---
# pm-agent — the Program Manager agent service: it reads Gitea issues, decides what to do
# about each thread, and runs one worker agent per assignment that authors a change, gates
# it and opens a pull request. Full design: platform/pm-agent/README.md and
# docs/plans/pm-agent-issue-to-pr.md.
#
# NO UI, NO INGRESS. There is deliberately no `gateway-access: shared` label and no
# HTTPRoute: nothing connects INTO this namespace. The dispatcher polls Gitea rather than
# receiving webhooks, precisely so that a namespace whose whole purpose is running
# model-authored code needs no inbound path at all (the reasoning is in the header of
# infra/agent/pm-dispatch.py). The operator's interface is the Gitea issue thread and
# `kubectl logs`.
#
# INTENTIONALLY NOT homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace=true. This is PLATFORM plumbing —
# CI/delivery machinery, like `gitea-actions` and `conformance`, not a user-facing app. Every
# Kyverno app policy matches on that label (the generated default-deny baseline, the
# egress-class and auth-mode label requirements), so carrying it would demand an auth mode
# and an egress class for a workload that serves no traffic. The baseline those policies
# would have generated is therefore shipped EXPLICITLY here instead — see networkpolicy.yaml.
#
# PodSecurity `restricted` IS enforced, unlike in `gitea-actions` (which needs a privileged
# DinD sidecar and so cannot). Nothing here needs any privilege: both the dispatcher and
# every worker run as uid 65532 with no capabilities, no privilege escalation and a
# read-only root filesystem. Declaring it means the kubelet refuses a pod that drifts from
# that, in addition to the admission policy that constrains the worker Job's shape.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: pm-agent
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: pm-agent
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/ci: pm-agent
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: latest