{ "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "$id": "https://home.keithjackson.dev/schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json", "title": "ServiceDefinition", "description": "Operator-facing onboarding contract for the home k3s + Longhorn platform. One ServiceDefinition per file under catalog/. Captures INTENT; the platform compiles it into concrete resources (see schemas/renderer-contract.md). Canonical source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md. Serves R-GITOPS-02; ties into R-NET-*, R-STATE-*, R-TLS-*, R-DNS-*, R-OBS-*, R-UPD-*, R-IDP-*. Schema version: 1.10.0 (adds optional `availability` for the container kind, one member: `availability.replicas`. It is AVAILABILITY INTENT, not a scheduling primitive -- it names no Kubernetes object, no topology key and no budget. 1 (the default) renders a Deployment exactly as before, so every pre-existing app stays byte-identical; >1 means the service must survive the loss of a single node, and the renderer satisfies that with a StatefulSet whose longhorn volumes become per-replica volumeClaimTemplates (a longhorn PVC is ReadWriteOnce and cannot attach on two nodes, so a multi-replica Deployment is UNSCHEDULABLE, not merely suboptimal), REQUIRED podAntiAffinity on kubernetes.io/hostname (preferred would let every replica land on one node and deliver none of the intended tolerance while reporting healthy), podManagementPolicy Parallel, a PodDisruptionBudget of minAvailable 1, and an `up` SLI that follows the rendered kind (a Deployment-shaped rule against a StatefulSet absent()s forever and can never fire). Added for pihole, where LAN DNS -- a critical network service -- was one pod on one node: measured 2026-10-04, losing the node running it meant roughly 6-10 minutes with no LAN resolution (tolerationSeconds 300 plus node-NotReady detection plus a Longhorn RWO force-detach). Deliberately NOT usable until a service's state is reproducible from git, because a replica with a fresh volume otherwise comes up serving but unconfigured -- for pihole that prerequisite was done first (decisions/2026-10-04-pihole-declare-state.md). Capped at 5: a count above the node count can never schedule under the anti-affinity this implies. Mechanism documented in schemas/renderer-contract.md `### availability`). 1.9.0 (adds optional `auth.apiRoutes` -- a per-service list of anchored path regexes the forward-auth oauth2-proxy sidecar answers with 401 instead of a 302 to Keycloak, rendered as one repeatable `--api-route` per entry. The `auth` block stays `additionalProperties: false`; this is one named, documented key, not an opened door. Without it there was NO per-app override hook at all, so the only way to answer an app's XHRs with 401 was a renderer-wide constant -- and the path shape is a property of the app: jackett's is `/api/` (33 x 302 vs 2 x 401 measured 2026-09-30, 4 of 6 POSTs answered by the proxy and never reaching the app), radarr's is `/signalr/` (232 x 302 measured 2026-10-01, every one a POST from a left-open browser tab that is never re-prompted), and pihole serves no `/api/` at all. Each entry must be anchored at `^/` and continue with literal path characters, because a too-broad regex turns a plain page load into a 401 and the service looks permanently broken to a logged-out user. Enforced on every gate run by ci/l0.sh's schema stage over catalog/*.yaml, by catalog/render.py refusing to render an unanchored entry, and by conformance/tests/l0-static/oauth2-proxy-api-routes-per-app)). 1.8.0 (adds optional `hardware` - a host HARDWARE CAPABILITY declaration for the container kind, currently one member: `hardware.gpu: intel-quicksync`, meaning the workload needs the host iGPU render device for hardware video transcode. It is an ENUM OF INTENT, not a device path: the renderer satisfies it today with just two things -- a /dev/dri hostPath volume (`DirectoryOrCreate`) and a read-write /dev/dri volumeMount on the app container -- and a later move to the Intel GPU device plugin is then a render.py change with no catalog edit. It sets NO podSecurityContext.supplementalGroups: measured in-container on prod 2026-09-30, the pms-docker cont-init hook adds the app user to the device's group inside the container and `s6-setuidgid` then REPLACES the process group list from /etc/group, discarding anything Kubernetes supplied, so such an entry would be inert and misleading. Renders NOTHING when absent, so every existing app stays byte-identical. Emits no privileged securityContext (Kyverno restrict-host-namespaces would reject it and it is not needed), no nodeSelector (node placement is a separate concern with its own justification) and no resource requests). 