---
# Identity config as code (R-IDP-03): the `homelab` realm — groups, roles, OIDC clients, brute-force
# hardening, and a conditional MFA flow that REQUIRES OTP for platform-admins (R-IDP-04). Reconciled
# declaratively by the Keycloak Operator; CARRIED BY platform-config (dependsOn platform).
#
# Client secrets are NOT in this file: they are injected from the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients
# Secret via spec.placeholders ($(env:...)) — so secrets exist only encrypted (R-IDP-04; SOPS, docs/07).
# Until that Secret is filled (operator hand-off, see keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml.example), this
# import stays PENDING on the unresolved placeholder.
apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
kind: KeycloakRealmImport
metadata:
  name: homelab
  namespace: keycloak
spec:
  keycloakCRName: keycloak
  placeholders:
    GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET:
      secret:
        name: keycloak-realm-clients
        key: grafana-client-secret
    OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET:
      secret:
        name: keycloak-realm-clients
        key: oauth2-proxy-client-secret
    GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET:
      secret:
        name: keycloak-realm-clients
        key: gitea-client-secret
    NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET:
      secret:
        name: keycloak-realm-clients
        key: nextcloud-client-secret
    SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET:
      secret:
        name: keycloak-realm-clients
        key: semaphore-client-secret
    HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET:
      secret:
        name: keycloak-realm-clients
        key: headlamp-client-secret
  realm:
    realm: homelab
    enabled: true
    displayName: "Homelab SSO"
    loginWithEmailAllowed: true
    registrationAllowed: false
    resetPasswordAllowed: true
    # Hardening (docs/15): brute-force detection ON; SSL required for external (edge-TLS) requests.
    bruteForceProtected: true
    permanentLockout: false
    sslRequired: external
    # --- Authorization model (R-IDP-06): groups drive access; platform-admins carry a realm role. ---
    roles:
      realm:
        - name: platform-admin
          description: "Privileged platform administrators — MFA required (R-IDP-04)."
    groups:
      - name: platform-admins
        realmRoles:
          - platform-admin
      - name: media-users
      - name: viewers
    # --- OIDC clients (native SSO). Group membership is exposed as a `groups` claim so apps and
    #     oauth2-proxy can authorize by group (R-IDP-06). ---
    clients:
      # Grafana — the concrete native-OIDC SSO proof target (docs/10 / deliverable #4).
      - clientId: grafana
        name: Grafana
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: false
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        secret: "$(env:GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
        redirectUris:
          - https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev/login/generic_oauth
        webOrigins:
          - https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
      # oauth2-proxy — forward-auth for non-OIDC UIs (PiHole, *arr, Prometheus, Alertmanager, …).
      - clientId: oauth2-proxy
        name: oauth2-proxy (forward-auth)
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: false
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        secret: "$(env:OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
        redirectUris:
          - https://*.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
          - https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
        webOrigins:
          - https://*.home.keithjackson.dev
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
      # kubernetes — kubectl OIDC login via kubelogin (int128/kubelogin `oidc-login`). PUBLIC client +
      # PKCE (S256) so NO client secret lives in any user's kubeconfig; kubelogin runs the auth-code
      # +PKCE flow against a localhost callback and caches the ID token. The k3s API server validates
      # that ID token (kube-apiserver oidc-issuer-url=this realm, oidc-client-id=kubernetes,
      # oidc-username-claim=email, oidc-groups-claim=groups); RBAC binds the `groups` claim — see
      # k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view). The cert
      # kubeconfig remains the break-glass admin, independent of Keycloak/OIDC availability.
      - clientId: kubernetes
        name: Kubernetes (kubectl)
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: true
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        attributes:
          "pkce.code.challenge.method": "S256"
        redirectUris:
          - http://localhost:8000
          - http://localhost:8000/
          - http://localhost:18000
          - http://localhost:18000/
          - http://127.0.0.1:8000
          - http://127.0.0.1:8000/
          - http://127.0.0.1:18000
          - http://127.0.0.1:18000/
        webOrigins:
          - http://localhost
          - http://127.0.0.1
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        # offline_access (optional): lets kubelogin request a long-lived OFFLINE refresh token via
