# platform/keycloak **Keycloak** — the platform Identity Provider (SSO via OIDC + SAML), onboarded early (Phase 6 IdP). - **Governing ADR:** [ADR-0014 — IdP: Keycloak](../../../home-network-k3s/decisions/adr-0014-idp-keycloak.md) - **Spec:** [docs/15 — Identity & Access](../../../home-network-k3s/docs/15-identity-and-access.md) - **Serves:** R-IDP-01..06 - **Owner:** WS-SEC ## Image / tooling strategy (F-KY1 landmine avoided) The original stub used the **Bitnami Keycloak chart + bundled Bitnami PostgreSQL**. Bitnami's free Docker Hub images were purged (DECISIONS-LOG **F-KY1**) → that path ImagePullBackOffs. Replaced with: - **Keycloak: the official Keycloak Operator** (`quay.io/keycloak/keycloak-operator` + `quay.io/keycloak/keycloak`, v26.0.6) driving a **`Keycloak` CR** + a **`KeycloakRealmImport` CR** for config-as-code (ADR-0014 permits Operator OR Helm; Operator gives clean CR-driven realm reconcile). - **Database: CloudNativePG** (`ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg`, see [`../cnpg`](../cnpg)) — a `Cluster` on the 3-replica **`longhorn`** StorageClass (DR-critical, R-IDP-05), with declarative backup hooks. quay.io + ghcr.io are unaffected by the Bitnami purge. Operator manifests are pinned upstream release files pulled as remote kustomize bases (the kubevirt-stub pattern); Renovate maintains the version. ## Layout (controllers / configs split — F-MON1) | File | Applied by | What | |---|---|---| | `kustomization.yaml` (namespace, operator CRDs+Deployment, admin secret, dashboard) | **platform** | controllers | | `keycloak-instance.yaml` (`Keycloak` CR, `${KEYCLOAK_REPLICAS}`) | **platform-config** | config | | `postgres-cluster.yaml` (CNPG `Cluster` on longhorn) | **platform-config** | config | | `keycloak-realm-import.yaml` (`KeycloakRealmImport`: realm/groups/clients/MFA) | **platform-config** | config | | `httproute.yaml` (keycloak.home.keithjackson.dev) | **platform-config** | config | | `servicemonitor.yaml` (Prometheus scrape) | **platform-config** | config | Realm config (groups `platform-admins`/`media-users`/`viewers`, OIDC clients `grafana`+`oauth2-proxy`, brute-force ON, and a **conditional MFA browser flow that REQUIRES OTP for platform-admins**, R-IDP-04) reconciles purely from git — no console clicking (R-IDP-03). ## Admin credential + break-glass (R-IDP-04 / R-IDP-05) The provisioned `keycloak-admin-credentials.sops.yaml` (keys `admin-user`/`admin-password`) is injected as the temporary **bootstrap/break-glass admin** via `KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_*` env (podTemplate escape hatch) — this consumes the secret **as provisioned, without re-keying it** (the operator's native `bootstrapAdmin` wants `username`/`password` keys, which would require editing the encrypted file). The Keycloak bootstrap admin is the documented break-glass path so an IdP/SSO outage does not lock the operator out (ADR-0014); Grafana likewise keeps its local admin login until SSO is proven. ## Operator hand-offs (fill before / during deploy) 1. **`keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml`** (keycloak ns) — from `.sops.yaml.example`. Two client secrets (`grafana-client-secret`, `oauth2-proxy-client-secret`), `openssl rand -hex 32` each. The realm import injects them into the Keycloak clients via `spec.placeholders`. Add to `kustomization.yaml` once filled. The realm import stays PENDING until this exists. 2. **`../oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml`** (oauth2-proxy ns) — `client-id: oauth2-proxy`, `client-secret` = the SAME `oauth2-proxy-client-secret` above, `cookie-secret` = `openssl rand -base64 32`. 3. **`../monitoring/grafana-oidc-credentials.sops.yaml`** (monitoring ns) — `client-secret` = the SAME `grafana-client-secret` above. (Cross-namespace Secrets can't be shared, so each client secret is stored twice — once for the realm import in `keycloak`, once for the consuming app.) See the two `.sops.yaml.example` templates for the exact keys + steps. No plaintext secret is ever committed. ## Exceptions that keep native auth (do not force SSO) — ADR-0014 Plex/Seerr (Plex auth), Minecraft (Mojang/Microsoft), UniFi (native).