -> lost+found only; du 20K; the "5.1% used"
was ext4's default 5% root reserve).
=== 3. k3s DATA-DIR MOVED — /var was 11.8 GiB and would have killed etcd ===
Measured on the fully-deployed dev cluster: containerd 21-25 GB/node, /var total 58-70 GB.
Prod's /var is 11.8 GiB and held BOTH etcd and the image store, so prod would have filled
/var during its first image pulls — and a full /var means etcd cannot write its WAL. Cluster
death, not degradation, arriving during bring-up. Invisible when the disk decision was made,
because "etcd on root" sounded like the 30 GiB / rather than a separate 12 GiB /var.
Now: p5 -> /data (LABEL=k3s-data), with /data/longhorn and /data/k3s. Neutral names chosen
deliberately — the partition now has two tenants, and reusing /srv would make "claimed" and
"unclaimed" indistinguishable to the idempotency pivot, while a bare `data` label would make
a stranger's `data` volume look already-claimed and weaken an assert.
The transition off the existing LABEL=longhorn mount is DECLARED, not inferred
(node_baseline_data_retired_fs_label/_retired_mount, defaults ""), because changing the label
makes a claimed node answer "no" to the pivot and walk into the greenfield path. Self-retiring
once blkid -L k3s-data succeeds. THREE independent gates keep live dev out: retired vars
default ""; gated on longhorn_source == claim-mountpoint (dev is `device`); and the emptiness
assert fails closed on dev's 18 volumes even if both were defeated.
k3s_data_dir is one variable read by two roles (k3s_server --data-dir; node_baseline derives
the etcd mount). Role default is k3s's own default, so dev is unchanged and keeps its
dedicated etcd device. node_baseline_etcd_source becomes `shared-data-partition` and is
LOAD-BEARING: the role asserts per run that the filesystem backing the etcd dir really IS the
data partition — had the mount silently failed, etcd plus 21-25 GB of images would land back
on the OS filesystem invisibly until the disk filled.
LONGHORN_DATA_PATH is a new cluster-vars knob (R-ENV-02): base and DEV /var/lib/longhorn,
prod /data/longhorn.
DEV PROVEN UNCHANGED, which is the property that mattered — the live cluster has 18 Longhorn
volumes on that path. All 12 substituting Flux paths rendered through
`kubectl kustomize | flux envsubst --strict` for both trees: 12/12 per-file SHA-256 identical
and an identical aggregate SHA over every rendered dev byte. With a POSITIVE CONTROL showing
the same harness detects prod changing on exactly one line — an all-identical result is
worthless if the harness cannot see change. Live check after: dev's default-data-path setting
still /var/lib/longhorn, 18 volumes attached, 0 Kustomizations unready.
Idempotent: run 2 is changed=0 on all three nodes. Also fixed a real tag bug — include_tasks
does NOT propagate its own tags to included tasks (unlike import_tasks), so `--tags disks`
selected the include and ran nothing inside it while reporting success.
OPEN DEFECTS, tracked not forgotten: node 2's warm-reboot hang (one clean reboot since, NOT a
fix); and node 3 runs dhcpcd for its wifi interface, which rewrites /etc/resolv.conf on lease
renewal — the role's `contended` detection checks resolvconf and NetworkManager only, so node
3's decided resolvers will silently revert.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. L0 substitution check 106 assertions.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03, R-STATE-01, R-STATE-02, R-PLAT-01. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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c1f24e4a6d |
fix(dns): resilient node resolvers — mechanism-detecting, per-environment (R-DNS-01/03)
Re-authors the fix stranded on origin/fix/node-dns-resilient-upstream (
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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e623d27e2d |
feat(ansible): parameterise target groups so prod reuses the roles unchanged (R-ENV-02)
roles/k3s_server, roles/cilium and every node-host playbook hardcoded the dev group
names k3s_primary/k3s_secondary/k3s_servers, so the prod inventory groups could not be
selected at all. That broke the R-ENV-02 promise that prod reuses the SAME roles, and
blocked PROD-PROVISIONING.md §6 outright.
