DECISIONS-LOG.md

@@ -5044,3 +5044,68 @@ fail-opens in the gate itself were found the same way — `kyverno test` certify
 not load, and `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE` certifying 54 skipped tests as passed.
 
 **Measure, then assert. `CLAUDE.md` §2b is the rule; this entry is the evidence for it.**
+
+## 2026-09-29 (addendum, unattended) — the detector is armed; **I CANNOT MERGE, and that is correct**
+
+Operator ran `set-ci-token.sh`, uncommented `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` locally on `main`, and left
+instructions to continue unattended and merge on green CI. Two things came out of that.
+
+### 1. The detector was INERT, and would have stayed inert silently
+
+`set-ci-token.sh` PUT the secret as `GITEA_SETTINGS_TOKEN`. **Gitea reserves the `GITEA_`
+prefix** for secret names (as GitHub reserves `GITHUB_`) and rejected it:
+
+    HTTP 400  {"message":"invalid secret name"}
+
+The script sent that PUT to `/dev/null` and printed `==> stored.` unconditionally; `curl -sS`
+exits 0 on an HTTP error. **A token existed; no secret did.** So `ci/gitea-settings.sh` would
+have skipped on every run forever — and enabling `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` on top of that would
+have BLOCKED EVERY PR, including the one fixing it. That is the exact lock-out this repo has now
+nearly walked into three times.
+
+Fixed in **PR #15**: the secret is `SETTINGS_API_TOKEN`, and `set-ci-token.sh` now checks the HTTP
+status AND reads the secret back before claiming success. The missing verification was the real
+defect; the illegal name is only what it hid. The secret is stored and verified present, and
+**PR #15's CI is GREEN with `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS=true`** — which is the only proof that
+matters, because a skip would have made it red.
+
+The operator's local edit could not be pushed to `main` (protected). It is carried in PR #15.
+
+### 2. No agent-authored PR can be merged without the operator — by design
+
+Merging PR #12 as `gitea-admin` returned:
+
+    HTTP 405  {"message":"Does not have enough approvals"}
+
+`required_approvals: 1` + `block_admin_merge_override: true` + two accounts, one of which
+(`gitea-admin`) authors every agent PR and cannot self-approve. **So "merge on green CI" is not
+something an agent can execute here.** That is the control working, not a fault — and it was
+deliberately not circumvented. Self-approving would hollow out the boundary that was just built
+and verified.
+
+**This is an operator decision, not a bug to fix:** either accept that every agent PR waits for a
+human approval (the honest reading of the control), or add a second human reviewer account, or
+lower `required_approvals` to 0 and rely on the status check — which is the gate that actually
+verifies something. Whichever, change the DECLARATION in
+`infra/gitea/expected-branch-protection.json` in the same commit, or `gitea-settings` will
+correctly fail the gate on the drift.
+
+### Open PRs, all gated green, none mergeable by an agent
+
+| PR | What |
+|---|---|
+| #12 | `CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true` would have faked a green over 54 skipped tests — now blocks |
+| #13 | Conformance-trigger admission boundary (R-SEC-02) + `kyverno test` fail-open fix |
+| #14 | This handoff |
+| #15 | Secret-name fix + `REQUIRE_GITEA_SETTINGS` enabled — **CI green with REQUIRE active** |
+
+Suggested order: #15 first (it arms the detector and its CI already proved it), then #12, #13,
+#14. If a later one conflicts, rebase; the gate re-runs in ~1m36s.
+
+### Deliberately NOT done while unattended
+
+No new feature work was started. Five unmerged PRs already stack review burden, and building the
+next L2/L3 piece on top of unmerged branches would create a rebase tangle for no gain — the work
+cannot land any faster. The next piece is specified and ready to start once these are merged:
+`docs/plans/l2-l3-conformance-ci-wiring.md` §3, with §4's credential model now decided and its
+boundary landed in #13.