---
# Default-deny baseline (R-NET-01): deny all ingress + egress, allow only DNS. `kured` is a PLATFORM
# namespace, so Kyverno's generator — scoped to `app-namespace=true` — does not produce this; we ship
# it explicitly, as crafty/headlamp/homepage/runbooks all do.
#
# THESE POLICIES DO APPLY TO kured, UNLIKE platform/vpn-ingress'. That component's identical-looking
# baseline is honest-but-inert because its DaemonSet runs `hostNetwork: true` and therefore has no
# Cilium endpoint for any policy to select. kured's chart defaults to `hostNetwork: false` and we
# keep that default (it needs the host PID namespace to reboot, not the host network stack), so it
# has a normal pod identity and every rule here is enforced.
#
# Cilium enforces the UNION of these policies (allow if ANY policy allows), so the CiliumNetworkPolicy
# below adds the kube-apiserver path on top of this deny-all floor.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny
  namespace: kured
  labels:
    homelab.keithjackson.dev/baseline: default-deny
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress: []
  egress:
    - to:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
      ports:
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
---
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# PROMETHEUS MUST REACH :8080, OR EVERY RULE IN alerts.yaml IS INERT.
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# This is not a theoretical hazard in this repo, it is a measured one. From the Longhorn entry in
# conformance/tests/l0-static/alert-metrics-have-scrape-targets/check.sh: with the ServiceMonitor
# applied and no NetworkPolicy allowance, all three targets were DISCOVERED and every scrape failed
# with "context deadline exceeded" after 10.0s — "a drop, not a refusal" — and the TSDB stayed
# empty. Target discovery succeeding is therefore NOT evidence the scrape works, and the alerts
# would have been quiet rather than broken. KuredNotReporting is the standing detector for exactly
# this regression, and it can only work if this policy is correct.
#
# THE WHOLE `monitoring` NAMESPACE, NOT THE PROMETHEUS POD LABELS — following the same choice
# longhorn/networkpolicy-metrics.yaml made and for the same reason: the prometheus-operator owns
# those pod labels and rewrites them on upgrade (measured 2026-10-17, the pod carries
# `app.kubernetes.io/name: prometheus` plus five operator-managed labels including a
# controller-revision-hash), so selecting on them makes the scrape silently fail on a chart bump.
# The namespace holds only the monitoring stack.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: kured-allow-prometheus-scrape
  namespace: kured
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: kured
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      # Set by the chart's `kured.matchLabels` helper (_helpers.tpl:70-71) with release name `kured`.
      app.kubernetes.io/name: kured
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
  ingress:
    - from:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: monitoring
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          # The container port the chart names `metrics` (daemonset.yaml:211-213), from
          # `configuration.metricsPort`, which we leave at the chart default of 8080 and mirror in
          # the HelmRelease's `service.port`.
          port: 8080
---
# Egress allows. kured talks to exactly two things and nothing else; both are required and the
# component is useless without either.
#
#   1. THE KUBE-APISERVER — the lock annotation on its own DaemonSet (`weave.works/kured-node-lock`),
#      cordon/uncordon (`nodes` patch), the node annotations, listing pods, and creating
#      `pods/eviction` objects during the drain. Reached via the `kube-apiserver` Cilium entity
#      rather than an IP: on this cluster the API is fronted by a kube-vip VIP that moves between
#      nodes on every reboot, so any CIDR-based rule here would break during the exact operation
#      this component exists to perform. Same construct as platform/headlamp/networkpolicy.yaml.
#
#   2. PROMETHEUS, on 9090 — the alert gate. The HelmRelease sets
#      `prometheusUrl: http://kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus.monitoring.svc.cluster.local:9090`
#      and `alertFilterMatchOnly: true`, so before taking the cluster lock kured asks Prometheus
#      whether any of LonghornVolumeDegraded / LonghornVolumeFaulted / KubeNodeNotReady /
#      NodeExporterDown is firing. IF THIS EGRESS IS BLOCKED, kured cannot evaluate the gate.
#      It treats the query error as "do not proceed" and skips the reboot — which is the correct
#      fail-safe direction, but it fails SILENTLY and indefinitely: reboots simply stop happening
#      and nothing goes red except, eventually, KuredRebootPending. Do not remove this rule
#      thinking it is only for metrics; metrics ingress is the policy above, this is the gate.
#
# NOTHING ELSE. No egress to the internet (kured pulls no content at runtime), no DNS beyond the
# baseline above, no Longhorn or etcd access — kured reads Longhorn's health THROUGH Prometheus
# alerts, never from Longhorn's own API, which is why that allow is absent here.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: kured-allow-egress
  namespace: kured
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: kured
spec:
  endpointSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: kured
  egress:
    - toEntities:
        - kube-apiserver
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            io.kubernetes.pod.namespace: monitoring
            app.kubernetes.io/name: prometheus
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "9090"
              protocol: TCP