main became a protected branch on 2026-09-29, so the direct push that 37 of 39 runbooks instructed is REJECTED. The wording was merely stale before; it is now actively wrong, and it is the line an operator reads mid-incident. Every occurrence now describes the real path: push a branch, open a PR, merge once the gate is green -- that merge is the deploy. 35 files shared one identical block; flux-reconcile.md, README.md and plex-claim.md each said it their own way and were corrected individually. plex-claim.md is rewritten around the delivery loop and records that THE SERVER IS NOW CLAIMED (PlexOnlineToken present in /config), so PLEX_CLAIM is a permanent no-op and the page only applies after a /config wipe. Adds infra/plex/claim-ship.sh, which drives branch -> commit -> push -> PR -> gate -> merge -> reconcile -> pod roll -> verdict with a stopwatch. Three steps are easy to lose under time pressure and two are SILENT when skipped: --with-source (without it the Kustomization applies the previously-fetched revision), the mandatory rollout restart (only the ciphertext changes, so the pod template is byte-identical and nothing restarts itself), and the feat/ branch prefix (act_runner capacity is 1, and a prefix inside gate.yml's push trigger fires a redundant run that serialises ahead of the PR run). Drops the "~4-minute TTL" the page asserted in four places. It was uncited, and upstream pms-docker documents no expiry at all. The countdown on plex.tv/claim is the authority. Measured loop: ~2m45s. DECISIONS-LOG carries the PM handoff: both halves of the 2026-08-31 CI claim were false, the stale-.runner root cause, the four-deep Flux dependency cascade, and the correction that a skipped Gitea job reports success rather than hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
11 KiB
vpn-down — The egress VPN tunnel is down
Alert: VPNTunnelDown (critical, 5m)
File: platform/monitoring/alerts.yaml, group platform-health.networking
Expression:
absent(node_network_receive_bytes_total{device="tun0"})
and on() (
(count(kube_node_labels{label_homelab_keithjackson_dev_egress_gateway="true"}) > 0)
or (count(count_over_time(node_network_receive_bytes_total{device="tun0"}[1h])) > 0)
)
What this means here
There is no in-cluster egress-gateway pod on this platform (ADR-0015). The tunnel is a host
systemd service — vpn-egress-tunnel, OpenVPN to PIA — running on one node, and steering is Cilium
eBPF via a CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy (vpn-egress-steering). OpenVPN creates and destroys tun0 with
the connection, so the tun0 byte-counter series exists if and only if the tunnel is up. The rule
keys on that presence rather than node_network_up, because tun0 reports operstate=unknown and
node_network_up is therefore 0 even when the tunnel is fine.
Live state, measured 2026-09-13: the tunnel is up (node_network_receive_bytes_total{device="tun0"}
= 1 series) and the gateway node is labelled (kube_node_labels{...egress_gateway="true"} = 1 series),
so this alert is armed and quiet. The gateway is k3s-prod-3 (192.168.2.12, eno1).
The two facts that decide your response:
- Cilium OSS has no egress-gateway failover. Gateway-node loss is an outage, not a degradation.
The ADR-0016 supersede drafted on 2026-09-06 is still open. Worse, Cilium OSS picks "the first node
in lexical ordering" among nodeSelector matches — so labelling
k3s-prod-1would silently steal the gateway role and the public egress IP fromk3s-prod-3.[vpn_egress_gateway_prod]is a separate inventory group holding onlyk3s-prod-3for this reason; run the role as-e vpn_egress_gateway_hosts=vpn_egress_gateway_prod --limit k3s-prod-3, with--list-hostsfirst, every time. - The
absent()was originally evaluated cluster-wide and became a permanent false alarm. On a cluster with no gateway node it could never clear, and from 2026-09-05T21:23Z it fired continuously intoemail-critical— unbounded noise on the one channel that must stay trustworthy. The two guards OR'd above are the fix: the alert arms itself the moment a node is labelled, and stays armed through a kube-state-metrics outage. Before that, the very first version keyed onabsent(gluetun_vpn_up), a metric gluetun's control API never exported at all — a pre-existing perma-false-alarm. If this alert is firing, verify the tunnel by hand before believing it.
