jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8
b2752aec48
Roll the verified Option-B per-app oauth2-proxy sidecar out to the remaining four forward-auth apps after the pihole canary was confirmed fail-closed (unauthenticated -> 302 to Keycloak, pod 2/2, clean sidecar OIDC discovery). Each app's Gateway route now terminates at its oauth2-proxy sidecar (:4180, --allowed-group=media-users, --upstream=http://127.0.0.1:<uiport>); the gateway-ingress CiliumNetworkPolicy allows the Gateway to reach ONLY :4180, so the bare UI is never served un-authenticated (fail-closed; R-IDP-02/06). The apps' own app/API ports stay in-Service for EAST-WEST callers (arr -> qbittorrent:8080 / jackett:9117) via the existing reciprocal-ingress allows. - keycloak: confidential jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr clients (realm-import + realm-clients mirror), provisioned live via kcadm (groups membership mapper). - secrets: four SOPS/age <app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials, wired into apps/wave-0 and apps/wave-1 by the renderer's sidecar-creds wave rule. - ci: remove the temporary canary deferral (all five goldens now reproduce). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
602 lines
26 KiB
YAML
602 lines
26 KiB
YAML
---
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# Identity config as code (R-IDP-03): the `homelab` realm — groups, roles, OIDC clients, brute-force
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# hardening, and a conditional MFA flow that REQUIRES OTP for platform-admins (R-IDP-04). Reconciled
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# declaratively by the Keycloak Operator; CARRIED BY platform-config (dependsOn platform).
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#
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# Client secrets are NOT in this file: they are injected from the SOPS-encrypted keycloak-realm-clients
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# Secret via spec.placeholders ($(env:...)) — so secrets exist only encrypted (R-IDP-04; SOPS, docs/07).
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# Until that Secret is filled (operator hand-off, see keycloak-realm-clients.sops.yaml.example), this
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# import stays PENDING on the unresolved placeholder.
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apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
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kind: KeycloakRealmImport
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metadata:
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name: homelab
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namespace: keycloak
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spec:
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keycloakCRName: keycloak
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placeholders:
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GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: grafana-client-secret
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OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: oauth2-proxy-client-secret
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GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: gitea-client-secret
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NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: nextcloud-client-secret
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SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: semaphore-client-secret
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HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: headlamp-client-secret
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CRAFTY_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: crafty-client-secret
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PIHOLE_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: pihole-client-secret
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JACKETT_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: jackett-client-secret
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QBITTORRENT_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: qbittorrent-client-secret
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RADARR_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: radarr-client-secret
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SONARR_CLIENT_SECRET:
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secret:
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name: keycloak-realm-clients
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key: sonarr-client-secret
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realm:
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realm: homelab
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enabled: true
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displayName: "Homelab SSO"
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loginWithEmailAllowed: true
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registrationAllowed: false
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resetPasswordAllowed: true
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# Hardening (docs/15): brute-force detection ON; SSL required for external (edge-TLS) requests.
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bruteForceProtected: true
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permanentLockout: false
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sslRequired: external
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# --- Authorization model (R-IDP-06): groups drive access; platform-admins carry a realm role. ---
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roles:
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realm:
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- name: platform-admin
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description: "Privileged platform administrators — MFA required (R-IDP-04)."
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groups:
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- name: platform-admins
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realmRoles:
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- platform-admin
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- name: media-users
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- name: viewers
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# --- OIDC clients (native SSO). Group membership is exposed as a `groups` claim so apps and
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# oauth2-proxy can authorize by group (R-IDP-06). ---
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clients:
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# Grafana — the concrete native-OIDC SSO proof target (docs/10 / deliverable #4).
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- clientId: grafana
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name: Grafana
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:GRAFANA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev/login/generic_oauth
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webOrigins:
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- https://grafana.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# oauth2-proxy — forward-auth for non-OIDC UIs (PiHole, *arr, Prometheus, Alertmanager, …).
