---
# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all ingress and all egress, allow only DNS.
#
# `pm-agent` is a PLATFORM namespace, so Kyverno does NOT auto-generate this (its policies
# match homelab.keithjackson.dev/app-namespace=true — see namespace.yaml for why this
# namespace deliberately lacks that label). It is shipped explicitly here, the same shape as
# the Kyverno-generated app baseline and as headlamp/homepage/crafty.
#
# Cilium enforces the UNION of this NetworkPolicy and the CiliumNetworkPolicies below (allow
# if ANY policy allows), so those add the three egress paths on top of deny-all. Nothing adds
# an ingress path: see the comment at the ingress policy that is not here.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny
  namespace: pm-agent
  labels:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress: []
  egress:
    - to:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
      ports:
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
---
# EGRESS for the DISPATCHER. Three destinations, and the list is the whole answer to "what
# can this thing reach".
#
#   1. the in-cluster Gitea (:3000) — read issues and comments, post comments. By pod
#      identity, not by hostname: the dispatcher dials the ClusterIP directly, which is also
#      why the matching INGRESS allow has to exist on Gitea's side (catalog/gitea.yaml
#      inClusterClients) — under Gitea's own namespace default-deny the connection would
#      otherwise be dropped there, exactly as it was for Flux's source-controller in the
#      2026-09-13 incident recorded in that file.
#   2. the kube-apiserver — `kubectl create job` / `kubectl get jobs`. The `kube-apiserver`
#      entity is the right selector here: on k3s the API server listens on the node's host
#      network, so `toEndpoints` cannot express it and `host` would be far wider.
#   3. tcp/443 to the world — the Anthropic API.
#
# ON (3), HONESTLY: `toEntities: world` on 443 permits reaching ANY external host on 443,
# not just api.anthropic.com. Cilium can express the tighter rule (`toFQDNs`), but nothing in
# this repository uses FQDN policy today and it depends on Cilium's DNS proxy being enabled,
# which has not been measured here — putting an unverified mechanism in a security-relevant
# position is worse than a documented wide rule. So the narrowing of this rule is a tracked
# follow-up with a prerequisite: verify the DNS proxy, then replace the `world` entry with
# `toFQDNs: [{matchName: api.anthropic.com}]` and re-measure that the model still answers.
# Until then, what bounds the egress of model-authored code is the PAIR of this rule and
# pm-worker's own baked-in allowlist of git hosts, which refuses to clone from or push to
# anywhere but the two addresses of this Gitea.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: pm-agent-allow-egress
  namespace: pm-agent
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: pm-agent
spec:
  endpointSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: pm-agent
  egress:
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: gitea
            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - { port: "3000", protocol: TCP }
    - toEntities:
        - kube-apiserver
    - toEntities:
        - world
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - { port: "443", protocol: TCP }
---
# EGRESS for a WORKER. The same two outward paths as the dispatcher — git over :3000 and
# tcp/443 for the model — and pointedly NOT the kube-apiserver.
#
# A worker holds no ServiceAccount token (rbac.yaml, and the Job template sets
# automountServiceAccountToken: false), so an API call would fail on authentication anyway.
# Denying the network path as well is the second of the two: the worker runs model-authored
# code, and "it could reach the API server but had no credential" is a worse place to stand
# than "it could not reach the API server". `kubectl` is on its PATH — it is in the pinned
# toolbox the gate needs — and this is what makes it inert.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: pm-agent-worker-allow-egress
  namespace: pm-agent
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: pm-agent-worker
spec:
  endpointSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: pm-agent-worker
  egress:
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: gitea
            app.kubernetes.io/name: gitea
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - { port: "3000", protocol: TCP }
    - toEntities:
        - world
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - { port: "443", protocol: TCP }

# THERE IS NO INGRESS POLICY, AND THAT IS THE DESIGN.
#
# The default-deny baseline above denies all ingress and nothing adds an allow back. No
# Service, no HTTPRoute, no webhook receiver, no metrics port: nothing outside this namespace
# can open a connection to anything inside it. The one component that might have wanted
# inbound reach — a Gitea webhook receiver — was deliberately not built; the dispatcher polls
# instead (infra/agent/pm-dispatch.py explains why at length).
#
# Keeping this as a comment rather than an empty policy is intentional: a reader asking "how
# is this thing reached?" should find the answer where they look for it, and the answer is
# "it isn't". If a future change adds a listener, it adds its allow HERE, scoped to one
# client namespace and one port, and says why in this comment block.
#
# One consequence worth naming for whoever wires observability later: there is no
# ServiceMonitor and no metrics endpoint, so a scrape from the `monitoring` namespace would
# be dropped by this baseline — adding metrics means adding the port AND the additive
# ingress allow for it, which is the same lesson as the oauth2-proxy sidecar scrape
# (decisions/2026-10-04-oauth2-sidecar-metrics-scrape-netpol.md).