# platform/kyverno — L0 policy-as-code gate & admission enforcer (T-0.5)

Kyverno is the platform's **L0 static/policy gate** (in CI, no cluster) **and** its
in-cluster **admission enforcer** (ADR-0011, `docs/14`, `docs/07`). The policies here
encode spec invariants as code: they run in CI as a merge gate **today** (Phase 0, no
cluster) and the same policies are wired to run in-cluster as an admission controller
later (Phase 2, `admission/`).

> **Enforcement complements, never replaces, behavior tests.** A policy admitting a
> manifest is not proof the runtime behaves (R-TEST-01). The L2/L3 **Chainsaw**
> behavior + fault-injection tests remain mandatory. See `admission/README.md`.

## Layout

```
platform/kyverno/
├── README.md                     # this file: policy→requirement map + CI entrypoint
├── labels.md                     # label/annotation convention (PROPOSED contract — escalated)
├── policies/                     # ClusterPolicies (authored once; CI + admission)
│   ├── require-default-deny-baseline.yaml   # R-NET-01 (generate baseline)
│   ├── validate-default-deny-shape.yaml     # R-NET-01 (reject malformed baseline)
│   ├── disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml      # R-SEC-01 (CI-only: sops block required)
│   ├── restrict-host-namespaces.yaml        # R-SEC-02 (+R-NET-01 bypass guard)
│   ├── require-egress-class-label.yaml      # R-NET-05
│   └── require-auth-mode-label.yaml         # R-IDP-02
├── servicedefinition/            # ServiceDefinition shape validation (kyverno-json)
│   ├── validate-servicedefinition.yaml      # R-GITOPS-02
│   ├── payloads/ (valid-* / invalid-*)      # pass & fail fixtures
│   └── README.md
├── tests/                        # `kyverno test` suite — runnable L0 tests NOW, no cluster
│   ├── kyverno-test.yaml                     # policies × fixtures × expected results
│   └── resources/ (good-* / bad-* fixtures + generated golden)
├── admission/                    # in-cluster enforcing bundle (scaffolding, T-2.7)
│   ├── namespace.yaml · helmrelease.yaml · kustomization.yaml
│   ├── secret-provenance.yaml                # R-SEC-01 admission variant (provenance)
│   └── README.md
└── scripts/run-l0.sh             # the single-command CI entrypoint for the gate
```

## Policy → requirement map

| Policy / artifact | Rule(s) | Requirement | Spec source | Behaves |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `require-default-deny-baseline` | `generate-default-deny` | **R-NET-01** | docs/03 default-deny baseline | Every app namespace auto-gets a deny-all (ingress+egress, DNS-only) NetworkPolicy |
| `validate-default-deny-shape` | `baseline-must-deny-both-directions` | **R-NET-01** | docs/03 | A baseline that leaves a direction open is rejected |
| `disallow-plaintext-secrets` | `secrets-must-be-sops-encrypted` | **R-SEC-01** | docs/07, docs/05, ADR-0007 | Committed Secrets must be SOPS-encrypted (`sops` block); plaintext rejected. **CI-only** |
| `restrict-host-namespaces` | `disallow-host-namespaces`, `disallow-privileged-containers` | **R-SEC-02** (+R-NET-01) | docs/07 least reach | App pods can't use hostNetwork/PID/IPC or privileged (would bypass default-deny) |
| `require-egress-class-label` | `require-egress-class` | **R-NET-05** | docs/03, docs/13 | App pods must declare `egress-class` ∈ {internet,vpn} |
| `require-auth-mode-label` | `require-auth-mode` | **R-IDP-02** | docs/13, docs/15 | App pods must declare `auth-mode` ∈ {oidc,forward-auth,native,none} |
| `validate-servicedefinition` (kyverno-json) | shape / dependencies / storage | **R-GITOPS-02** | docs/13 (+03,15) | ServiceDefinition is schema/invariant valid before render; public⇒not `none` auth |
| `admission/secret-provenance` | `secrets-must-be-flux-managed` | **R-SEC-01** | docs/07 | **Admission-only** variant: app-ns Secrets must come from Flux/SOPS (see below) |

Coverage of the T-0.5 requirement set: **R-TEST-01** (behavior-tagged, reproducible
tests — this whole suite), **R-NET-01**, **R-SEC-01**, **R-SEC-02**, **R-IDP-02**,
**R-NET-05**, **R-GITOPS-02**. Every policy carries its `R-*` IDs in the
`homelab.keithjackson.dev/requirements` annotation so the coverage report can pick
them up automatically.

## CI entrypoint (the L0 gate)

CI (WS-GITOPS `.gitea/workflows`, then Gitea Actions) runs the **single command**:

```bash
platform/kyverno/scripts/run-l0.sh
```

which performs, with pinned tool versions (`KYVERNO_VERSION`, `KYVERNO_JSON_VERSION`):

```bash
# 1) ClusterPolicy tests — offline, no cluster
kyverno test platform/kyverno/tests

# 2) ServiceDefinition validation — offline, no cluster
kyverno-json scan --policy platform/kyverno/servicedefinition/validate-servicedefinition.yaml \
  --payload <each catalog/ ServiceDefinition and the valid-* fixtures>   # must pass
#   plus each invalid-* fixture must be REJECTED (script asserts non-zero exit)
```

`kyverno test` emits pass/fail per policy×rule×resource and supports JUnit output for
the coverage/merge gate:

```bash
kyverno test platform/kyverno/tests --output junit > results/kyverno-l0.junit.xml
```

Exit non-zero fails the merge gate (`docs/14` gating rules). Deterministic, hermetic,
self-contained — no cluster, no external state (reproducibility contract, R-TEST-02).

## Notes / handoffs

- **Label keys are a proposed contract** (`labels.md`) shared with WS-NET / WS-SEC /
  WS-GITOPS. Values are spec-fixed; keys need owner sign-off (coordination-protocol §2).
- **Secrets CI vs admission divergence** is deliberate and documented in
  `admission/README.md` and `policies/disallow-plaintext-secrets.yaml`.
- The ServiceDefinition JSON Schema (WS-GITOPS T-0.3) is the complementary structural
  contract; this Kyverno policy encodes the *invariants* from `docs/13`.
- Tool availability: neither `kyverno` nor `kyverno-json` is installed on the WS-TEST
  workstation, so this suite was authored but **not executed here**; the CI agent
  (T-0.2/T-0.4 harness) runs `scripts/run-l0.sh` as the gate.