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- clientId: oauth2-proxy
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name: oauth2-proxy (forward-auth)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://*.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
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- https://auth.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
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webOrigins:
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- https://*.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# kubernetes — kubectl OIDC login via kubelogin (int128/kubelogin `oidc-login`). PUBLIC client +
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# PKCE (S256) so NO client secret lives in any user's kubeconfig; kubelogin runs the auth-code
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# +PKCE flow against a localhost callback and caches the ID token. The k3s API server validates
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# that ID token (kube-apiserver oidc-issuer-url=this realm, oidc-client-id=kubernetes,
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# oidc-username-claim=email, oidc-groups-claim=groups); RBAC binds the `groups` claim — see
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# k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml (oidc:platform-admins -> cluster-admin, oidc:viewers -> view). The cert
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# kubeconfig remains the break-glass admin, independent of Keycloak/OIDC availability.
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- clientId: kubernetes
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name: Kubernetes (kubectl)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: true
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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attributes:
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"pkce.code.challenge.method": "S256"
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redirectUris:
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- http://localhost:8000
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- http://localhost:8000/
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- http://localhost:18000
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- http://localhost:18000/
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- http://127.0.0.1:8000
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- http://127.0.0.1:8000/
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- http://127.0.0.1:18000
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- http://127.0.0.1:18000/
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webOrigins:
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- http://localhost
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- http://127.0.0.1
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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# offline_access (optional): lets kubelogin request a long-lived OFFLINE refresh token via
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# `--oidc-extra-scope=offline_access`, so the operator's kubectl isn't forced to re-auth on the
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# ONLINE session idle/max timeouts (ssoSessionIdleTimeout 30m / ssoSessionMaxLifespan 10h).
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# Offline tokens honour offlineSessionIdleTimeout (30d) with offlineSessionMaxLifespanEnabled=false
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# (no hard cap) — see k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml header for the kubeconfig exec-arg. Optional (not default)
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# so it is opt-in per the client's request scopes; realm session timeouts stay unchanged.
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optionalClientScopes:
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- offline_access
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# gitea — native OIDC SSO for the bootstrapping-critical git host (catalog/gitea.yaml auth.mode
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# oidc; docs/13 SSO row, docs/15 "Native OIDC"; R-IDP-02). Confidential auth-code client modeled on
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# grafana. Redirect URI is Gitea's OAuth2 callback for the auth source named `keycloak`
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# (/user/oauth2/<source>/callback). The `groups` claim drives authorization: Gitea maps the
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# platform-admins group -> Gitea admin (auth source --admin-group; R-IDP-06). The LOCAL Gitea admin
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# remains the break-glass path (docs/15 availability caveat). Secret injected from the SOPS
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# keycloak-realm-clients Secret via the GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET placeholder (R-IDP-04).
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- clientId: gitea
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name: Gitea
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev/user/oauth2/keycloak/callback
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webOrigins:
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- https://gitea.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# nextcloud — native OIDC SSO for the file-sync host (catalog/nextcloud.yaml auth.mode oidc; docs/13
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# SSO row, docs/15; R-IDP-02). Confidential auth-code client modeled on grafana. Redirect URI is the
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# user_oidc app's callback (/apps/user_oidc/code). The `groups` claim drives group provisioning in
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# Nextcloud (user_oidc --group-provisioning; R-IDP-06). The LOCAL Nextcloud admin stays break-glass
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# (docs/15). Secret injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-clients Secret via NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET.
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- clientId: nextcloud
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name: Nextcloud
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:NEXTCLOUD_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/apps/user_oidc/code
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webOrigins:
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- https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev
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# Post-logout redirect allow-list (#logout "redirect failed"). On sign-out user_oidc redirects the
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# browser to Keycloak's end_session_endpoint with post_logout_redirect_uri=<Nextcloud base '/'> and
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# client_id=nextcloud but NO id_token_hint (provider sendIdTokenHint=0), so Keycloak validates the
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# redirect against this client attribute — empty => "Invalid redirect uri" => the operator's
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# "redirect failed". The wildcard covers the base URL and any logout landing path. Keycloak stores
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# this as the client attribute `post.logout.redirect.uris` (## separates multiple values).
