2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jakman85andClaude Opus 5	a209a618fd	fix(pm-agent): the agent is IN the cluster — one git host, the cluster-local service name ... An in-cluster consumer reaches a service by its *.svc.cluster.local name, which is by design a different path from how a client outside the cluster reaches the same service. pm-worker's host allowlist accepted TWO values: the cluster-local name and the external hostname gitea.home.keithjackson.dev. The second is removed. It was never needed — nothing sets it — it would route in-cluster traffic out through the Gateway and back for no reason, and as an ACCEPTED value it widened the allowlist to a host reachable over the namespace's world:443 egress rule, which is precisely the injection shape the allowlist exists to refuse. probe-validation.sh now pins that: 20 refusals, including the external hostname, the cluster-local name over https, and the cluster-local name on the wrong port. Also corrects a remark in the handoff entry: I cited cluster-vars' GATEWAY_VIP (192.168.1.53) as suspicious next to the nodes' 192.168.2.x. That was noise — those base cluster-vars values are dev-era leftovers for a decommissioned cluster and say nothing about prod. None of the measured facts depended on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-10-05 23:40:55 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5	8b5e950baa	test(pm-agent): a committed negative-path probe for the worker's input guards ... pm-worker's command is pinned by admission with no args, so everything a caller could influence arrives in the environment — and the guards at the top of that script are what stand between an injected variable and a clone from the wrong host or a push to the wrong ref. Nothing exercised them, which makes them a claim rather than a control. probe-validation.sh asserts 17 refusals, each on BOTH a non-zero exit and the specific message, so a guard that stopped firing cannot pass by failing somewhere else. It covers a redirected git host, a real and reachable WRONG one (the egress policy permits tcp/443, so that case is not hypothetical), the right host with a smuggled path, 'main' and five other bad branch shapes, a malformed owner/repo, a bad mode, a bad issue number, and each missing credential. build-image.sh runs it inside the built image too. Writing it found three things: - the PM_BRANCH != main guard is unreachable while the pattern check above it holds, so the comment claiming it as the defence was wrong about which line does the work. Kept as an assertion independent of the regex; the comment now says so. - the EXIT trap ended in a failing test, which under set -e can replace the script's real exit code with that failure. - a provenance LOG LINE read a file through a redirect that set -o pipefail would have turned into a dead worker if the file were absent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-10-05 22:34:46 -05:00