Running the commands in this runbook
kubectl does not work on the operator workstation. The toolchain lives only in the pinned dev
container, and the host's k3s-oidc context hangs on a browser prompt once its token expires —
that hang is not the cluster being down. Every command below runs as:
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c 'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes'
Always pass --context k3s-prod explicitly. dev.sh merges BOTH clusters into one kubeconfig and
picks a current-context per invocation, and that default has already changed once — it was k3s-dev
until dev was decommissioned on 2026-09-13, and is k3s-prod now. A command that names its context means
the same thing next month as it does today; one that relies on the default does not, and the failure is
silent (it answers confidently about the other cluster). CLUSTER=prod infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run kubectl ... selects it explicitly, and every invocation prints a banner naming the cluster it is about
to talk to — read it. Do not run two dev.sh invocations at once; they share one container and
interfere.
USE FULLY-QUALIFIED RESOURCE NAMES, ALWAYS. Three CRDs on this cluster register the kind Backup:
longhorn.io/v1beta2, postgresql.cnpg.io/v1 and velero.io/v1. The bare short name resolves to
Longhorn's, which holds zero objects — so kubectl get backup -A prints "No resources found" on
a cluster holding 6 Velero backups and 27 CNPG backups. Verified on prod 2026-09-13. Reading that as
"the backups are gone" and acting on it turns a false negative into real data loss. Write
backups.velero.io, backups.postgresql.cnpg.io, clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io,
settings.longhorn.io, volumes.longhorn.io, nodes.longhorn.io.
Mutating kubectl (apply, patch, annotate, rollout) and flux reconcile are blocked for
agents here: every durable change goes through git. main is a protected branch — a direct push
is rejected. A change lands by pushing a branch, opening a PR, and merging it once the gate is
green; that merge is the deploy. Where this runbook gives a mutating command it is for an operator,
and it says so.
First commands
Confirm on the host, not from Prometheus:
ssh k3s-prod-3 'systemctl status vpn-egress-tunnel --no-pager | head -20; echo; ip -br addr show tun0; echo; ip link show tun0 | head -2'
Which node is the gateway, and is it labelled?
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod get nodes -L homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-gateway,homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-uplink; echo; \
kubectl --context k3s-prod get ciliumegressgatewaypolicies.cilium.io -o yaml | grep -A6 "nodeSelector\|egressIP\|interface"'
The check that catches the silent failure (see cause 1 below) — does Cilium's datapath point at the interface that actually exists?
ssh k3s-prod-3 'ip -o link | awk -F: "{print \$1, \$2}" | grep tun0'
infra/devcontainer/dev.sh run bash -c \
'kubectl --context k3s-prod -n kube-system exec ds/cilium -c cilium-agent -- cilium-dbg bpf egress list'
If the Egress Ifindex in that map is not the live tun0 ifindex, egress is broken even though this
alert is quiet.
Is traffic actually leaving through the tunnel?
ssh k3s-prod-3 'curl -s --interface tun0 --max-time 10 https://ipinfo.io/ip; echo; nft list table inet vpn_killswitch 2>/dev/null | grep -E "counter|killswitch_" | head'
Likely causes, most likely first
1. The tunnel is UP but Cilium is steering at a dead interface (the silent one)
This is the richest failure on the platform and it does not set off this alert.
Cilium resolves a CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy's interface: tun0 exactly once, caches
(egress IP, ifindex), and never re-resolves. On k3s-dev-3, cilium-dbg bpf egress list showed
Egress Ifindex 3 — there is no ifindex 3 on that node; the live tun0 was 1780. Egress was
dead for about 80 minutes with nothing alerting and the conformance ledger still reading green.
egress-gateway-reconciliation-trigger-interval: 1s does not cover it (netlink link events are not
Kubernetes object events).
Measured behaviour, so you can pick a lever that works:
| action | result |
|---|---|
| annotate the CEGP | map → 1780 in 8s, PIA IP returns |
systemctl restart vpn-egress-tunnel |
tun0 1780→1985, map stays 1780, still broken |
the exact vpn-killswitch stop/30s/start sequence |
still broken 20s+ later |
| set any unrelated label on the gateway node | recovers within 10s |
The durable fix is in roles/vpn_egress_gateway: the OpenVPN up-script publishes a node label
homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-uplink=<tun0 addr>-<ifindex> on every connect (via
systemctl start --no-block, so it can never block the tunnel), plus a 2-minute convergence timer for
boot. A node label, not a CEGP annotation — a node writing to GitOps state is a drift fight.
