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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 761e25cc3f docs(runbooks): two more uncited "4-minute" claims the first pass missed
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gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
A systematic grep for the TTL assertion found it still in runbooks/README.md and in
runbooks/kustomization.yaml, outside the page being rewritten. Same correction: the
countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority, not a number in our tree.

README.md also now records that the server is CLAIMED and points at claim-ship.sh with
the measured ~2m45s loop, rather than describing a push-based sequence that no longer
exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 01:57:47 -05:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 8e017fad91 docs(runbooks): the PR flow, not git push origin main -- that instruction is now blocked
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gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
gate / conformance (push) Has been skipped
main became a protected branch on 2026-09-29, so the direct push that 37 of 39 runbooks
instructed is REJECTED. The wording was merely stale before; it is now actively wrong,
and it is the line an operator reads mid-incident.

Every occurrence now describes the real path: push a branch, open a PR, merge once the
gate is green -- that merge is the deploy. 35 files shared one identical block;
flux-reconcile.md, README.md and plex-claim.md each said it their own way and were
corrected individually.

plex-claim.md is rewritten around the delivery loop and records that THE SERVER IS NOW
CLAIMED (PlexOnlineToken present in /config), so PLEX_CLAIM is a permanent no-op and the
page only applies after a /config wipe.

Adds infra/plex/claim-ship.sh, which drives branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate ->
merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verdict with a stopwatch. Three steps are easy to lose
under time pressure and two are SILENT when skipped: --with-source (without it the
Kustomization applies the previously-fetched revision), the mandatory rollout restart
(only the ciphertext changes, so the pod template is byte-identical and nothing restarts
itself), and the feat/ branch prefix (act_runner capacity is 1, and a prefix inside
gate.yml's push trigger fires a redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run).

Drops the "~4-minute TTL" the page asserted in four places. It was uncited, and upstream
pms-docker documents no expiry at all. The countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority.
Measured loop: ~2m45s.

DECISIONS-LOG carries the PM handoff: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false,
the stale-.runner root cause, the four-deep Flux dependency cascade, and the correction
that a skipped Gitea job reports success rather than hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 01:42:35 -05:00
gitea-admin 27d0ef3324 Merge pull request 'chore(plex): fresh plex.tv claim token' (#4) from feat/plex-claim-token-013124 into main
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gate / conformance (push) Has been skipped
2026-09-29 06:33:04 +00:00
jakman85 bbd4f682a6 chore(plex): fresh plex.tv claim token
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gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
Injected inside the plex.tv claim window per runbooks/plex-claim.md.
2026-09-29 01:31:24 -05:00
jakman85 0391139240 Merge pull request 'feat(plex): wire PLEX_CLAIM from a SOPS Secret (placeholder value)' (#1) from feat/plex-claim-sops-secret into main
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Reviewed-on: #1
2026-09-29 06:18:14 +00:00
jakman85 e9f441b5ce Merge pull request 'docs(gitea): a skipped job reports SUCCESS, not pending' (#3) from fix/conformance-context-is-fail-open into main
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Reviewed-on: #3
2026-09-29 06:12:30 +00:00
jakman85andClaude Opus 5 4fd75ccdaa feat(plex): wire PLEX_CLAIM from a SOPS Secret so the server can be claimed
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m58s
gate / conformance (pull_request) Has been skipped
Plex cannot create libraries over the already-mounted 8.33T NFS bulk share while
the server is UNCLAIMED. catalog/plex.yaml carried a long argument for leaving
PLEX_CLAIM unwired; the operator has decided to override it. This implements the
wiring in the way that respects the half of that argument which is still true.

WHAT WAS TRUE AND STILL IS: a https://plex.tv/claim token has a ~4-minute TTL,
far shorter than commit -> push -> Flux reconcile -> pod-roll on its own timers.
So the committed value is a documented PLACEHOLDER and the live token is injected
by the operator inside that window, with the reconcile FORCED rather than waited
for. runbooks/plex-claim.md is that timed procedure.

WHAT WAS NOT TRUE: the old comment claimed "a placeholder/absent claim Secret
would crashloop the pod". Half of that is wrong, and the difference is the whole
design. Established from plexinc/pms-docker's own first-run script (branch
`master`, root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, s6-overlay v2), cross-checked
byte-identical against the same file inside the running :latest image:

  * the claim exchange (line 106) is gated on PLEX_CLAIM being non-empty AND the
    PlexOnlineToken pref in /config being empty. Once the server is claimed the
    block is skipped entirely, so the env is a NO-OP on every later start
    whatever it holds ("If server is already logged in, this parameter is
    ignored" -- upstream README).
  * with an invalid/expired token on a still-unclaimed /config, plex.tv answers
    403 with an empty body; curl's status is never checked, the token sed yields
    empty, the success branch at line 120 does not fire, there is no else branch
    and no non-zero exit, and the script (no `set -e`) exits 0. The pod comes up
    UNCLAIMED AND SERVING. It does not crashloop.
  * the image never sets S6_BEHAVIOUR_IF_STAGE2_FAILS (default 0 = continue even
    if a cont-init script failed), so even a non-zero exit would not halt
    startup.

An ABSENT Secret is the real hard failure (secretKeyRef has no `optional`, so it
is CreateContainerConfigError), which is why the Secret is committed, encrypted
and listed in the wave kustomization rather than hand-created at claim time.

NO SCHEMA CHANGE. `optional` on secretKeyRef would only be needed if the pod had
to tolerate a missing Secret or could not start without a VALID token. Neither
holds: the Secret always exists in the Flux graph, and an invalid token is
non-fatal. schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json is untouched, and so are
catalog/render.py's env emission and the renderer contract.

Changes:
  * apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml -- new Opaque Secret plex-claim/plex,
    key PLEX_CLAIM, SOPS-encrypted to the committed age recipient. Its header
    carries NO dollar-brace expressions on purpose: kustomize preserves body
    comments into the stream envsubst reads (per
    conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-substitution), so quoting the
    upstream shell conditions verbatim would have been a live substitution
    hazard on apps-wave-0, not prose.
