---
# North-south ingress for the runbooks at https://<apex>/runbooks/ — the exact prefix the alert
# annotations already point at (`runbook_url: "https://${BASE_DOMAIN}/runbooks/<name>"`, 42 of them
# across platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, platform/monitoring/pvc-capacity-alerts.yaml,
# platform/cnpg/alerts.yaml and platform/kubevirt/alerts.yaml). Nothing about those annotations
# changes; this route is what finally makes them resolve.
#
# NO `hostnames:` — DELIBERATE, and the reason this manifest needs no Flux variable substitution.
# An HTTPRoute with no hostnames inherits the hostname of every listener it attaches to, and this
# route attaches to exactly one: `https-apex`, whose hostname is `${BASE_DOMAIN}`
# (platform/gateway/gateway.yaml). So the route is correct on dev and on prod with no
# `postBuild.substituteFrom` anywhere in this tier — which matters a great deal here, because the
# SAME Flux Kustomization renders the runbook markdown into a ConfigMap. With substitution enabled,
# Flux's envsubst would run over the runbook prose and silently EMPTY every `${...}` in every shell
# example a runbook contains (it fails open — DECISIONS-LOG 2026-09-01, the Cilium k8sServiceHost
# incident). Declaring no hostname removes the last reason to substitute, so the docs ship verbatim.
# See clusters/base/runbooks.yaml.
#
# PATH PRECEDENCE AGAINST HOMEPAGE. platform/homepage/httproute.yaml already binds `https-apex` with
# PathPrefix `/`. Gateway API resolves a conflict between rules on the same hostname by preferring
# the LONGEST path match, so `/runbooks` wins over `/` for these requests and homepage keeps
# everything else. The two routes coexist by specification, not by luck — and the live 200s recorded
# in the commit prove it on this Gateway implementation (Cilium).
#
# ============================ AUTH: THIS ROUTE IS PUBLIC ==============================
# auth-mode=none, deliberately, and it is the one route in this repo where that is the SAFE choice.
#
# THE CIRCULARITY. Every other exposed UI here declares forward-auth (oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak).
# Put these pages behind that and `runbooks/keycloak-down` becomes unreadable precisely when
# Keycloak is down; `runbooks/keycloak-db` unreadable when its CNPG database is down;
# `runbooks/keycloak-client-secrets` unreadable during the exact failure mode that broke all 12
# OIDC clients on 2026-09-06 while every health signal stayed green. An on-call who cannot log in
# is the primary reader of this route. Gating documentation on the identity provider it documents
# is a loop with no exit.
#
# WHAT IS ACTUALLY EXPOSED. Operational procedure: metric names, thresholds, kubectl invocations,
# component topology. No credentials, no secrets, no tokens, no internal IPs beyond the LAN ranges
# already written in the public spec repo. The content is the same text any reader of the git repo
# can see. The real cost is reconnaissance value — it names what runs here and how it fails — and
# that is accepted knowingly, against the certainty of a locked-out operator staring at a login page
# during an outage. If that trade is ever revisited, the correct fix is NOT forward-auth on this
# route; it is to keep it public and move sensitive specifics out of the runbooks.
#
# HOW forward-auth IS ENFORCED HERE — and why this route is genuinely different. Enforcement is NOT
# a Gateway ext-authz attachment; it is PER-POD. Each forward-auth service runs an oauth2-proxy
# sidecar, its Service publishes BOTH the app port and 4180, and the service's HTTPRoute targets
# :4180 — verified on prod for all five that declare `auth: forward-auth` in the catalog (pihole,
# jackett, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr). Ingress traffic therefore always traverses oauth2-proxy,
# which performs the Keycloak exchange and the group check. The app port stays on the Service so
# in-cluster clients can talk service-to-service without SSO (that is how sonarr/radarr reach
# qBittorrent's API), which is deliberate, not a leak: Cilium default-deny decides who may use it.
#
# So this route is NOT "no more open than its neighbours" — its neighbours are closed and this one is
# open, on purpose, for the lockout reason argued above. It has no oauth2-proxy sidecar and targets
# its app port directly. If a Gateway-level ext-authz attachment is ever introduced, this route must
# be left OUT of it ON PURPOSE, and this comment is the record of that decision so nobody "fixes" it
# later and re-closes the loop. (Headlamp is also excluded from forward-auth, for a different and
# equally deliberate reason: it runs native Keycloak OIDC and forwards the logged-in user's id_token
# to the apiserver for per-user RBAC, with clusterRoleBinding.create=false so its ServiceAccount can
# do nothing on its own.)
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
  name: runbooks
  namespace: runbooks
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: runbooks
  annotations:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-mode: none
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-rationale: >-
      Public on purpose. An operator locked out of Keycloak is this route's primary reader;
      gating it behind Keycloak would make runbooks/keycloak-down unreadable exactly when it is
      needed. Content is operational procedure only — no secrets. Do NOT add this route to the
      Gateway ext-authz attachment when forward-auth enforcement lands.
spec:
  parentRefs:
    - name: shared
      namespace: gateway
      sectionName: https-apex     # the apex listener; the wildcard `https` listener won't match it
  rules:
    - matches:
        - path:
            type: PathPrefix
            value: /runbooks
      backendRefs:
        - name: runbooks
          port: 80