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jakman85andClaude Opus 5 8eb5baffa4
gate / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1m38s
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feat(sec): constrain the conformance CI trigger at admission (R-SEC-02)
Implements the credential model the operator chose for wiring L2/L3 into CI: a narrow
trigger SA bounded by a fail-closed Kyverno admission policy, rather than the
zero-credential GitOps-native alternative (plan section 4, primary model).

THE ESCALATION THIS CLOSES. Kubernetes places NO `use` check on a Job's
serviceAccountName. Any principal that can `create jobs` in ns conformance can create a Job
running as conformance-runner -- nodes/patch, pods/exec, namespaces/patch -- with an
arbitrary command. A CI token with plain `create jobs` IS that privileged identity no matter
how narrow its own Role looks. RBAC cannot fix this; only constraining the SHAPE of what the
trigger may create can.

Adds:
  * SA/Role/RoleBinding conformance-trigger -- create+get+list+watch jobs, get pods and
    pods/log, nothing else. Namespaced. No delete (a trigger that can delete can hide a
    failed run), no exec, no secrets. Results come back as a tarball on stdout read via
    pods/log, so no execution channel into the runner pod is ever granted.
  * ClusterPolicy conformance-trigger-job-shape -- Enforce, failurePolicy: Fail. It does NOT
    use ${KYVERNO_VALIDATION_ACTION}: a security boundary an overlay can downgrade to Audit
    is not a boundary. It constrains ONLY conformance-trigger, so a mistake here cannot wedge
    the rest of the cluster.
  * Flux Kustomization `conformance` -> ./conformance/incluster, wait:false and non-gating
    like apps-vms, so a test identity can never stall the platform or app tiers.
  * A kyverno test with seven cases, six of them real escalation paths.

VERIFIED by `kyverno apply` (pass: 10, fail: 6, error: 0), not assumed:
  evil-command    DENIED at /spec/template/spec/containers/0/command/   <- THE attack
  evil-image      DENIED at .../image/
  tag-not-digest  DENIED at .../image/          (mutable tag is republishable)
  host-namespaces DENIED at /spec/template/spec/hostPID/
  extra-volume    DENIED by the volumes foreach
  injected-args   DENIED by the args foreach
  good-run        ADMITTED

ALSO FIXES A FAIL-OPEN IN THE GATE ITSELF. `kyverno test` does NOT fail when a policy cannot
LOAD: every row becomes "Skip / Invalid Policy" and it still prints "N tests passed" and
exits 0. Measured while writing this policy -- a schema error (subjects in a separate
match.all entry from resources) produced exactly that, and ci/l0.sh would have certified a
security policy that does not load as green. This is not specific to this policy: a typo in
restrict-host-namespaces or secret-provenance would silently disable it with the gate still
green. ci/l0.sh now scans for "Invalid Policy" and fails. Proven: broken policy -> l0 rc=1,
restored -> rc=0.

IMAGE PINNING, HONEST LIMIT: the plan specifies pinning the exact runner image digest. That
image does not exist yet, so this enforces the enforceable half -- the image must be under
the conformance repository path AND digest-pinned, never a mutable tag. Residual surface:
anyone who can PUSH to that path could publish a different digest. Tighten to the literal
digest when the image is built; it is a one-line change to the pattern, reviewed in a PR,
which is where a change to a security boundary belongs.

NOT YET WIRED, deliberately: no runner image, no trigger kubeconfig, no CLUSTER_AVAILABLE.
The identities here are inert until those exist, and PR #12 makes CLUSTER_AVAILABLE=true
block rather than fake a green in the meantime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 03:22:41 -05:00

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YAML

# Reconciled by clusters/base/conformance.yaml (non-gating, wait:false).
#
# RBAC ONLY. chainsaw-job.yaml is deliberately NOT listed: that manifest is a TEMPLATE the CI
# trigger renders and submits per run (with the commit SHA and the touched --requirements). Flux
# reconciling it would create a permanent Job object and fight the trigger for ownership.
#
# The identities here are inert without
# platform/kyverno/admission/conformance-trigger-job-shape.yaml, which is what actually bounds
# the trigger to the committed run shape. RBAC is the necessary half, that policy the sufficient
# half — see the header of rbac.yaml.
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- rbac.yaml