  * catalog/plex.yaml -- the PLEX_CLAIM env via valueFrom.secretKeyRef, the
    "deliberately NOT set" block rewritten around the TTL + one-shot design, and
    the stale crashloop claim in the /config storage comment corrected.
  * apps/wave-0/plex.yaml -- re-rendered with the canonical command
    (`--all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation`). No L1 golden
    under conformance/tests/l1-rendering covers plex, so this is the only
    rendered surface that moves.
  * catalog/render.py -- plan_apps_waves places `<svc>-claim-secret.sops.yaml`
    in the app's OWN wave, like the bootstrap secret, plus a selftest assertion.
    Without this, the next `--emit-waves` would have silently dropped the Secret
    from apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml and put the pod into
    CreateContainerConfigError. apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml is the hand-pruned
    subset (vm-demo/keycloak are rendered but deliberately unlisted), so its one
    new line was applied without re-emitting the rest.
  * runbooks/plex-claim.md + its kustomization.yaml generator entry + README
    index -- the operator procedure that fits in 4 minutes, including the single
    forced-reconcile command and the mandatory pod roll (a changed Secret does
    NOT restart anything: PLEX_CLAIM is read only at container start and the pod
    template is byte-identical across this change).

Touched requirements: R-SEC-01 (secrets encrypted at rest), R-GITOPS-02
(ServiceDefinition onboarding contract).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-28 22:26:44 -05:00
45 changed files with 650 additions and 83 deletions

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+82
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@@ -4781,3 +4781,85 @@ accurate before the PR flow and are stale now. Correcting them is tracked, not d
3. Land `feat/plex-claim-sops-secret` (PR #1) once the gate can actually run. 3. Land `feat/plex-claim-sops-secret` (PR #1) once the gate can actually run.
4. Claim plex, after checking it is not already claimed. 4. Claim plex, after checking it is not already claimed.
5. Correct the 37 runbooks' `git push origin main` wording. 5. Correct the 37 runbooks' `git push origin main` wording.
## 2026-09-29 — Plex is claimed; the CI/CD gate that "enforced" it never existed. **PM HANDOFF.**
Began as "inject a plex.tv claim token". Ended by discovering the delivery pipeline was fiction,
rebuilding it, and shipping the token through it. Plex is **claimed** — `PlexOnlineToken` is
present in `/config` on the `plex-config` PVC, so the exchange is now a permanent no-op and the
library scan is running over the 8.33T NFS share.
### The finding: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false
That entry recorded "Gitea Actions CI is LIVE + enforcing … required status check; runner
`incluster-dind` online". Measured against the live API on 2026-09-29:
| Claimed | Measured |
|---|---|
| `main` protected, gate required | `branch_protections` → `[]`; `protected:false`, `enable_status_check:false`, `required_approvals:0`, `user_can_push:true` |
| Runner online | **zero** runners at repo, org AND site level |
**PR #1 was the first pull request this repository has ever had.** Its contexts sat `pending`
for 30.6 minutes across 122 polls and never reported. For a month, every "the gate enforces this"
statement rested on an assertion nobody had checked — the same fail-open class as 2026-09-18,
and the reason it hid so long is that the log itself was the evidence.
### Root cause of the dead runner
`act_runner` registers **once** and persists its identity in `/data/.runner` on the
`act-runner-data` PVC. Gitea no longer held a matching row, so the pod booted, saw `.runner`,
**skipped registration**, and polled with an identity Gitea did not recognise. Symptom: zero
runners, pod Running, nothing crashlooping, no error anyone reads. Deleting the PVC forced a
genuine re-registration (`.runner is missing` → `Runner registered successfully`).
It then did not come back for several minutes, because Flux could not recreate the PVC:
`apps-wave-1` was blocked four levels deep on a **stale** `DependencyNotReady` for
`platform-config`, which itself read `Ready=True`. Each wave re-evaluates only on its own
`interval: 10m`, so a resource deleted at the bottom of the chain can take ~40 min to return.
**Force it** with `flux reconcile kustomization apps-wave-1 --with-source` rather than waiting.
### Corrections to things this log and the runbooks asserted
- **A skipped Gitea job reports `success`, not pending.** Measured: `gate / conformance` returned
`success` / "Has been skipped". An earlier entry (#2) said requiring it would deadlock every PR.
Wrong — it would pass **vacuously**, forever, while nothing ran. Under HARD RULE 4 that is worse
than a deadlock, because a deadlock is loud. Never require it; require
`gate / gate (pull_request)` alone. Corrected in #3.
- **`gate.yml`'s push trigger omits `feat/**`** (it lists `feature/** fix/** docs/** chore/**`).
With `act_runner` capacity 1, a branch prefix that IS in that list fires a second redundant run
which serialises ahead of the PR run and doubles wall-clock. Exploited deliberately in
`infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`; the honest fix is to align the trigger list.
- **The "~4-minute TTL"** asserted in four places was **uncited**, and upstream `pms-docker`
documents no expiry at all. The authoritative reading is the countdown plex.tv/claim renders at
issue time. Removed from `runbooks/plex-claim.md`; the same claim still sits in
`catalog/plex.yaml` and the Secret's header comment (left alone — editing a `.sops.yaml`
comment risks the MAC, and touching `catalog/plex.yaml` re-renders a golden).
### Measured, once the pipeline actually worked
`gate / gate (pull_request)` 1m34s–1m58s. Full claim loop end to end **~2m45s** — comfortably
inside the window, which retires the theory that a short-lived token cannot survive a PR flow.
That theory was mine and it was wrong: the pipeline was never too slow, it simply did not exist.
### State now
- `main` **protected**, `user_can_push:false`. Runner `incluster-dind` online.
- `CLAUDE.md` is the agent delivery contract; `infra/gitea/` holds the protection + runner scripts.