        # `--oidc-extra-scope=offline_access`, so the operator's kubectl isn't forced to re-auth on the
        # ONLINE session idle/max timeouts (ssoSessionIdleTimeout 30m / ssoSessionMaxLifespan 10h).
        # Offline tokens honour offlineSessionIdleTimeout (30d) with offlineSessionMaxLifespanEnabled=false
        # (no hard cap) — see k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml header for the kubeconfig exec-arg. Optional (not default)
        # so it is opt-in per the client's request scopes; realm session timeouts stay unchanged.
        optionalClientScopes:
          - offline_access
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
      # gitea — native OIDC SSO for the bootstrapping-critical git host (catalog/gitea.yaml auth.mode
      # oidc; docs/13 SSO row, docs/15 "Native OIDC"; R-IDP-02). Confidential auth-code client modeled on
      # grafana. Redirect URI is Gitea's OAuth2 callback for the auth source named `keycloak`
      # (/user/oauth2/<source>/callback). The `groups` claim drives authorization: Gitea maps the
      # platform-admins group -> Gitea admin (auth source --admin-group; R-IDP-06). The LOCAL Gitea admin
      # remains the break-glass path (docs/15 availability caveat). Secret injected from the SOPS
      # keycloak-realm-clients Secret via the GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder (R-IDP-04).
      - clientId: gitea
        name: Gitea
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: false
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        secret: "$(env:GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
        redirectUris:
          - https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/user/oauth2/keycloak/callback
        webOrigins:
          - https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
      # nextcloud — native OIDC SSO for the file-sync host (catalog/nextcloud.yaml auth.mode oidc; docs/13
      # SSO row, docs/15; R-IDP-02). Confidential auth-code client modeled on grafana. Redirect URI is the
      # user_oidc app's callback (/apps/user_oidc/code). The `groups` claim drives group provisioning in
      # Nextcloud (user_oidc --group-provisioning; R-IDP-06). The LOCAL Nextcloud admin stays break-glass
      # (docs/15). Secret injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-clients Secret via NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET.
      - clientId: nextcloud
        name: Nextcloud
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: false
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        secret: "$(env:NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET)"
        redirectUris:
          - https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/apps/user_oidc/code
        webOrigins:
          - https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
        # Post-logout redirect allow-list (#logout "redirect failed"). On sign-out user_oidc redirects the
        # browser to Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud base '/'> and
        # client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider sendIdTokenHint=0), so Keycloak validates the
        # redirect against this client attribute — empty => "Invalid redirect uri" => the operator's
        # "redirect failed". The wildcard covers the base URL and any logout landing path. Keycloak stores
        # this as the client attribute `post.logout.redirect.uris` (## separates multiple values).
        attributes:
          post.logout.redirect.uris: https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/*
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
      # semaphore — native OIDC SSO for the Ansible UI (catalog/semaphore.yaml auth.mode oidc; docs/13 SSO
      # row, docs/15; R-IDP-02). Confidential auth-code client modeled on grafana. Redirect URI is
      # Semaphore's OIDC callback (/api/auth/oidc/<provider>/redirect for provider `keycloak`). The
      # `groups` claim is exposed for authorization (R-IDP-06). The LOCAL Semaphore admin stays break-glass
      # (docs/15). Secret injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-clients Secret via SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET.
      - clientId: semaphore
        name: Semaphore
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: false
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        secret: "$(env:SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET)"
        redirectUris:
          - https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect
        webOrigins:
          - https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
      # headlamp — the Kubernetes dashboard (platform/headlamp). Confidential auth-code client modeled
      # on grafana. Redirect URI is Headlamp's OIDC callback (<base>/oidc-callback). Headlamp forwards
      # the logged-in user's id_token to the k3s apiserver as the bearer, so RBAC is applied PER USER
      # via the existing oidc:* group bindings (k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml) — NOT via Headlamp's ServiceAccount.
