468 lines
31 KiB
YAML
468 lines
31 KiB
YAML
# ServiceDefinition: qbittorrent
|
|
# Source of truth: spec docs/13-service-catalog.md row 13; docs/03-networking-isolation-and-egress.md;
|
|
# docs/15-identity-and-access.md; decisions/adr-0015 (VPN egress steering).
|
|
# internal download client | egress VPN + kill-switch | config on Longhorn | auth forward-auth
|
|
# (bare web UI, no native OIDC).
|
|
#
|
|
# BULK DOWNLOADS TIER — DELIVERED 2026-09-12 (the deferral below is CLOSED; kept for the record).
|
|
# This entry used to ship config-only, with a comment promising to attach the downloads volume "once
|
|
# OQ-2 is resolved". OQ-2 was resolved for STATIC pre-existing datasets (schema 1.5.0 / renderer
|
|
# `class: bulk` + `export` -> a static, pre-bound NFS PV), and plex/sonarr/radarr/nextcloud all took
|
|
# their media mounts — but qBittorrent's was never added, so the DOWNLOAD CLIENT was the one member
|
|
# of the chain with no media volume at all. Measured on prod 2026-09-12:
|
|
# Session\DefaultSavePath=/downloads/ Session\TempPath=/downloads/incomplete/
|
|
# Downloads\SavePath=/downloads/ `ls /downloads` -> No such file or directory
|
|
# i.e. the app was configured to write a path that DID NOT EXIST, in a container with no volume there.
|
|
# Anything it did manage to create would have been invisible to sonarr/radarr, lost on every pod
|
|
# recreation, and filling the NODE's ephemeral disk in the meantime. The `downloads` entry under
|
|
# storage: below closes that. See docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md and the bulk-tier L0 conformance test.
|
|
#
|
|
# VPN-class (docs/13 row 13; docs/03 "VPN-class set"): ALL of this pod's public-internet egress
|
|
# (peer/tracker/DHT traffic) MUST leave via the node PIA tunnel, never the WAN. `egress: vpn` renders
|
|
# the homelab.keithjackson.dev/egress-class=vpn pod label the shared CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy
|
|
# (platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml) selects on to steer + kill-switch the traffic OUTSIDE the
|
|
# workload (R-NET-05/06/07). No independent egress path; fail-closed if tun0 is down.
|
|
#
|
|
# Inbound reachability (<- sonarr, <- radarr) is an EAST-WEST allow rendered on the arr side; being
|
|
# VPN-class governs egress, not intra-cluster reachability. This service initiates nothing east-west, so
|
|
# dependencies is empty (reaches only DNS + VPN internet).
|
|
# Validates against schemas/servicedefinition.schema.json.
|
|
name: qbittorrent
|
|
kind: container
|
|
source:
|
|
image: lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:5.3.0 # pinned stable tag (R-UPD-01); update.range governs advancement