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attributes:
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post.logout.redirect.uris: https://nextcloud.home.keithjackson.dev/*
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# semaphore — native OIDC SSO for the Ansible UI (catalog/semaphore.yaml auth.mode oidc; docs/13 SSO
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# row, docs/15; R-IDP-02). Confidential auth-code client modeled on grafana. Redirect URI is
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# Semaphore's OIDC callback (/api/auth/oidc/<provider>/redirect for provider `keycloak`). The
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# `groups` claim is exposed for authorization (R-IDP-06). The LOCAL Semaphore admin stays break-glass
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# (docs/15). Secret injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-clients Secret via SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET.
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- clientId: semaphore
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name: Semaphore
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:SEMAPHORE_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev/api/auth/oidc/keycloak/redirect
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webOrigins:
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- https://semaphore.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# headlamp — the Kubernetes dashboard (platform/headlamp). Confidential auth-code client modeled
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# on grafana. Redirect URI is Headlamp's OIDC callback (<base>/oidc-callback). Headlamp forwards
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# the logged-in user's id_token to the k3s apiserver as the bearer, so RBAC is applied PER USER
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# via the existing oidc:* group bindings (k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml) — NOT via Headlamp's ServiceAccount.
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#
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# AUDIENCE MAPPER (the key integration nuance): the apiserver is configured oidc-client-id=
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# kubernetes, so it only accepts ID tokens whose `aud` CONTAINS `kubernetes`. A plain `headlamp`
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# client issues aud=[headlamp] -> the apiserver would REJECT it. The oidc-audience-mapper below
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# ADDS the `kubernetes` client to the audience, giving aud=[headlamp, kubernetes]: Headlamp's own
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# verifier accepts it (aud contains headlamp) AND the apiserver accepts it (aud contains
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# kubernetes). This keeps the apiserver's oidc config untouched (preferred over widening
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# api-audiences). The `groups` mapper (same as the other clients) carries the group claim the
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# apiserver maps to oidc:<group> for the RBAC bindings.
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- clientId: headlamp
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name: Headlamp (Kubernetes dashboard)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:HEADLAMP_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev/oidc-callback
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webOrigins:
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- https://headlamp.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# Add `kubernetes` to the token audience so the k3s apiserver (oidc-client-id=kubernetes)
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# accepts the forwarded id_token. `included.client.audience` names the existing `kubernetes`
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# client; the mapper appends it to `aud` in the ID token (and access token, harmless).
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- name: audience-kubernetes
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-audience-mapper
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config:
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"included.client.audience": kubernetes
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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# crafty — the Minecraft management panel (platform/crafty). Crafty's web UI has NO native OIDC,
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# so it is gated by a PER-APP oauth2-proxy REVERSE-PROXY sidecar (Option B; platform/crafty +
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# platform/oauth2-proxy/README.md) — this is that sidecar's confidential auth-code client, modeled
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# on the grafana/oauth2-proxy clients. Redirect URI is the oauth2-proxy callback on Crafty's host.
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# The `groups` claim (bare names) lets the sidecar enforce --allowed-groups=platform-admins
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# (R-IDP-06). Secret injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-clients Secret via CRAFTY_CLIENT_SECRET
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# (R-IDP-04); the SAME value is mirrored in platform/crafty/crafty-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml
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# (cross-namespace mirror, like grafana/gitea/headlamp). Provisioned live via kcadm at authoring
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# time (2026-08-28) and captured here as the durable GitOps source of truth.
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- clientId: crafty
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name: Crafty Controller (oauth2-proxy)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:CRAFTY_CLIENT_SECRET)"
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redirectUris:
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- https://crafty.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
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webOrigins:
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- https://crafty.home.keithjackson.dev
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defaultClientScopes:
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- email
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- profile
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- roles
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protocolMappers:
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- name: groups
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protocol: openid-connect
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protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
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config:
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"full.path": "false"
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"id.token.claim": "true"
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"access.token.claim": "true"
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"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
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"claim.name": groups
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# pihole — the DNS admin UI (catalog/pihole.yaml auth.mode forward-auth). PiHole's UI has NO
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# native OIDC, so it is gated by a PER-APP oauth2-proxy REVERSE-PROXY sidecar (Option B, rendered
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# by catalog/render.py) — this is that sidecar's confidential auth-code client, modeled on the
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# crafty/oauth2-proxy clients. Redirect URI is the oauth2-proxy callback on PiHole's host. The
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# `groups` claim (bare names) lets the sidecar enforce --allowed-group=platform-admins (R-IDP-06).
