--- # oauth2-proxy — forward-auth for apps WITHOUT usable OIDC (PiHole, *arr UIs, qBittorrent, Homepage, # Prometheus, Alertmanager, Hubble UI — ADR-0014). Authenticates users against the Keycloak `homelab` # realm, then the Gateway ext-auth lets the request through only for an authenticated session # (R-IDP-02: no management UI unauthenticated). Chart image is quay.io/oauth2-proxy (not Bitnami). apiVersion: helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2 kind: HelmRelease metadata: name: oauth2-proxy namespace: oauth2-proxy spec: interval: 30m chart: spec: chart: oauth2-proxy version: ">=10.0.0 <11.0.0" # k8s-1.36 catch-up (app v7.15.x). Renovate maintains sourceRef: kind: HelmRepository name: oauth2-proxy namespace: oauth2-proxy install: remediation: retries: 3 upgrade: remediation: retries: 3 values: replicaCount: ${OAUTH2_PROXY_REPLICAS} # overlay knob: dev 1 / prod 2 (HA) — R-ENV-02 config: # client-id / client-secret / cookie-secret from the SOPS secret (name only). client-id + # client-secret MUST match the realm's `oauth2-proxy` client (keycloak-realm-clients secret). existingSecret: oauth2-proxy-credentials extraArgs: provider: oidc oidc-issuer-url: https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab # Forward-auth (ext-auth) mode: no upstream app; return 202 for an authenticated session so the # Gateway ext-authz can allow/deny. Auth headers are surfaced to the backend. reverse-proxy: "true" upstream: static://202 set-xauthrequest: "true" pass-access-token: "true" email-domain: "*" # Single sign-in/callback host for all forward-auth-protected services on the platform zone. redirect-url: https://auth.${BASE_DOMAIN}/oauth2/callback whitelist-domain: ".${BASE_DOMAIN}" cookie-domain: ".${BASE_DOMAIN}" cookie-secure: "true" # Expose group membership so per-service group authorization (R-IDP-06) can be enforced. The # Keycloak `oauth2-proxy` client emits a `groups` claim (full.path=false => bare names like # `platform-admins`, keycloak-realm-import.yaml). `--allowed-groups` below is the PLATFORM FLOOR: # a valid Keycloak session is NOT enough — the user must ALSO be in `platform-admins`, or # /oauth2/auth returns 403 and ext_authz denies (R-IDP-06). Every currently-onboarded # forward-auth app (pihole, *arr, qbittorrent, homepage, prometheus, alertmanager, hubble) # declares `groups: [platform-admins]` in its ServiceDefinition, so this floor matches them all. # Per-ROUTE group differentiation (a future app allowing a different group) does NOT need a # second proxy: the ext_authz filter appends `?allowed_groups=` to /oauth2/auth from the # HTTPRoute's `homelab.keithjackson.dev/auth-groups` annotation — oauth2-proxy honours the # per-request query on top of this floor. See forward-auth-cec.yaml + README "opt-in". oidc-groups-claim: groups allowed-group: platform-admins # R-IDP-06 floor: authenticated AND in platform-admins (oauth2-proxy flag is singular --allowed-group, repeatable) # Single Keycloak provider => skip the oauth2-proxy interstitial "Sign In" button and 302 # straight to Keycloak. Verified in-cluster: WITHOUT this, an ext_authz-denied browser request # gets oauth2-proxy's HTML sign-in page (HTTP 403) instead of an immediate redirect (docs/15 UX). skip-provider-button: "true" scope: "openid email profile" # ── Cold-start gate: do not start the proxy until Keycloak's discovery doc answers ────────── # MEASURED on prod 2026-10-17, during the UPS move: oauth2-proxy performs OIDC discovery ONCE at # startup and EXITS 1 if it fails. On a whole-cluster cold boot Keycloak is not serving yet, so # the Gateway answers 503 and the proxy dies: # # [provider.go:55] Performing OIDC Discovery... # [main.go:73] ERROR: Failed to initialise OAuth2 Proxy: ... failed to discover OIDC # configuration: unexpected status "503": no healthy upstream # # It then sits in exponential CrashLoopBackOff long after Keycloak is healthy -- one replica was # still down minutes later and only a manual pod delete cleared it. There is no retry flag; the # process simply does not survive a cold start. A readinessProbe cannot help (the container is # already dead), and CrashLoopBackOff backoff is not tunable per-pod. # # `extraInitContainers` is the chart's OWN documented hook for this -- its commented example in # values.yaml is literally `- name: wait-for-idp` -- and the chart already uses an alpine init # container for its built-in waitForRedis gate, so this adds no new base image to the platform. # A pod in Init does not accrue CrashLoopBackOff backoff and retries promptly, which is the whole # point. # # BOUNDED, AND FAILS OPEN. After ~5 minutes it gives up and starts the proxy anyway: the worst # case is then exactly today's behaviour, never something new. An unbounded wait would trade a # CrashLoop for a pod wedged in Init forever, which is not an improvement. # # SHELL VARIABLES ARE WRITTEN BARE ($i, $url, $(( ))), WITH NO BRACED FORM ANYWHERE. This file is # rendered through Flux envsubst (platform declares postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars), which # CONSUMES braced expansions -- so a braced shell variable renders to the empty string and # silently breaks the loop. BASE_DOMAIN below is braced ON PURPOSE: it is a real cluster-vars # knob and must be substituted. Same hazard, and the same convention, as the gitea and nextcloud # OIDC bootstrap hooks. (ci: flux-postbuild-substitution enforces it.) extraInitContainers: - name: wait-for-idp image: docker.io/library/alpine:3.22 imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"] args: - | set -u url=https://keycloak.${BASE_DOMAIN}/realms/homelab/.well-known/openid-configuration i=0 while [ "$i" -lt 60 ]; do # busybox wget validates against alpine's ca-certificates-bundle, so a real TLS # failure is a non-zero exit here rather than a false pass. if wget -q -O /dev/null --timeout=5 "$url" 2>/dev/null; then echo "[wait-for-idp] Keycloak discovery reachable; starting oauth2-proxy" exit 0 fi i=$(( i + 1 )) sleep 5 done echo "[wait-for-idp] discovery still unreachable after ~5m; starting anyway so this" >&2 echo "[wait-for-idp] gate can never be worse than the un-gated behaviour it replaces" >&2 exit 0 securityContext: allowPrivilegeEscalation: false runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 65534 runAsGroup: 65534 readOnlyRootFilesystem: true capabilities: drop: - ALL resources: requests: cpu: 10m memory: 16Mi limits: memory: 32Mi # Metrics for the ServiceMonitor (../oauth2-proxy servicemonitor in platform-config). metrics: enabled: true # ENFORCEMENT (Phase 6): oauth2-proxy is the AUTHENTICATOR; the per-route ext_authz ENFORCEMENT is # Gateway-side. On Cilium 1.16.5 the shared Gateway's Envoy config is a machine-owned, constantly # regenerated CiliumEnvoyConfig (`gateway/cilium-gateway-shared`) that CANNOT be injected into, # and native Gateway-API ExternalAuth (GEP-1494) ships in NO released Cilium version yet. The # enforcement mechanism + the three wiring options are documented in README.md; the interim # self-authored ext_authz listener is forward-auth-cec.yaml (a template, not yet Flux-wired).