---
# Headlamp — the Kubernetes web dashboard, served at headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev with Keycloak
# native-OIDC login and PER-USER RBAC (ADR-0014, docs/15). Official kubernetes-sigs/headlamp Helm
# chart via a Flux HelmRelease (same pattern as platform/monitoring's kube-prometheus-stack).
#
# ── PER-USER RBAC (the whole point) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Headlamp is configured for OIDC, so its backend forwards the LOGGED-IN USER's OIDC id_token as the
# bearer to the k3s API server. The apiserver validates that token (oidc-issuer-url = this realm,
# oidc-client-id=kubernetes, oidc-username-claim=email, oidc-groups-claim=groups; see
# infra/ansible roles/k3s_server) and RBAC is applied per user via the EXISTING group bindings
# (platform/keycloak/k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml: oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view).
# So every user gets exactly their own rights — NOT a shared identity.
#
#   clusterRoleBinding.create=false  ← DELIBERATE. The default chart binds Headlamp's ServiceAccount
#   to cluster-admin; that would let the backend act as cluster-admin. We do NOT want that: user
#   requests ride the user's forwarded id_token, so the SA needs no cluster rights. Removing the
#   binding means an unauthenticated backend can do nothing — the secure posture for per-user RBAC.
#
# ── AUDIENCE NUANCE ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# The apiserver only accepts ID tokens whose `aud` CONTAINS `kubernetes` (oidc-client-id=kubernetes).
# A `headlamp` client would issue aud=[headlamp]. The Keycloak `headlamp` client therefore carries an
# AUDIENCE protocol mapper that ADDS `kubernetes` to the token audience (keycloak-realm-import.yaml),
# giving aud=[headlamp, kubernetes]: Headlamp's own verifier accepts it (aud contains headlamp) AND
# the apiserver accepts it (aud contains kubernetes). This keeps the apiserver config untouched.
apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2
kind: HelmRelease
metadata:
  name: headlamp
  namespace: headlamp
spec:
  interval: 30m
  chart:
    spec:
      chart: headlamp
      # 0.41.x, NOT 0.40.x. Chart 0.40.1 shipped the `-session-ttl=86400` container arg BEFORE the
      # backend flag existed: its image (appVersion v0.40.1) has no `session-ttl` flag, so the pod
      # crashlooped with `flag provided but not defined: -session-ttl` (upstream issue #4883). The
      # backend gained `f.Int("session-ttl", …)` in v0.41.0, and chart 0.41.0 pins that same image
      # (appVersion == chart version), so chart+image realign: every arg the chart renders for our
      # values (-session-ttl + the -oidc-* args from the externalSecret; useCookie stays default-false
      # so `-oidc-use-cookie` is NOT emitted) is supported by the v0.41.0 backend. Renovate maintains
      # within 0.41.x; the appVersion continues to pin the Headlamp image.
      version: ">=0.41.0 <0.42.0"
      sourceRef:
        kind: HelmRepository
        name: headlamp
        namespace: headlamp
  install:
    remediation:
      retries: 3
  upgrade:
    remediation:
      retries: 3
  values:
    replicaCount: 1
    # In-cluster mode: Headlamp discovers the apiserver from the pod's in-cluster config, then
    # OVERRIDES the bearer with the user's OIDC id_token for authenticated requests.
    config:
      inCluster: true
      oidc:
        # OIDC config (OIDC_CLIENT_ID / OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET / OIDC_ISSUER_URL / OIDC_SCOPES /
        # OIDC_CALLBACK_URL) is supplied via an EXISTING SOPS-encrypted Secret consumed by name only
        # (R-IDP-04) — the chart envFrom's it. The Secret keys ARE the env var names (no renaming),
        # and the chart's `-oidc-*` args reference them via $(...), e.g.
        # `-oidc-idp-issuer-url=$(OIDC_ISSUER_URL)`; a camelCase key would leave that arg unexpanded
        # and break OIDC login (`unsupported protocol scheme ""`). Nothing sensitive is rendered here.
        externalSecret:
          enabled: true
          name: headlamp-oidc
          hasScopes: true
    # PER-USER RBAC: do NOT grant Headlamp's ServiceAccount cluster-admin. User requests are
    # authorized by their forwarded OIDC token against the existing oidc:* group bindings.
    serviceAccount:
      create: true
    clusterRoleBinding:
      create: false
    # Hardened pod defaults from the chart (runAsNonRoot, uid 100). Kept explicit for clarity.
    securityContext:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 100
      runAsGroup: 101
      privileged: false
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
      # NOTE: readOnlyRootFilesystem intentionally left unset (chart default). Enabling it needs a
      # writable /tmp (+ plugins dir) emptyDir; deferred as a runtime-verified follow-up hardening.
    resources:
      requests:
        cpu: 50m
        memory: 128Mi
      limits:
        memory: 256Mi
    service:
      type: ClusterIP
      port: 80