1.7.0 (no field changes; a MAPPING change to `exposure`, which had never had an effect on DNS. `exposure: internal` now renders ExternalDNS's own controller annotation onto every HTTPRoute it emits, set to a value other than `dns-controller`, so external-dns (v0.21.0, source/gateway.go -> annotations.IsControllerMismatch) skips the route before resolving any hostname and the service is INCAPABLE of producing a public record. Both docs/09 R-DNS-03 and schemas/renderer-contract.md already said `internal` renders no public DNS record; nothing enforced it, and six internal services -- jackett, pihole, qbittorrent, radarr, semaphore, sonarr -- were publishing `.home.keithjackson.dev` into the PUBLIC Cloudflare zone answering with the RFC1918 Gateway VIP, which published the internal subnet and a full service inventory and made each name a DNS-rebind primitive. Enforced on every gate run by conformance/tests/l0-static/internal-services-publish-no-public-dns). 1.6.0 (splits `observability.metrics` from WHERE metrics live: adds optional `metricsEndpoint` (port/name/path/interval) and optional `livenessWorkload` (kind/name). `metrics: true` previously rendered a ServiceMonitor hardcoded to a port named `metrics` that no rendered Service ever defined, so all twelve app monitors discovered ZERO targets and every `up{job=...}` SLI was structurally inert on prod; a monitor is now rendered only from a declared `metricsEndpoint`, which also renders the Service port and the monitoring-namespace ingress allow, and the `up` SLI is expressed against kube-state-metrics -- a signal that exists for every workload without a per-app exporter. `livenessWorkload` names the object whose readiness IS the service, for the case where the running workload is not the one this SD renders). 1.5.0 (adds optional `inClusterClients` — additional in-cluster clients, named by NAMESPACE, admitted to a declared port of this service DIRECTLY, bypassing the shared Gateway. `ingressRoutes` admits only the Gateway proxy identity and `dependencies` only links catalog services, so a PLATFORM controller dialling a Service ClusterIP had no authorable form at all; that gap is what deadlocked prod's GitOps when its GitRepository moved to the in-cluster Gitea Service. Renders one least-privilege ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy per entry — the named namespace and the declared port, nothing wider). 1.4.0 (makes the `bulk` tier REAL: a bulk storage entry now carries `export` (the absolute NFS export path on the ${BULK_NFS_SERVER} host) and renders a STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume + PVC over data that already exists outside the cluster, plus optional `subPath` and `readOnly` on any entry. Resolves the OQ-2 bulk-backing stub for STATIC pre-existing datasets; dynamic bulk provisioning remains unimplemented and unneeded). 1.3.0 added optional pod-level podSecurityContext for the container kind — k8s PodSecurityContext emitted verbatim onto the pod spec; its fsGroup unblocks non-root images e.g. semaphore/UID-1001 writing a mounted Longhorn PVC). 1.2.0 added optional per-container env/envFrom/lifecycle for the container kind — k8s EnvVar/EnvFromSource/Lifecycle shapes emitted verbatim onto the app container; unblocks headless-install/DB-backed apps e.g. gitea/nextcloud/semaphore/unifi/minecraft. 1.1.0 added the shape invariant exposure:public => auth.mode!=none (docs/13 v1.1 / docs/15 / R-IDP-02).", "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name", "source"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "description": "DNS label -> .${BASE_DOMAIN}, i.e. .home.keithjackson.dev on dev and .prod.home.keithjackson.dev on prod (docs/13, docs/09). Must be a valid RFC 1123 DNS label.", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 63 }, "kind": { "type": "string", "description": "PaaS container (default) or IaaS VM via KubeVirt (docs/13; R-PLAT-02/03).", "enum": ["container", "vm"], "default": "container" }, "source": { "type": "object", "description": "Workload source. container => image; vm => vmTemplate (CDI source). Exactly one, matching kind.", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "properties": { "image": { "type": "string", "description": "Container image reference (repo/image[:tag]). Required when kind=container.", "minLength": 1 }, "vmTemplate": { "type": "string", "description": "KubeVirt/CDI source image reference. Required when kind=vm.", "minLength": 1 } } }, "env": { "type": "array", "description": "Optional per-container environment variables for the container kind (docs/13). Mirrors the k8s EnvVar shape and is emitted verbatim onto the app container: each entry is either a literal {name, value} or a {name, valueFrom: {secretKeyRef|configMapKeyRef}} sourced from a Secret/ConfigMap key. Absent => no env (existing apps render byte-identical). Ignored for kind=vm (VMs configure via cloud-init).", "default": [], "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "description": "Environment variable name (C_IDENTIFIER).", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$" }, "value": { "type": "string", "description": "Literal value. Mutually exclusive with valueFrom." }, "valueFrom": { "type": "object", "description": "Source the value from a Secret or ConfigMap key (exactly one of secretKeyRef/configMapKeyRef).", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "maxProperties": 1, "properties": { "secretKeyRef": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name", "key"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 }, "key": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 } } }, "configMapKeyRef": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name", "key"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 }, "key": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 } } } } } }, "oneOf": [ { "required": ["value"], "not": { "required": ["valueFrom"] } }, { "required": ["valueFrom"], "not": { "required": ["value"] } } ] } }, "envFrom": { "type": "array", "description": "Optional bulk env sources for the container kind. Mirrors the k8s EnvFromSource shape and is emitted verbatim onto the app container: each entry pulls ALL keys from a Secret or ConfigMap (exactly one of secretRef/configMapRef). Absent => no envFrom (existing apps render byte-identical). Ignored for kind=vm.", "default": [], "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "maxProperties": 1, "properties": { "secretRef": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 } } }, "configMapRef": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 } } } } } }, "lifecycle": { "type": "object", "description": "Optional container lifecycle hooks for the container kind (docs/13). Mirrors the k8s Lifecycle shape and is emitted verbatim onto the app container. Used for idempotent break-glass/bootstrap steps (e.g. gitea's postStart exec that seeds a local admin). Absent => no lifecycle (existing apps render byte-identical). Ignored for kind=vm.", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "properties": { "postStart": { "$ref": "#/$defs/execHandler" }, "preStop": { "$ref": "#/$defs/execHandler" } } }, "podSecurityContext": { "type": "object", "description": "Optional pod-level SecurityContext for the container kind (docs/13). Mirrors the k8s PodSecurityContext shape and is emitted verbatim onto the pod spec (spec.template.spec.securityContext). Its primary use is `fsGroup`, which makes a mounted Longhorn PVC group-writable by a non-root image (e.g. semaphore runs as UID 1001 and cannot otherwise write its config PVC). Absent => no pod securityContext (existing apps render byte-identical). Ignored for kind=vm.", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "properties": { "runAsUser": { "type": "integer", "description": "UID the container processes run as." }, "runAsGroup": { "type": "integer", "description": "Primary GID the container processes run as." }, "runAsNonRoot": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Require the container to run as a non-root UID (validated at admission)." }, "fsGroup": { "type": "integer", "description": "Supplemental group applied to mounted volumes so they are group-owned + group-writable (chowned by the kubelet), letting a non-root image write a PVC." }, "fsGroupChangePolicy": { "type": "string", "enum": ["Always", "OnRootMismatch"], "description": "When the kubelet recursively applies fsGroup ownership to a volume." }, "supplementalGroups": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "integer" }, "description": "Additional GIDs added to the first process in each container." } } }, "availability": { "type": "object", "description": "Optional availability intent for the container kind: how many replicas of this workload must be running. INTENT ONLY -- it names no Kubernetes object and no scheduling primitive. How the platform satisfies it (workload kind, per-replica volumes, node spreading, disruption budget) is catalog/render.py's business, documented in schemas/renderer-contract.md `### availability`. Absent => replicas 1 and a Deployment, so every pre-existing app renders byte-identical. Ignored for kind=vm (a VM's availability is a different problem with different primitives).", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "properties": { "replicas": { "type": "integer", "description": "How many replicas must be running. 1 (default) renders a Deployment exactly as before. >1 declares that the service must survive the loss of a single node; the renderer then emits a StatefulSet with per-replica volumeClaimTemplates, required per-node anti-affinity, podManagementPolicy Parallel and a PodDisruptionBudget. Only declare >1 for a service whose on-disk state is reproducible from git -- a replica with a fresh volume comes up serving whatever it can bootstrap itself, and nothing else.", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 5, "default": 1 } } }, "hardware": { "type": "object", "description": "Optional host HARDWARE CAPABILITY the workload needs, for the container kind (docs/13). This field declares INTENT (`what device class this service needs`), never MECHANISM (`which host path to bind-mount`, `which extended resource to request`). That separation is the whole point of the enum: the platform currently satisfies `intel-quicksync` with a /dev/dri hostPath volume and a matching mount on the app container, but a later migration to the Intel GPU device plugin (`gpu.intel.com/i915` resource requests, no hostPath) must be a catalog/render.py change and NOTHING else - no ServiceDefinition may need editing, and no reviewer may have to re-derive per-service device wiring. Do NOT 'simplify' this into a raw device path, a hostPath, or a resource request; that would push a platform implementation detail into the operator-facing contract and make the migration a catalog-wide edit. Absent => no device wiring at all (existing apps render byte-identical). Ignored for kind=vm (a VM gets devices through KubeVirt's own domain.devices).", "additionalProperties": false, "minProperties": 1, "properties": { "gpu": { "type": "string", "description": "GPU capability class this service needs. `intel-quicksync` = the host's Intel Quick Sync Video render device (the iGPU's /dev/dri/renderD* node) for hardware video transcode/decode. Enum, not a free-form device path, so the satisfying mechanism stays swappable (see the parent description). Extend the enum when a genuinely different capability class appears (e.g. nvidia-nvenc), never to name a different path to the same one.", "enum": ["intel-quicksync"] } } }, "exposure": { "type": "string", "description": "internal = LAN-only (internal DNS + Gateway on LAN); public = additionally edge port-forwarded 80/443 (docs/09; R-DNS/R-NET).", "enum": ["internal", "public"], "default": "internal" }, "egress": { "type": "string", "description": "Egress class (docs/03; R-NET-05). internet = default WAN route; vpn = steered by Cilium Egress Gateway out the egress-gateway node's host PIA VPN tunnel, with a mandatory host kill-switch (ADR-0015; R-NET-06).", "enum": ["internet", "vpn"], "default": "internet" }, "storage": { "type": "array", "description": "Persistent volumes. If it must survive a rebuild it lives here, never on ephemeral/hostPath (docs/04; R-STATE-01/02/04). A `longhorn` entry renders a dynamically provisioned PVC; a `bulk` entry renders a STATIC, pre-bound NFS PersistentVolume + its PVC over data that already exists outside the cluster.", "default": [], "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["name", "class"], "properties": { "name": { "type": "string", "description": "Volume identifier within the service (e.g. config, media, db).", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$" }, "size": { "type": "string", "description": "PVC request in Kubernetes quantity form (e.g. 5Gi). Required for the longhorn tier. For the bulk tier it is the STATIC PV's advertised capacity: NOTHING enforces it (the ZFS pool is the real limit), so state the dataset's current size so `kubectl get pv` reports something true. Omitted => the bulk PV/PVC carry no capacity, which the API rejects, so bulk in practice sets it.", "pattern": "^[1-9][0-9]*(Mi|Gi|Ti)$" }, "mountPath": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional explicit absolute container mount path for this volume. Default is /data/. Set it when the app expects a FIXED on-disk layout the default cannot express (e.g. Gitea keeps all state directly under /data). Renderer honors this verbatim; omitting it preserves the /data/ default for back-compat (R-STATE-01).", "pattern": "^/.*[^/]$" }, "class": { "type": "string", "description": "longhorn = 3-replica block storage for app/config/DB state (R-STATE-02); bulk = large external media tier, NOT 3x replicated, backed by a STATIC NFS PersistentVolume the renderer emits (requires `export`).", "enum": ["longhorn", "bulk"], "default": "longhorn" }, "export": { "type": "string", "description": "bulk ONLY: the absolute NFS export path on the bulk server (e.g. /mnt/Storage/plex). The SERVER is NOT named here - it is the ${BULK_NFS_SERVER} cluster-vars knob, so the same ServiceDefinition promotes across environments (R-ENV-02). Required whenever class is bulk; forbidden otherwise.", "pattern": "^/.*[^/]$" }, "subPath": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional relative path WITHIN the volume to mount instead of its root. NOTE for hardlink/atomic-move workloads (Sonarr/Radarr): two subPath mounts of the same export are two separate mounts, so link() across them fails EXDEV. Mount the common ancestor once instead.", "pattern": "^[^/].*[^/]$" }, "readOnly": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Mount this volume read-only. For a bulk volume this also sets the PersistentVolume's nfs.readOnly (the mount really is `ro`) and makes its access mode ReadOnlyMany instead of ReadWriteMany.", "default": false } }, "allOf": [ { "if": { "properties": { "class": { "const": "bulk" } }, "required": ["class"] }, "then": { "required": ["export"] }, "else": { "not": { "required": ["export"] } } } ] } }, "dependencies": { "type": "array", "description": "Explicit east-west allow rules; everything else is denied (docs/03; R-NET-01/02). Empty => the service can reach only DNS.", "default": [], "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["to", "port"], "properties": { "to": { "type": "string", "description": "Destination service name (another catalog entry or a co-located component such as this service's DB).", "minLength": 1 }, "port": { "type": "integer", "description": "Destination TCP/UDP port.", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535 }, "protocol": { "type": "string", "enum": ["tcp", "udp"], "default": "tcp" } } } }, "ingressRoutes": { "type": "array", "description": "Hostnames/ports to expose north-south; rendered to HTTPRoute + Certificate + DNS (docs/08, docs/09; R-DNS/R-TLS).", "default": [], "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["host", "port"], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "description": "Hostname under the platform zone, as a single DNS label plus the ${BASE_DOMAIN} token — e.g. 'gitea.${BASE_DOMAIN}' (docs/09). ${BASE_DOMAIN} is the per-environment hostname suffix from clusters/base/cluster-vars.yaml, resolved by Flux postBuild substitution at reconcile time (dev: home.keithjackson.dev, prod: prod.home.keithjackson.dev). AUTHOR THE TOKEN, NOT A LITERAL: a literal suffix is what let prod be authored to serve dev's public hostnames out of the shared Cloudflare zone, and prod's external-dns then deleted dev's records (infra/PROD-PROVISIONING.md §10). The literal 'home.keithjackson.dev' form stays accepted so the L1 render fixtures — which are renderer INPUTS, not reconciled manifests — keep validating unchanged.", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?\\.(\\$\\{BASE_DOMAIN\\}|home\\.keithjackson\\.dev)$" }, "port": { "type": "integer", "description": "Backing Service port the route targets.", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535 } } } }, "inClusterClients": { "type": "array", "description": "Additional IN-CLUSTER clients, identified by their NAMESPACE, permitted to reach this service's port DIRECTLY — east-west, bypassing the shared Gateway (docs/03; R-NET-01/02). Neither existing field can express this: `ingressRoutes` opens only the north-south path from the Gateway proxy identity (`fromEntities: [ingress]`), and `dependencies` compiles edges only between CATALOG services. A PLATFORM controller that dials this service's ClusterIP is therefore unauthorable — which is exactly how prod's GitOps deadlocked once its GitRepository moved to the in-cluster Gitea Service (source-controller DENIED => the source cannot reconcile => the downstream tier that would fix it never applies). Each entry renders ONE least-privilege ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy: this service's endpointSelector, `fromEndpoints` matching ONLY the named namespace, on ONLY the declared port — never `fromEntities: all`. Additive: the default-deny baseline still denies everything undeclared (R-NET-01). It is NOT a dependency edge and creates no wave ordering — the client is a platform component, not a catalog service.", "default": [], "uniqueItems": true, "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["namespace", "port"], "properties": { "namespace": { "type": "string", "description": "The client's namespace, and the WHOLE identity that is matched (`k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace`): every pod in it is admitted on the declared port. Name a platform-controller namespace whose entire membership may legitimately hold that reach (flux-system, monitoring), never a shared or multi-tenant one.", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", "maxLength": 63 }, "port": { "type": "integer", "description": "The port on THIS service the client may reach (the Service/container port). One entry per port; an undeclared port stays denied.", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535 }, "protocol": { "type": "string", "enum": ["tcp", "udp"], "default": "tcp" }, "name": { "type": "string", "description": "Short client name used in the rendered policy name `-allow--ingress`. Defaults to `namespace`. It exists because that name is operator-facing — it is what `kubectl get cnp` and a Hubble drop show — and because an allowance already applied live can then be authored under its EXISTING name, so Flux adopts the live object in place instead of creating a near-duplicate and leaving an unmanaged leftover (gitea/flux-system: `gitea-allow-flux-ingress`).", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$", "maxLength": 40 } } } }, "auth": { "type": "object", "description": "SSO integration (docs/15, ADR-0014; R-IDP-02/06). Default posture for any exposed UI is forward-auth unless it declares native OIDC (oidc) or a documented exception (native).", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["mode"], "properties": { "mode": { "type": "string", "description": "oidc = app is a Keycloak OIDC client (own login); forward-auth = oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak at the Gateway; native = app manages its own auth (documented exception, e.g. Plex/Seerr, or Keycloak itself as the IdP); none = no auth (internal-only, discouraged).", "enum": ["oidc", "forward-auth", "native", "none"], "default": "forward-auth" }, "groups": { "type": "array", "description": "Keycloak groups permitted access (R-IDP-06). Required and non-empty for oidc/forward-auth (least privilege: authenticated AND in an authorized group). N/A for native/none.", "items": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 }, "uniqueItems": true, "default": [] }, "apiRoutes": { "type": "array", "description": "forward-auth ONLY: path regexes this app serves as a MACHINE API, which the oauth2-proxy sidecar must answer with 401 instead of a 302 to Keycloak (one --api-route per entry; the flag is repeatable and singular -- --api-routes does not exist in v7.8.1 and the proxy refuses to start with it). WHY THIS IS PER-APP AND NOT A RENDERER CONSTANT: oauth2-proxy's built-in AJAX guard fires only on an EXACT `Accept: application/json`, which these apps' JavaScript does not consistently send, so an unauthenticated XHR gets a 302 that the browser follows invisibly, the live Keycloak SSO session satisfies silently, and the call resolves 200 carrying the app's HTML where the JavaScript expected JSON -- no prompt, no error, and on a write it is worse, because a browser following a 302 re-issues a POST as a GET and DROPS THE BODY. Measured on jackett 2026-09-30: 33 x 302 against 2 x 401 on /api/ paths, with 4 of 6 POSTs answered by the proxy and never reaching the app (access-log upstream field `-`). Measured on radarr 2026-10-01, 23h after the cookie fix deployed: 232 x 302, ALL of them POST /signalr/messages/negotiate from the operator's own browser -- a left-open tab whose cookie the rename orphaned, polling forever, silently redirected every time and NEVER re-prompting. But the path shape is a property of the APP, not of the pattern: radarr's broken path is /signalr/ and jackett's is /api/, and pihole serves no /api/ at all, so a renderer-wide constant would apply one app's path shape to five. Declare only paths this app actually serves as JSON/RPC and that a browser never NAVIGATES to. BREADTH IS THE DANGER: too broad and a plain page load answers 401 instead of signing the operator in, i.e. the service looks permanently broken to a logged-out user and no sign-in is ever offered. The item pattern therefore REQUIRES each entry to be anchored at `^/` and to continue with literal path characters, which rejects `^/`, `^/.*`, `.*` and any unanchored or alternated regex; alternation is refused rather than supported because the flag is repeatable, so one regex per route costs nothing and keeps each entry readable. N/A for oidc/native/none (no sidecar is rendered).", "items": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^\\^/[A-Za-z0-9._~/-]+(\\.\\*|\\$)?$" }, "uniqueItems": true, "default": [] } } }, "update": { "type": "object", "description": "Per-service automated-update policy (docs/11; R-UPD-01/02/03). The operator declares the policy once; an automation controller resolves it - no human/AI edits a tag.", "additionalProperties": false, "properties": { "channel": { "type": "string", "description": "Release channel. stable only unless explicitly opted in (R-UPD-01).", "default": "stable" }, "range": { "type": "string", "description": "Acceptable versions: semver range or tag regex (feeds the Flux ImagePolicy)." }, "cadence": { "type": "string", "description": "How often to check/apply (the schedule; scan interval)." }, "autoRollbackOnFailedHealth": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Revert automatically on failed health gates (R-UPD-03).", "default": true }, "pin": { "type": "string", "description": "Operator freeze escape hatch: a fixed version that stops automation for this service." } } }, "observability": { "type": "object", "description": "Observability intent; rendered to ServiceMonitor/PodMonitor + log scraping + dashboards + alerts (docs/10; R-OBS-01).", "additionalProperties": false, "properties": { "metrics": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Whether the platform collects signals for this service (logs to Loki + kube-state-metrics-derived liveness). It does NOT assert that the workload serves a Prometheus endpoint — say that with metricsEndpoint.", "default": true }, "slis": { "type": "array", "description": "Per-service alert intents (e.g. up). Each becomes at least one alert rule (R-OBS-01).", "items": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 }, "default": [] }, "metricsEndpoint": { "type": "object", "description": "WHERE this workload serves Prometheus metrics. Absent (the default for every catalog entry today) means it serves none, and NO ServiceMonitor is rendered — the renderer used to emit one naming port `metrics` regardless, which no rendered Service ever defined, so all twelve monitors discovered zero targets and every `up`-based SLI was structurally inert. When present it renders all three halves of a working scrape together: the named Service port, the ServiceMonitor endpoint, and the monitoring-namespace ingress allow that the default-deny baseline would otherwise drop.", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["port"], "properties": { "port": { "type": "integer", "description": "Container/Service port the metrics endpoint listens on.", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535 }, "name": { "type": "string", "description": "Service port name the ServiceMonitor endpoint selects on.", "minLength": 1, "default": "metrics" }, "path": { "type": "string", "description": "HTTP path serving the Prometheus exposition format.", "minLength": 1, "default": "/metrics" }, "interval": { "type": "string", "description": "Scrape interval (Prometheus duration).", "pattern": "^[0-9]+[smh]$", "default": "30s" } } }, "livenessWorkload": { "type": "object", "description": "WHICH Kubernetes object's readiness constitutes this service being up, for the `up` SLI. Defaults to the object this ServiceDefinition renders (Deployment named after the service for kind: container, VirtualMachineInstance for kind: vm). Override only when the object that actually runs on the cluster is a different one — keycloak's server is a StatefulSet owned by the Keycloak operator, and a Deployment-shaped rule would read an absent series and fire forever.", "additionalProperties": false, "properties": { "kind": { "type": "string", "description": "Workload kind whose kube-state-metrics readiness series the SLI reads.", "enum": ["Deployment", "StatefulSet", "DaemonSet", "VirtualMachineInstance"] }, "name": { "type": "string", "description": "Object name (defaults to the service name).", "minLength": 1 } } } } }, "backup": { "type": "object", "description": "Backup posture (docs/04; R-STATE-03). Irreplaceable state MUST be backed up off-cluster; bulk media may be 'reacquirable'.", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["policy"], "properties": { "policy": { "type": "string", "description": "Reference to an off-cluster backup schedule, or the literal 'reacquirable' for bulk media that is not backed up 1:1.", "minLength": 1 } } } }, "allOf": [ { "$comment": "kind determines which source field is required (docs/13). Absent kind defaults to container -> image.", "if": { "required": ["kind"], "properties": { "kind": { "const": "vm" } } }, "then": { "properties": { "source": { "required": ["vmTemplate"] } } }, "else": { "properties": { "source": { "required": ["image"] } } } }, { "$comment": "oidc/forward-auth require at least one authorized group (R-IDP-06; docs/15 acceptance gate: restricted to the allowed group).", "if": { "required": ["auth"], "properties": { "auth": { "required": ["mode"], "properties": { "mode": { "enum": ["oidc", "forward-auth"] } } } } }, "then": { "properties": { "auth": { "required": ["groups"], "properties": { "groups": { "minItems": 1 } } } } } }, { "$comment": "auth.apiRoutes only has a consumer under forward-auth: it renders --api-route onto the per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar, and no sidecar is rendered for oidc/native/none. Declaring it elsewhere would be a SILENT NO-OP -- the operator believes the app's XHRs now answer 401 and nothing changed -- so it is rejected at the schema instead (R-IDP-02).", "if": { "required": ["auth"], "properties": { "auth": { "required": ["apiRoutes"], "properties": { "apiRoutes": { "minItems": 1 } } } } }, "then": { "properties": { "auth": { "required": ["mode"], "properties": { "mode": { "const": "forward-auth" } } } } } }, { "$comment": "public exposure must not be unauthenticated: an explicit auth.mode 'none' is disallowed on public services (docs/13 v1.1, docs/15, R-IDP-02). Absent auth defaults to forward-auth at render time, so it is permitted here.", "if": { "required": ["exposure"], "properties": { "exposure": { "const": "public" } } }, "then": { "properties": { "auth": { "properties": { "mode": { "not": { "const": "none" } } } } } } } ], "$defs": { "execHandler": { "type": "object", "description": "A container lifecycle hook. Only the exec form is supported (a command run inside the container); mirrors k8s LifecycleHandler.exec.", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["exec"], "properties": { "exec": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["command"], "properties": { "command": { "type": "array", "description": "Command line to execute inside the container. Not run in a shell unless the command itself invokes one.", "minItems": 1, "items": { "type": "string" } } } } } } } }