jakman85andClaude Opus 5
a2440a3125
Two halves of one repeatable upgrade process. Neither works alone. (a) OS upgrades and reboots platform/kured/ — Kubernetes Reboot Daemon, chart 6.1.0/app 1.23.0, in its own Flux Kustomization (dependsOn platform, wait:true). NOT in platform/kustomization.yaml: that tier gates platform-config and every apps wave, so a wedged reboot daemon there could stall every application. A component added to make maintenance safer must not be able to cause an outage. infra/ansible/roles/unattended_upgrades/ — new role (node_baseline is touched by other open branches, and this is a different lifecycle), enabled for prod in group_vars. The human gate is the SENTINEL, which is how this honours node_baseline's "IT DOES NOT REBOOT" (k3s-prod-2 hung on a warm reboot 2026-09-03) and cluster-upgrade-plan.md's rejection of automating away the gate between nodes: u-u is security-only with the kernel blacklisted, so it essentially never writes /var/run/reboot-required. That file appears when an operator deliberately runs node-baseline.yml --tags kernel. kured then does only the mechanical half, including the ordering rule node_baseline has to shout. Quorum: concurrent reboots are structurally impossible, not merely unlikely. concurrency:1 plus kured's single lock annotation (API-server optimistic concurrency), and lockTtl:0 — an expiring lock is exactly the 3-node etcd catastrophe, so a hung node holds it forever and nothing cascades. Longhorn: measured 25 volumes x 3 replicas, hard anti-affinity, 600s replenishment wait, serialized rebuild — so every drain degrades ALL volumes to 2/3 and the inter-node gate must be volume robustness, not pod readiness. Doubled: lockReleaseDelay 30m (unconditional) plus kured's Prometheus alert gate (semantic). alertFilterMatchOnly:true is load-bearing — the flag inverts the regexp's meaning, and under the chart default kured would have been blocked on day one by the five alerts measured firing with no end in sight, and never rebooted anything. Kernel floor (kernel >= 6.13, EFI memattr): excluded TWICE. The running kernel comes from o=Debian Backports, which is not an allowed origin, so u-u cannot see a kernel upgrade; and ^linux- is blacklisted anyway so widening origins later cannot re-arm it. Asserted against apt-config dump, not against the file just written. 6.12 kernels are still installed and bootable on all three nodes, and nothing was held. Closes a silent no-op: update-notifier-common was absent on all three nodes, so NOTHING could create the sentinel. kured alone would have idled forever at 1/1 Running. platform/kured/alerts.yaml — three rules over kured's only metric, with a companion promtool suite pinning each both ways, plus runbooks/node-reboot-automation.md. Window is DAILY 03:00-06:00 because a weekly one forces for:8d, longer than this cluster's 7d Prometheus retention. (b) Image/dependency automation Renovate was aspirational: renovate.json present and complete, with no workflow, no in-cluster workload, and its docker+kubernetes managers disabled — so every plain image: tag was maintained by nothing while seven files claimed otherwise. .gitea/workflows/renovate.yaml — scheduled daily, dry_run default true for a safe first run, and a preflight that FAILS (not skips) without RENOVATE_TOKEN, because a skipped Gitea job reports success and that is how this stayed inert. Renovate now owns both halves; Flux image-automation is formally closed: it pushes commits rather than opening PRs (bypassing CLAUDE.md §1), and it cannot work here anyway — main is protected user_can_push:false and the flux-system GitRepository has no secretRef. Its controllers are installed and have idled 43 days with zero CRs. conformance/: +34/-0, one new SCRAPE_OWNERS entry claiming kured_. Weakens nothing; tightens the check for this component (requires service.create+metrics.create, both chart-default false, plus a companion NetworkPolicy requirement). Required because assertion (3) fails an alert over an unclaimed metric and KNOWN_UNWIRED_METRICS is shrink-only. Sensitive paths touched: clusters/**, conformance/**, .gitea/** — needs a non-author approving review; /approve-override deliberately NOT posted. NOT verified: no OS upgrade run, no node rebooted, no lock observed, the Ansible role never executed, and whether CNPG switches its primary on a drain-induced eviction (the most likely way the first real reboot fails). Full list in the handoff entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
platform/
Cluster-wide platform services, Flux-managed (R-PLAT-01, R-GITOPS-01/02/03). Reconciled
by the platform Flux Kustomization defined in clusters/base/platform.yaml,
before apps/.
Governing spec: docs/05-gitops-and-delivery.md,
docs/01-architecture-overview.md.
Phase 0 scaffolding only. Every component here is a structurally-correct stub — a Flux HelmRelease and/or Kustomization with a values placeholder, a README citing the governing ADR/spec, and TODOs for the phase that fills it in. No cluster exists; nothing reconciles yet. Do not add working config, secrets, or provisioning under Phase 0 (spec
AGENTS.md§1/§5/§6,roadmap/phases.md).