- **All 37 runbooks** that instructed `git push origin main` now describe the PR flow — that
instruction had become actively blocked, not merely stale.
- `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh` drives the claim loop end to end.
### Next steps
1. **`enable_status_check: true`** with `gate / gate (pull_request)` as the only context. The
prerequisite is met: the gate has been observed green on real PRs.
2. Add `jakman85` as a repo **collaborator**, then `required_approvals: 1`. (Currently the only
org member is `gitea-admin`, which agents authenticate as — requiring approval before that is
fixed would leave nobody able to approve.)
3. Run the **push probe** against protection: `gitea-admin` is a site admin and Gitea may let it
bypass. `user_can_push:false` is the API's opinion, not proof.
4. Align `gate.yml`'s push trigger with this repo's `feat/**` prefix.
5. Convert the `dind` container to a **native sidecar** with a `startupProbe`, per the standing
FOLLOW-UP note in `apps/wave-1/gitea-actions.yaml`. It deletes both hand-rolled wait loops and
the envsubst hazard. Land it ALONE — it is the merge gate for the whole repo.
6. Create the Plex libraries over `/media/movies`, `/media/tv`, `/media/photos`.
+1
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@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ resources:
- pihole-dns.yaml - pihole-dns.yaml
- pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml - pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
- pihole.yaml - pihole.yaml
- plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
- plex.yaml - plex.yaml
- qbittorrent-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml - qbittorrent-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml
- qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml - qbittorrent-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
+69
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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# Plex plex.tv server-claim token (WS-APPS). SOPS-encrypted (age).
# Consumed by catalog/plex.yaml as env PLEX_CLAIM via valueFrom.secretKeyRef.
#
# NOTE ON THESE COMMENTS: they carry NO dollar-brace expressions, deliberately. This file is applied
# by the apps-wave-0 Flux Kustomization, which runs envsubst over the built output, and kustomize
# preserves body comments into that stream (see conformance/tests/l0-static/flux-postbuild-
# substitution). A braced token quoted from the upstream shell script would be a live hazard here,
# not prose, so the upstream conditions below are described in words.
#
# THE VALUE SHIPPED WITH THIS FILE IS A PLACEHOLDER, DELIBERATELY — the literal string
# `replace-me-with-a-fresh-plex-tv-claim-token`, not a credential. A https://plex.tv/claim token has
# a ~4-minute TTL, far shorter than commit -> push -> Flux reconcile -> pod-roll, so no token
# committed here is ever still valid when the pod starts. This file exists to make the Secret — and
# therefore the env reference — ALWAYS RESOLVABLE IN THE FLUX GRAPH, not to carry a working token.
# The real token is injected by the operator inside that 4-minute window: runbooks/plex-claim.md.
#
# WHY SHIPPING A PLACEHOLDER IS SAFE (verified against plexinc/pms-docker branch `master`, the
# s6-overlay v2 script root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, cross-checked byte-identical against
# the same file extracted from the running `plexinc/pms-docker:latest` image):
# - line 106 guards the claim exchange on TWO conditions: PLEX_CLAIM non-empty AND the
# PlexOnlineToken pref read out of /config empty. Once the server is claimed that block is
# skipped entirely, so whatever this Secret holds is a NO-OP on every later start. Upstream
# README: "If server is already logged in, this parameter is ignored."
# - on a still-UNCLAIMED /config, an invalid or expired token makes plex.tv answer 403 with an
# empty body. curl's exit status is never checked, the sed for the authentication-token element
# yields the empty string, and the success branch at line 120 simply does not fire. There is no
# else branch and no non-zero exit; the script has no `set -e` and ends by touching
# /.firstRunComplete and echoing, so it exits 0. The server comes up UNCLAIMED and serving.
# It does NOT crashloop.
# - the image never sets S6_BEHAVIOUR_IF_STAGE2_FAILS, whose default is 0 ("continue silently even
# if a cont-init script failed"), so even a hypothetical non-zero exit would not halt startup.
# A MISSING Secret would NOT be safe: the ServiceDefinition schema's valueFrom.secretKeyRef shape
# has no `optional` field, so an absent Secret is a hard CreateContainerConfigError. That is exactly
# why this file is committed and listed in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml instead of being created
# by hand at claim time.
#
# INJECTION / ROTATION (operator, not agents) — runbooks/plex-claim.md has the timed procedure:
# infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
# Never decrypt this file into a shell, a log, or a shared terminal.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: plex-claim
namespace: plex
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: plex
type: Opaque
stringData:
PLEX_CLAIM: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:nLmzeUBWRhRjUakrGiGzQpQuqZNcIYvRH6M=,iv:z0on/dArsNejNLrp3V1nSiNLFzKcREhPuMO1634CwQw=,tag:Ih23CT1JYna/5lfYQUb1Dw==,type:str]
sops:
kms: []
gcp_kms: []
azure_kv: []
hc_vault: []
age:
- recipient: age175l8mdpdfu7hq0aml3exs3gykarwjmuvr23sq56s3wjejnyk44wsp4mfzg
enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSA2dWtqOVNQalZ2QlRxOXJa
cDc1MTdtWENkdWIxS1JId3dIU1JDSmk0ODNrCk1YUzhFWXR3bUxyV2NNcmFOakdz
THl1Q284dFJxTy9Rd1h0eXJJaVZtdmcKLS0tIERuN0ZFeW9zdi9aNFRYNWxmUS9s
QUtYdHEvN042ajNoNktOLzlYQmQrc1kK4NHozMbXVzNGYbUBRbK6a9Uw/sVPAfe6
RW5KWzZ4I/hloqjN3zzVISoSMieMkBGDnF5qZS5N6FqIc6/HrsDD8A==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
lastmodified: "2026-09-29T06:31:16Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:62BmBAq45CD2g6LDyx+Ho4bTfrhJcaro/RB/iM+OaRc4a/D83MhjbcBL11Uz/O726inqhkvCKDJ/fFemoc50JDbtC79cYMaxrGJNjFM0sdckWrowPvh6ie7HHHUBRBaefl+gNfnc+pbvcncvRzwA4RyzcZse1wbxKfHN8FjEopE=,iv:h0cMShs3tIgnY6eruUYymYrcLFzQZLk/uXQJ/Jsd5ek=,tag:nZ9Pau7p4xWT1QCN1vv2vA==,type:str]
pgp: []
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
version: 3.9.4
+5
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@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ spec:
value: Etc/UTC value: Etc/UTC
- name: ALLOWED_NETWORKS - name: ALLOWED_NETWORKS
value: 10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16 value: 10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16
- name: PLEX_CLAIM
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: plex-claim
key: PLEX_CLAIM
volumeMounts: volumeMounts:
- name: config - name: config
mountPath: /config mountPath: /config
+40 -9
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@@ -32,11 +32,40 @@ env:
# (10.43.0.0/16); 192.168.0.0/16 covers the home LAN. # (10.43.0.0/16); 192.168.0.0/16 covers the home LAN.
- name: ALLOWED_NETWORKS - name: ALLOWED_NETWORKS
value: 10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16 value: 10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16
# PLEX_CLAIM is deliberately NOT set here: a https://plex.tv/claim token has a ~4-min TTL, far # PLEX_CLAIM — the ONE-SHOT plex.tv server claim, sourced from the SOPS Secret `plex-claim`
# shorter than the commit -> push -> Flux reconcile -> pod-roll cycle, so any token committed to git # (apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml, same wave => applied in the same reconcile as this
# is already expired by the time the pod starts. Claiming is a one-time LIVE step (UI sign-in, or a # workload). Plex cannot create libraries over the mounted bulk share while the server is
# single API POST) against the running server; the claim then persists on the /config PVC and # UNCLAIMED, so this is wired; it was previously left out on the reasoning below, and only one
# survives pod rolls (including the roll this env change causes), so it never belongs in git. # half of that reasoning survived contact with the upstream source.
#
# THE 4-MINUTE TTL IS STILL TRUE, and it is now the OPERATIONAL constraint rather than a reason to
# abstain. A https://plex.tv/claim token expires in ~4 minutes — far shorter than commit -> push ->
# Flux reconcile -> pod-roll if that cycle is left to its own timers. So the committed value is a
# documented PLACEHOLDER and the live token is injected by the operator inside that window, with an
# explicit `flux reconcile` to collapse the wait: runbooks/plex-claim.md is the timed procedure.
#
# ONE-SHOT, AND SAFE TO SIT HERE EXPIRED. Verified from plexinc/pms-docker's own first-run script
# (branch `master`, root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run, confirmed byte-identical to the file in
# the running `:latest` image), NOT assumed:
# - the exchange (line 106) is guarded on TWO conditions: PLEX_CLAIM non-empty AND the
# PlexOnlineToken pref in /config empty. Once claimed, the block is SKIPPED — this env is a
# no-op on every subsequent start, whatever it holds. (Upstream README: "If server is already
# logged in, this parameter is ignored.") The claim itself persists on the /config PVC as before.
# - an invalid/expired token on a still-unclaimed /config gets a 403 with an empty body; curl's
# status is unchecked, the token `sed` yields "", the success branch at line 120 does not fire,
# there is no `else` and no `exit 1`, and the script (no `set -e`) exits 0. It comes up UNCLAIMED and
# SERVING — it does NOT crashloop. The image also leaves S6_BEHAVIOUR_IF_STAGE2_FAILS at its
# default 0, which continues startup even when a cont-init script fails.
# So the earlier "a placeholder claim Secret would crashloop the pod" note was WRONG about the
# placeholder; it was right only about an ABSENT Secret. secretKeyRef here has no `optional` field,
# so the Secret must always exist in the Flux graph — which is why it is committed, encrypted, and
# listed in apps/wave-0/kustomization.yaml rather than hand-created at claim time. No schema change
# is needed: `optional` would only matter if a missing Secret had to be tolerated, and it doesn't.
- name: PLEX_CLAIM
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: plex-claim
key: PLEX_CLAIM
# ADVERTISE_IP ("Custom server access URLs") is DEFERRED, not accidentally omitted. It tells Plex # ADVERTISE_IP ("Custom server access URLs") is DEFERRED, not accidentally omitted. It tells Plex
# which URL to advertise to plex.tv for REMOTE clients. The only candidate is # which URL to advertise to plex.tv for REMOTE clients. The only candidate is
# https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev, but that host resolves via split-horizon DNS to the INTERNAL # https://plex.home.keithjackson.dev, but that host resolves via split-horizon DNS to the INTERNAL
@@ -56,10 +85,12 @@ storage:
# container's EPHEMERAL layer -> unclaimed + all state lost on restart. The image inits as # container's EPHEMERAL layer -> unclaimed + all state lost on restart. The image inits as
# root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns /config to the plex user, then drops -> no fsGroup needed # root (s6-svscan PID 1), chowns /config to the plex user, then drops -> no fsGroup needed
# (verified in-cluster: PID1=root, "Plex Media Server"=plex). Persisting /config here also # (verified in-cluster: PID1=root, "Plex Media Server"=plex). Persisting /config here also
# makes the claim survive restarts once claimed. To auto-claim on first boot instead of the # makes the claim survive restarts once claimed — which is what makes the PLEX_CLAIM env
# UI sign-in, the operator adds a PLEX_CLAIM env from a fresh https://plex.tv/claim token # above a ONE-SHOT: the token is exchanged for a PlexOnlineToken written here, and the
# (4-min TTL) — deliberately NOT wired here: the env secretKeyRef pattern has no `optional`, # exchange is then skipped on every later start. (The older note here claimed a
# so a placeholder/absent claim Secret would crashloop the pod. See operator hand-off. # placeholder claim Secret "would crashloop the pod"; upstream's first-run script says