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# Secret injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-clients Secret via PIHOLE_CLIENT_SECRET (R-IDP-04);
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# the SAME value is mirrored in apps/wave-0/pihole-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml (cross-
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# namespace mirror). Provisioned live via kcadm at authoring time (2026-08-31) and captured here
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# as the durable GitOps source of truth (the operator imports the realm once; kcadm is authoritative).
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- clientId: pihole
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name: PiHole (oauth2-proxy)
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protocol: openid-connect
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enabled: true
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publicClient: false
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standardFlowEnabled: true
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directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
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secret: "$(env:PIHOLE_CLIENT_SECRET)"
|
|
redirectUris:
|
|
- https://pihole.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
|
|
webOrigins:
|
|
- https://pihole.home.keithjackson.dev
|
|
defaultClientScopes:
|
|
- email
|
|
- profile
|
|
- roles
|
|
protocolMappers:
|
|
- name: groups
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
|
|
config:
|
|
"full.path": "false"
|
|
"id.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"access.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"claim.name": groups
|
|
# jackett/qbittorrent/radarr/sonarr — media stack UIs (catalog/*.yaml auth.mode forward-auth,
|
|
# auth.groups media-users). Each has a bare UI with no usable native OIDC, gated by a per-app
|
|
# oauth2-proxy REVERSE-PROXY sidecar (Option B, rendered by catalog/render.py) — these are those
|
|
# sidecars' confidential auth-code clients, modeled on the crafty/pihole clients. Redirect URI is
|
|
# the oauth2-proxy callback on each app's host; the `groups` mapper (bare names) lets the sidecar
|
|
# enforce --allowed-group=media-users (R-IDP-06). Secrets injected from the SOPS keycloak-realm-
|
|
# clients Secret via the *_CLIENT_SECRET placeholders (R-IDP-04); the SAME values are mirrored in
|
|
# apps/wave-*/<app>-oauth2-proxy-credentials.sops.yaml. Provisioned live via kcadm 2026-08-31 and
|
|
# captured here as the durable GitOps source of truth (operator imports once; kcadm authoritative).
|
|
- clientId: jackett
|
|
name: Jackett (oauth2-proxy)
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
publicClient: false
|
|
standardFlowEnabled: true
|
|
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
|
|
secret: "$(env:JACKETT_CLIENT_SECRET)"
|
|
redirectUris:
|
|
- https://jackett.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
|
|
webOrigins:
|
|
- https://jackett.home.keithjackson.dev
|
|
defaultClientScopes:
|
|
- email
|
|
- profile
|
|
- roles
|
|
protocolMappers:
|
|
- name: groups
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
|
|
config:
|
|
"full.path": "false"
|
|
"id.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"access.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"claim.name": groups
|
|
- clientId: qbittorrent
|
|
name: qBittorrent (oauth2-proxy)
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
publicClient: false
|
|
standardFlowEnabled: true
|
|
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
|
|
secret: "$(env:QBITTORRENT_CLIENT_SECRET)"
|
|
redirectUris:
|
|
- https://qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
|
|
webOrigins:
|
|
- https://qbittorrent.home.keithjackson.dev
|
|
defaultClientScopes:
|
|
- email
|
|
- profile
|
|
- roles
|
|
protocolMappers:
|
|
- name: groups
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
|
|
config:
|
|
"full.path": "false"
|
|
"id.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"access.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"claim.name": groups
|
|
- clientId: radarr
|
|
name: Radarr (oauth2-proxy)
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