      #
      # AUDIENCE MAPPER (the key integration nuance): the apiserver is configured oidc-client-id=
      # kubernetes, so it only accepts ID tokens whose `aud` CONTAINS `kubernetes`. A plain `headlamp`
      # client issues aud=[headlamp] -> the apiserver would REJECT it. The oidc-audience-mapper below
      # ADDS the `kubernetes` client to the audience, giving aud=[headlamp, kubernetes]: Headlamp's own
      # verifier accepts it (aud contains headlamp) AND the apiserver accepts it (aud contains
      # kubernetes). This keeps the apiserver's oidc config untouched (preferred over widening
      # api-audiences). The `groups` mapper (same as the other clients) carries the group claim the
      # apiserver maps to oidc:<group> for the RBAC bindings.
      - clientId: headlamp
        name: Headlamp (Kubernetes dashboard)
        protocol: openid-connect
        enabled: true
        publicClient: false
        standardFlowEnabled: true
        directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
        secret: "$(env:HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET)"
        redirectUris:
          - https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev/oidc-callback
        webOrigins:
          - https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev
        defaultClientScopes:
          - email
          - profile
          - roles
        protocolMappers:
          - name: groups
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
            config:
              "full.path": "false"
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
              "userinfo.token.claim": "true"
              "claim.name": groups
          # Add `kubernetes` to the token audience so the k3s apiserver (oidc-client-id=kubernetes)
          # accepts the forwarded id_token. `included.client.audience` names the existing `kubernetes`
          # client; the mapper appends it to `aud` in the ID token (and access token, harmless).
          - name: audience-kubernetes
            protocol: openid-connect
            protocolMapper: oidc-audience-mapper
            config:
              "included.client.audience": kubernetes
              "id.token.claim": "true"
              "access.token.claim": "true"
    # --- MFA for platform-admins (R-IDP-04): a browser flow whose OTP step is CONDITIONAL on the
    #     platform-admin role. Non-admins log in without OTP; platform-admins must enroll/present TOTP.
    #     Set as the realm browserFlow below. VERIFY at bring-up (see runbook): a malformed flow fails
    #     the whole import — if so, the fallback is to comment this block + browserFlow and configure
    #     the conditional-OTP-by-role flow via the admin console. ---
    authenticationFlows:
      - alias: browser-mfa
        description: "Browser flow with conditional OTP required for platform-admins."
        providerId: basic-flow
        topLevel: true
        builtIn: false
        authenticationExecutions:
          - authenticator: auth-cookie
            authenticatorFlow: false
            requirement: ALTERNATIVE
            priority: 10
            userSetupAllowed: false
          - authenticator: identity-provider-redirector
            authenticatorFlow: false
            requirement: ALTERNATIVE
            priority: 20
            userSetupAllowed: false
          - authenticatorFlow: true
            requirement: ALTERNATIVE
            priority: 30
            flowAlias: browser-mfa-forms
            userSetupAllowed: false
      - alias: browser-mfa-forms
        description: "Username/password then conditional OTP."
        providerId: basic-flow
        topLevel: false
        builtIn: false
        authenticationExecutions:
          - authenticator: auth-username-password-form
            authenticatorFlow: false
            requirement: REQUIRED
            priority: 10
            userSetupAllowed: false
          - authenticatorFlow: true
            requirement: CONDITIONAL
            priority: 20
            flowAlias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
            userSetupAllowed: false
      - alias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
        description: "Require OTP only for users with the platform-admin role."
        providerId: basic-flow
        topLevel: false
        builtIn: false
        authenticationExecutions:
          - authenticator: conditional-user-role
            authenticatorFlow: false
            requirement: REQUIRED
            priority: 10
            authenticatorConfig: conditional-otp-platform-admin
            userSetupAllowed: false
          - authenticator: auth-otp-form
            authenticatorFlow: false
            requirement: REQUIRED
            priority: 20
            userSetupAllowed: false
    authenticatorConfig:
      - alias: conditional-otp-platform-admin
        config:
          "condition.evaluated.user.role": platform-admin
          negate: "false"
    browserFlow: browser-mfa