# otherwise — see the PLEX_CLAIM comment in `env` above. An ABSENT Secret is the hard
# failure, and that is why one is committed.)
# THE LIBRARY (docs/04 bulk tier). One READ-ONLY mount of the export ROOT, giving /media/movies, # THE LIBRARY (docs/04 bulk tier). One READ-ONLY mount of the export ROOT, giving /media/movies,
# /media/tv and /media/photos — the whole tree the layout actually has (`ls /mnt/Storage/plex`: # /media/tv and /media/photos — the whole tree the layout actually has (`ls /mnt/Storage/plex`:
# downloads/ movies/ photos/ tv/). # downloads/ movies/ photos/ tv/).
+15 -1
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@@ -1844,6 +1844,10 @@ def plan_apps_waves(sds: list, present_files: set) -> dict:
convention: convention:
- `<svc>.yaml` -> wave(svc) - `<svc>.yaml` -> wave(svc)
- `<svc>-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc) (consumed by svc's env, same apply) - `<svc>-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc) (consumed by svc's env, same apply)
- `<svc>-claim-secret.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc) (a one-shot upstream-service claim token
consumed by svc's env — plex's plex.tv claim. Same wave as the app for the same reason the
bootstrap secret is: an env `secretKeyRef` has no `optional`, so the Secret must be applied
in the SAME reconcile as the workload or the pod is CreateContainerConfigError.)
- `<svc>-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc) (forward-auth sidecar OIDC creds) - `<svc>-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc) (forward-auth sidecar OIDC creds)
- `<svc>-db.yaml` -> wave(svc-db) (a strictly-lower wave; CNPG DB) - `<svc>-db.yaml` -> wave(svc-db) (a strictly-lower wave; CNPG DB)
- `<svc>-db-app.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc-db) (CNPG initdb owner secret) - `<svc>-db-app.sops.yaml` -> wave(svc-db) (CNPG initdb owner secret)
@@ -1870,6 +1874,11 @@ def plan_apps_waves(sds: list, present_files: set) -> dict:
w = waves[name] w = waves[name]
add(w, f"{name}.yaml") add(w, f"{name}.yaml")
add(w, f"{name}-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml") add(w, f"{name}-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml")
# A one-shot claim token for an UPSTREAM service (plex's plex.tv claim). Same wave as the
# app: it is read by the app's env at pod start, and an env secretKeyRef has no `optional`,
# so a Secret applied in a later wave would leave the pod in CreateContainerConfigError.
# Placed only when the file exists, so services without one are unaffected.
add(w, f"{name}-claim-secret.sops.yaml")
# forward-auth (Option B): the per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar's OIDC client + cookie secret. # forward-auth (Option B): the per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar's OIDC client + cookie secret.
# Same wave as the app (the sidecar reads it at pod start); placed only when the file exists, # Same wave as the app (the sidecar reads it at pod start); placed only when the file exists,
# so non-forward-auth apps are unaffected. Mirrors the bootstrap-secret naming convention. # so non-forward-auth apps are unaffected. Mirrors the bootstrap-secret naming convention.
@@ -2548,7 +2557,8 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
# 7a) plan_apps_waves: sidecars inherit their unit's wave; not-onboarded SDs are skipped; # 7a) plan_apps_waves: sidecars inherit their unit's wave; not-onboarded SDs are skipped;
# EXTRA_UNITS anchor strictly above; a file absent from the tree is never placed. # EXTRA_UNITS anchor strictly above; a file absent from the tree is never placed.
present = { present = {
"a.yaml", "svc.yaml", "svc-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml", "a.yaml", "a-claim-secret.sops.yaml",
"svc.yaml", "svc-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml",
"svc-db.yaml", "svc-db-app.sops.yaml", "svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml", "svc-db.yaml", "svc-db-app.sops.yaml", "svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml",
"svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml", "svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml",
"gitea.yaml", "gitea.yaml",
@@ -2559,6 +2569,10 @@ def _selftest() -> int:
plan = plan_apps_waves(plan_sds, present) plan = plan_apps_waves(plan_sds, present)
flat = {f: wv for wv, fs in plan.items() for f in fs} flat = {f: wv for wv, fs in plan.items() for f in fs}
check(flat.get("a.yaml") == 0, "leaf app must land in wave 0") check(flat.get("a.yaml") == 0, "leaf app must land in wave 0")
check(flat.get("a-claim-secret.sops.yaml") == 0,
"a `<svc>-claim-secret.sops.yaml` (plex's plex.tv claim) must be placed in the SAME wave "
"as its app — an env secretKeyRef has no `optional`, so a later wave means "
"CreateContainerConfigError")
check(flat.get("svc-db.yaml") == 0 and flat.get("svc-db-app.sops.yaml") == 0 check(flat.get("svc-db.yaml") == 0 and flat.get("svc-db-app.sops.yaml") == 0
and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml") == 0 and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials.sops.yaml") == 0
and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml") == 0, and flat.get("svc-db-backup-credentials-prod.sops.yaml") == 0,
+93
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@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# plex-claim-ship.sh — run this IMMEDIATELY AFTER editing the SOPS secret with a fresh
# plex.tv claim token. It drives the whole CI/CD loop end to end and prints a running
# stopwatch so you can see the budget being spent.
#
# branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate -> merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verify
#
# It never sees, prints, or handles the token: the file is already encrypted by sops.
set -euo pipefail
HOST=gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
OWNER=Home-Network
REPO=home-network-k3s-impl
SECRET=apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
T0=$(date +%s)
el() { printf '\n[T+%02d:%02d] %s\n' $(( ($(date +%s)-T0)/60 )) $(( ($(date +%s)-T0)%60 )) "$1"; }
cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
# --- preflight: refuse to ship a file that is not what we think it is -------------
git diff --quiet -- "$SECRET" && { echo "ERROR: $SECRET is unchanged. Edit it first:"; \
echo " infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops $SECRET"; exit 1; }
grep -q 'PLEX_CLAIM: ENC\[' "$SECRET" || { echo "ERROR: $SECRET is not encrypted. REFUSING."; exit 1; }
[ -z "$(git status --porcelain | grep -v " $SECRET\$")" ] || echo "NOTE: other files are dirty; only $SECRET will be committed."