publicClient: false
|
|
standardFlowEnabled: true
|
|
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
|
|
secret: "$(env:RADARR_CLIENT_SECRET)"
|
|
redirectUris:
|
|
- https://radarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
|
|
webOrigins:
|
|
- https://radarr.home.keithjackson.dev
|
|
defaultClientScopes:
|
|
- email
|
|
- profile
|
|
- roles
|
|
protocolMappers:
|
|
- name: groups
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
|
|
config:
|
|
"full.path": "false"
|
|
"id.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"access.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"claim.name": groups
|
|
- clientId: sonarr
|
|
name: Sonarr (oauth2-proxy)
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
publicClient: false
|
|
standardFlowEnabled: true
|
|
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false
|
|
secret: "$(env:SONARR_CLIENT_SECRET)"
|
|
redirectUris:
|
|
- https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev/oauth2/callback
|
|
webOrigins:
|
|
- https://sonarr.home.keithjackson.dev
|
|
defaultClientScopes:
|
|
- email
|
|
- profile
|
|
- roles
|
|
protocolMappers:
|
|
- name: groups
|
|
protocol: openid-connect
|
|
protocolMapper: oidc-group-membership-mapper
|
|
config:
|
|
"full.path": "false"
|
|
"id.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"access.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"userinfo.token.claim": "true"
|
|
"claim.name": groups
|
|
# --- MFA for platform-admins (R-IDP-04): a browser flow whose OTP step is CONDITIONAL on the
|
|
# platform-admin role. Non-admins log in without OTP; platform-admins must enroll/present TOTP.
|
|
# Set as the realm browserFlow below. VERIFY at bring-up (see runbook): a malformed flow fails
|
|
# the whole import — if so, the fallback is to comment this block + browserFlow and configure
|
|
# the conditional-OTP-by-role flow via the admin console. ---
|
|
authenticationFlows:
|
|
- alias: browser-mfa
|
|
description: "Browser flow with conditional OTP required for platform-admins."
|
|
providerId: basic-flow
|
|
topLevel: true
|
|
builtIn: false
|
|
authenticationExecutions:
|
|
- authenticator: auth-cookie
|
|
authenticatorFlow: false
|
|
requirement: ALTERNATIVE
|
|
priority: 10
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
- authenticator: identity-provider-redirector
|
|
authenticatorFlow: false
|
|
requirement: ALTERNATIVE
|
|
priority: 20
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
- authenticatorFlow: true
|
|
requirement: ALTERNATIVE
|
|
priority: 30
|
|
flowAlias: browser-mfa-forms
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
- alias: browser-mfa-forms
|
|
description: "Username/password then conditional OTP."
|
|
providerId: basic-flow
|
|
topLevel: false
|
|
builtIn: false
|
|
authenticationExecutions:
|
|
- authenticator: auth-username-password-form
|
|
authenticatorFlow: false
|
|
requirement: REQUIRED
|
|
priority: 10
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
- authenticatorFlow: true
|
|
requirement: CONDITIONAL
|
|
priority: 20
|
|
flowAlias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
- alias: browser-mfa-conditional-otp
|
|
description: "Require OTP only for users with the platform-admin role."
|
|
providerId: basic-flow
|
|
topLevel: false
|
|
builtIn: false
|
|
authenticationExecutions:
|
|
- authenticator: conditional-user-role
|
|
authenticatorFlow: false
|
|
requirement: REQUIRED
|
|
priority: 10
|
|
authenticatorConfig: conditional-otp-platform-admin
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
- authenticator: auth-otp-form
|
|
authenticatorFlow: false
|
|
requirement: REQUIRED
|
|
priority: 20
|
|
userSetupAllowed: false
|
|
authenticatorConfig:
|
|
- alias: conditional-otp-platform-admin
|
|
config:
|
|
# Keycloak's conditional-user-role authenticator reads the role from `condUserRole`
|
|
# (ConditionalUserRoleAuthenticatorFactory.CONDITIONAL_USER_ROLE). The prior key
|
|
# "condition.evaluated.user.role" is not a real property, so the role resolved to null →
|
|
# "Invalid role name submitted: null" → the REQUIRED conditional-OTP step threw and blocked
|
|
# every platform-admins login (e.g. Headlamp) with a 403. Value is the realm role name.
|
|
condUserRole: platform-admin
|
|
negate: "false"
|
|
browserFlow: browser-mfa
|