|
|
# LinuxServer images run their service as the user `abc`, whose uid/gid these two set. They are
|
|
# LOAD-BEARING FOR THE BULK MOUNT, not cosmetic — exactly as on sonarr/radarr. Measured on prod
|
|
# 2026-09-12 BEFORE this change: `id` inside the container reported the qbittorrent-nox process as
|
|
# uid=911 gid=911, and /mnt/Storage/plex/downloads is 0755 owned 1000:1000. 0755 grants write to the
|
|
# OWNER ONLY, so uid 911 would have mounted the export cleanly and then failed every write with
|
|
# EACCES — the "mounts fine, cannot write" failure the sonarr entry warns about at length.
|
|
env:
|
|
- name: PUID
|
|
value: "1000" # owner uid of /mnt/Storage/plex/downloads (and of every dir under the export)
|
|
- name: PGID
|
|
value: "3000" # the export's dominant group, matching sonarr/radarr: files this writes stay
|
|
# readable to the EXISTING non-k3s consumers of the same dataset, and land
|
|
# group-owned the same way the arrs' own writes do
|
|
# --- THE DURABLE WebUI CREDENTIAL (consumed by the postStart hook below) -------------------
|
|
# Measured on prod 2026-09-13: /config/qBittorrent/qBittorrent.conf held NEITHER `WebUI\Username`
|
|
# NOR `WebUI\Password_PBKDF2`. qBittorrent 5.x reads that as "no credential configured" and mints a
|
|
# NEW random `admin` password on EVERY process start, announcing it ONLY on stdout ("A temporary
|
|
# password is provided for this session: ..."). Two real consequences, not hypotheticals:
|
|
# * Sonarr and Radarr store a download-client username/password in their OWN databases. Both
|
|
# tested valid against the then-current temporary password; both would have started failing at
|
|
# the NEXT qbittorrent pod restart, silently breaking Completed Download Handling (the arrs
|
|
# report a failed client, not a failed import).
|
|
# * The human operator had no stable login: every restart meant reading the pod log.
|
|
# Provided as apps/wave-0/qbittorrent-bootstrap-secret.sops.yaml (SOPS/age, decrypted by Flux) —
|
|
# same shape and naming as gitea-bootstrap, so `render.py --emit-waves` places it in this wave.
|
|
- name: QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME
|
|
valueFrom:
|
|
secretKeyRef:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-bootstrap
|
|
key: webui-username
|
|
- name: QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD
|
|
valueFrom:
|
|
secretKeyRef:
|
|
name: qbittorrent-bootstrap
|
|
key: webui-password
|
|
lifecycle:
|
|
# LEVEL-TRIGGERED CREDENTIAL ASSERTION, run on EVERY container start.
|
|
#
|
|
# WHY A postStart HOOK AND NOT A CronJob RECONCILER: the repo's idiom for "state Flux cannot reach
|
|
# directly" is the level-triggered CronJob (platform/keycloak/client-secret-reconciler.yaml,
|
|
# apps/wave-0/nextcloud-db.yaml). That idiom's PRINCIPLE — desired state lives in git and is
|
|
# RE-ASSERTED unconditionally, never set once — is exactly what is applied here, but the trigger is
|
|
# the container start rather than a clock, because the failure this closes IS a container start:
|
|
# * The credential is read by qbittorrent-nox ONCE, at process start, from a file on the config
|
|
# PVC. A 15-minute cron would therefore leave a 0-15 minute window after every restart, PVC
|
|
# restore or rebuild in which the app serves a random password and both arrs are broken. The
|
|
# hook has no such window: it runs before/with the very start that would otherwise regenerate.
|
|
# * A CronJob would also have to reach the conf from OUTSIDE the pod — mounting an RWO Longhorn
|
|
# PVC that the app already holds, or `kubectl exec`-ing with RBAC it would need granting — and
|
|
# then edit a file UNDER the running process, whose own save-on-exit can overwrite the edit.
|
|
# In-container, before the service starts, none of that exists.
|
|
# * It needs no ServiceAccount, no RBAC, no NetworkPolicy and no API token: strictly less
|
|
# privilege than the CronJob alternative (R-SEC/least-privilege).
|
|
# The gitea entry's postStart is the same pattern (idempotent bootstrap of a credential the app
|
|
# keeps in its own state), and the schema documents this hook for exactly that use.
|
|
#
|
|
# AND WHY NOT AN initContainer, which is the genuinely tempting third option: it would run strictly
|
|
# BEFORE qbittorrent-nox, removing the race the `s6-svc -r` below exists to cover, and its stdout
|
|
# would reach `kubectl logs -c <init>` instead of the kubelet. Two reasons it loses here:
|
|
# * It CANNOT do step (3) — the ground-truth login that proves the WebUI actually accepts the
|
|
# credential — because the WebUI is not running yet. That assertion is the most valuable line
|
|
# in this whole mechanism: it is what turns "we wrote a file" into "the credential works", and
|
|
# writing the right PBKDF2 bytes is precisely the part that is easy to get subtly wrong.
|
|
# * The ServiceDefinition schema (1.5.0) has `lifecycle` but NO initContainers field, so it would
|
|
# mean a schema version bump plus a renderer change — a blast radius across every service's
|
|
# golden — to buy something strictly weaker than what the hook already does.
|
|
# The honest summary: postStart trades a short, self-healing start-up race (detected and closed by
|
|
# the s6 restart + re-verify loop) for the ability to VERIFY. That is the right trade.
|
|
#
|
|
# DURABILITY, the whole point — all three paths end with the SAME credential:
|
|
# pod restart -> conf on the PVC already holds it; the hook verifies and writes NOTHING.
|
|
# config-PVC restore from an older backup -> restore requires the pod to be recreated, so the
|
|
# hook runs and re-asserts over whatever the snapshot contained.
|
|
# rebuild from git -> empty PVC; the image copies /defaults/qBittorrent.conf, the hook writes the
|
|
# credential into it before the service is serving. Nothing outside git.
|
|
#
|
|
# WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: it never weakens authentication. `WebUI\AuthSubnetWhitelist` (bypassing auth
|
|
# for the pod CIDR) was REJECTED: it leaves the human login broken, and makes qBittorrent's auth
|
|
# depend on network policy staying correct forever. The WebUI keeps demanding a password; that
|
|
# password is simply now known, fixed, and reproducible from git.
|
|
postStart:
|
|
exec:
|
|
command:
