# ServiceDefinition: jackett
# Source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md row 4; docs/03-networking-isolation-and-egress.md;
# docs/15-identity-and-access.md; decisions/adr-0015 (VPN egress steering).
# internal indexer proxy | egress VPN + kill-switch | config on Longhorn | auth forward-auth
# (bare web UI, no native OIDC).
#
# VPN-class (docs/13 row 4; docs/03 "VPN-class set"): Jackett scrapes public torrent indexers/trackers;
# that egress MUST leave via the node PIA tunnel, never the WAN. `egress: vpn` renders the
# homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class=vpn pod label the shared CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy
# (platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml) selects on to steer + kill-switch the traffic OUTSIDE the
# workload (R-NET-05/06/07). No independent egress path; fail-closed if tun0 is down.
#
# Inbound reachability (← sonarr, ← radarr) is an EAST-WEST allow rendered on the arr side when those
# services are onboarded. This service initiates nothing east-west, so dependencies is empty (reaches
# only DNS + VPN internet). Validates against schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json.
name: jackett
kind: container
source:
  image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:v0.24.2865-ls7
exposure: internal              # LAN-only web UI at jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 4; R-DNS/R-NET)
egress: vpn                     # indexer scraping via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
storage:
  - name: config
    size: 2Gi
    class: longhorn             # indexer definitions/API keys on 3-replica Longhorn (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
    mountPath: /config          # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
                                # LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
                                # /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
                                # holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
                                # configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
                                # every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
                                # 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
                                # dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
                                # This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
                                # The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
                                # so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
dependencies: []                # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
ingressRoutes:
  - host: jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
    port: 9117                  # Jackett WebUI; protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09, docs/15)
auth:
  mode: forward-auth            # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
  groups:
    - media-users               # authenticated AND in an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
    # platform-admins is a SUPERSET, not a widening. --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
    # listing both means "media consumers OR platform operators". Without it the media UIs are
    # reachable by NOBODY the moment media-users is empty: on prod the realm's only user is the
    # operator, who is in platform-admins only, so jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr answered an
    # immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback (no login prompt, because the Keycloak SSO session
    # already existed) while pihole/crafty — which already gate on platform-admins — worked.
    # This grants no real privilege: platform-admins already maps to cluster-admin via
    # k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins), so a member can already exec into these pods.
    - platform-admins           # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
  # Answer Jackett's OWN API with 401 instead of a 302 to Keycloak (schema 1.9.0; renders
  # --api-route, singular and repeatable, onto the oauth2-proxy sidecar).
  #
  # MEASURED on this pod's access log, 2026-09-30: on /api/ paths, 33 x 302 against 2 x 401 —
  # and 4 of 6 POSTs were answered BY THE PROXY and never reached Jackett (access-log upstream
  # field `-`, not `/`), including both `/api/v2.0/server/update` calls. Jackett's jQuery does
  # not send the exact `Accept: application/json` oauth2-proxy's AJAX guard requires, so the
  # 302 was followed invisibly, satisfied silently by the live Keycloak SSO session, and
  # resolved 200 carrying the dashboard's HTML where the JavaScript expected JSON. A browser
  # following a 302 also re-issues a POST as a GET and DROPS THE BODY, which is why "adding an
  # indexer silently does nothing" was the user-visible symptom and nothing logged a failure.
  #
  # SCOPE: `/api/` only. Jackett serves its UI at /UI/ and its static assets elsewhere, and a
  # browser never NAVIGATES to /api/ — so a plain page load is still 302'd into a silent SSO
  # sign-in, which is the behaviour that must not change.
  apiRoutes:
    - ^/api/
update:
  channel: stable               # R-UPD-01
  range: ">=0.22.0"             # floor only, no ceiling (0.24.x runs as of 2026-10-30; Jackett has no
                                # major line to hold back from, so renovate.json5 mirrors no cap)
  cadence: "0 4 * * *"
  autoRollbackOnFailedHealth: true   # R-UPD-03
observability:
  metrics: true
  slis:
    - up                        # indexer proxy down -> alert (docs/10; R-OBS-01)
backup:
  policy: daily-offcluster      # indexer config/API keys backed up off-cluster (docs/04; R-STATE-03)