creds="$(printf 'protocol=https\nhost=%s\n\n' "$HOST" | git credential fill)"
U="$(sed -n 's/^username=//p' <<<"$creds")"; P="$(sed -n 's/^password=//p' <<<"$creds")"
api() { curl -sS --config <(printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$U" "$P") "$@"; }
# feat/ prefix ON PURPOSE. act_runner capacity is 1, and gate.yml's PUSH trigger covers
# feature/** fix/** docs/** chore/** but NOT feat/** — so a chore/ branch would fire a
# second, redundant run that SERIALISES ahead of the PR run and doubles the wall clock.
BRANCH="feat/plex-claim-token-$(date +%H%M%S)"
el "committing on $BRANCH"
git checkout -q -b "$BRANCH"
git add "$SECRET"
git commit -q -m 'chore(plex): fresh plex.tv claim token
Injected inside the plex.tv claim window per runbooks/plex-claim.md.'
SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
el "pushing"
git push -q -u origin "$BRANCH"
el "opening PR"
PR=$(jq -n --arg h "$BRANCH" --arg b main --arg t 'chore(plex): fresh plex.tv claim token' \
'{head:$h,base:$b,title:$t,body:"Token injection inside the claim window. Wiring already reviewed in #1."}' \
| api -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data @- \
"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls" | jq -r '.number')
[ -n "$PR" ] && [ "$PR" != "null" ] || { echo "PR creation failed"; exit 1; }
echo " PR #$PR"
el "waiting for the gate (expect ~1m40s)"
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
st=$(api "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/commits/${SHA}/status" | jq -r '.state')
printf '\r gate=%s [T+%ss] ' "$st" "$(( $(date +%s)-T0 ))"
case "$st" in success) echo; break;; failure|error) echo; echo "GATE FAILED — stopping."; exit 1;; esac
sleep 5
done
[ "$st" = "success" ] || { echo; echo "gate did not finish in time"; exit 1; }
el "merging PR #$PR"
api -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"Do":"merge"}' \
"https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR}/merge" >/dev/null
git checkout -q main && git pull -q --ff-only origin main
el "forcing the Flux reconcile (--with-source, or it applies the OLD revision)"
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'flux --context k3s-prod -n flux-system reconcile kustomization apps-wave-0 --with-source'
# MANDATORY here. Only the Secret ciphertext changed, so the Deployment pod template is
# byte-identical and NOTHING restarts on its own. PLEX_CLAIM is read once, at container
# start. Skipping this is failure mode #2 in runbooks/plex-claim.md.
el "rolling the pod (mandatory — a changed Secret restarts nothing)"
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex rollout restart deployment/plex && \
kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex rollout status deployment/plex --timeout=120s'
el "verdict"
./infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex logs deploy/plex --since=3m | grep -i -e claim -e token || true'
cat <<'NOTE'
"Attempting to obtain server token..." + "Token obtained successfully" -> CLAIMED
"Attempting..." with no success line -> token expired; retry, nothing is broken
neither line -> already claimed, or env did not reach the container
Confirm it persisted (prints the attribute NAME only, never its value):
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- sh -c \
"grep -o PlexOnlineToken= \"/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml\" | head -1"'
NOTE
+10 -2
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Every alert rule in this platform carries an annotation of the form
runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>" runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"
46 of them, over the 35 names below. Until this directory existed, that path returned **HTTP 404** on the 46 of them, over 35 names. Until this directory existed, that path returned **HTTP 404** on the
live cluster: every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment they needed live cluster: every alert that reached a human handed them a dead link at the exact moment they needed
help. These pages are what makes the link resolve. help. These pages are what makes the link resolve.
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ negative is how a CLI quirk becomes real data loss. Write `backups.velero.io`,
`backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `settings.longhorn.io`, `backups.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io`, `settings.longhorn.io`,
`volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
`git push origin main` **is** the deploy; there is no other apply step. Durable changes go through git. Merging a PR into `main` **is** the deploy; there is no other apply step. `main` is protected, so a
direct push is rejected — durable changes go through a branch, a PR, and a green gate.
## Alerts you should not trust the silence of (measured 2026-09-13) ## Alerts you should not trust the silence of (measured 2026-09-13)
@@ -108,6 +109,13 @@ Each affected runbook says so on its own page and gives the by-hand equivalent.
- **`keycloak-client-secrets`** — the client/URL reconciler failing or silent. The 2026-09-06 lockout that - **`keycloak-client-secrets`** — the client/URL reconciler failing or silent. The 2026-09-06 lockout that
every green signal missed. every green signal missed.
### Operator procedures (no alert links here)
- **`plex-claim`** — claiming the Plex Media Server. **Claimed 2026-09-29**; the page now only
applies after a `/config` wipe. The claim token is short-lived — read the countdown on
plex.tv/claim — so it is a timed sequence, scripted as `infra/plex/claim-ship.sh`:
token → `sops` → PR → gate → merge → **forced** `flux reconcile` → pod roll (~2m45s measured).
Includes why a changed Secret does not restart anything, and why an expired token is harmless.
### Virtualisation ### Virtualisation
- **`kubevirt-control-plane`** — VM lifecycle operations will fail; running VMs keep running. - **`kubevirt-control-plane`** — VM lifecycle operations will fail; running VMs keep running.
- **`kubevirt-launch-failed`** — a VMI reached the Failed phase. The three k3s-specific launch traps. - **`kubevirt-launch-failed`** — a VMI reached the Failed phase. The three k3s-specific launch traps.