|
|
- /bin/bash
|
|
- -c
|
|
- |
|
|
# Assert the durable WebUI credential in the config PVC's qBittorrent.conf, then PROVE the
|
|
# running WebUI accepts it. Idempotent: the steady-state path writes nothing at all.
|
|
#
|
|
# THIS SCRIPT CONTAINS NO BRACED DOLLAR EXPANSION AT ALL, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE.
|
|
# apps-wave-0 declares postBuild.substituteFrom cluster-vars, so Flux runs envsubst over
|
|
# this whole manifest at RECONCILE time. The repo's escape contract (double the dollar;
|
|
# enforced by render.py's assert_substitution_safe) makes such a form correct ON THE
|
|
# CLUSTER — but only there:
|
|
# envsubst collapses the doubled dollar, so the SAME text run any other way (a `kubectl
|
|
# apply` of the golden, which runs no envsubst; a hand `kubectl exec` of the script during
|
|
# development) keeps the doubled dollar, which bash reads as its own PID. Not hypothetical;
|
|
# see the PORT comment below for the bug it actually caused here. Bare `$VAR` and `$(cmd)`
|
|
# are untouched by envsubst, so they are used throughout and the script behaves IDENTICALLY
|
|
# however it is run.
|
|
set -u
|
|
CONF=/config/qBittorrent/qBittorrent.conf
|
|
SVC=/run/service/svc-qbittorrent
|
|
# The WebUI's listening port, as a LITERAL. It matches ingressRoutes[0].port in this
|
|
# ServiceDefinition — which is the single place the renderer takes the containerPort, the
|
|
# Service port and the HTTPRoute backend port from — and the image exposes no WEBUI_PORT
|
|
# env var for a lookup to read anyway.
|
|
# It USED to be a doubled-dollar default-operator expansion of a WEBUI_PORT env var, and
|
|
# that cost real time: run without envsubst, bash read the doubled dollar as its own PID,
|
|
# so PORT became "<pid>{WEBUI_PORT:-8080}" — the brace never expanded, the digits never
|
|
# matched. Every curl below then got an unparseable URL, returned nothing, and the hook
|
|
# logged "the WebUI rejected the durable
|
|
# credential" — having never actually asked it. That MISDIAGNOSIS is preserved in this
|
|
# service's own marker log at 2026-09-13T05:35Z (three "rejected" lines, then GAVE UP,
|
|
# against a WebUI that accepted the credential perfectly well). A literal cannot be mangled.
|
|
PORT=8080
|
|
# A postStart hook's stdout/stderr goes to the KUBELET, not to `kubectl logs` — so a hook
|
|
# that only echoes is effectively silent (gitea's hits the same wall and writes a marker
|
|
# file for it). Every outcome therefore also lands, timestamped, on the persistent config
|
|
# volume: /config/qbittorrent-webui-cred.log is where an operator looks to see whether the
|
|
# credential from git was asserted and accepted on this start.
|
|
log() {
|
|
echo "[qbt-webui-cred] $*"
|
|
printf '%s [qbt-webui-cred] %s\n' "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)" "$*" \
|
|
>> /config/qbittorrent-webui-cred.log 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# (1) The image's init-qbittorrent-config copies /defaults/qBittorrent.conf onto the PVC
|
|
# before it starts the service. Wait (bounded, ~30s) so we EDIT that file instead of
|
|
# racing to create one it would then not overwrite.
|
|
n=0
|
|
while [ ! -s "$CONF" ] && [ "$n" -lt 120 ]; do n=$((n + 1)); sleep 0.25; done
|
|
|
|
waited=0
|
|
attempt=0
|
|
while [ "$attempt" -lt 3 ]; do
|
|
attempt=$((attempt + 1))
|
|
|
|
# (2) Converge the conf. 0 = already correct (steady state: NO write, NO re-salt),
|
|
# 10 = rewritten, anything else = could not write.
|
|
python3 - "$CONF" <<'PY'
|
|
import base64, hashlib, hmac, os, stat, sys
|
|
|
|
conf = sys.argv[1]
|
|
user = os.environ.get("QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME", "")
|
|
pw = os.environ.get("QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD", "")
|
|
if not user or not pw:
|
|
sys.stderr.write("[qbt-webui-cred] credential env is empty - refusing to touch the conf\n")
|
|
raise SystemExit(1)
|
|
|
|
# qBittorrent's OWN parameters (base/utils/password.cpp): PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100000
|
|
# iterations, 16-byte random salt, 64-byte digest, stored as
|
|
# WebUI\Password_PBKDF2="@ByteArray(<base64 salt>:<base64 digest>)"
|
|
# Get any one of them wrong and the app simply rejects every login.
|
|
ITERATIONS, DIGEST_LEN, SALT_LEN = 100000, 64, 16
|
|
UKEY, PKEY, SECTION = "WebUI\\Username", "WebUI\\Password_PBKDF2", "[Preferences]"
|
|
|
|
def matches(raw):
|
|
"""True iff the stored digest is one OUR password produces (salt is read from it)."""
|
|
v = raw.strip().strip('"')
|
|
if v.startswith("@ByteArray(") and v.endswith(")"):
|
|
v = v[len("@ByteArray("):-1]
|
|
try:
|
|
salt_b64, digest_b64 = v.split(":", 1)
|
|
salt = base64.b64decode(salt_b64, validate=True)
|
|
digest = base64.b64decode(digest_b64, validate=True)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return False
|
|
if not salt or not digest:
|
|
return False
|
|
return hmac.compare_digest(
|
|
hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha512", pw.encode(), salt, ITERATIONS, len(digest)), digest)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
lines = open(conf, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").read().splitlines()
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
lines = []
|
|
|
|
def value_of(key):
|
|
for i, line in enumerate(lines):
|
|
if line.startswith(key + "="):
|
|
return i, line.split("=", 1)[1]
|
|
return -1, None
|
|
|
|
ui, uval = value_of(UKEY)
|
|
pi, pval = value_of(PKEY)
|
|
if uval == user and pval is not None and matches(pval):
|
|
raise SystemExit(0) # converged - leave the file (and its salt) alone
|
|
|
|
salt = os.urandom(SALT_LEN)
|
|
digest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha512", pw.encode(), salt, ITERATIONS, DIGEST_LEN)
|
|
stored = base64.b64encode(salt).decode() + ":" + base64.b64encode(digest).decode()
|
|
desired = [UKEY + "=" + user, PKEY + '="@ByteArray(' + stored + ')"']
|
|
|
|
out = [line for i, line in enumerate(lines) if i not in (ui, pi)]
|
|
if SECTION in out:
|
|
at = out.index(SECTION) + 1
|
|
else:
|
|
if out and out[-1].strip():
|
|
out.append("")
|
|
out.append(SECTION)
|
|
at = len(out)
|
|
out[at:at] = desired
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(conf) or ".", exist_ok=True)
|
|
tmp = conf + ".webui-cred.new"
|
|
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
|
fh.write("\n".join(out) + "\n")
|
|
fh.flush()
|
|
os.fsync(fh.fileno())
