Files
jakman85andClaude Opus 4.8 948c390272 conformance: serialize heavy L2/L3 tests + author alerting SMTP sink
TASK 1 — reliably single-pass green L2/L3:
Split run_chainsaw into a LIGHT pass (concurrent, config parallelism) and a
HEAVY pass (serial, parallel=1). The KubeVirt-CDI/Longhorn/DR tests
(vm-lifecycle, vm-data-survival, vm-default-deny, data-survival, dr-restore)
spike embedded-etcd on the small dev VMs; running them serially in their own
pass keeps their etcd spikes from ever coinciding with another test's setup —
the coincidence that let one heavy test's apiserver blip fail-close Kyverno
admission and abort every in-flight test at 0.01s. Heavy set is keyed by test
dir basename and overridable via CONF_HEAVY_TESTS. Each pass writes its own
JUnit; lib/merge_junit.py stitches them into the one stable report.junit.xml
CI collects, so the split is invisible downstream. Overall rc is the union of
both passes (no masking — real failures still surface).

Proof: full --layer l2,l3 run now completes single-pass green: 24/24 passed,
0 failures/errors/skipped. vpn-killswitch, which previously failed with an
apiserver EOF (etcd blip), passed; no mass environmental setup-aborts.

TASK 2 (T-4.1) — author conformance/tests/l3-fault-injection/alerting/
fixtures/smtp-sink.yaml: a hermetic Mailpit SMTP capture sink (Service
smtp-sink, SMTP 1025, HTTP API 8025) the alerting test applies as its mail
sink. restricted-PodSecurity compliant, in-memory (no PVC). Unblocks the
previously-aborting alerting scaffold; it now passes.

Touches conformance/ + ci-read content only — no apps/ or platform/ workload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-08-26 02:56:56 -05:00
..

Conformance tests — layout & requirement-tagging convention

Every test is a Chainsaw Test in its own directory:

tests/
  l1-rendering/        L1 — ServiceDefinition -> rendered resources match golden
  l2-behavioral/       L2 — real runtime behavior (probes against a cluster)
  l3-fault-injection/  L3 — break something; assert fail-closed / no-data-loss
  meta/                harness self-checks (R-TEST-*), cluster-independent
    <test-name>/chainsaw-test.yaml

The layer a test belongs to is its subtree and its .../layer annotation; the coverage generator cross-checks the two.

Requirement-tagging convention (authoritative)

A test declares the requirement(s) it verifies three ways; the label is the source of truth, the annotations must agree with it (the coverage generator fails on drift):

metadata:
  name: default-deny
  labels:
    # ONE label per verified R-* ID. Machine-selectable + coverage source of truth.
    conformance.home.k3s/R-NET-01: "true"
  annotations:
    # Human-readable canonical list — MUST equal the label set.
    conformance.home.k3s/requirements: "R-NET-01"
    # Declared layer (L1|L2|L3|META) — must match the subtree.
    conformance.home.k3s/layer: "L2"
    # true => R-TEST-05 requires this to be (or have) an L3 fault-injection test.
    conformance.home.k3s/safety-critical: "false"
    # Given/When/Then intent, for the coverage report and reviewers.
    conformance.home.k3s/intent: "Given ... When ... Then ..."

Why a label per requirement (not a comma list): Kubernetes label values can't hold a comma-separated list, and chainsaw test --selector selects on label keys/values. One conformance.home.k3s/<R-ID>=true label per requirement makes both subset-selection and coverage extraction exact and robust.

How this drives the tooling

  • Subset runs (merge gate): run.sh --requirements R-NET-01,R-NET-06 resolves the R-IDs to the set of test dirs carrying those labels (union, deduped) and runs each once.
  • Coverage (lib/coverage.py): reads these labels from every chainsaw-test.yaml, maps each registry requirement -> its verifying test(s), and flags gaps + any label/annotation mismatch + tags not in the registry.
  • JUnit: results (real or skipped-scaffold) carry the R-IDs in classname + properties, so the JUnit itself stays traceable (R-TEST-04).

Authoring rules (R-TEST-01/02/06)

  • Behavior, not existence. Assert what the system does (a probe cannot connect), never that an object merely exists (a policy can exist and not enforce).
  • Given/When/Then structure with given-*/when-*/then-* step names.
  • Hermetic & self-cleaning. Rely on Chainsaw's per-test namespace + auto-teardown; put any out-of-namespace fixture cleanup in a finally block. A leaked fixture is a failure.
  • Bounded, deterministic waits. Use assert/error polling within the config timeouts; never sleep-and-hope.
  • Safety-critical => fault-injection. For a safety-critical requirement, actually break the thing and assert fail-closed / no-data-loss, with finally restoring state.
  • Never weaken a test to go green (R-TEST-06). If the spec can't be met, escalate to the PM — do not relax the assertion or the requirement.

Scaffolds in this tree carry TODO(T-x.y) markers where a fixture/assertion lands as a later roadmap phase delivers the capability under test.