+4 -2
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@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -78,8 +78,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -63,8 +63,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -87,8 +87,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+5 -3
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
## What this means here ## What this means here
Something in the GitOps chain is stuck at Ready=False. On this cluster that is more consequential than Something in the GitOps chain is stuck at Ready=False. On this cluster that is more consequential than
it sounds, because **`git push origin main` IS the deploy** — there is no other apply step. A stuck it sounds, because **merging a PR into `main` IS the deploy** — there is no other apply step. A stuck
Kustomization means git and the cluster have diverged and nothing will close the gap. Kustomization means git and the cluster have diverged and nothing will close the gap.
The chain has **14 tiers**: `flux-system` → `cilium` → `platform` → `platform-config` → The chain has **14 tiers**: `flux-system` → `cilium` → `platform` → `platform-config` →
@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -87,8 +87,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+5
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ configMapGenerator:
- node-io=node-io.md - node-io=node-io.md
- node-memory=node-memory.md - node-memory=node-memory.md
- node-memory-swap=node-memory-swap.md - node-memory-swap=node-memory-swap.md
# Operator procedure, not an alert page (no alert links to it — the
# alert-runbooks-resolvable check treats that as advisory). It is served
# because the plex.tv claim window is short and is not a thing to go looking
# for in git: /runbooks/plex-claim has to resolve the moment it is needed.
- plex-claim=plex-claim.md
- pvc-capacity=pvc-capacity.md - pvc-capacity=pvc-capacity.md
- targets-down=targets-down.md - targets-down=targets-down.md
- update-rollback=update-rollback.md - update-rollback=update-rollback.md
+4 -2
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@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -74,8 +74,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -75,8 +75,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -56,8 +56,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -56,8 +56,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -227,8 +227,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+189
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@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
# plex-claim — claiming the Plex Media Server inside the token window
**Alert:** none. This is an **operator procedure**, not an incident page — it is indexed here because
it is the page you need at the moment you need it, with a stopwatch running.
**Files:** `catalog/plex.yaml` (env `PLEX_CLAIM`), `apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml`
(the SOPS Secret `plex-claim`, key `PLEX_CLAIM`), `apps/wave-0/plex.yaml` (the rendered golden).
## What this means here
Plex will not let you **create libraries** over the mounted bulk media share while the server is
**unclaimed** — the 8.33 T NFS tree at `/media` is there, readable, and unusable. Claiming binds the
server to a plex.tv account. It is a **one-shot** operation: the token is exchanged once for a durable
`PlexOnlineToken` written into `Preferences.xml` on the `plex-config` Longhorn PVC, and from then on
the `PLEX_CLAIM` env is **ignored on every start** (upstream gate:
`[ ! -z "${PLEX_CLAIM}" ] && [ -z "${token}" ]` in `root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run`).
**A `https://plex.tv/claim` token is short-lived — minutes, not hours.** Read the countdown the
claim page shows you; do not budget against a number written here. That is shorter than PR → gate →
merge → Flux's 10-minute reconcile interval → pod roll if you let those run on their own timers,
which is why this page exists: the loop is scripted and the reconcile is **forced** rather than
waited for. Measured end to end on 2026-09-29: **~2m45s**.
**An expired or wrong token does not break anything.** Verified against the image's own first-run
script (and the copy inside `plexinc/pms-docker:latest`): a failed exchange gets a 403 with an empty
body, `curl`'s status is never checked, the token `sed` yields empty, the `if` does not fire, there is
no `else` and no `exit 1`, and the script (no `set -e`) exits 0. The pod comes up **unclaimed and
serving**. So a burnt token costs you one more attempt, not an outage — and the repo deliberately
ships a **placeholder** in that Secret for exactly this reason (the env `secretKeyRef` has no
`optional`, so the Secret must always exist even when its value is useless).
## Running the commands in this runbook
`kubectl` does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's `k3s-oidc` context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires — that
hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass `--context k3s-prod` explicitly. `dev.sh` merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once (k3s-dev until dev
was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, k3s-prod now). Do not run two `dev.sh` invocations at once.
Mutating `kubectl` and `flux reconcile` are blocked for agents here. **This whole page is operator
work** — the reconcile and the pod roll below are deliberate operator actions, and the durable change
is still a git change.
## First commands
**Before spending a token, find out whether the server is already claimed.** This prints only the
attribute NAME, never its value — do not widen it to print the token:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex exec deploy/plex -- sh -c \
"grep -o PlexOnlineToken= \"/config/Library/Application Support/Plex Media Server/Preferences.xml\" | head -1"'
```
`PlexOnlineToken=` printed ⇒ **already claimed**; stop, there is nothing to do and no token to burn.
Empty output ⇒ unclaimed, continue.
Is the workload healthy enough to claim at all, and is the wave reconciling?
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get deploy,pod,pvc'
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system get kustomization apps-wave-0'
```
## The procedure
> **STATUS: this server was CLAIMED on 2026-09-29** and `PlexOnlineToken` is present in
> `/config` on the `plex-config` PVC. The upstream exchange is gated on that pref being
> *absent*, so `PLEX_CLAIM` is now a **no-op on every start** whatever it holds. You only need
> this page again after a `/config` wipe or a rebuild onto an empty PVC.
**On the clock.** The token is short-lived — **read the countdown that plex.tv/claim shows you**
rather than trusting a number written here. (Earlier revisions of this page asserted a "~4-minute
TTL" in four places with no citation; upstream `pms-docker` documents no expiry at all. The page
is the only authority, and it is on screen at T+0.)
**A burnt token costs nothing.** An expired token gets a 403 with an empty body, `curl`'s status is
never checked, the `if` does not fire, there is no `else` and no `exit 1`, and the script (no
`set -e`) exits 0. The pod comes up unclaimed and serving. So retry freely.
### One command
1. **T+0 — get the token.** Sign in to plex.tv as the account that should OWN this server, open
<https://plex.tv/claim>, copy the `claim-…` string.