Reconciliation flow (how a change lands)
git (source of truth)
│ operator PR → CI (lint · schema · Kyverno L0 · Chainsaw) → merge to tracked branch
▼
Flux GitRepository (clusters/base/flux-system.yaml)
▼
Flux Kustomization "platform" → ./platform (this dir) ── substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┐
│ prune=true (drift correction, R-GITOPS-03) · wait=true │ R-ENV-02
▼ │
Flux Kustomization "apps" → ./apps (dependsOn platform) ─ substituteFrom cluster-vars ──┘
Git is authoritative; the cluster conforms to git and drift is auto-corrected (R-GITOPS-01/03).
Manual kubectl apply of platform state is prohibited (spec AGENTS.md §5).
The dev ↔ prod overlay model (R-ENV-02)
Platform manifests are authored once. Every value that legitimately differs between environments
is a ${TOKEN} resolved from the cluster-vars ConfigMap via Flux postBuild.substituteFrom. The
clusters/dev and clusters/prod overlays differ only by the values they patch into
cluster-vars (issuer, replica counts, storage sizes, retention). See
clusters/README.md. Base manifests are never forked per environment.
Components (one directory each)
| Dir | Component | Governing ADR / spec | Serves |
|---|---|---|---|
cilium/ |
CNI + kube-proxy replacement + Gateway API + Egress Gateway + Hubble | ADR-0002, docs/03 | R-NET-* |
longhorn/ |
Replicated block storage; 3-replica default StorageClass + bulk tier | ADR-0003, docs/04 | R-STATE-* |
cert-manager/ |
TLS via Let's Encrypt DNS-01 (Cloudflare); staging + prod ClusterIssuers | ADR-0006, docs/08 | R-TLS-* |
externaldns/ |
Automatic DNS records for public services (Cloudflare) | docs/09 | R-DNS-* |
gateway/ |
Gateway API GatewayClass + shared HTTPS Gateway + wildcard cert | ADR-0002/ADR-0006, docs/09 | R-DNS-01, R-TLS-01 |
monitoring/ |
kube-prometheus-stack + Loki + Grafana Alloy + Alertmanager | docs/10 | R-OBS-* |
velero/ |
Off-cluster backup/DR of volumes + resource state | ADR-0003, docs/04 | R-STATE-03 |
kubevirt/ |
KubeVirt + CDI (IaaS: application VMs on the same K8s surface) | ADR-0005, docs/06 | R-PLAT-03 |
image-automation/ |
Flux image-update-automation (hands-off image tag advance) | ADR-0009, docs/11 | R-UPD-02 |
keycloak/ |
Platform IdP (OIDC + SAML), config-as-code, PostgreSQL on Longhorn | ADR-0014, docs/15 | R-IDP-* |
oauth2-proxy/ |
Forward-auth at the Gateway for non-OIDC apps → Keycloak | ADR-0014, docs/15 | R-IDP-* |
kyverno/ |
L0 policy-as-code gate — OWNED BY THE POLICY ENGINEER (WS-TEST). | ADR-0011, docs/14 | R-TEST-* |
⚠️ INTEGRATION TODO(PM): wire kyverno into the platform kustomization
platform/kyverno/ is authored by a different agent (the policy engineer, WS-TEST). This
workstream did not create any files under platform/kyverno/ and must not.
platform/kustomization.yaml intentionally omits - kyverno. Once the
policy engineer's files land, the PM must add - kyverno to that list (recommended first, so
policies are present before other components reconcile). The line is present as a commented TODO in
the kustomization.
Secrets
Every secret referenced below (Cloudflare API token, Velero backup-target creds, Keycloak admin/DB, oauth2-proxy cookie/client secrets) is referenced by name only and will be committed SOPS-encrypted (WS-SEC, ADR-0007). No plaintext secret appears anywhere in this tree.
Cross-workstream contracts surfaced by these stubs
- cilium (WS-NET ↔ WS-INFRA): Cilium's initial CNI install is done by Ansible at cluster bootstrap (docs/02, Phase 1). The HelmRelease here manages Cilium config thereafter; its Helm values MUST match the Ansible bootstrap values (kubeProxyReplacement, k8sServiceHost/Port, API server host) or reconciliation will fight the bootstrap. Contract owner: WS-NET + WS-INFRA.
- gateway + cert-manager + externaldns (WS-NET + WS-SEC): the shared Gateway listener, the
wildcard
*.home.keithjackson.devcert, and the ExternalDNS source all reference each other; they form the "Issuer + Gateway TLS" interface inroadmap/workstreams.md. - image-automation (WS-UPDATE): this dir holds only the cluster-wide ImageUpdateAutomation +
git write-back. Per-service
ImageRepository/ImagePolicyare rendered from each ServiceDefinition'supdateblock (WS-GITOPS/WS-UPDATE), living withapps/. - keycloak/oauth2-proxy (WS-SEC): the SSO/auth contract (
authblock → Keycloak client / oauth2-proxy protection) is owned by WS-SEC; these are placeholders pending that contract.