Nothing monitors this coupling yet; that gap is exactly why dev sat dead for 80 minutes.
2. PIA handed two gateways the same tunnel address
Standing rule: one PIA server per gateway. The vaulted .ovpn pins one server, so when prod came up
green, dev went down: both gateways dialled 158.173.241.112:1198 and PIA gave both the tunnel address
10.72.192.7. Each reconnect steals it — a measured ~2-minute mutual-eviction cycle (dev restarting at
22:57:05, 22:59:03, 23:01:05, 23:03:05, 23:05:06 UTC). Fix: the role var
vpn_egress_gateway_pia_remote ("<host> <port>") rewrites only the .ovpn remote line; prod is
pinned to 158.173.241.135 (pool 158.173.241.{34,55,112,135,239}). "A single green probe is not
a stability check."
3. PIA "unreachable" — suspect a stale server list first
The 2026-08-22/23 chain went port collision → UDP/53 → 8080 → "MTU" (Cilium VXLAN pod MTU 1450 is real
but irrelevant to a 14-byte handshake) → "the network blackholes PIA" (wrong) before the actual
cause: gluetun's stale bundled server list, dialling retired 46.246.x/212.112.x addresses when
live SE Stockholm is 158.173.241.x. Lesson recorded verbatim: when a client "can't reach" the
provider, suspect the stale server list first.
4. The gateway node is down
absent() also fires when the gateway node or its node-exporter is gone, so this alert covers
gateway-node-down by design. Go to /runbooks/node-down. Remember: there is no failover — while
k3s-prod-3 is down, VPN-classed egress is an outage.
5. Nothing is wrong and the alert is lying
Given the two false-alarm post-mortems above, always confirm ip -br addr show tun0 on the host before
acting.
What the kill-switch does and does not do
Proven with counters on k3s-prod-3, because the intuitive reading is wrong: with
bpf.masquerade: true (which Egress Gateway requires) SNAT and egress happen in eBPF and
bpf_redirect() skips netfilter POSTROUTING. Measured: forward saddr=pod-CIDR 0,
postrouting oif WAN saddr=pod-CIDR 0. What actually fails closed is Cilium's own drop —
tcpdump during tunnel stop and restart showed 0 packets leaving either device. The nft table is
kept as defence-in-depth for node-originated tunnel-sourced traffic and was proven both ways:
ping -I 10.72.192.7 with the ip-rule → 3/3 at 144 ms with killswitch_accept advancing; rule removed
→ killswitch_drop 0→3 packets / 252 bytes, 100% loss. Every rule carries a counter, so:
if killswitch_drop ever counts in normal operation, the datapath has changed. A reported "leak
window" was measured as no WAN leak — a stale egress IP follows the cached ifindex, not a routing
lookup. Note the .nft file uses table + flush table, which clears rules but leaves named-set
elements intact.
When to escalate or stop
- Escalate immediately if the gateway node is down. No failover exists; this is an outage with no in-cluster remedy.
- Never label a second node
egress-gateway=true. Lexical ordering meansk3s-prod-1would silently take the role and the public egress IP. - Do not restart the tunnel expecting Cilium to follow — measured above, it does not. If the map is stale, touching a node label is the lever that works (operator action).
- Do not remove or "simplify" the nft kill-switch because the counters read zero. Zero on the pod path is the expected, measured result of eBPF masquerade; the table guards a different path.
- A leak concern is a security matter (docs/07) — escalate rather than experimenting.
Source of truth: runbooks/vpn-down.md. Index: /runbooks/
Records: DECISIONS-LOG.md "2026-09-12 — VPN egress on PROD (k3s-prod-3), and three things the repo
believed that are not true"; the 2026-08-22/23 gluetun chain; commit 155df8e (R-NET-06 re-proven on
prod, recovery ≤3s).