|
|
# This hook runs as ROOT; the service runs as PUID:PGID. A root-owned 0600 conf would
|
|
# cost the app the ability to save its own settings, so carry the ownership over.
|
|
try:
|
|
st = os.stat(conf)
|
|
os.chown(tmp, st.st_uid, st.st_gid)
|
|
os.chmod(tmp, stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode))
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
os.chown(tmp, int(os.environ.get("PUID", "1000")),
|
|
int(os.environ.get("PGID", "1000")))
|
|
os.chmod(tmp, 0o664)
|
|
os.replace(tmp, conf) # atomic: the app never reads a half-written conf
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
sys.stderr.write("[qbt-webui-cred] cannot write %s: %s\n" % (conf, exc))
|
|
raise SystemExit(1)
|
|
raise SystemExit(10)
|
|
PY
|
|
rc=$?
|
|
|
|
if [ "$rc" = 0 ]; then
|
|
log "conf already holds the durable credential for '$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME' (no write)"
|
|
elif [ "$rc" = 10 ]; then
|
|
log "asserted WebUI Username + Password_PBKDF2 into $CONF"
|
|
# postStart runs CONCURRENTLY with the s6 init chain, so qbittorrent-nox may ALREADY
|
|
# have read the old, credential-less conf and be serving a random temporary password.
|
|
# Restart the SUPERVISED SERVICE (not the pod) so it re-reads what was just written.
|
|
# Nothing to do when the service has not started yet - it will read the new file.
|
|
# Its own counter, NOT the shared `waited` API budget: sharing one counter is how the
|
|
# 2026-09-13 failure spent the entire verification budget before the first login and
|
|
# then fired attempts 2 and 3 with no wait left at all.
|
|
sv=0
|
|
while [ "$sv" -lt 60 ] && [ "$(s6-svstat -u "$SVC" 2>/dev/null)" != "true" ]; do
|
|
sv=$((sv + 1)); sleep 1
|
|
done
|
|
if [ "$(s6-svstat -u "$SVC" 2>/dev/null)" = "true" ]; then
|
|
log "qbittorrent-nox was already running - restarting it to load the credential"
|
|
s6-svc -r "$SVC" || log "s6-svc -r failed (continuing to verify anyway)"
|
|
sleep 3
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
log "FAILED to write the credential into $CONF (helper exit $rc). The WebUI will keep" >&2
|
|
log "minting a random password every start and BOTH arrs will break. Fix and restart." >&2
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# (3) GROUND TRUTH: the WebUI itself must accept it. Wait for the API to answer at ALL
|
|
# (shared ~120s budget across attempts), then spend exactly ONE login per attempt -
|
|
# at most 3 rejected logins, which stays under qBittorrent's default ban threshold.
|
|
#
|
|
# "THE API NEVER ANSWERED" IS A DIFFERENT FAULT FROM "THE PASSWORD WAS REJECTED", and
|
|
# conflating them is what made this hook lie once already (see the PORT comment). An
|
|
# unreachable WebUI is reported as unreachable, and the hook stops rather than spending
|
|
# its remaining login attempts to produce two more identical wrong diagnoses.
|
|
api_ok=0
|
|
while [ "$waited" -lt 120 ]; do
|
|
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -m 3 -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [ -n "$code" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ]; then api_ok=1; break; fi
|
|
waited=$((waited + 1)); sleep 1
|
|
done
|
|
if [ "$api_ok" != 1 ]; then
|
|
log "the WebUI never answered on 127.0.0.1:$PORT within the wait budget, so the" >&2
|
|
log "credential in $CONF is UNVERIFIED. This is NOT a rejected password - it was" >&2
|
|
log "never submitted. Do not rotate the credential on the strength of this line." >&2
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
body=$(curl -sS -m 10 \
|
|
--data-urlencode "username=$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME" \
|
|
--data-urlencode "password=$QBT_WEBUI_PASSWORD" \
|
|
"http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/api/v2/auth/login" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
if [ "$body" = "Ok." ]; then
|
|
log "VERIFIED: the WebUI accepts the durable credential for '$QBT_WEBUI_USERNAME'"
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
log "WebUI rejected the durable credential (login said '$body')" >&2
|
|
# A rejection when the conf was ALREADY converged (rc=0, nothing written) can only mean
|
|
# the running qbittorrent-nox is serving something it read from an EARLIER conf, so
|
|
# rewriting the same bytes on the next attempt would change nothing. The remedy is to
|
|
# make the process RE-READ the file, so restart the supervised service and let the next
|
|
# attempt re-verify. Without this the retry loop could never change its own outcome.
|
|
if [ "$(s6-svstat -u "$SVC" 2>/dev/null)" = "true" ]; then
|
|
log "restarting qbittorrent-nox so it re-reads $CONF, then re-verifying" >&2
|
|
s6-svc -r "$SVC" || log "s6-svc -r failed (continuing to verify anyway)" >&2
|
|
sleep 3
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
log "GAVE UP after $attempt attempts: the WebUI does not accept the credential from git." >&2
|
|
# A postStart hook MUST exit 0 - a non-zero exit makes the kubelet KILL the container
|
|
# (FailedPostStartHook -> CrashLoopBackOff), turning a credential fault into an outage.
|
|
# Both failure paths above therefore log LOUDLY and exit 0; the `up` SLI still watches the
|
|
# app, and the arrs' own download-client health check surfaces a broken credential.
|
|
exit 0
|
|
podSecurityContext:
|
|
# For the LONGHORN config PVC only, and for the same reason radarr/sonarr set it: fsGroup is a NO-OP
|
|
# on the NFS volume (the in-tree plugin does no ownership management), but on a Longhorn filesystem
|
|
# the kubelet applies it, so /config becomes group-writable by the now-uid-1000 process without
|
|
# depending on the image chowning it. (This image DOES chown: init-qbittorrent-config runs
|
|
# `lsiown -R abc:abc /config`. Belt and braces — the live /config was 911:911 before this change,
|
|
# and losing write access to it would lose the WebUI password hash and the session state.)
|
|
fsGroup: 3000
|
|
exposure: internal # LAN-only web UI at qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN} (docs/13 row 13; R-DNS/R-NET)
|
|
egress: vpn # ALL public egress via node PIA tunnel + kill-switch (docs/03; ADR-0015; R-NET-05/06)
|
|
storage:
|
|
- name: config
|
|
size: 5Gi
|
|
class: longhorn # settings/categories/session on 3-replica Longhorn; DR-critical (docs/04; R-STATE-02)
|
|
mountPath: /config # THE APP WRITES /config, NOT the renderer default /data/config.
|
|
# LSIO images run with `-data=/config` (Jackett/qBittorrent likewise use
|
|
# /config), so without this the Longhorn PVC mounted at /data/config sat
|
|
# holding nothing but lost+found while the app wrote its entire
|
|
# configuration to the container's EPHEMERAL writable layer — destroyed on
|
|
# every pod recreation: restart, reschedule, image bump. Measured in-cluster
|
|
# 2026-09-12: /data/config was dev=2080 with [lost+found], /config was
|
|
# dev=2053 on the node's own disk with [Sentry asp config.xml logs].
|
|
# This is the SAME failure catalog/plex.yaml:54 already records fixing.
|
|
# The live /config contents were copied onto each PVC before this landed,
|
|
# so API keys and credentials other apps reference were preserved.
|
|
# THE DOWNLOADS AREA — ONE mount of the SAME export sonarr/radarr/plex already consume
|
|
# (192.168.2.30:/mnt/Storage/plex), narrowed by subPath to the `downloads` subtree and presented at
|
|
# /downloads, which is precisely where this app is ALREADY configured to write.
|
|
#
|
|
# WHY subPath: downloads AND NOT THE EXPORT ROOT AT /media (the shape sonarr/radarr use):
|
|
# * LEAST PRIVILEGE, AND IT COSTS NOTHING HERE. A download client has no business writing the
|
|
# LIBRARY. The arrs need the root mount because THEY hardlink downloads/ -> tv/ or movies/ and
|
|
# link() is a same-MOUNT operation (EXDEV otherwise) — their smallest common ancestor genuinely
|
|
# IS the export root. qBittorrent performs no such cross-directory link: it writes into the
|
|
# downloads tree and nothing else, so narrowing to that subtree removes movies/, tv/ and photos/
|
|
# from this pod's mount namespace without removing any operation it actually performs.
|
|
# * HARDLINKS STILL WORK, because they are not done here. The arrs still see ONE mount containing
|
|
# both /media/downloads and /media/tv, so their link() stays intra-mount. Proven live 2026-09-12:
|
|
# a file created from this pod under /downloads was hardlinked from the sonarr pod between
|
|
# /media/downloads/... and /media/tv/... with st_nlink 1 -> 2 and no EXDEV.
|
|
# * IT IS ONE MOUNT, so the L0 test `bulk-tier-distinct-from-replicated` assertion (6) — no
|
|
# workload mounts one export twice — holds. That assertion is about TWO mounts inside ONE pod;
|
|
# a single subPath mount is not the EXDEV trap, two are.
|
|
# * The narrowing is a CLIENT/kubelet guarantee, stated honestly: the NFS server still exports the
|
|
# whole dataset to this node, so the containment is the mount namespace, not the server's ACLs —
|
|
# the same class of caveat docs/BULK-NFS-STORAGE.md §5 records for plex's readOnly.
|
|
#
|
|
# NOT readOnly — this is the one workload whose whole job is WRITING here.
|
|
#
|
|
# KNOWN, DELIBERATE SIDE EFFECT ON SHARED STATE: the image's init-qbittorrent-config runs
|
|
# `lsiown abc:abc /downloads` (non-recursive) whenever /downloads is a mount, so starting this pod
|
|
# chgrps /mnt/Storage/plex/downloads from 1000:1000 to 1000:3000 on the SERVER. Benign and verified:
|
|
# the directory is mode 0755, whose group bits (r-x) are identical to its other bits, so no consumer
|
|
# — k3s or legacy — gains or loses any access. Recorded because it is a write to state shared with
|
|
# non-cluster consumers, which should never be a surprise.
|
|
#
|
|
# PATH AGREEMENT WITH THE ARRS IS STILL *NOT* CLOSED — see DECISIONS-LOG 2026-09-12 "Remote Path
|
|
# Mappings". This pod calls the finished file /downloads/<name>; sonarr/radarr call the same bytes
|
|
# /media/downloads/<name>. Same inode, different absolute path, so Completed Download Handling needs
|
|
# ONE Remote Path Mapping per arr (remote host `qbittorrent.qbittorrent.svc.cluster.local`, remote
|
|
# path /downloads/, local path /media/downloads/).
|
|
#
|
|
# THOSE MAPPINGS ARE NOW CONFIGURED AND VERIFIED ON PROD (2026-09-12), together with the qBittorrent
|
|
# download client itself — which did not exist in EITHER arr until then (both
|
|
# `GET /api/v3/downloadclient` returned `[]`, so completed-download handling had never been wired up
|
|
# at all). `downloadclient/testall` reports isValid=true in both, and Sonarr's queue was observed
|
|
# reporting outputPath=/downloads/... with the mapping deleted and /media/downloads/... with it
|
|
# present — same torrent, same client.
|
|
#
|
|
# BUT THEY LIVE IN THE ARRS' OWN DATABASES (app state on their config PVCs), NOT IN GIT: a rebuild
|
|
# from git alone does NOT restore them and no gate here notices their absence. The alternative —
|
|
# repointing qBittorrent's SavePath at /media/downloads and mounting this subPath there instead —
|
|
# buys path agreement at the cost of editing THIS app's config PVC, which is also app state; it was
|
|
# not chosen because it changes a running download client's save path, which the deferral above
|
|
# already shows is easy to get wrong. It is nonetheless the RECOMMENDED end state (it makes the
|
|
# mappings unnecessary and puts the mountPath half of the fix in git) and is awaiting an operator
|
|
# decision, not a technical blocker.
|
|
#
|
|
# RELATED OPEN BLOCKER: this app has no durable WebUI credential (no WebUI\Username /
|
|
# WebUI\Password_PBKDF2 in qBittorrent.conf), so v5 issues a NEW temporary `admin` password on every
|
|
# start. The arrs' saved download-client password therefore goes stale on every pod restart. See the
|
|
# same DECISIONS-LOG entry for the two fixes, neither of which was taken unilaterally.
|
|
- name: downloads
|
|
class: bulk
|
|
export: /mnt/Storage/plex # the ZFS dataset Storage/plex, on ${BULK_NFS_SERVER} — the SAME export
|
|
# plex (ro) and sonarr/radarr (rw) mount; one dataset, one set of inodes
|
|
subPath: downloads # the handoff subtree ONLY: no movies/, no tv/, no photos/
|
|
mountPath: /downloads # matches the app's EXISTING Session\DefaultSavePath / TempPath, so no
|
|
# change to config-PVC app state is needed to make this take effect
|
|
size: 9Ti # ADVISORY ONLY on a static NFS PV (the ZFS pool is the real limit): the
|
|
# dataset's 8.4 T used rounded up, stated the same way plex/sonarr/radarr
|
|
# state it so `kubectl get pv` reports something true
|
|
dependencies: [] # default-deny: reaches only DNS; arr reach it north of its own egress (docs/03; R-NET-01/02).
|
|
# STILL EMPTY WITH THE NFS MOUNT ABOVE, AND THAT IS CORRECT, NOT AN
|
|
# OVERSIGHT. An NFS PersistentVolume is mounted by the NODE KERNEL in the
|
|
# HOST netns, not by this pod: there is no pod-side socket to 2049, so no
|
|
# CiliumNetworkPolicy can permit or deny it and none is needed. Verified by
|
|
# construction — sonarr and radarr have mounted this same export read-write
|
|
# for weeks and neither has any CNP naming the NFS server or port 2049
|
|
# (grep apps/wave-1/sonarr.yaml: none). The SAME fact is what keeps the VPN
|
|
# egress gateway off this traffic (its selector is a podSelector), and
|
|
# 192.168.2.30 is inside the 192.168.0.0/16 excludedCIDR besides — see
|
|
# platform/vpn-egress/egress-steering.yaml, "BULK NFS".
|
|
ingressRoutes:
|
|
- host: qbittorrent.${BASE_DOMAIN}
|
|
port: 8080 # qBittorrent WebUI; protected at the Gateway by forward-auth (docs/09, docs/15)
|
|
auth:
|
|
mode: forward-auth # oauth2-proxy -> Keycloak; bare UI, no usable native OIDC (docs/15; R-IDP-02)
|
|
groups:
|
|
- media-users # authenticated AND in an authorized group (R-IDP-06)
|
|
# See catalog/jackett.yaml for the full rationale: --allowed-group is repeatable and OR-ed, so
|
|
# platform-admins here is a superset, not a widening (that group already carries cluster-admin
|
|
# via k8s-oidc-rbac.yaml). Without it, an empty media-users locks every operator out with an
|
|
# immediate 403 at the oauth2-proxy callback — observed on prod 2026-09-12.
|
|
- platform-admins # operators of these services must not be locked out of them
|
|
# NO `apiRoutes` HERE: UNMEASURED, not cleared. qBittorrent's WebUI drives everything through
|
|
# /api/v2/, so it is plausibly affected in the same way jackett is — but plausibility is what
|
|
# put a renderer constant on the table in the first place. MEASURED 2026-10-01 on the live pod
|
|
# (qbittorrent-5547bdb9bd-zq557, 0 restarts, 23h): 13,649 log lines, ZERO unauthenticated
|
|
# requests, nothing but health probes. No traffic means no evidence either way. Add `^/api/`
|
|
# when someone opens the WebUI and records the 302/401 split, as was done for jackett.
|
|
update:
|
|
channel: stable # R-UPD-01
|
|
range: ">=5.0.0 <6.0.0" # stay on the qBittorrent 5.x stable line
|
|
cadence: "0 4 * * *"
|
|
autoRollbackOnFailedHealth: true # R-UPD-03
|
|
observability:
|
|
metrics: true
|
|
slis:
|
|
- up # download client down -> alert (docs/10; R-OBS-01)
|
|
backup:
|
|
policy: daily-offcluster # config (categories/settings) backed up off-cluster (docs/04; R-STATE-03)
|