2. **Put it in the Secret** — in place, encrypted, never touching a plaintext file:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run sops apps/wave-0/plex-claim-secret.sops.yaml
```
3. **Ship it.** This drives the whole delivery loop and prints a running stopwatch:
```
./infra/plex/claim-ship.sh
```
branch → commit → push → PR → gate → merge → `flux reconcile --with-source` → `rollout restart`
→ verdict. It refuses to run if the file is unchanged or not encrypted.
**Measured end to end, 2026-09-29: ~2m45s.** Gate ~1m40s, merge + reconcile ~25s, pod roll and
container start ~30s.
### Why it is a script and not six pasted commands
`main` is a **protected branch** — the direct push this page used to instruct is now rejected — so
the deploy is a PR merged after a green gate. Three of those steps are easy to get wrong under time
pressure, and two are silent when skipped:
- **`--with-source` is load-bearing.** Without it the Kustomization applies the previously-fetched
revision, not your commit.
- **The pod roll is mandatory.** Only the Secret's ciphertext changes, so the Deployment's pod
template is byte-identical and *nothing restarts on its own*. `PLEX_CLAIM` is read once, at
container start. Skip this and the new Secret sits in the cluster while the running pod keeps the
old value forever.
- **The branch is named `feat/…` on purpose.** `act_runner` capacity is 1, and `gate.yml`'s push
trigger covers `feature/** fix/** docs/** chore/**` but *not* `feat/**`. A `chore/` branch fires a
second redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run and roughly doubles the wall clock.
### Reading the verdict
* `Attempting to obtain server token from claim token` **and** `Token obtained successfully`
⇒ **claimed.** Re-run the First-commands `PlexOnlineToken=` check to confirm it persisted, then
create the libraries over `/media/movies`, `/media/tv`, `/media/photos`.
* `Attempting…` with **no** success line ⇒ the token was expired or invalid. Nothing is broken; go
back to step 1 with a new one.
* **Neither line** ⇒ the exchange was skipped: `/config` already had a `PlexOnlineToken` (already
claimed — the expected case now), or the env did not reach the container. Check by NAME only:
```
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n plex get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=plex \
-o jsonpath="{.items[0].spec.containers[0].env[*].name}"'
```
## Likely causes, most likely first
When the claim does not take, in order of how often it is the answer here:
1. **The token expired** — you exceeded the countdown, usually by reviewing the PR instead of
merging it the moment the gate went green. Symptom: the "Attempting…" line with no success line.
Remedy: a new token, and let `claim-ship.sh` drive the loop rather than pasting steps.
2. **The pod was never restarted** (step 5 skipped). Symptom: no claim log lines at all from a pod
whose `AGE` predates your push. The Secret is correct in git and in the cluster and the running
container still holds the placeholder.
3. **Flux had not applied the commit yet** when you rolled the pod — step 5 run before step 4
finished, so the new pod read the OLD Secret. Check
`kubectl --context k3s-prod -n flux-system get kustomization apps-wave-0 -o jsonpath='{.status.lastAppliedRevision}'`
against your commit, then roll again.
4. **Already claimed** — the exchange is gated on `PlexOnlineToken` being absent from `/config`, so a
server claimed earlier ignores every later token silently. This is the benign case.
5. **`plex.tv` unreachable.** The upstream `curl` has no `--max-time`/`--connect-timeout`, so a stalled
connection can leave the container sitting in cont-init with **nothing listening on 32400** — the
one genuine hang risk in this path. Symptom: pod Running but never Ready, log stops after
"Attempting…". Check egress (`plex` is `egress: internet`) rather than re-rolling repeatedly.
6. **Wrong plex.tv account.** The claim succeeds and binds the server to whoever was signed in at
step 1. Unclaiming is a plex.tv-side operation on that account — see "escalate or stop".
## When to escalate or stop
- **Stop after two failed token attempts** and fix the timing, not the token. The third rushed attempt
is how people start editing live Secrets by hand, which leaves the cluster holding a value that is
in no git commit — precisely the drift `qbittorrent-bootstrap` had to be recovered from.
- **Never `kubectl edit`/`patch` the `plex-claim` Secret in the cluster, and never
`kubectl create secret` it.** Everything durable goes through the SOPS file; a live-only Secret is
reverted (or adopted with the wrong value) on the next reconcile.
- **Never `sops -d` this file into a terminal, a log, or a shared screen**, and never widen the
`PlexOnlineToken=` check into one that prints the value. The token is a plex.tv account credential.
- **If the server got claimed to the wrong account, stop and get the operator.** Reversing it means
removing the server from that account on plex.tv and clearing `PlexOnlineToken` from
`Preferences.xml` on the PVC — a destructive edit of app state on the replicated tier, not a git
change.
- **Do not delete the `plex-config` PVC to "start clean".** It holds the library database, metadata
and watch state (`policy: daily-offcluster`), and it is expensive to rebuild. The claim is a
two-line pref, not a reason to lose the DB.
- After a successful claim, **leave the expired token in the SOPS file**. It is inert (the exchange is
skipped once claimed) and the Secret must keep existing, because the env `secretKeyRef` has no
`optional` — deleting it would put the pod into `CreateContainerConfigError`.
---
Source of truth: `runbooks/plex-claim.md`. Index: `/runbooks/`
Upstream behaviour cited here is from `plexinc/pms-docker` branch `master`,
`root/etc/cont-init.d/40-plex-first-run` (s6-overlay v2), cross-checked against the same file inside
the running `plexinc/pms-docker:latest` image.
+4 -2
View File
@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
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@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -54,8 +54,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands
+4 -2
View File
@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@ a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09
`settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`. `settings.longhorn.io`, `volumes.longhorn.io`, `nodes.longhorn.io`.
Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for Mutating kubectl (`apply`, `patch`, `annotate`, `rollout`) and `flux reconcile` are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git (`git push origin main` **is** the deploy). agents here: every durable change goes through git. **`main` is a protected branch — a direct push
Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator, and it says so. is rejected.** A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
## First commands ## First commands