TWO KNOBS, deliberately separate — Ansible templates a play's `hosts:` BEFORE any host
context exists, so group_vars is unreadable there, while roles run WITH host context:
* which hosts a play RUNS ON — k3s_hosts, k3s_primary_hosts/k3s_secondary_hosts
(k3s.yml's split), vpn_egress_gateway_hosts; each `| default(<dev group>)`, set by -e
only. Follows node-health.yml's established `<name>_hosts | default(dev)` pattern.
* which group a ROLE means by "my primary"/"my servers" — k3s_primary_group,
k3s_servers_group in group_vars/all.yml (dev), overridden in group_vars/k3s_prod.
Follows the k3s_api_host convention already in this repo. No per-run flag.
DEV IS UNCHANGED — the key evidence. --list-hosts/--list-tasks/--syntax-check captured
for all 9 playbooks at HEAD and after: sorted host lists IDENTICAL for all 9, same
primary/secondary split, same 6-play site.yml. (Raw --list-hosts PRINT ORDER varies run
to run; proven to be Ansible's own set ordering by running UNMODIFIED HEAD cilium.yml
four times -> 3,1,2 / 1,3,2 / 1,2,3 / 1,2,3. Hence sorted comparison.) --list-tasks
differs in exactly two files, only by added TAGS annotations and one new assert; no task
reordered, renamed or removed. Var resolution verified per environment with -c local:
dev -> k3s_primary/192.168.1.50/sans .50,.49,127.0.0.1,.51,.52; prod ->
k3s_prod_primary/192.168.2.10/vip .9/sans .10,.9,127.0.0.1,.11,.12.
BREAKS THE SMARTMONTOOLS CIRCULAR DEPENDENCY. node_baseline tasks are now tagged
packages/system/disks, so the package install can run alone:
ansible-playbook playbooks/node-baseline.yml -e k3s_hosts=k3s_prod --tags packages
Skipping is the guard — no disks-tagged task is selected, so the
BLOCKED-pending-disk-decision paths are never templated, let alone passed to mkfs.
Belt-and-braces, a new disks-tagged assert fires first in a FULL run and names §2
explicitly instead of failing obscurely at mkfs. `tags: never` was deliberately NOT used
(it would change the default run).
FOOTGUN FOUND AND FIXED: roles/cilium, cluster_verify and flux_bootstrap all hardcoded
.cache/dev.kubeconfig — the exact file infra/devcontainer/dev.sh exports as $KUBECONFIG.
Once prod became targetable, a prod cilium/verify run would have SILENTLY OVERWRITTEN it,
leaving the operator's kubectl quietly answering from PROD. Now cluster_kubeconfig_name
(dev.kubeconfig -> prod.kubeconfig). Dev path byte-identical.
KNOWN, DOCUMENTED, NOT FIXED HERE: flux-bootstrap.yml retargets but roles/flux_bootstrap
shells out to bootstrap/flux/bootstrap.sh with a hardcoded --path=clusters/dev — a
bootstrap/ subtree change, not a target-group change (§6, cross-referenced to §7).
vpn.egress.gateway.yml is parameterised but prod has no egress group yet and would need
its own vaulted PIA credentials. --check against prod is still impossible until the prod
vault exists — even the packages-only run needs it.
Nothing was run against the dev cluster: --list-hosts/--list-tasks/--syntax-check, plus
debug/assert with -c local, only.
Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-02, R-ENV-03. Task: T-7.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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666cc0d809 |
feat(ansible): prod node inventory + vaulted become; smartmontools into node_baseline
Prod inventory scaffolding for the three bare-metal nodes, and the become posture the operator ruled for production. BECOME: prod does NOT get dev's NOPASSWD sudo. Prod keeps a real sudo boundary and supplies the password to Ansible as an ansible-vault-encrypted `ansible_become_password` in inventory/group_vars/k3s_prod/vault.yml, mirroring the existing hypervisor and proxmox_hosts groups. The decrypting passphrase stays outside the repo (~/.config/home-k3s/ansible-vault-pass), so plays still run unattended with no plaintext secret in git. Committed here: README.md + vault.yml.example only — the operator creates the encrypted vault (`ansible-vault create`), as with every other vaulted group. PACKAGES BELONG IN THE ROLE (operator ruling): smartmontools is now declared in node_baseline_packages, not hand-installed on a node. Drive health tooling is a permanent part of a bare-metal node's baseline — dev nodes are VMs and never needed it. Same click-ops-never principle as the rest of the repo. ADDRESSING: nodes .10/.11/.12, reached DIRECTLY on the LAN (no pfSense NAT hop, unlike dev's 192.168.2.102:225x mapping), so ansible_host is the real node IP. kube-vip control-plane VIP is 192.168.2.9 — deliberately BELOW the nodes and OUTSIDE the Cilium LB pool (.20-.30) so kube-vip and LB-IPAM can never contend for an address. The ingress Gateway VIP (.20) and the LB pool are Flux/cluster-vars concerns and deliberately do not appear in Ansible. BLOCKED-BY-DESIGN: node_baseline_longhorn_device / node_baseline_etcd_device are present but set to an obviously invalid /dev/BLOCKED-... path pending the operator's disk-layout decision (node 1 is a single SATA SSD; the role's /dev/vdb,/dev/vdc defaults are virtio names that do not exist on bare metal). Leaving them unset would silently fall back to those equally-nonexistent defaults — a confusing failure that looks like a wiring bug. This fails just as hard and says exactly why. KNOWN FOLLOW-UP: roles/k3s_server and every node-host playbook hardcode the literal group names k3s_primary/k3s_secondary/k3s_servers, so the k3s_prod_* groups are not selected by them as-is. Harmless now (nothing can accidentally run against prod) but the "same roles, unchanged" reuse R-ENV-02 promises needs the target group parameterized before §6 of PROD-PROVISIONING.md can execute. Documented in hosts.ini and both READMEs. Serves: R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-SEC-01. Task: T-7.1. Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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ef0a735145 |
node_baseline: add cryptsetup (Longhorn 1.12 RequiredPackages) for Debian 13 re-provision
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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af5fc5b25f |
feat(tofu,ansible): SSD-backed etcd disk per k3s node (Phase 1: code + plan)
Interim bridge to stop Longhorn replica-rebuild I/O storms on the shared HDD
Storage pool from starving etcd WAL fsync (crash-looping k3s / flapping the
kube-vip VIP). Adds a small dedicated SSD disk per node for etcd only; Longhorn
stays on HDD. See docs/plans/ssd-etcd-isolation.md.
tofu (infra/tofu):
- New vars etcd_ssd_datastore (default "local-zfs" = rpool/data, Micron 5100
SATA SSD mirror w/ PLP) and etcd_disk_gib (default 16).
- New virtio2 disk block on the SSD datastore per VM: discard=on, cache=none
(honor guest fsync straight to the ZFS ZIL — safe on PLP SSD), iothread=false.
Kept last (ascending interface) so bpg does not reorder virtio0/virtio1.
- Revert the debian_cloud_image resource to the long type name
proxmox_virtual_environment_download_file to match the R2 state: bpg >= 0.111
dropped the cross-type moved{} linkage to the short proxmox_download_file, so
the stale moved block failed EVERY plan with "Resource type mismatch" (broken
on main too). Aligning code to state yields a clean plan with no image
re-download. Short-name migration is deferred to a deliberate `tofu state mv`.
ansible (node_baseline):
- Format /dev/vdc (label k3s-etcd) and mount it at
/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/db (defaults,noatime; no nofail so a missing etcd
disk fails loudly rather than silently landing etcd on the root HDD) before
k3s starts, so a rebuilt node comes up with etcd isolated on SSD. Data-safe:
filesystem module never reformats an existing fs.
Phase 1 only: non-disruptive. No tofu apply, no node/VM/etcd/Longhorn changes.
tofu plan verified: 0 to add, 3 to change, 0 to destroy — every VM an in-place
disk ADD (virtio2), dev-3 also an in-place memory 16384->24576; no VM replace.
Merge gate green (render==golden included).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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1004c8eae6 |
ansible(node_baseline): don't fail on qemu-guest-agent when no virtio channel (agent disabled in tofu); enable-only
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
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a2392a4a43 |
tofu(proxmox): API-only native cloud-init; move node baseline to Ansible node_baseline role
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |