fe45d0f5c510dd443e8191eee5b0da42f679157f
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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fe45d0f5c5 |
feat(conformance): cover R-TLS-02, R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03 — 42/51 -> 45/51, and find a real gap
DECISIONS-LOG records Phase 7 being opened knowingly while the uncovered set included R-ENV-01/02/03 — the very requirements prod provisioning serves. Two of those three are now covered, plus R-TLS-02. tls-lifecycle-automated R-TLS-02 L0 (in the merge gate) cert-lifecycle-automated R-TLS-02 L2 (authored, NOT executed) dev-nodes-provisioned-as-code R-ENV-01 L0 prod-baremetal-not-dev-surface R-ENV-03 L0 Coverage 42/51 (82.4%) -> 45/51 (88.2%), 6 gaps, 0 safety-critical. Remaining: R-C2-01, R-C2-02, R-NET-04, R-PLAT-01, R-SEC-03, R-STATE-04. Verified through the real runner: --layer l0 7/7 PASS, the three new ones 3/3 PASS, --strict-coverage exit 0 with 0 label/annotation mismatches. *** R-TLS-02 "REVOKED" IS NOT SATISFIED — A REAL GAP, NOT A TEST DEFECT. *** The spec requires certificates be "issued, renewed, AND REVOKED without manual steps", and docs/08 reads revocation as "removing/rotating a certificate is a declarative change". That needs enableCertificateOwnerRef: true; platform/cert-manager/helmrelease.yaml does not set it (chart default false). Verified read-only on BOTH live clusters: gateway/wildcard-home-tls has ZERO ownerReferences, so deleting the Certificate would leave the private key serving indefinitely. The L2 test asserts the requirement AS WRITTEN and will fail until this is decided. It was deliberately NOT softened — weakening a test to match the implementation is how a suite stops meaning anything. NOT FLIPPED UNATTENDED, and the reason is specific rather than caution: the wildcard Certificate lives under ./platform, which runs prune: true. With owner refs ON, any transient prune of that Certificate — exactly what happened to the CDI StorageProfiles hours ago — would delete the SERVING TLS Secret for every host, and reissuance is bounded by Let's Encrypt's duplicate-certificate limit (5/week per identical name set), which could leave a cluster with no trusted cert for a week. Security gap vs a plausible week-long TLS outage is an operator call. NON-VACUITY DEMONSTRATED, which is the part that makes these worth having: 7/7 perturbations fail for R-TLS-02, 8/8 for R-ENV-01, 13/13 for R-ENV-03, and each restored copy passes. Perturbations were applied to a throwaway copy; neither this repo nor the read-only spec repo was modified. TWO CHECKS INITIALLY PASSED WHEN PERTURBED and were rewritten — the exact degrade-to-no-op failure this repo keeps hitting. The first draft asked "is this file's DIRECTORY referenced by a kustomization", which a directory reference always satisfies, and keyed Secrets by name alone, so external-dns's copy of `cloudflare-api-token` satisfied cert-manager's reference. Now a recursive kustomize resource-graph walk from each Flux path, and Secrets keyed by (namespace, name). Both bite. SECURITY NOTE, recorded because this project has already leaked a password once: `ansible-inventory --list` PRINTS DECRYPTED VAULT VALUES — it emitted the prod become-password to stdout during exploration, since the vault passphrase file is mounted into the dev container. Both new checks use only --syntax-check and --list-hosts, and say so in a comment. Confirmed no plaintext value reached disk: vault.yml is still AES256-encrypted and the tree has no assigned value. WHAT IS NOT PROVEN, per requirement: R-TLS-02 "revoked" (above), and issuance + observed renewal await the unexecuted L2. R-ENV-01 cannot prove the running VMs came from this module (needs OpenTofu state) — it proves the four lifecycle stages exist as code and cover every dev node, and that the chain RESOLVES under real ansible-playbook. R-ENV-03 cannot prove the HARDWARE (the K8s API exposes no "am I virtual" fact; mini-PC/bare-metal is operator-attested) — it proves prod is AUTHORED as 3 directly-reached nodes with no IaC creating them, sharing dev's playbooks and roles, with no prod-only manifest, branch or role anywhere. VERIFIED BY ME: coverage delta and the 3/3 L0 pass through the real runner; the zero-ownerReferences finding on both clusters; that the new checks avoid ansible-inventory; that no credential material reached disk. Full CI gate PASS. Refs R-TLS-02, R-ENV-01, R-ENV-03, R-TEST-01..05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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8a2be824f6 |
feat(ci): substitution-safety gate + escape 6 comment hazards; strict mode is now SAFE
Adds conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution/ — an offline, stdlib-only
L0 check tagged R-ENV-02 + R-GITOPS-01 (deliberately NOT R-TEST-01, which would
overclaim). It reuses lib/status.py's `resources:` walk rather than forking it, so "what a
path renders" has exactly one definition. It asserts: every ${...} on a substituted path
is defined-or-escaped (comments included); no default-operator form on an undefined name;
no unparseable expansion; the rendering path actually substitutes cluster-vars; every
overlay-patched /data/KEY has a base default; and that the gate itself is load-bearing.
WIRED AS AN UNCONDITIONAL STAGE (3c) in ci/l0.sh, and that matters: stage 3b scopes to
touched requirements, and ci/touched-requirements.sh maps only clusters/* to R-ENV-02 —
so an edit to a substituted manifest under apps/ or platform/ would have filtered this
check out of exactly the change that introduces the bug. l0 fail -> BLOCK=1 in gate.sh.
Mutation-tested all five assertion classes (undefined token, indexed expansion, :- form,
missing substituteFrom, un-wired gate); each fails as intended, baseline green.
STRICT MODE IS PROVEN SAFE TO ENABLE — measured, not inspected. For all 11 substituted
paths, `kubectl kustomize --load-restrictor LoadRestrictionsNone <path> | flux envsubst
--strict` exits 0 against cluster-vars base defaults. Negative control confirms the
incident: with K3S_API_HOST unset, non-strict renders k8sServiceHost empty while strict
exits 1 with `variable not set (strict mode)`. The feature gate itself is NOT flipped
here — that is a live-cluster change and the operator's call.
Escapes the six comment hazards that stood in the way (apps/vms/unifi x4,
platform/longhorn x2). All were prose ABOUT the escaping convention; since the repo's own
contract is that $${...} emits a literal ${...}, escaping them is both precise and
self-consistent. kustomize strips these particular comments today, but comment survival is
an implementation detail — a body comment carrying $ WAS observed surviving into built
apps/wave-1 — and a survivor would kill the whole Kustomization.
DOCTRINE CORRECTED (measured against flux 2.4.0): clusters/base/apps-vms.yaml claimed an
indexed expansion is fatal "escaped or not". Escaping is TOTAL — $${ARR[0]} emits the
literal text safely; only the UNESCAPED indexed form is fatal. Corrected in place.
Also empties DOCUMENTED_GAPS in conformance/run.sh with rationale: R-ENV-02 and
R-GITOPS-01 now have a real verifying test, which run.sh's own comment named as the
trigger for removing them.
Advisory output (not failures): 6 dead cluster-vars knobs — BASE_DOMAIN, CLUSTER_ENV,
CLUSTER_POD_CIDR, PIA_REGION, PLATFORM_NODE_SELECTOR_{KEY,VALUE}. The last four are
documented reference-only; BASE_DOMAIN and CLUSTER_ENV look like genuine rot (hostnames
are hardcoded elsewhere) and are worth a follow-up.
Gate: MERGE GATE: PASS. 102 assertions, 0 hazards.
Serves: R-ENV-02, R-GITOPS-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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jakman85andClaude Opus 5
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6e77150ae1 |
fix(ci): kill the false-green base resolution; cover R-SEC-01/02 + R-TEST-06 (L0)
Unblocks the enforced Gitea gate, which correctly BLOCKED this branch on ['R-SEC-01','R-SEC-02','R-TEST-06'] being touched but uncovered. Tests were authored; the coverage rule was NOT narrowed. === THE FALSE GREEN (root cause) === `make -C ci gate` locally reported PASS having checked NOTHING. resolve_base() validated nothing, and EVERY way of failing to find a base degraded silently to an empty touched set + exit 0: an `HEAD~1` last resort, a two-dot diff fallback masking a failing three-dot diff, and no check that HEAD is even AHEAD of the base. Run while sitting on `main` (main == origin/main), `origin/main...HEAD` is empty -> "no changed files vs base" -> the empty set means run.sh is invoked with NO --requirements -> coverage.py's --require gate never runs at all. Green by vacuum. Now: candidates are BASE_REF > GITHUB_BASE_REF > origin/main > main, each verified to resolve. HEAD~1 and the two-dot fallback are gone. Unresolvable base / no merge base / failed diff / HEAD-not-ahead -> loud banner, EMPTY stdout, exit 3, and a machine-readable reason (on-base | no-base | diff-failed). gate.sh turns exit 3 into an UNDECIDED decision: `on-base` -> "NOT APPLICABLE — no branch under gate" (exit 0 so push-to-main runs don't break, but it never reads as PASS); `no-base`/`diff-failed` -> BLOCKED. It also now prints the diff base it used. A stale local main warns (widens, never falsely greens). Also fixed `make -C ci test`, which was SWALLOWING failing suites. Regression: ci/tests/touched-requirements-base.test.sh — 31 assertions over 8 throwaway-repo scenarios including the exact false-green case, an already-merged branch, no base ref, a single-commit repo, bogus BASE_REF, a shallow GITHUB_BASE_REF, and origin/main-preferred-over-stale-main. === NEW L0 STATIC LAYER (conformance/tests/l0-static/) === Where docs/14 actually puts these invariants. Each check.sh really executes offline via `run.sh --layer l0` and is wired into ci/l0.sh, so it runs on every PR. No scaffolds. R-SEC-01 no-plaintext-secrets (165 assertions / 445 tracked files): .sops.yaml holds only PUBLIC age recipients; every committed Secret is SOPS-wrapped with a mac and ENC[...] values; ansible vault.yml files are $ANSIBLE_VAULT; no secret-valued ansible key carries a literal outside a vault; no PEM key / age secret key / kubeconfig client-key-data is tracked; Flux declares sops decryption; the disallow-plaintext-secrets policy Enforces and has a proving `result: fail` row. Exemptions are SELF-POLICING, not path allowlists — a .example must be referenced by no kustomization and hold only placeholders, and the Kyverno fixture is exempt ONLY while a test asserts the policy rejects it. Proven against 7 injected violations, including deleting the negative row and weakening Enforce->Audit. R-SEC-02 least-privilege-rbac (41 assertions): no wildcard apiGroup/resource/verb and no escalate|bind|impersonate in any in-repo Role/ClusterRole; no ServiceAccount bound to cluster-admin or a wildcard role; the conformance runner's own test identity is scoped and holds no rights over RBAC objects; the default-deny/host-namespace/egress-class policies Enforce and each carry a negative row. Proven against 6 injected violations. R-TEST-06 spec-immutability-enforced (16 assertions): drives the REAL ci/spec-immutability.sh against HERMETIC throwaway spec repos and asserts its exit code in every state — clean-at-pin 0, edits under docs/ or decisions/ 1, untracked addition 1, unadopted drift 1, explicit pin bump 0, ABSENT spec repo 3 (honest skip, never green), unpinned SPEC_PIN 1 — plus that gate.sh sets BLOCK=1 on its failure, so the mechanism is load-bearing. The real spec repo is never written to. Each check documents what it does NOT cover (runtime decryption, git history, runtime least-privilege, branch protection) rather than overclaiming. status.py now reads check.sh too, so a placeholder L0 body still outranks an `executable: true` annotation. Coverage 37/51 -> 40/51 (11 gaps); executable tests 32 -> 35; scaffold-only stays 5 — no sixth scaffold was added. Serves: R-SEC-01, R-SEC-02, R-TEST-01..06. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |