jakman85andClaude Opus 5
5da116b34d
The four forward-auth media UIs (jackett, qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr) gate on `--allowed-group=media-users` alone. On prod the `homelab` realm has exactly one user — the operator's `jakman85` — and it is a member of `platform-admins` ONLY. `media-users` has zero members, so those four hosts were reachable by nobody: oauth2-proxy completed OIDC discovery, redirected to Keycloak, got a token whose `groups` claim is `["platform-admins"]`, found no allowed group in it, and answered 403. No login form appeared because the browser already held a Keycloak SSO session from a platform-admins login — hence "403 immediately". pihole and crafty were unaffected: they already gate on platform-admins. `--allowed-group` is repeatable and OR-ed, so listing both groups means "media consumers OR platform operators". This grants no real privilege — platform-admins already maps to cluster-admin via k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins), so a member can already exec into these pods — and it keeps media-users meaningful for non-admin household accounts. Ruled out while diagnosing: client-secret drift (all 7 sidecar secrets hash-match keycloak-realm-clients), stale apex URLs (every live sidecar carries keycloak.prod.home.keithjackson.dev), missing group mappers (all 7 clients emit claim=groups, full.path=false), and the central oauth2-proxy pod restarts — those were Keycloak returning 503 "no healthy upstream" to OIDC discovery at startup, a consequence of the Keycloak roll, not a cause. Goldens re-rendered with the canonical command: python3 catalog/render.py --all catalog -o apps --wave-layout --no-image-automation R-IDP-06 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
65 lines
4.4 KiB
YAML
65 lines
4.4 KiB
YAML
# ServiceDefinition: jackett
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# Source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md row 4; docs/03-networking-isolation-and-egress.md;
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# docs/15-identity-and-access.md; decisions/adr-0015 (VPN egress steering).
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# internal indexer proxy | egress VPN + kill-switch | config on Longhorn | auth forward-auth
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# (bare web UI, no native OIDC).
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#
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# VPN-class (docs/13 row 4; docs/03 "VPN-class set"): Jackett scrapes public torrent indexers/trackers;
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# that egress MUST leave via the node PIA tunnel, never the WAN. `egress: vpn` renders the
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# homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class=vpn pod label the shared CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy
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# (platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml) selects on to steer + kill-switch the traffic OUTSIDE the
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# workload (R-NET-05/06/07). No independent egress path; fail-closed if tun0 is down.
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#
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# Inbound reachability (← sonarr, ← radarr) is an EAST-WEST allow rendered on the arr side when those
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# services are onboarded. This service initiates nothing east-west, so dependencies is empty (reaches
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# only DNS + VPN internet). Validates against schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json.
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name: jackett
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kind: container
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source:
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image: lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett:latest
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exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 4; R-DNS/R-NET)
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egress: vpn # indexer scraping via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
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storage:
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- name: config
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size: 2Gi
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class: longhorn # indexer definitions/API keys on 3-replica Longhorn (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
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mountPath: /config # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
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# LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
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# /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
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# holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
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# configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
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# every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
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# 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
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# dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
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# This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
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# The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
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# so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
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dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02)
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ingressRoutes:
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- host: jackett.${BASE_DOMAIN}
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port: 9117 # Jackett WebUI; protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09, docs/15)
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auth:
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mode: forward-auth # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
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groups:
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- media-users # authenticated AND in an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
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# platform-admins is a SUPERSET, not a widening. --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
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# listing both means "media consumers OR platform operators". Without it the media UIs are
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# reachable by NOBODY the moment media-users is empty: on prod the realm's only user is the
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# operator, who is in platform-admins only, so jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr answered an
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# immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback (no login prompt, because the Keycloak SSO session
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# already existed) while pihole/crafty — which already gate on platform-admins — worked.
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# This grants no real privilege: platform-admins already maps to cluster-admin via
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# k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins), so a member can already exec into these pods.
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- platform-admins # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
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update:
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channel: stable # R-UPD-01
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range: ">=0.22.0" # stay on the Jackett 0.22.x stable line
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cadence: "0 4 * * *"
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autoRollbackOnFailedHealth: true # R-UPD-03
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observability:
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metrics: true
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slis:
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- up # indexer proxy down -> alert (docs/10; R-OBS-01)
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backup:
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policy: daily-offcluster # indexer config/API keys backed up off-cluster (docs/04; R-STATE-03)
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